* James A. Donald:
From time to time I hear that DNSSEC is working fine, and on examining
the matter I find it is working fine except that
Seems to me that if DNSSEC is actually working fine, I should be able
to provide an authoritative public key for any domain name I control,
and
James A. Donald wrote:
From time to time I hear that DNSSEC is working fine, and on examining
the matter I find it is working fine except that
Seems to me that if DNSSEC is actually working fine, I should be able to
provide an authoritative public key for any domain name I control, and
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, Mar 21, 2008 at 08:52:07AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
From time to time I hear that DNSSEC is working fine, and on examining
the matter I find it is working fine except that
Seems to me that if DNSSEC is actually working fine, I should be able to
On Sat, Mar 22, 2008 at 10:59:18AM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, Mar 21, 2008 at 08:52:07AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
From time to time I hear that DNSSEC is working fine, and on examining
the matter I find it is working fine except that
Seems to me
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Er... Allow me the option o fdisbeleiving your assertion.
PTR records can and do point to mutiple names. Some narrow
implementations have assumed that there will only be a single
data element and this myth - that PTRs only point to a
On Sat, Mar 22, 2008 at 02:46:40PM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Er... Allow me the option o fdisbeleiving your assertion.
PTR records can and do point to mutiple names. Some narrow
implementations have assumed that there will only be a single
data
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, Mar 22, 2008 at 02:46:40PM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Er... Allow me the option o fdisbeleiving your assertion.
PTR records can and do point to mutiple names. Some narrow
implementations have assumed that there
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Nothing terribly new here -- short interview with someone who bought
an RFID credit card reader on ebay for $8 and demonstrates getting
people's credit card information at short distances using it. Still,
it is interesting to see how trivial it is to do.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, Mar 22, 2008 at 03:52:49PM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, Mar 22, 2008 at 02:46:40PM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Er... Allow me the option o fdisbeleiving your assertion.
PTR records can and do
Jim:
Thanks for your detailed response on the convergent encryption issue.
In this post, I'll just focus on one very interesting question that
you raise: When do either of these attacks on convergent encryption
apply?.
In my original note I was thinking about the allmydata.org Tahoe
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Five years ago, Congress killed an experimental
Pentagon antiterrorism program meant to vacuum up electronic data
about people in the U.S. to search for suspicious patterns. Opponents
called it too broad an intrusion on Americans' privacy, even after the
Sept.
James A. Donald wrote:
From time to time I hear that DNSSEC is working fine, and on examining
the matter I find it is working fine except that
DNSSEC is working fine as a technology. However, it is worth
remembering that it works based on digitally signing an entire zone -
the state of
At 10:38 AM 3/21/2008 -0700, Jon Callas wrote:
Despite that my hypotheses are only that, and I have no experimental
data, I think that using a large block cipher mode like EME to induce
a pseudo-random, maximally-fragile bit region is an excellent
mitigation strategy.
Isn't EME patented? -
ANNOUNCING Allmydata.org Tahoe, the Least-Authority Filesystem, v1.0
We are pleased to announce the release of version 1.0 of the Tahoe
Least Authority Filesystem.
The Tahoe Least Authority Filesystem is a secure, decentralized,
fault-tolerant filesystem. All of the source code is available
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