Ben Goertzel wrote:
It **could** be that the only way a system can give rise to
probabilistically sensible patterns of action-selection, given
limited computational resources, is to do stuff internally that is
based on nonlinear dynamics rather than probability theory.
But, I doubt it...
So, sorry, but I am looking at the same data, and as far as I am
concerned I see almost no evidence that probability theory plays a
significant role in cognition at the concept level.
What that means, to go back to the original question, is that the
possibility I raised is still
The only thing that troubles me about this discussion of the relevance
of probability theory to AGI is the way it seems to be *partly* founded
on an assumption that I, for one, cannot accept.
The assumption is that the underlying dynamics of things at the concept
level (or logical term
Hi,
s.
1) Would anyone currently putting energy into the foundations of
probability discussion be willing to say that this hypothetical
human mechanism could *still* be meaningfully described in terms of
a tractable probabilistic formalism (by, e.g., transforming or
approximating
Richard,
The assumption is that the underlying dynamics of things at the concept
level (or logical term level, if concept is not to your liking) can
be meaningfully described by things that look something like
probabilities.
I never try to accurately duplicate the human mind. Instead, I just
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Hi,
s.
1) Would anyone currently putting energy into the foundations of
probability discussion be willing to say that this hypothetical human
mechanism could *still* be meaningfully described in terms of a
tractable probabilistic formalism (by, e.g., transforming or
I may have been guilty of writing too compactly again, so here is a
quick reply.
What I was trying to say was:
(1) Suppose the human mind works this way, with the overall intelligence
of the system being a (complex) consequence of the interaction of
elements whose local structure (the
Pei Wang wrote:
On 2/4/07, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I fully accept that you don't care if the human mind does it that way,
because you want NARS to do it differently. My question was at a higher
level. If we knew for sure that the human mind was using something like
a
Richard Loosemore wrote:
...
[ASIDE. An example of this. The system is trying to answer the
question Are all ravens black?, but it does not just look to its
collected data about ravens (partly represented by the vector of
numbers inside the raven concept, which are vaguely related to the
I would never, ever claim that the human mind doesn't show any
regularity in its management of beliefs and concepts. Far from it! It
is only the nature of those regularities that are of interest to me.
They can be formalizable, or they can be partially complex. Ditto for
the idea that I might
Pei Wang wrote:
I agree with Oaksford and Chater in their general spirit, that is, the
so-called *irrationality* may have a deeper explanation, though I
don't agree with the concrete (Bayesian) explanation they suggest.
One interpretation: when the mind tries to rely too heavily on a
routine,
On Sun, 04 Feb 2007 12:46:06 -0500, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
If we knew for sure that the human mind was using something like a
formalized system (and not the messy nonlinear stuff I described), then
we could quite comfortably say Hey, let's do the same, but simpler and
It **could** be that the only way a system can give rise to
probabilistically sensible patterns of action-selection, given
limited computational resources, is to do stuff internally that is
based on nonlinear dynamics rather than probability theory.
But, I doubt it...
The human brain may
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