Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
- Original Message - From: "Jim Devine" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] -Nathan wrote: ... when a people democratically support atrocities by their -government, it is not just the leadership that bears responsibility but -the people themselves. this sounds as if you are advocating the strategic bombing of the US, Nathan. After all, we voted Bill "mad bomber" Clinton into office. Actually, as I've said before, I think many forms of terrorism are justified, including some that has been aimed at the US and its citizens. The idea that only military targets are allowed in warfare is actually most convenient for those with overwhelming military force and well-protected civilian populations - ie. the US. As Ken notes, of course such responsibility is complicated, but then it is complicated whether an 18-year old draftee deserves to die in any war. And it is complicated because in any democratic situation, there are many people who oppose the policy of the state, even if they lack the majoriity power to block those actions. Contra many folks, though, I think the US's collective guilt has far less to do with its particular military actions, some of which like Kosovo and Haiti I can defend, but in its collective enforcement of a global economic system that starves millions of people each years throughout the world, while denying needed medicine to millions more. -- Nathan Newman
Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
En relación a [PEN-L:2914] Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile, el 10 Oct 00, a las 0:36, Nathan Newman dijo: Contra many folks, though, I think the US's collective guilt has far less to do with its particular military actions, some of which like Kosovo and Haiti I can defend, but in its collective enforcement of a global economic system that starves millions of people each years throughout the world, while denying needed medicine to millions more. A pity you do not see that this economic order depends on the permanent exercise of military force, PARTICULARLY those deployed on apparently or falsely "humanitarian" reasons, such as is the case in Haiti or Kossovo. It seems to be a constant with Anglo politics that they will always kill you or rob you on the basis of some "principle", as the Irishman George Bernard Shaw once pointed out... Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
It seems to be a constant with Anglo politics that they will always kill you or rob you on the basis of some "principle", as the Irishman George Bernard Shaw once pointed out... And this is worse than robbing or killing you on the basis of no principle? --jks
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It seems to be a constant with Anglo politics that they will always kill you or rob you on the basis of some "principle", as the Irishman George Bernard Shaw once pointed out... And this is worse than robbing or killing you on the basis of no principle? --jks Actually, yes. The amount of such random violence in the world is rather small in comparison to the massacres in the name of principle. And in the United States *all* the really serious violence (domestically and in U.S. foreign policy) is highly principled. The War on Crime certainly does more physical and moral damage than crime does. Carrol
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
Néstor wrote:
It seems to be a constant with Anglo politics that
they will always kill you or rob you on the basis of some
"principle", as the Irishman George Bernard Shaw once pointed out...
JKS wrote:
And this is worse than robbing or killing you on the basis of no
principle? --jks
Carrol wrote:
Actually, yes. The amount of such random violence in the world is rather
small in
comparison to the massacres in the name of principle. And in the United
States *all*
the really serious violence (domestically and in U.S. foreign policy) is
highly
principled. The War on Crime certainly does more physical and moral damage
than crime
does.
I think that Justin was asking about the principle, not the magnitude. As
far as the former is concerned, I think it doesn't matter whether a killing
is done based on principle or no principle, except that principle-based
killings ("in the name of human rights," etc.) have the additional
component of hypocrisy. In the end, what really matters is practice, what's
really done, not intention. (We're not talking about _accidental_ killings
here.)
