Re: [tor-bugs] #25672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Debugger in developer tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25672: Debugger in developer tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 sysrqb]:
 > Hmm, here's another one.
 >
 > {{{
 > [04-11 00:10:07] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/7.5.3/torbrowser-install-7.5
 .3_en-US.exe via
 >--unknown--:71e69d27f4adff41fb754a6dc960dfeb
 > [04-11 00:10:07] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 NEW 0
 www.torproject.org:443 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:46916 PURPOSE=USER
 > [04-11 00:10:07] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60
 SENTCONNECT 36 www.torproject.org:443
 > [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 REMAP 36
 138.201.14.197:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 > [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 SUCCEEDED
 36 138.201.14.197:443
 > [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/7.5.3/torbrowser-install-7.5.3_en-
 US.exe via
 >--unknown--:71e69d27f4adff41fb754a6dc960dfeb
 > [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 NEW 0
 dist.torproject.org:443 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:46918 PURPOSE=USER
 > [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61
 SENTCONNECT 36 dist.torproject.org:443
 > [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 REMAP 36
 38.229.72.17:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 > [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 SUCCEEDED
 36 38.229.72.17:443
 > }}}
 > ,
 > If you go to any webpage and right-click on any link (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25672#comment:5>
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Re: [tor-bugs] #24919 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox still prompts for enabling Sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24919: Orfox still prompts for enabling Sync
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5709 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I wonder if https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/109cd0a34ffe helps
 here as well? If not I guess adding to that patch to fix the remaining
 mobile bits is the way to go.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25763 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Design a .onion icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25763: Design a .onion icon
-+--
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  < antonela >
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [ticket:25763 antonela]:
 > We should support a way to identify v1, v2, and v3 onion services.

 A small mercy: v1 onion services disappeared long long ago. So now there
 are only "legacy" (v2) and "new" (v3).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25751 [Webpages/Website]: Add Rose Foundation to our Sponsors page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25751: Add Rose Foundation to our Sponsors page
--+-
 Reporter:  t0mmy |  Owner:  arma, hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 Whoops!

 Thanks both!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25755 [Community/Outreach]: Choose name for new mailing list tor-lang-es (was: Create mailing list tor-lang-es)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25755: Choose name for new mailing list tor-lang-es
+
 Reporter:  ilv |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  qbi => alison
 * component:  Internal Services/Service - lists => Community/Outreach


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 ilv]:
 > I'd like to give some time to discuss the possible name with whomever is
 interested.

 Sounds great. In that case I'm moving this ticket out of the "please make
 this mailing list" component, so poor qbi doesn't go mad trying to figure
 out which tickets are asking for a list and which tickets aren't yet
 asking for a list. :)

 > tor-lang-es
 > tor-spanish (this way we'd avoid possible conflicts for future lists
 such as tor-pt)

 Out of these two, I would pick the first one. Calling it "spanish" is just
 asking for people to get offended that you didn't want to use their own
 language's word for the language. :)

 Speaking of language-specific names: what is the intended scope of the
 list? Is it for users? Developers? Journalists? Every possible thing in
 one list so long as the people want to write in español? I ask because if
 it's a general talk list, another option could be tor-talk-es. That name
 might have some baggage because of how many Internet cranks we have
 attracted to tor-talk (which in a sense served its purpose, to keep them
 away from the other more productive lists). But if you have people trying
 to propose bugfixes in español, and users trying to ask usage questions in
 español, and people discussing Facebook's privacy policies in español, all
 on this one list, did you succeed or fail?

 > tor-espanol (this could be easier to understand for locals)

 My only concern here would be what happens when we want to create a tor-
 فارسی list, and whether email tools et al could handle such a thing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25773 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Speculative Connect and Download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25773: Disable Speculative Connect and Download
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I should also mention that because this download occurs speculatively, it
 is not bound to/associated with a firstPartyURI, so if the server requires
 a cookie (or the same originating-ip-address, or some other auth) obtained
 from another context/tab/domain-isolation, then this download will fail in
 a confusing way for the user.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25773 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Speculative Connect and Download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25773: Disable Speculative Connect and Download
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 For some context:

 {{{
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.262762 UTC - [Main Thread]: V/nsHttp
 nsHttpConnectionMgr::SpeculativeConnect [ci=.S.P...www.torproject.org:443
 (socks:127.0.0.1:9150)[--unknown--:3'?^ML^Y[ET^T'֯5^YM^G(sI
 <9D>4]^privateBrowsingId=1]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.262841 UTC - [Main Thread]: D/nsHttp
 NulHttpTransaction::NullHttpTransaction() mActivityDistributor is active
 [this=7c2ddc744880, www.torproject.org]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263023 UTC - [Socket Thread]: V/nsHttp
 nsHttpConnectionMgr::OnMsgSpeculativeConnect
 [ci=.S.P...www.torproject.org:443
 (socks:127.0.0.1:9150)[--unknown--:3'?^ML^Y[ET^T'֯5^YM^G(
 sI<9D>4]^privateBrowsingId=1]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263036 UTC - [Socket Thread]: V/nsHttp Init
 nsHttpConnectionInfo @7c2ddb5bf2c0
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263088 UTC - [Socket Thread]: V/nsHttp
 nsHttpConnectionMgr::AtActiveConnectionLimit
 [ci=.S.P...www.torproject.org:443
 (socks:127.0.0.1:9150)[--unknown--:3'?^ML^Y[ET^T'֯5^YM^G(
 sI<9D>4]^privateBrowsingId=1 caps=401]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263120 UTC - [Socket Thread]: V/nsHttp Creating
 nsHalfOpenSocket [this=7c2ddcb5bb60 trans=7c2ddc744880
 ent=www.torproject.org key=.S.P...www.torproject.org:443
 
