Mark,
I'm saying Godelian completeness/incompleteness can't be easily
defined in the context of natural language, so it shouldn't be applied
there without providing justification for that application
(specifically, unambiguous definitions of "provably true" and
"semantically true" for natural lang
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 1:04 PM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> We've been over this one several times in the past (perhaps you haven't been
> here). Blind people can "see" - they can draw the shapes of objects. . They
> create their visual shapes out of touch.Touch comes prior to vision
Trent:
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 10:38 AM, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
I think humans represent chess by a huge number of *visual* patterns.
http://www.eyeway.org/inform/sp-chess.htm
We've been over this one several times in the past (perhaps you haven't been
here). Blind
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 10:38 AM, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think humans represent chess by a huge number of *visual* patterns.
http://www.eyeway.org/inform/sp-chess.htm
Trent
---
agi
Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archiv
> Within the domain of chess there is everything to know about chess.
> So if it comes up to be a good chess player learning chess from playing
> chess must be sufficient. Thus, an AGI which is not able to enhance its
> abilities in chess from playing chess alone is no AGI.
I'm jumping into t
I am very impressed about the performance of humans in chess compared to
computer chess.
The computer steps through millions(!) of positions per second. And even if
the best chess players say they only evaluate max 3 positions per second I
am sure that this cannot be true because there are so many
Yeah, but these programs did not learn to play via playing other computer
players or studying the rules of the game ... they use alpha-beta pruning
combined with heuristic evaluation functions carefully crafted by human
chess experts ... i.e. they are created based on human knowledge about
playing
Just now there is a world championship in chess. My chess programs (e.g.
Fritz 11) can give a ranking for all moves given an arbitrary chess
position.
The program agrees with the grandmasters which moves are in the top 5. In
most situations it even agrees which move is the best one.
Thus, human s
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 8:48 AM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I suspect that's a half-truth...
Well as a somewhat good chess instructor myself, I have to say I
completely agree with it. People who play well against computers
rarely rank above first time players.. in fact, most of the
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 6:46 PM, Trent Waddington <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 8:41 AM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Yes ... at the moment the styles of human and computer chess players are
> > different enough that doing well against computer players does n
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 8:41 AM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Yes ... at the moment the styles of human and computer chess players are
> different enough that doing well against computer players does not imply
> doing nearly equally well against human players ... though it certainly
>
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 5:38 PM, Trent Waddington <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
> > I am sure that everyone who learns chess by playing against chess
> computers
> > and is able to learn good chess playing (which is n
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Matthias Heger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I am sure that everyone who learns chess by playing against chess computers
> and is able to learn good chess playing (which is not sure as also not
> everyone can learn to be a good mathematician) will be able to be a
I just wanted to make a short interjection in this discussion.
There is a book named "Computers and Common Sense" published in about
1961, which is one of those Lighthill-report type AI-is-impossible
books. It makes for some fun reading as the author (with the fitting
name"Mortimer Taube" I think
So to sum up, while you think linguistic vagueness comes from Godelian
incompleteness, I think Godelian incompleteness can't even be defined
in this context, due to linguistic vagueness.
OK. Personally, I think that you did a good job of defining Godelian
Incompleteness this time but arguably
I like that. NLU isn't AGI-complete but achieving it is (if you've got a
vaguely mammalian-brain-like architecture :-)
- Original Message -
From: Ben Goertzel
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2008 10:18 AM
Subject: **SPAM** Re: [agi] Understanding and Prob
Natural language understanding is a problem. And a system with the ability
to understand natural language is obviously able to solve *this* problem.
But the ability to talk about certain domains does not imply the ability to
solve the problems in this domain.
I have argued this point with my ex
Guys,
A slightly weird conversation. *Everything* cognitive involves problem-solving.
Perception (is it a bird or a plane?) involves problem-solving.
Perhaps what you really mean is "...involves *deliberate/conscious*
problem-solving as opposed to *automatic/unconscious* problem-solving" ?
Matthias,
I say understanding natural language requires the ability to solve problems. Do
you disagree? If so, then you must have an explanation for how an AI that
could understand language would be able to understand novel metaphors or
analogies without doing any active problem-solving. Wha
--- On Thu, 10/23/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi. I don't understand the following
> statements. Could you explain it some more?
>
>> - Natural language can be learned from examples. Formal language
>> can not.
I really mean that formal languages like C++ and HTML are not des
Gödel' theorem is of no relevance for the human brain because there is a
much stronger restriction.
Human brain has emerged by biological evolution. The restriction that the
brain has finite resources is *much stronger* than any restriction which
comes from Gödel's theorem. Thus any hypothetical pr
--- On Thu, 10/23/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> I have already proved something stronger
>
> What would you consider your best reference/paper outlining
> your arguments?
I summarized my argument here:
http://cs.fit.edu/~mmahoney/compression/rationale.html
-- Matt Mahoney, [EM
Mark,
My type 1 & 2 are probably the source of your confusion, since I
phrased them so that (as you said) they depend on "intention".
Logicians codify the intension using semantics, so it is actually
well defined, even though it sounds messy. But, since that explanation
did not work well, let me
There are many papers published on learning of formal grammars from
examples... it's a well-understood problem, addressable via neural nets,
statistical learning methods, genetic programming and so forth...
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 10:02 AM, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi. I don't un
On whether NLU is AGI-complete, it really depends on the particulars of the
definition of NLU ... but according to my own working definition of NLU I
agree that it isn't ...
However, as I stated before, within any vaguely mammalian-brain-like AI
architecture, I do suspect that achieving NLU is AGI
I do not agree. Understanding a domain does not imply the ability to solve
problems in that domain.
And the ability to solve problems in a domain even does not imply to have a
generally a deeper understanding of that domain.
Once again my example of the problem to find a path within a graph fr
Hi. I don't understand the following statements. Could you explain it some
more?
- Natural language can be learned from examples. Formal language can not.
I think that you're basing this upon the methods that *you* would apply to each
of the types of language. It makes sense to me that becau
But, I still do not agree with the way you are using the incompleteness
theorem.
Um. OK. Could you point to a specific example where you disagree? I'm a
little at a loss here . . . .
It is important to distinguish between two different types of
incompleteness.
1. Normal Incompleteness-- a
I have already proved something stronger
What would you consider your best reference/paper outlining your arguments?
Thanks in advance.
- Original Message -
From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2008 8:55 PM
Subject: Re: AW: AW: [agi] Language le
Once again, there is a depth to understanding - it's not simply a binary
proposition.
Don't you agree that a grandmaster understands chess better than you do, even
if his moves are understandable to you in hindsight?
If I'm not good at math, I might not be able to solve y=3x+4 for x, but I mig
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 12:55 AM, Matt Mahoney wrote:
>
>
> I suppose you are right. Instead of encoding mathematical rules as a grammar,
> with enough training
> data you can just code all possible instances that are likely to be
> encountered. For example, instead
> of a grammar rule to encode
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 4:13 AM, Trent Waddington
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 8:39 AM, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> If you consider programming an AI social activity, you very
>> unnaturally generalized this term, confusing other people. Chess
>> programs do
The goal of chess is well defined: Avoid being checkmate and try to
checkmate your opponent.
What checkmate means can be specified formally.
Humans mainly learn chess from playing chess. Obviously their knowledge
about other domains are not sufficient for most beginners to be a good chess
player
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