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: RE: Re: Yugoslavia again
In a message dated 10/8/00 6:01:36 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Then we shouldn't be sorry to see the nationalist thugs at the CIA, DOD, NSA etc go too.Once we figure out how to get rid of them of course Surely we will not. Though they mostly aren't nationalist in the way that Slobo was and is. Maybe some at the DoD are. Btw, Ian, got that book you referred me to; it looks good, thanks. --jks
Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
I was away for a couple of days, so I'm behind and I'm confused. I thought Yeltsin used state power to bomb the Duma, and Pinochet used the army to overthrow Allende. I could swear the special bodies of Serb armed men essentially laid down their arms and gave in to the throngs in the streets. Am I just a dupe of the NYT? Doug One can also raise the question of what kind of brutal dictator Milosevic is, who permitted the USA and other imperialist powers to spend more money on the opposition parties than any other government would permit. One can also raise the question of what kind of brutal dictator Milosevic is when his cops and army never laid a finger on any protestor. If the United States kept to the same high standards of Yugoslavia, then Ralph Nader never would have been excluded from sitting in the audience of a debate that he by rights should have been participating in. If the United States kept to the same high standards of Yugoslavia, not a single demonstrator would have been beaten or gassed in Seattle or Philadelphia. Louis Proyect The Marxism mailing-list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
Actually, I agree that Milosevic was not so undemocratic compared to many other regimes. He was a brutal murderer who promoted the use of rape as a weapon and ethnic clensing as policy. But the fact that he was able to do so reflects not just his personal qualities but a rough reflection of the Serbian democratic will, an unfortunate reflection on that population. And that is one reason I could support the Kosovo intervention and war with Serbia, precisely because there was collective responsibility by Serbians for the crimes in Kosovo - collective responsibility in the sense that all democratic systems share for their government's policy. It is a great thing that a large share of the population has decided to repudiate that past policy. We will see if it translates into a more just settlement for the populations of Bosnia and Kosovo. -- Nathan Newman Interesting. The Goldhagen thesis adapted to Yugoslavia. Louis Proyect The Marxism mailing-list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
- Original Message - From: "Louis Proyect" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] But the fact that he was able to do so reflects not just his personal qualities but a rough reflection of the Serbian democratic will, an unfortunate reflection on that population. And that is one reason I could support the Kosovo intervention and war with Serbia, precisely because there was collective responsibility by Serbians for the crimes in Kosovo - collective responsibility in the sense that all democratic systems share for their government's policy. -Interesting. The Goldhagen thesis adapted to Yugoslavia. Short memory. I did that a while ago. But the idea that people might have some responsibility for the actions of their government is hardly some bizarro way-out idea. It's a basic tenet of any democratic theory. And when a people democratically support atrocities by their government, it is not just the leadership that bears responsibility but the people themselves. Some people have noted that Milsoevic was partly rejected in this election because the population wanted to escape the sanctions that the US and Europe have imposed. That result is exactly the point of imposing the sanctions. And they made sense only because we had some expectation that popular pressure could force Milosevic out. Compare this to the sanctions against Iraq, which amount to the murder of innocents, since the Iraqi people have so little democratic power, it is hard to hold them responsible for Hussein's government's actions, and they have little power to oust him. -- Nathan Newman
Re: Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile
So is there some age limit on this "responsibility"? Are ten year old's guilt=free? Are those suffering Alzheimers' excluded? Are those who voiced opposition or even disapproved in thought OK? Aren't Americans going to need a humungous throng of shrinks to help Americans deal with their collective guilt? Cheers, Ken Hanly - Original Message - From: Nathan Newman [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, October 09, 2000 4:06 PM Subject: [PEN-L:2895] Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia to fSU and Chile - Original Message - From: "Louis Proyect" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] But the fact that he was able to do so reflects not just his personal qualities but a rough reflection of the Serbian democratic will, an unfortunate reflection on that population. And that is one reason I could support the Kosovo intervention and war with Serbia, precisely because there was collective responsibility by Serbians for the crimes in Kosovo - collective responsibility in the sense that all democratic systems share for their government's policy. -Interesting. The Goldhagen thesis adapted to Yugoslavia. Short memory. I did