(socks:127.0.0.1:9150)[--unknown--:3'?^ML^Y[ET^T'֯5^YM^G(sI<9D>4]^privateBrowsingId=1]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263138 UTC - [Socket Thread]: V/nsHttp
 nsHalfOpenSocket::SetupStreams [this=7c2ddcb5bb60
 ent=.S.P...www.torproject.org:443
 (socks:127.0.0.1:9150)[--unknown--:3'?^ML^Y[ET^T'֯5^Y
 M^G(sI<9D>4]^privateBrowsingId=1] setup routed
 transport to origin www.torproject.org:443 via :443
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263150 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 creating nsSocketTransport @7c2ddd26c000
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263162 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::Init [this=7c2ddd26c000 host=www.torproject.org:443
 origin=www.torproject.org:443 proxy=127.0.0.1:9150]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263184 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 Reset callbacks for secinfo=0 callbacks=7c2df4593dc0
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263196 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::OpenOutputStream [this=7c2ddd26c000 flags=2]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263206 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::PostEvent [this=7c2ddd26c000 type=0 status=0 param=0]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263219 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport STS
 dispatch [7c2df4593ee0]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263236 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 OnDispatchedEvent Same Thread Skip Signal
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263246 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::OpenInputStream [this=7c2ddd26c000 flags=2]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263252 UTC - [Main Thread]: D/nsHttp
 nsHttpChannel::OnCacheEntryAvailable [this=7c2ddc0c1800 entry=7c2ddc60aaa0
 new=1 appcache=0 status=0 mAppCache=0 mAppCacheForWrite=0]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263256 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::PostEvent [this=7c2ddd26c000 type=0 status=0 param=0]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263311 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport STS
 dispatch [7c2df4593f70]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263291 UTC - [Main Thread]: D/nsHttp
 nsHttpChannel::SetupTransaction [this=7c2ddc0c1800]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263325 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 OnDispatchedEvent Same Thread Skip Signal
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263360 UTC - [Main Thread]: D/nsHttp Creating
 nsHttpTransaction @7c2ddd26c400
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263397 UTC - [Main Thread]: D/nsHttp nsHttpChannel
 7c2ddc0c1800 created nsHttpTransaction 7c2ddd26c400
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263377 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketOutputStream::AsyncWait [this=7c2ddd26c288]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263563 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 OnDispatchedEvent Same Thread Skip Signal
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263577 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::OnSocketEvent [this=7c2ddd26c000 type=0 status=0
 param=0]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263586 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 MSG_ENSURE_CONNECT
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263636 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::ResolveHost [this=7c2ddd26c000 www.torproject.org:443]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263647 UTC - [Socket Thread]: D/nsSocketTransport
 nsSocketTransport::PostEvent [this=7c2ddd26c000 type=1 status=0 param=0]
 2018-04-11 02:11:26.263658 UTC - [Socket 

Re: [tor-bugs] #25772 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Require a minimum partial fingerprint prefix on consensus health

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25772: Require a minimum partial fingerprint prefix on consensus health
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Gosh no, why complicate things?

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[tor-bugs] #25773 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Speculative Connect and Download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25773: Disable Speculative Connect and Download
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 As a follow up to #25770, it turns out Tor Browser actually begins (and
 sometimes completes) the download before the user can confirm they
 actually want the-thing. This manifests in #7449 and #11254 as the file
 being downloaded in /tmp (on Unix, or similar on other platforms) and then
 it is moved into the correct directory.

 This provides an obvious performance improvement, especially for our use
 case. Unfortunately, this download begins before the user is even given
 the "where do you want this file saved" prompt, and I'm worried subtly
 downloading a file in the background is dangerous is some context,
 particularly some of our users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25755 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Create mailing list tor-lang-es

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25755: Create mailing list tor-lang-es
---+-
 Reporter:  ilv|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by ilv):

 Thanks for the tip arma. Before providing the answers I'd like to give
 some time to discuss the possible name with whomever is interested. The
 name tor-lang-es could be accurate but could also be a terrible name. I
 have some suggestions:

 tor-lang-es
 tor-spanish (this way we'd avoid possible conflicts for future lists such
 as tor-pt)
 tor-espanol (this could be easier to understand for locals)

 It will be good to hear opinions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25772 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Require a minimum partial fingerprint prefix on consensus health

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25772: Require a minimum partial fingerprint prefix on consensus health
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by tom):

 There's no real additional load on the server; but if you still want it to
 avoid typos I can...

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[tor-bugs] #25772 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Require a minimum partial fingerprint prefix on consensus health

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25772: Require a minimum partial fingerprint prefix on consensus health
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I can load all the relays with fingerprints starting with "B".

 Does this cause too much load on the server?
 If it does, please impose a minimum of 2 or 4 fingerprint characters.

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[tor-bugs] #25771 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Make the consensus health individual relay load trigger on enter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25771: Make the consensus health individual relay load trigger on enter
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Usually, when I want to submit a form after typing in a field, I can just
 type enter. But this doesn't work on the consensus health individual relay
 load text box.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Debugger in developer tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit (was: Debugger in delevoper tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25672: Debugger in developer tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 (I noticed the typo when I received the email.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Debugger in delevoper tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25672: Debugger in delevoper tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I should also mention
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15599#comment:9 is another
 instance of this. I noticed this in my logs, too. An OCSP fetch should
 happen over the domain isolated circuit.

