hanks.
-- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
pgp0.pgp
Description: PGP signature
2p fashion is
difficult, and will require agoric load levelling elements (to prevent bad
nodes from DoSing the global store) which also requires prestige tracking.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.
; http://www.chic.caltech.edu/
If you want to fly a LEO constellation of them, you need a very sparse structure (or
a huge density of pongsats, which doesn't agree with observations).
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
_
putations within the web.
The real issue is whether people can volunteer information stored in their
addressbook. Not everybody is an Orkut/Friendster/FOAF exhibitionist.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.0707
but the fact is no web-of-trust implementation to
> date works, or even comes close to working.
Web of trust is useless, if Johnny User is supposed to do
the checking.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
mobile phone infrastructure for
online payments, but it has its own problems (Bluetooth/IrDa, security, fax
effect, etc).
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE
From: Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Interview with Glenn Henry, founder of VIA processor subsidiary CeTo: [EMAIL
PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2004 18:51:21 +0200
http://linuxdevices.com/articles/AT2656883479.html
[ker-snip]
The third one, is one you haven't asked me abo
Currently, all non-truck license plates are
discarded, but it's clear enough theres demand for realtime tracing of select
and movement profiles for the masses, for data mining.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
c key is stored in /var/ssl/cflex_pub.key (to export public
key 1 using muscleTool: "exportkey 1 /var/ssl/cflex_pub.key")
- Michael
___
Muscle mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://lists.drizzle.com/mailman/listinfo/
* Refik Molva, Eurecom, France
* Kai Rannenberg, University of Frankfurt, Germany
* Stephen Weis, MIT
------
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
ecurity." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Clarifications below...
Eugen Leitl wrote:
>- Forwarded message from "\"Hal Finney\"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -
>
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney")
>Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2004 12:57:29 -0700 (PDT)
>To: [E
nvironment is
OpenBSD/Linux/OpenSSL/gpg.
Any suggestions?
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://mo
7;t be able to
steal the private key itself.
> http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000201.html
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA
igned cert Start/TLS
config out of the box. Even without cert caching, that'd require a MITM.
Not exactly cheap, and prone to detection, if practiced on a nonnegligible
scale (fingerprint checking).
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
pable loss for the institutions.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org
1/SHA256 in hardware I'll
update the padlock driver as well. Than I expect almost no slowdown even
in HMAC mode (which is almost always used in ESP).
Michal Ludvig
___
Subscription: http://lists.logix.cz/mailman/listinfo/cryp
EMAIL PROTECTED]
Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
------
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7
the cargo
cult/snake oil variety. Only a question of time before the first MMS worm
wipes out all Nokias, or something.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 0
y Dept.
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
--
Eugen* Leitl http://lei
Gear.com
Custom Embedded Solutions + Security Fx:+61 7 38913630 http://www.uCdot.org
___
Subscription: http://lists.logix.cz/mailman/listinfo/cryptoapi
List archive: http://lists.logix.cz/pipermail/cryptoap
PadLock mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://lists.logix.cz/mailman/listinfo/padlock
--
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3
add a wrapper for cia_modesel, that when cia_modesel is
NULL, it falls back to the old behaviour. This way, we don't have to
patch all algorithm implementations to include cia_modesel.
How you like that idea?
--
Fruhwirth Clemens <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://clemens.endorphin.org
andom/tunnel-alt.html
[3]. A hash table or alternatively a bloom filter can be used to
detect whether we have previously seen a preIV.
This document has been placed in the public domain by Connelly
Barnes, 2005-01-17.
___
i2p mailing list
[E
y or Speedpass token in a
tinfoil sheath when not in use. But Mr. Sabetti, the Texas Instruments
executive, said such precautions were unnecessary. "It's a solution to a
problem that doesn't exist," he said.
Dan Bedore, a spokesman for Ford, said the company had confidence in the
te
s 'take ownership', which has the effect of
> erasing it and regenerating new internal keys.
Really? How interesting. Please tell us more.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144ht
003B
chip(not tested).
___
Subscription: http://lists.logix.cz/mailman/listinfo/cryptoapi
List archive: http://lists.logix.cz/pipermail/cryptoapi
--
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
vgeniy Polyakov
Crash is better than data corruption -- Arthur Grabowski
___
Subscription: http://lists.logix.cz/mailman/listinfo/cryptoapi
List archive: http://lists.logix.cz/pipermail/cryptoapi
--
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
Ph:+61 7 34352815 http://www.SnapGear.com
Custom Embedded Solutions + Security Fx:+61 7 38913630 http://www.uCdot.org
___
Subscription: http://lists.logix.cz/mailman/listinfo/cryptoapi
List archive: http://lists.logix.cz/pipermail/cryptoapi
-
private key pairs. DTCP would be an
even more attractive target as it would allow easy computer recording
of protected data via Firewire, USB2, or IP. However its reliance on
the much-maligned principle of security through obscurity (keeping the
details secret) may in practice give it a greater
other. This is a potentially really sticky mess.