that a while ago. But the idea that people might have some responsibility for the actions of their government is hardly some bizarro way-out idea. It's a basic tenet of any democratic theory. And when a people democratically support atrocities by their government, it is not just the leadership that bears responsibility but the people themselves. Some people have noted that Milsoevic was partly rejected in this election because the population wanted to escape the sanctions that the US and Europe have imposed. That result is exactly the point of imposing the sanctions. And they made sense only because we had some expectation that popular pressure could force Milosevic out. Compare this to the sanctions against Iraq, which amount to the murder of innocents, since the Iraqi people have so little democratic power, it is hard to hold them responsible for Hussein's government's actions, and they have little power to oust him. -- Nathan Newman
RE: Re: Yugoslavia again
I'm sorry to see Milosevich go. In God's name, why? Don't *ever* be sorry to see nationalist thugs go. Were you sorry to see Tudjman go? Were you sorry to see Mobutu go? Were you sorry to see Galtieri go? Brad DeLong == Then we shouldn't be sorry to see the nationalist thugs at the CIA, DOD, NSA etc go too.Once we figure out how to get rid of them of course Ian
Re: Re: Yugoslavia
Michael, I am sure there are. But what is the relevance in this case? Paul Date sent: Fri, 06 Oct 2000 18:22:42 -0700 From: Michael Perelman [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:[PEN-L:2747] Re: Yugoslavia To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Paul, aren't there other examples about the US defending figure head presidents vs. strong legislatures when it suited them? [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Meanwhile, as Ken Hanly has posted, his party retains an absolute majority in the legislature -- democratically elected -- and, it is noted, Kostinica has no legislative power since the office of president is largely ceremonial/ figurehead head of state. i.e. Milosevic exerted power through political rather than executive or legislative influence, power he retains through his influence on the governing party, not on his elected office. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia
I can't recall the case, but someone will remember. A compliant president was elected who wanted to go against the parliament, but the US demanded that the authority be given to the president. I suspect that the same will happen in Yugoslavia. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Michael, I am sure there are. But what is the relevance in this case? Paul -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia
En relación a [PEN-L:2748] Re: Re: Yugoslavia, el 6 Oct 00, a las 20:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] dijo: Michael: Paul, aren't there other examples about the US defending figure head presidents vs. strong legislatures when it suited them? Paul: Michael, I am sure there are. But what is the relevance in this case? Néstor: The relevance lies in that they will now campaign to bribe and threaten the Parliament, and even attempt a coup if they can manage to find a traitor at the High Military Command. A constitutional reform would also be interesting... Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia
I mistakenly erased Louis response to my post and his summary of Estrin's position in his 1991article. I essentially agree with a lot of what Estrin says, in particular about the failure to develop an effective capital market. But that was the point of my arguement that the 1975 move to self-financing by captive banks was one of the things that caused the eventual crisis (for reasons I haven't the time to go into at the moment) and which also exacerbated the problem of growing inequality. It also made the problem of starting new firms almost impossible because the source of capital was capitive to the existing enterprises. This in turn led to overinvestment in existing firms and overhiring leading to economic difficulties of weaker, non-competitive firms, municipal (largely) bailouts and further problems that Estrin details. The point I was making is that it was the move away from market socialism to contractual (monopoly) self-management that made the problem worse and unsolvable. But whatever, I don't see how this provides any evidence for Louis' bald statement that this proves the non-viability of market socialism. It is the same as saying that the collapse of the Soviet Union is proof in the non-viability of central planning and/or the non- viability of socialism. Paul Phillips, Economics, University of Manitoba
Re: Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia
But whatever, I don't see how this provides any evidence for Louis' bald statement that this proves the non-viability of market socialism. It is the same as saying that the collapse of the Soviet Union is proof in the non-viability of central planning and/or the non- viability of socialism. Paul Phillips, Economics, University of Manitoba I'm sorry. I was a little bit rushed when I posted the Estrin recap, so I couldn't really flesh out my admittedly reductionist conclusion. What I meant to say is that market socialism collapsed in Yugoslavia for extrinsic rather than intrinsic causes. That is to say, Yugoslavia was subjected to market capitalist forces from outside her border that effectively undermined the market socialist experiment within. The problem is that despite the best of intentions there is a dialectical relationship between the two types of market. What gives a market socialist economy a certain kind of elan in its early stages is exactly what will destroy it in the long run. For instance, there is little doubt that access to Western bank credits provided a lift-off to China in the 1980s. However, in the process of integrating with international funding institutions both private and public China is creating a new set of relationships that will weaken her economy. It seems unlikely that Yugoslavia would have enjoyed the kind of success she had in the 1960s without the ties to the West. By the same token, it was these ties that eventually destroyed the economy. That is the reason I continue to be pleasantly surprised by Cuba's survival as a socialist nation. It is a demonstration that a socialist economy can interact with the capitalist world and not be swamped. Louis Proyect The Marxism mailing-list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia
Louis, By and large I agree with you except that I think, had it not been for the ethnic nationalisms and an emasculated central government, reforms and economic policies could have been put in place to weather the external storm, just as (so far) Cuba has done. Paul Phillips, Economics, University of Manitoba. Date sent: Tue, 18 Jul 2000 13:37:31 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Louis Proyect [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:[PEN-L:21957] Re: Re: Re: Re: Yugoslavia Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] But whatever, I don't see how this provides any evidence for Louis' bald statement that this proves the non-viability of market socialism. It is the same as saying that the collapse of the Soviet Union is proof in the non-viability of central planning and/or the non- viability of socialism. Paul Phillips, Economics, University of Manitoba I'm sorry. I was a little bit rushed when I posted the Estrin recap, so I couldn't really flesh out my admittedly reductionist conclusion. What I meant to say is that market socialism collapsed in Yugoslavia for extrinsic rather than intrinsic causes. That is to say, Yugoslavia was subjected to market capitalist forces from outside her border that effectively undermined the market socialist experiment within. The problem is that despite the best of intentions there is a dialectical relationship between the two types of market. What gives a market socialist economy a certain kind of elan in its early stages is exactly what will destroy it in the long run. For instance, there is little doubt that access to Western bank credits provided a lift-off to China in the 1980s. However, in the process of integrating with international funding institutions both private and public China is creating a new set of relationships that will weaken her economy. It seems unlikely that Yugoslavia would have enjoyed the kind of success she had in the 1960s without the ties to the West. By the same token, it was these ties that eventually destroyed the economy. That is the reason I continue to be pleasantly surprised by Cuba's survival as a socialist nation. It is a demonstration that a socialist economy can interact with the capitalist world and not be swamped. Louis Proyect The Marxism mailing-list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Re: Yugoslavia
Paul, thanks for the very informative post. At 04:10 PM 7/17/00 -0500, you wrote: Jim, in the case of Slovenia at least, unemployment did not rise during the crisis as it remained around 2 per cent though this was in part due to overemployment by enterprises. right. Also, wasn't a lot of the unemployment "exported" to the north? Contrary to the prevailing neoclassical orthodoxy (Ward-Vanek) workers were overly protective of fellow workers leading to considerable hidden redundancy which didn't come to the surface until after austerity and abandonment of socialist self- management at the end of the 80's. I think it was Domar who pointed out the obvious -- that a co-op wouldn't fire its own members. That's why I use phrases like "fraternity-like exclusivity." Frats don't expel their members (except for really extreme behavior) while being reluctant to increase membership by a fixed amount each year. In the case of a co-op, there's much less turnover (no "graduation") so that the problem of exclusivity can easily become intensified. As a result unemployment increased markedly in the early 90s after the breakup and the loss of the domestic market. However, in Slovenia it only rose to just over 9 per cent (9.1% in 1993-94) which was the peak. (It has since fallen to around 7.5%) In general, I would argue that self-management put a damper on regional tensions as opposed to the political, cultural and religious ationalisms that took advantage of the economic crisis arising out of other factors. Don't you think that self-managed firms tended to be monolithically Serbian, Croatian, or whatever? That's very common with self-selecting organizations. This can prevent communication between ethnic groups that could counteract the nationalistic demagogues... Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Re: Yugoslavia