 {{{
 [04-11 00:04:30] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS: https://twitter.com/search-
 advanced via
--unknown--:71e69d27f4adff41fb754a6dc960dfeb
 [04-11 00:04:30] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 51 NEW 0
 twitter.com:443 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:46898 PURPOSE=USER
 [04-11 00:04:30] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 51 SENTCONNECT
 36 twitter.com:443
 [04-11 00:04:30] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 51 REMAP 36
 104.244.42.65:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 [04-11 00:04:30] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 51 SUCCEEDED 36
 104.244.42.65:443
 [04-11 00:04:31] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS: http://ocsp.digicert.com/ via
--unknown--:71e69d27f4adff41fb754a6dc960dfeb
 [04-11 00:04:31] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 52 NEW 0
 ocsp.digicert.com:80 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:46900 PURPOSE=USER
 [04-11 00:04:31] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 52 SENTCONNECT
 36 ocsp.digicert.com:80
 [04-11 00:04:31] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 52 REMAP 36
 93.184.220.29:80 SOURCE=EXIT
 [04-11 00:04:31] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 52 SUCCEEDED 36
 93.184.220.29:80
 [04-11 00:06:26] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 52 CLOSED 36
 93.184.220.29:80 REASON=DONE
 [04-11 00:06:27] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 51 CLOSED 36
 104.244.42.65:443 REASON=DONE
 }}}

 Considering how often it seems this occurs, I'm guessing plumbing the
 first party URI through the layers is more complicated than expected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 New patch: `b25511-003.patch`.

 I also mocked `tor_gettimeofday()` here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * Attachment "b25511-003.patch" added.

 Patch (Revision 3)

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[tor-bugs] #25770 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Connection established before External App Blocker prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25770: Connection established before External App Blocker prompt
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This will likely require a Firefox patch, but it seems like Firefox pre-
 emptively establishes a connection with the server before the user is
 prompted about downloading a file. This isn't obvious.

 In addition to
 [[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25672#comment:2 | #25672
 comment 2]] I see:

 {{{
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/7.5.3/torbrowser-install-7.5.3_en-
 US.exe via
--unknown--:71e69d27f4adff41fb754a6dc960dfeb
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 NEW 0
 dist.torproject.org:443 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:46918 PURPOSE=USER
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 SENTCONNECT
 36 dist.torproject.org:443
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 REMAP 36
 38.229.72.17:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 SUCCEEDED 36
 38.229.72.17:443
 [04-11 00:10:09] Torbutton INFO: Component Load 0: New ExternalAppBlocker.
 [04-11 00:10:13] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 CLOSED 36
 138.201.14.197:443 REASON=DONE
 [04-11 00:10:21] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 CLOSED 36
 38.229.72.17:443 REASON=CONNRESET
 }}}

 The CONNRESET is when I click Cancel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-34, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 I think this should go in 0.3.3 since it restores behavior that #13837
 disabled. I rebased it on to maint-0.3.3 in mikeperry/bug24989_033

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Debugger in delevoper tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25672: Debugger in delevoper tools is fetching website over catch-all circuit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Hmm, here's another one.

 {{{
 [04-11 00:10:07] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/7.5.3/torbrowser-install-7.5
 .3_en-US.exe via
--unknown--:71e69d27f4adff41fb754a6dc960dfeb
 [04-11 00:10:07] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 NEW 0
 www.torproject.org:443 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:46916 PURPOSE=USER
 [04-11 00:10:07] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 SENTCONNECT
 36 www.torproject.org:443
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 REMAP 36
 138.201.14.197:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 60 SUCCEEDED 36
 138.201.14.197:443
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/7.5.3/torbrowser-install-7.5.3_en-
 US.exe via
--unknown--:71e69d27f4adff41fb754a6dc960dfeb
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 NEW 0
 dist.torproject.org:443 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:46918 PURPOSE=USER
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 SENTCONNECT
 36 dist.torproject.org:443
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 REMAP 36
 38.229.72.17:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 [04-11 00:10:08] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 61 SUCCEEDED 36
 38.229.72.17:443
 }}}
 ,
 If you go to any webpage and right-click on any link (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25672#comment:2>
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Re: [tor-bugs] #24734 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the return value of fascist_firewall_choose_address_node()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24734: Remove the return value of fascist_firewall_choose_address_node()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Can someone else please do the next review on this ticket?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17949 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make loopback address search more accurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17949: Make loopback address search more accurate
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-client tor-relay loopback   |  Actual Points:
  weird-configuration|
Parent ID:  #17991   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  medium =>
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 I'm happy to look at this ticket eventually, but I'd like someone else to
 do the initial review here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25769: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at
../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779.
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  relay, 034-must, 033-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 After some discussion on IRC, I'm pretty sure this is a duplicate of
 #25691 and #25692 (both bugs seem to occur in this log).  Cross-linked
 from the other tickets for reference.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in onion_pick_cpath_exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25691: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
onion_pick_cpath_exit
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  regression, 0.3.4-must => regression, 034-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25692 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25692: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must 033-backport regression |  Actual Points:
  chutney 034-included-20180403  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 The 0.3.3 version of this bug seems to be #25769.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in onion_pick_cpath_exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25691: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
onion_pick_cpath_exit
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 0.3.4-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by catalyst):

 This bug seems to be in 0.3.3 as well; see the logs in #25769.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25769: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at
../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779.
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  relay, 034-must, 033-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  relay => relay, 034-must, 033-backport
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 This seems to be the 0.3.3 version of #25692.  The surrounding code is
 very similar; we just seem to have changed the assertion from `info` to
 `info || client` in 0.3.4.  I'm not sure they're identical bugs though.