-
You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To manage your subscription, go to
http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
Archives at: http://www.interesting
guesses are to be right.
The fingerprint hash (fingerprint's fingerprint) has to be resistant
to rotation/translation, area size and subpattern presence, and tolerate
some skin lesion noise, so it's the very opposite of a cryptographic hash.
Probably quite easy to reverse.
--
Eu
safely connected to an insecure, networked machine.
> Is there a real problem that they uniquely solve, sufficient
> to drive the building of the needed infrastructure?
> I don't see it, and I'd love to be made smarter.
--
E
for
local online banking is PIN/TAN (TANs distributed on dead tree).
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29
equired by law to issue secure smartcards
and smartcard readers, or suffer extreme losses through fraud
they won't introduce these secure readers and smartcards.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.0710
s, worm, and malware resistance than
> Microsoft or Linux. Teenagers are pretty sophisticated.
Are we talking even about the same species? About
the same teenagers which already own malware-infested
PCs, and swap whatever ringtones, logos and games en vogue
with
ike the technology (still) isn't ready for prime time.
Not ready for 1984? One sure would hope so.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3
Cambridge working with Ike Chuang, but is back at Columbia, I
understand. She's pretty sharp.
--Rod
-
You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To manage your subscription, go to
http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
Archives at: http://www.interesting-p
live wp servers.
-J
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
On Wed, Oct 19, 2005 at 09:45:38AM -0500, Alaric Dailey wrote:
> Cisco seems to be doing these kinds of boneheaded things for quite sometime.
Does Juniper have a better security story?
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
>http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences
>
>
>
>
___
p2p-hackers mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p
set up, however, especially on an
unsupported platform.
I do have a HBCI smartcard setup with my private account but don't use it
since it's locked in a proprietary software jail.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
tes of every vehicle (currently, only trucks
are charged) by OCR. The police is purportely very interested to obtain
realtime access to the logs.
Don't we all feel much safer, already?
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>lei
nization.
this is a feature in my eyes, as private group networks are what this
is intended for and meatspace pad exchange a desired requirement to
ensure trust is properly placed.
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
_
D
PS: I believe this is very close to having a one-time stored pad, but the
difference with traditional Pads is that this one is tored in an anonymous
location.(See Coderman's post.)
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
___
provide time destruction so i assume this is in reference
to Tyler's description. you could couple the user authentication with
a physically hardened token of some sort for access to the pads but
even this would require manual destruction.
do they make physically hardened authent
[4] http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright03
[5] http://www.shmoocon.org/speakers.html#overlier
[6] http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-federal-06/bh-fed-06-speakers.html#Syverson
----- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
_
t Mailing List openssl-dev@openssl.org
Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 1
te software component designed for use with OpenSSL. Both
common slips; it took me a year to break that habit :-)
-Steve M.
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List
ms at 100..1000 MBit/s
speed, with IPsec or OpenVPN (FreeBSD 6.2 or pfsense data
would be great).
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B
for random endpoints?
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 7
te that the Directive also applies to phone calls ... and the
It also applies to mobile phone location in the cell.
> transposition of that into national laws is supposed to be completed by
> October 2007; most countries have until March 2009 for Internet logs
Apparently, Germany will implem
ly interesting Physics).
>
> - Quantum Computing is "science fiction". Some science fiction
> eventually becomes reality.
A nice blog to follow here is Shtetl-Optimized:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/
--
Eugen* Leitl
On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 12:30:40PM -0400, Kelly John Rose wrote:
> If Google, or other similar businesses want to convince people to store
> data in the cloud, they need to set up methods where the data is
> encrypted or secured before it is even provided to them using keys which
That would compl
ng list
cryptogra...@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbio
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 03:54:26PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote:
> Having a public bulletin board of posted emails, plus a protocol for
> anonymously finding the ones your key can decrypt, seems like a pretty decent
> architecture for prism-proof email. The tricky bit of crypto is in making
> access
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 04:24:19PM -0700, Glenn Willen wrote:
> I am going to be interested to hear what the rest of the list says about
> this, because this definitely contradicts what has been presented to me as
> 'standard practice' for PGP use -- verifying identity using government issued
> ID
Guys, in order to minimize Tor Project's dependance on
federal funding and/or increase what they can do it
would be great to have some additional funding ~10 kUSD/month.