Jim, in the case of Slovenia at least, unemployment did not rise during the crisis as it remained around 2 per cent though this was in part due to overemployment by enterprises. Contrary to the prevailing neoclassical orthodoxy (Ward-Vanek) workers were overly protective of fellow workers leading to considerable hidden redundancy which didnt come to the surface until after austerity and abandonment of socialist self- management at the end of the 80's. As a result unemployment increased markedly in the early 90s after the breakup and the loss of the domestic market. However, in Slovenia it only rose to just over 9 per cent (9.1% in 1993-94) which was the peak. (It has since fallen to around 7.5%) In general, I would argue that self-management put a damper on regional tensions as opposed to the political, cultural and religious nationalisms that took advantage of the economic crisis arising out of other factors. That will have to be all for now. Paul Phillips, Economics, University of Manitoba I read an interesting paper today by Saul Estrin titled "Yugoslavia: The case of self-managing Market Socialism" that appeared originally in the Autumn, 1991 Journal of Economic Perspectives. Basically he tells the tale of a society impaled on the horns of a dilemma. It was committed to egalitarian goals, but its market based economy and insertion into the global economy based on export of manufactured goods militated against those goals. After 1974 there was a retreat from the more pronounced market experiments of the 1960s. Estrin leaves no doubt that this was driven by the need for the government to retain some credibility with the working class which was beginning to resent growing unemployment and wage differentials. Estrin, no leftist, feels that this undermined the success of a true market socialism, with the emphasis on market. He is correct. Like Brus, the Polish economist, he understands that without a free market in labor and capital investment, it is difficult to achieve the "efficiency" of the West. One of the curious consequences of the 1974-1988 turn was the institution of further divisions within a workplace in order to make self-management even more rigorous than was the case on a plant level. Each plant was broken down into workshops which were run as mini-firms, with their own goals and incentives. Needless to say, this was not the answer to Yugoslavia's problems. Even though the economy continued to perform well through the late 1970s, growth effectively stopped after 1979 when Western banks made lending requirements more stringent. Estrin feels that the solution to this impasse was making the economy leaner and meaner so that an export-oriented model could succeed on conventional terms. Of course, manyYugoslavian workers did not fight against Nazism in order to create such a society. Those in a more favorable position oriented toward the west and hastening of capitalist "reforms" while the less well-off stuck to some kind of socialist program. These were the people who voted for Milosevic and got the shit kicked out of them by Nato's bombers. Estrin points out that even from the beginning Yugoslavia failed to create an effective capital market. Funds were invested by state banks not on the basis of expected profit, but perceived social need. Obviously this explains the decision to invest in Kosovo early on. Even in the case where there were large wage-differentials, Yugoslavia was never able to facilitate the creation of new firms with a new work force. All new enterprises of any size had to be socially owned. Hence those funky old Yugos rather than dot.coms. As Estrin states, "In practice, the Yugoslavs subsidized loss-makers to maintain jobs. This was usually done at the local level by the commerical banks which were controlled by enterprises and local authorities. The scale of subsidies was therefore reflected more in balance sheets of the banks than the public sector deficit. Even in the 1970s, some ten percent of the labor force was employed in loss-making firms; this profitability was calculated on the basis of low or zero capital costs and the proportion has risen dramatically in the 1980s." Of course, Estrin's article was written before the implosion of Yugoslavia which was caused by the "white flight" retreat of the more prosperous republics away from this kind of paternalistic but economically unfeasible setup. Market socialism didn't work. Market capitalism does, for what its worth. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org/
Re: Re: Yugoslavia
Debt Trap. Monthly Review Press, I think. Michael, What is the reference for that? Thanks, Steve On Sun, 16 Jul 2000, Michael Perelman wrote: Paul, what do you think of Cheryl Payer's analysis of Yugo.? She says that the US encouraged self-management to split Yugo. from the USSR. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Yugoslavia
I am working by memory, but her work said that the U.S. encouraged Yugoslavia to follow through with a self-management as a means of further differentiating itself from the Soviet Union, worried that the two countries might develop a rapprochement. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Michael, This is the first I have ever heard of this suggestion. It sounds highly improbable to me. According to all my Yugo sources, the decision was taken in 1950 largely at the suggestion/urging of Edvard Kardelj, who was a close associate of Tito's. It was a response to the failure of central planning in such a decentralized and ethnically diverse nation and to the negative response to the rise of the bureaucracy. In any case, it came after the split from the Soviet Union in 1948 so the chronology doesn't make sense of Payer's analysis. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