 The `!(exit_ei == NULL)` assertion seems to be a duplicate of #25691.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24660 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wrap our PRNG interface(s) in Rust with appropriate traits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24660: Wrap our PRNG interface(s) in Rust with appropriate traits
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-crypto, rng, roadmap, 034  |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-master, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 I've made an upstream issue asking about the release/stabilisation of the
 rand_core crate: https://github.com/rust-lang-nursery/rand/issues/386

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25763 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Design a .onion icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25763: Design a .onion icon
-+--
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  < antonela >
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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[tor-bugs] #25769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25769: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at
../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  relay
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Relay on Debian 9:
 {{{
  Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside.
 Excellent.
  tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779:
 onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info failed. (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha
 )
  Bug: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at
 ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2779. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x44) [0x56222d382154] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x56222d39d989] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_establish_circuit+0x3b6) [0x56222d2d21c6]
 (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_launch_by_extend_info+0x7d)
 [0x56222d2e569d] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(consider_testing_reachability+0x1ad)
 [0x56222d2932cd] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_send_next_onion_skin+0x372)
 [0x56222d2d1a82] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x7c391) [0x56222d275391] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_receive_relay_cell+0x31e) [0x56222d27738e]
 (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(command_process_cell+0x170) [0x56222d2e8050] (on
 Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(channel_tls_handle_cell+0x32b) [0x56222d2c84eb] (on
 Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1154d1) [0x56222d30e4d1] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x10bffe) [0x56222d304ffe] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x5371e) [0x56222d24c71e] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x6a0) [0x7f0920af65a0] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x2bc) [0x56222d24d78c] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x275) [0x56222d24ee95] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x56222d2482da] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x56222d248049] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1)
 [0x7f091f3522e1] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a) [0x56222d24809a] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha
 )
  Failed to find node for hop #2 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
  Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable from the outside.
 Excellent. Publishing server descriptor.
  tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2390:
 onion_pick_cpath_exit: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed. (on
 Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
 onion_pick_cpath_exit at ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2390. Stack trace: (on
 Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x44) [0x56222d382154] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x56222d39d989] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_establish_circuit+0xa22) [0x56222d2d2832]
 (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_launch_by_extend_info+0x7d)
 [0x56222d2e569d] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_build_needed_circs+0x3c8) [0x56222d2e5e28]
 (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x53c78) [0x56222d24cc78] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x6a0) [0x7f0920af65a0] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x2bc) [0x56222d24d78c] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x275) [0x56222d24ee95] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x56222d2482da] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x56222d248049] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1)
 [0x7f091f3522e1] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a) [0x56222d24809a] (on Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha
 )
  tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2390:
 onion_pick_cpath_exit: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed. (on
 Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
 onion_pick_cpath_exit at ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2390. Stack trace: (on
 Tor 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x44) [0x56222d382154] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x56222d39d989] (on Tor
 0.3.3.4-alpha )
  Bug: 

Re: [tor-bugs] #24919 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox still prompts for enabling Sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24919: Orfox still prompts for enabling Sync
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5709 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 The current plan, as I understand it, is we disable Sync (at compile-time)
 until we sufficiently audit the implementation and decide it is proxy-
 safe. We'll allow Sync after that time. Sync is already mostly disabled in
 Orfox, but the UI is still confusing so we should improve that - and
 ensure it is actually not available.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25562 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Hacking page with Orfox instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25562: Update Tor Browser Hacking page with Orfox instructions
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Oh, yeah, done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:11 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 catalyst]:
 > > > What output do you get from `ntpq -n -c sysinfo -c peers`?
 > > {{{
 > > associd=0 status=c016 leap_alarm, sync_unspec, 1 event, restart,
 > > system peer:0.0.0.0:0
 > > system peer mode:   unspec
 > > }}}
 > Thanks. I'm pretty sure the above means the ntpd is not synchronized;
 possibly it has just restarted?
 > > {{{
 > > leap indicator: 11
 > > stratum:16
 > > log2 precision: -24
 > > root delay: 0.000
 > > root dispersion:0.045
 > > reference ID:   INIT
 > > reference time: .  Thu, Feb  7 2036  8:28:16.000
 > > system jitter:  0.00
 > > clock jitter:   0.000
 > > clock wander:   0.000
 > > broadcast delay:0.000
 > > symm. auth. delay:  0.000
 > >  remote   refid  st t when poll reach   delay   offset
 jitter
 > >
 ==
 > >  0.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 > >  1.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 > >  2.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 > >  3.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 > >  ntp.ubuntu.com  .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 > > }}}
 > I think the other output is also consistent with the ntpd having just
 restarted.
 >
 > Anyway, as arma commented above, the more likely problem seems to be a
 dirauth having an inaccurate clock.
 Is there anything I should do on my end? manually sync ntpd?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 catalyst]:
 > > What output do you get from `ntpq -n -c sysinfo -c peers`?
 > {{{
 > associd=0 status=c016 leap_alarm, sync_unspec, 1 event, restart,
 > system peer:0.0.0.0:0
 > system peer mode:   unspec
 > }}}
 Thanks. I'm pretty sure the above means the ntpd is not synchronized;
 possibly it has just restarted?
 > {{{
 > leap indicator: 11
 > stratum:16
 > log2 precision: -24
 > root delay: 0.000
 > root dispersion:0.045
 > reference ID:   INIT
 > reference time: .  Thu, Feb  7 2036  8:28:16.000
 > system jitter:  0.00
 > clock jitter:   0.000
 > clock wander:   0.000
 > broadcast delay:0.000
 > symm. auth. delay:  0.000
 >  remote   refid  st t when poll reach   delay   offset
 jitter
 >
 ==
 >  0.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 >  1.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 >  2.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 >  3.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 >  ntp.ubuntu.com  .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
 > }}}
 I think the other output is also consistent with the ntpd having just
 restarted.