If anyone is aware of anyone who can provide funding at
that level or higher, please contact exec...@torproject.org
__
A%2F%2Fwww.urec.cnrs.fr%2Frubrique216.html&hl=en&ie=UTF8&sl=fr&tl=en
--
Kilian
___
Beowulf mailing list, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To change your subscription (digest mode or unsubscribe) visit
http://www.beowulf.org/mailman/listinfo/beowulf
---
In case somebody missed it,
http://www.tfr.org/wiki/index.php?title=Technical_Proposal_(IPETEE)
I'm not sure what the status of http://postel.org/anonsec/
is, the mailing list traffic dried up a while back.
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl htt
be
> too much longer before the human assist is all but unneeded.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_Collect is in operation in entire
Germany. It does OCR on all license plates (also used for police
purposes in realtime, despite initial vigorous denial) but currently
is only used for truck toll.
t a year or
two in less than 5 years.
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/Debatte-um-Zugriff-auf-LKW-Mautdaten-fuer-Fahndungen-geht-weiter--/meldung/76321
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 4
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/24/spanish_enigmas/
Spanish discover cache of 26 Enigma machines
Franco's 'secret weapon' tracked to army HQ
By Lester Haines
Posted in Science, 24th October 2008 10:03 GMT
Spanish newspaper El Pa�s last week tracked down 26 examples of Franco's
"secret w
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/the_skein_hash.html?1
October 29, 2008
The Skein Hash Function
NIST is holding a competition to replace the SHA family of hash functions,
which have been increasingly under attack. (I wrote about an early NIST hash
workshop here.)
Skein is our subm
proxy.google.com/arXivblog
------
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A
From: Toni Alatalo
Subject: Re: [Opensim-dev] Technical assessment of Cable Beach asset server
To: opensim-...@lists.berlios.de
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 18:47:00 +0200
Reply-To: opensim-...@lists.berlios.de
Eugen Leitl kirjoitti:
> On Thu, Jan 15, 2009 at 02:10:13PM +0900, Mike Mazur wrote:
&
ects
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bot_nets
[5] http://www.gelato.unsw.edu.au/archives/git/0506/5273.html
[6] http://www.gelato.unsw.edu.au/archives/git/0506/5299.html
_______
tahoe-dev mailing list
tahoe-...@allmydata.org
http://allmydata.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
--
--
http://www.wired.com/print/science/discoveries/magazine/17-05/ff_kryptos
Mission Impossible: The Code Even the CIA Can't Crack
By Steven Levy Email 04.20.09
The sculpture named Kryptos at CIA headquarters contains a secret message ?
but not even the agency's brightest can crack its code.
Phot
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Tellitec_Tellinet_Sat_Spy_manual%2C_6_Mar_2006
Tellitec Tellinet Sat Spy manual, 6 Mar 2006
May 24, 2009
Summary
Tellinet is an accelerator for satellite communications made by Tellitec GmbH
of Berlin. It supports encrypted TCP (ETCP), but as this confidential manual
I can has contributions, please?
From: Michael Richardson
Subject: Re: [btns] IETF75
To: Eugen Leitl
cc: b...@ietf.org
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2009 15:03:33 -0400
>>>>> "Eugen" == Eugen Leitl writes:
Eugen> On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 03:15:59PM +0200, Juli
http://www.randombit.net/bitbashing/programming/serpent_in_simd.html
Wed, 09 Sep 2009
Speeding up Serpent: SIMD Edition
The Serpent block cipher was one of the 5 finalists in the AES competition,
and is widely thought to be the most secure of them due to its conservative
design. It was also con
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/science/27trojan.html?8dpc=&pagewanted=all
Old Trick Threatens the Newest Weapons
By JOHN MARKOFF
Published: October 26, 2009
Despite a six-year effort to build trusted computer chips for military
systems, the Pentagon now manufactures in secure facilities run
"We discuss why no existing cipher satisfies the requirements of this
application". Uh-oh.
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=131dae03-39ae-48be-a8d6-8b0034c92555&DisplayLang=en
AES-CBC + Elephant diffuser
Brief Description
A Disk Encryption Algorithm for Windows Vista
T
On Thu, Oct 29, 2009 at 07:15:53AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> At 2:24 PM +0100 10/29/09, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> >"We discuss why no existing cipher satisfies the requirements of this
> >application". Uh-oh.