 Anyway, as arma commented above, the more likely problem seems to be a
 dirauth having an inaccurate clock.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * Attachment "all logs.zip" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Here are all my logs on the relay.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25638 [Webpages/Website]: Design mocks for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25638: Design mocks for torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--

Comment (by isabela):

 Antonela update from sponsor9 meeting

 Worked with a landing page iteration based on our Rome meeting about
 it. Content + Illos are still placeholder. Feel free to make comments!
 [anto]
 https://marvelapp.com/4471ig9/screen/40451153
 https://marvelapp.com/4471ig9/screen/40451140

 Sent an email this week with the illustrators proposals! I hope we can
 define it soon to move forward [anto]
 https://www.dropbox.com/sh/6i9b2x72ye9eb1t/AACdmUA-
 A5DewxHfT5vYWk3Ma?dl=0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:2 catalyst]:
 > The clock skew tolerance should probably be larger than 61 seconds so
 this might be an actual bug.  I think we could use a little more
 information though.  Is the skew the same amount each time you get that
 warning, or does it change?
 >
 > What output do you get from `ntpq -n -c sysinfo -c peers`?
 associd=0 status=c016 leap_alarm, sync_unspec, 1 event, restart,
 system peer:0.0.0.0:0
 system peer mode:   unspec
 leap indicator: 11
 stratum:16
 log2 precision: -24
 root delay: 0.000
 root dispersion:0.045
 reference ID:   INIT
 reference time: .  Thu, Feb  7 2036  8:28:16.000
 system jitter:  0.00
 clock jitter:   0.000
 clock wander:   0.000
 broadcast delay:0.000
 symm. auth. delay:  0.000
  remote   refid  st t when poll reach   delay   offset
 jitter
 ==
  0.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
  1.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
  2.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
  3.ubuntu.pool.n .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000
  ntp.ubuntu.com  .POOL.  16 p-   6400.0000.000
 0.000

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:30 neel]:
 > I can understand the race condition.
 >
 > Should we do this? If so, how should we mock the `tor_gettimeofday()`?
 In doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md are some instructions about how to make a
 function mockable and how to later mock it in a test.  Right now I think
 `tor_gettimeofday()` isn't mockable, but that should be easily fixed.

 Please let us know if you have additional questions or would like any help
 with this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25637 [Webpages/Website]: sitemap for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25637: sitemap for torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--

Comment (by isabela):

 Added V1 of sitemap to be reviewed on Friday's sponsor9 meeting.

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/25637/torproject.org-sitemap.png

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/25637/torproject.org-sitemap.pdf

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25637 [Webpages/Website]: sitemap for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25637: sitemap for torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by isabela):

 * Attachment "torproject.org-sitemap.png" added.

 torproject-sitemap-v1 PNG

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25637 [Webpages/Website]: sitemap for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25637: sitemap for torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by isabela):

 * Attachment "torproject.org-sitemap.pdf" added.

 torproject-sitemap-v1 PDF

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:7 arma]:
 > * I'm going to file a consensus-health ticket and a doctor ticket

 Done: #25767 and #25768.

 > * I'm going to contact dizum's operator and get him to fix it one more
 time.

 Also done (well, initiated).

 > * I continue to think we should change the relay consensus fetching
 algorithm to wait a little while when it rolls the dice and they come up
 between :55 and :00. Dgoulet says he has a diagram, in his little book, of
 when each role fetches the consensus. We should get that transcribed into
 dir-spec, and then build a plan for this third item.

 Pending on dgoulet to send us the pics.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17949 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make loopback address search more accurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17949: Make loopback address search more accurate
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-client tor-relay loopback   |  Actual Points:
  weird-configuration|
Parent ID:  #17991   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Updated branch: https://github.com/rl1987/tor/commits/feature17949_cont

 I am not sure if Windows part of this is right. Can anyone give it some
 attention? Does `make test` pass on Windows?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge, review-   |  implemented
  group-35   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21765 [Core Tor/Tor]: PortForwardingHelper stdout/stderr log forwarding seems fragile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21765: PortForwardingHelper stdout/stderr log forwarding seems fragile
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  technical-debt,  |  Actual Points:
  031-deferred-20170425, 032-unreached,  |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25409   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This code is getting removed; the ticket is now moot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25409 [Core Tor/Tor]: rip out PortForwarding options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25409: rip out PortForwarding options
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:  technical-debt, 034-triage-20180328  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Rockin'!  Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge, review-   |  Actual Points:
  group-35   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:16 nickm]:
 > Looks okay to me; please add a changes file and I'll merge it?

 Done!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25768 [Core Tor/DocTor]: doctor should check for clock skew on dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25768: doctor should check for clock skew on dir auths
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by arma):

 Also note that I filed nearly the same ticket for consensus-health in
 #25767 -- I wonder if there is some better way to handle overlapping
 functionality in the future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25767 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: consensus-health should check for clock skew on dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25767: consensus-health should check for clock skew on dir auths
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 Also note that I filed nearly the same ticket for doctor in #25768 -- I
 wonder if there is some better way to handle overlapping functionality in
 the future.

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[tor-bugs] #25768 [Core Tor/DocTor]: doctor should check for clock skew on dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25768: doctor should check for clock skew on dir auths
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 In #25756 we discovered that it can actually produce a user-visible
 complaint when dizum has its clock wrong by 65 seconds.

 Specifically, when the combination of skew from the dir auth and from the
 relay doing the fetch sum to more than 60 seconds, then if the relay
 decides to update its consensus at just the right time, the relay will get
 a warn message.

 It would be great if doctor checked the Date: header on dir auth
 responses, and did something smart if it's not right enough.

 Note that the Date header gets chosen when the dir auth begins to respond
 to the request, so if it takes 25 seconds to finish downloading the
 request, you shouldn't decide that the Date was wrong by 25 seconds.

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[tor-bugs] #25767 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: consensus-health should check for clock skew on dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25767: consensus-health should check for clock skew on dir auths
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 In #25756 we discovered that it can actually produce a user-visible
 complaint when dizum has its clock wrong by 65 seconds.

 Specifically, when the combination of skew from the dir auth and from the
 relay doing the fetch sum to more than 60 seconds, then if the relay
 decides to update its consensus at just the right time, the relay will get
 a warn message.

 It would be great if consensus-health checked the {{{Date:}}} header on
 dir auth responses, and did something smart if it's not right enough.

 Note that the Date header gets chosen when the dir auth begins to respond
 to the request, so if it takes 25 seconds to finish downloading the
 request, you shouldn't decide that the Date was wrong by 25 seconds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25409 [Core Tor/Tor]: rip out PortForwarding options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25409: rip out PortForwarding options
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, 034-triage-20180328  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:11 nickm]:
 > Small changes needed: Instead of removing these lines in config.c,
 replace them to use OBSOLETE instead:
 > {{{
 > -  V(PortForwarding,  BOOL, "0"),
 > -  V(PortForwardingHelper,FILENAME, "tor-fw-helper"),
 > }}}
 > (That's how we remove options.)

 Okay, fixed! I've also added a changes file describing why the feature was
 removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Ok, here's a plan:

 * I'm going to file a consensus-health ticket and a doctor ticket, to have
 us check the dir auths for clock skew, to get earlier notice when they go
 wrong.

 * I'm going to contact dizum's operator and get him to fix it one more
 time.

 * I continue to think we should change the relay consensus fetching
 algorithm to wait a little while when it rolls the dice and they come up
 between :55 and :00. Dgoulet says he has a diagram, in his little book, of
 when each role fetches the consensus. We should get that transcribed into
 dir-spec, and then build a plan for this third item.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Hm. Can you get it to dump version and h_version there, to see what they
 are claiming to be?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23846 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use libtool for building shared library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23846: Use libtool for building shared library
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  sbs
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-mobile, s8-api,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328 034-included-20180402 034  |
  -roadmap-subtask   |
Parent ID:  #25510   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 To try to answer your questions: we use msys+mingw for our windows builds;
 we don't support or recommend MSVC.  MSYS2 should be fine.

 I'd love appveyor support, but there's already a ticket for that, with
 some work in progress: see #25549.  They aren't done yet; maybe they could
 use some help.

 I'd be fine having an automake rule to install the static library and
 header, but it would need to be off-by-default, and enabled with --enable-
 library-install or something.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Scenario: dizum is 65 seconds early. So it votes early, and sends a
 signature early, and most importantly, it makes the new consensus
 available early.

 So if the relay here has the correct time, and it happens to ask for a
 consensus at the 59 minute mark, then dizum has already switched over to
 handing out the new consensus, and most importantly, it sticks a timestamp
 on the new consensus that says it came from the top of the hour. And while
 all the other dir auths have accurate clocks, they send their signatures
 early (5 minutes early) for robustness. So it doesn't matter whether they
 have accurate clocks, dizum can by itself produce a consensus with a
 timestamp in the future that their signatures on it, and it can do this
 theoretically as soon as it has enough signatures from dir auths for that
 round -- i.e. 5 minutes early if it wanted to drift more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Ok, here's our hint: both this ticket and the tor-relays thread had this
 happen at 59 minutes after the hour.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24734 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the return value of fascist_firewall_choose_address_node()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24734: Remove the return value of fascist_firewall_choose_address_node()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Do we have a log message around there that says where we got the consensus
 from?

 Since this is a dir mirror, we got it from an authority, right?

 There is a tiny part of me that wonders if this is because dizum's clock
 is 65 seconds early.

 But...it *can't* be just that, right? Since this relay is seeing a
 consensus that was made in the future, and that means this relay's clock
 is set far enough in the past that all the dir auths made a consensus and
 timestamped it and made it available yet it was *still* in the future from
 this relay's perspective.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25515 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25515: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport   |
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328, 034-must crash 033-backport
 032-backport =>
 prop286, 034-triage-20180328, 034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport
 031-backport
 * status:  reopened => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, there's a fix in `bug23693_031_redux`, probably.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 See also this thread on tor-relays:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2018-February/014593.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: I keep getting this error on my relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: I keep getting this error on my relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:   => clock-skew, s8-errors
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.2.10
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor8-can
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 The clock skew tolerance should probably be larger than 61 seconds so this
 might be an actual bug.  I think we could use a little more information
 though.  Is the skew the same amount each time you get that warning, or
 does it change?

 What output do you get from `ntpq -n -c sysinfo -c peers`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-34, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Should this go into 0.3.3 or 0.3.4?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24854 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extract the authority list from config.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24854: Extract the authority list from config.c
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  torspec, tor-dirauth, 029-backport,  |  implemented
  031-backport, 032-backport, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  review-group-32, review-group-33, review-  |
  group-34, 034-triage-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #24818   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.9 and forward. Pfew! Good work, everybody!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25409 [Core Tor/Tor]: rip out PortForwarding options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25409: rip out PortForwarding options
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, 034-triage-20180328  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Small changes needed: Instead of removing these lines in config.c, replace
 them to use OBSOLETE instead:
 {{{
 -  V(PortForwarding,  BOOL, "0"),
 -  V(PortForwardingHelper,FILENAME, "tor-fw-helper"),
 }}}
 (That's how we remove options.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge, review-   |  Actual Points:
  group-35   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks okay to me; please add a changes file and I'll merge it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25762 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make periodic events array with flags including when they are enabled/disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25762: Make periodic events array with flags including when they are
enabled/disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, client, |  Actual Points:
  s8-perf|
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, client, performance => 034-roadmap-
 subtask, client, s8-perf


Comment:

 Normalize keywords.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25766 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25766: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/46 is a github pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25766 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25766: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (This branch is based on the `remove_tb_empty` branch of #25760.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25766 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25766: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Current branch is `token_bucket_refactor`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25244 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create a tor-launcher user repo for sysrqb

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25244: Please create a tor-launcher user repo for sysrqb
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of the browsing history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22867: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of
the browsing history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by AxelF):

 Can confirm the issue still persists. Those are some tricky tracking URLs
 in places.sqlite, they persist even after TBB is restarted.

 
[[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22867/xxx.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of the browsing history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22867: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of
the browsing history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by AxelF):

 * Attachment "xxx.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25737 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of xpcproxy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25737: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of 
xpcproxy?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 {{{
 12:12:00 H OK, one last thing, my logging shows...
 12:12:05 H EXEC: launchd -> /usr/libexec/xpcproxy
 12:12:05 H   TIME   STRTIME PID
 PPID ARGS
 12:12:05 H START:1616533459 2018 Apr 10 10:09:54963
 1 xpcproxy org.mozilla.firefox.55196
 12:12:05 H EXEC: xpcproxy ->
 /Applications/Firefox.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox
 12:12:05 H   TIME   STRTIME PID
 PPID ARGS
 12:12:05 H START:1616537512 2018 Apr 10 10:09:54963
 1 /Applications/Firefox.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox
 12:12:16 H When starting via Spotlight
 12:12:46 H That EXEC line does mean that xpcproxy is starting
 Firefox
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25764: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24309 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "24309 - tba.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25737 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of xpcproxy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25737: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of 
xpcproxy?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 I talked with haik a bit also:

 {{{
 11:22:27 H In some cases I see it being called with "xpcproxy
 org.mozilla.firefox.14156"
 11:22:53 H That 14156 is not a PID.
 11:24:11 H Maybe turning on launchd logging can shed some light on
 what we're doing to trigger it. It's always started by launchd.
 11:25:28 T Hm. xpcproxy org.mozilla.firefox.14156that first bit
 seems like a signing certificate or package identifier; but sure about the
 14156 though. Maybe a port?
 11:26:09 H Yeah maybe a port.
 11:28:56 H So instructing the user to run "ps -ef|grep xpcproxy"
 might give us the arguments to xpcproxy at the time. Since it's basically
 a launcher, we want to know what it's launching that is doing the https
 requests.
 11:29:33 H Or any way they can get the full command with arguments.
 11:36:11 H OK, I think I have the logging setup locally so I should
 see what the arguments are if it happens.
 12:05:27 H If you start the browser through Spotlight, it is started
 by xpcproxy
 12:08:00 H And if you start it through Finder
 12:10:28 H Hold on, not sure, "xpcproxy /Applications/.../firefox"
 is run, but not sure if that starts it
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---

Comment (by antonela):

 Replying to [comment:8 cypherpunks]:
 >
 > Another option instead of showing colors to convey the security level
 one can show a number badge from 1 to 3 (more security => bigger number,
 Standard => 1, Safe => 2, ...etc). `setBadgeTest` can also show a text but
 one would need to see if it will fit in that space
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add-
 ons/WebExtensions/API/browserAction/setBadgeText
 >
 >

 This is a good option to test, yes. I don't know how normal people will
 understand the number, but it worth an exploration for sure. Thinking
 about incremental numbers = more security is tricky. If I get an A grade
 is better than a C grade. But if I get 3 is better than 1? How intuitive
 is it? IDK. I'll prepare mocks to see how it feels. Thanks :)



 > (Also a note on the `about:preferences` changes: I think they're
 unnecessary since the functionality would already be offered by the
 security button, so there's no need for duplicate effort)
 >

 Well, we don't want to have the slider on the Top bar UI. The doorhanger
 is just showing the security setting description + a call to action in the
 case the user wants to change it. So if the user wants to change the
 security setting, they should go to `about:preferences` to upgrade or
 downgrade their setup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25760: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by robgjansen):

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > Thanks, Rob!
 >
 > Is there anybody else you think I should ask?  Otherwise I think I
 should remove these fast, since they're getting in the way.

 Since this is a testing network event, I think the primary consumers would
 be Shadow and chutney. For Shadow, there is a chance that some researcher
 out there is using the event, but I doubt this is the case (and I don't
 recalling having been asked any questions about it). For chutney, I think
 you and teor are among the main users. The only other person that comes to
 mind is Karsten.

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[tor-bugs] #25766 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25766: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask,
 Severity:  Normal   |  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25373
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8-can   |
-+-
 Our existing token bucket code is a mess.  We should clean it up before we
 tackle #25373.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25737 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of xpcproxy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25737: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of 
xpcproxy?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Some discussion from today:
 {{{
 15:17 < Alex_Gaynor> tjr: Not sure I have a ton to contribute; we
 definitely use
  XPC IPC in process startup, but I can't imagine we're
 doing
  anything that intentionally causes a network
 connection.
  Dunno why an XPC process would need to make it's own
 network
  connections at all. I'm not sure I have anything to
 suggest
  besides using dtrace/lldb/something to capture the
 full
  stacktrace from XPCproxy when it makes the DNS lookup
 15:18 <+tjr> Alex_Gaynor: Is there a particular function that does 'XPC
 IPC'?
 15:20 < Alex_Gaynor> tjr:
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 central/source/ipc/glue/GeckoChildProcessHost.cpp#823-884
 15:23 <+tjr> So everything that goes through a 'MachPortSender' or a
  'mach_port_t' is ultimately going through xpcproxy?
 15:25 <+tjr> And it seems like xpcproxy is technically capable of making
 network
  connections given the right input (even if we don't know what
 that
  is) - so it seems like it could be used to bypass that
 sandbox
  rule...
 15:26 <+tjr> Assuming not "If you're using LittleSnitch as your
 application
  firewall, it sometimes logs connections against the wrong
 process."
 15:28 < Alex_Gaynor> tjr: I _think_, I can't say for certain I don't know
 a ton
  about xpcproxy
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 >
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/25658-exploration.png

 Another option instead of showing colors to convey the security level one
 can show a number badge from 1 to 3 (more security => bigger number,
 Standard => 1, Safe => 2, ...etc). `setBadgeTest` can also show a text but
 one would need to see if it will fit in that space
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add-
 ons/WebExtensions/API/browserAction/setBadgeText

 (Also a note on the `about:preferences` changes: I think they're
 unnecessary since the functionality would already be offered by the
 security button, so there's no need for duplicate effort)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25760: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25763 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Design a .onion icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25763: Design a .onion icon
-+--
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  < antonela >
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by steph):

 * cc: steph@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25757 [Core Tor/Stem]: Allow offline integ tests to be run in a no-network/firewalled state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25757: Allow offline integ tests to be run in a no-network/firewalled state
---+
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Wee! Fun seeing a commit from that far back. Really from the primordial
 days of stem. :P

 Tests are happy for me too. Pushed - thanks for the fix!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25373: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've started work on the refactoring part of this logic in a branch called
 `token_bucket_refactor` on top of `remove_tb_empty`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25760: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 whoops, hit "submit changes" too early.

 In the meantime, could I have a review on my branch `remove_tb_empty`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25760: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 In the meantime

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25760: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Thanks, Rob!

 Is there anybody else you think I should ask?  Otherwise I think I should
 remove these fast, since they're getting in the way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20351 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Turn the updateindex module into a function that runs after each module run

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20351: Turn the updateindex module into a function that runs after each module 
run
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20518 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-20251
 this patch branch].  I chose warn-level for index-update failures as these
 are attempted after each module run.

 (review is not urgent as this should be deployed together with #20350)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25765: TBA - Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about
different padlock states for .onion services
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23247 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Related with #25764

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25764/24309%20-%20tba.png
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25764/dialog-
 default-ani.mov

 Working on having a mockup for each case based on
 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bPrNLIl7Qy-
 sA7aTfElu80Xk2eXzTfH_5BGTOUDK8XU/edit

 If it is ok, I'll continue working on tablet sizes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25737 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of xpcproxy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25737: Tor Browser's update check bypassed Tor once on macos, because of 
xpcproxy?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > Sorry for my delay, I had to ask the network administrator: the logs and
 cache contain an entry for `aus1.torproject.org`.

 To add to gk's questions: does the presence of `aus1.torproject.org` in
 your log mean that something did a DNS lookup on that name? I assume so,
 which means the leaked request was an application update request.

 There are at least three possible explanations for the request you saw:
 1. At some point in the past, the default browser proxy preferences were
 modified. Then you started Tor Browser and an application update request
 was sent before the settings were reset to the correct values (which
 Torbutton does during application startup in conjunction with Tor
 Launcher). I think this scenario might occur if transproxy mode was
 enabled at some prior time.
 2. There is a bug in Torbutton or Tor Launcher which temporarily caused
 the wrong proxy settings to be configured. Looking at the code, I do not
 see such a bug but it might be there.
 3. There is a proxy bypass bug in Tor Browser (and probably Firefox as
 well) that is triggered under certain conditions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25764: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24309 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Description changed by antonela:

Old description:

> TBA work on parent ticket
>
> Mobile
> Tablet - 7inch
> Tablet - 9 inch

New description:

 TBA work on parent ticket

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[tor-bugs] #25765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25765: TBA - Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about
different padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ux-team,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201804
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #23247
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 TBA work on parent ticket

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25764: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24309 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Hi all!
 I worked on a v0 for our new circuit display UI/UX for Android users.

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25764/24309%20-%20tba.png
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25764/dialog-
 default-ani.mov

 I'm using a Dialog component in order to have a similar doorhanger
 behavior.
 https://material.io/guidelines/components/dialogs.html

 If it is ok, I'll continue working on tablet sizes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25754 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Prop#291 choices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25754: Make Prop#291 choices
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, tor-guard,  |  Actual Points:
  guard-discovery|
Parent ID:  #25546   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Hello Mike,

 I did a big analysis of the engineering side of prop#291 here:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013057.html

 tl;dr Proposal will work well as currently written, but it can have some
 side-effects we might want to think more about.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25764: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24309 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "dialog-default-ani.mov" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25764: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24309 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "24309 - tba.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "dialog-default-ani.mov" removed.


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