>
> Yeah, we all know what a light-weight and careless p
ferneces:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/04/severe_openssl_vulnerability/
http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~valeria/research/publications/DATE10RSA.pdf
--
Anthony G. Basile, Ph.D.
Chair of Information Technology
D'Youville College
Buffalo, NY 14201
USA
(716) 829-8197
------
-
d add
encrypted/digested product to the host entropy pool with the specified
entropy density estimate adjusted downward to your requirements. (most
OS'es support this)
--
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
g attacks is there) tamperproof exchange is over
traditional cryptography.
I agree with Perry that it solves a non-problem.
> There is a human-readable summary at: http://focus.aps.org/story/v25/st7
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org&quo
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=25670&channel=Briefings§ion=Microprocessors
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Nanoscale Random Number Circuit to Secure Future Chips
Intel unveils a circuit that can pump out truly random numbers at high speed.
By Tom Simonite
It might s
pect and monetize
my data stream.
> starting with the DNS itself, and also most public contents (because
Encryption is cheap enough (especially if you cache keys from
previous sessions). Why not encrypt everything?
> their purveyors won't want to pay for the crypto; sad but true).
--
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-719726,00.html
09/27/2010 11:23 AM
Recruited by West Germany
Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO
By Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West Germans were desperate to prevent
a pre-programmed, statistically random set from elsewhere.
Journal source: Nature Photonics, DOI: 10.1038/nphoton.2010.197
___
tt mailing list
t...@postbiota.org
http://postbiota.org/mailman/listinfo/tt
- End forward
On Thu, Sep 30, 2010 at 11:23:39PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> On Sep 30, 2010, at 9:24 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> Right from the snake-oil-security-dept.
> Really? Just what about it is snake oil? Quantum vacuum fluctuations
That QM RNGs are special in comparison to other RNGs
Not new, but some probably have missed it.
http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.
amest vendor
response for its RSA SecurID token compromise:
http://pwnies.com/winners/
___
cryptography mailing list
cryptogra...@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl
Comments?
https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/5dd304276ba5745ec21fc1e6686a0b28da29e6fc
___
The cryptography mailing list
cryptography@metzdowd.com
http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 02:44:32PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> > My main issue with this proposal is that somebody identifiable is
> > going to manufacture these boxes. Maybe several somebodies, but
> > IMO, that's an identifiable central point of control/failure.
Recently there's a trend f
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 01:30:35PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:04:34 +0200 Faré wrote:
> > One thing that irks me, though, is the problem of the robust, secure
> > terminal: if everything is encrypted, how does one survive the
> > loss/theft/destruction of a computer or
On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 04:11:57PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> If a person at Snowden's level in the NSA had any access to information
Snowden didn't have clearance for that information. He's being described
as 'brilliant' and purportedly was able to access documents far beyond his
lev
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 04:25:12PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> A response he wrote as part of a discussion at
> http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html:
>
> Q: "Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source encryption
> software and silently replacing these
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 09:19:07PM -0400, Derrell Piper wrote:
> ...and to add to all that, how about the fact that IPsec was dropped as a
> 'must implement' from IPv6 sometime after 2002?
Apropos IPsec, I've tried searching for any BTNS (opportunistic encryption mode
for
IPsec) implementations,
liberationtech. Unsubscribe,
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
compa...@stanford.edu.
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36
in mind I should really start on my weekend soon.)
peace,
--
Nick
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-t...@lists.torproject.org
To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen*
- Forwarded message from Thor Lancelot Simon -
Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 15:36:33 -0400
From: Thor Lancelot Simon
To: Eugen Leitl
Cc: cryptogra...@randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14)
On Sat, Sep 07
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 01:53:13PM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:53 PM, Marcus D. Leech wrote:
>
> > One wonders why they weren't already using link encryption systems?
> >
>
> Probably line rate and the cost of encrypting every single fiber link.
> There are few vendors
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 04:41:04PM -0400, Richard Outerbridge wrote:
> Surely not Canada? After all, we're one of the five eyes! ;)
Six. Sweden (FRA) is part of it. http://www.heise.de/tp/blogs/8/154917
___
The cryptography mailing list
cryptography@met
o
simulate the various subtle offwhite characteristics of a well
described actual physical process.
___
cryptography mailing list
cryptogra...@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
- End forwarded message -
--
o
not bother with the extra effort required to produce the Koblitz
curves).
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-t...@lists.torproject.org
To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leit
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 07:42:33PM -1000, Tim Newsham wrote:
> Jumping in to this a little late, but:
>
> > Q: "Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source
> > encryption software and silently replacing these with their own versions?"
> > A: (Schneier) Yes, I believe so.
>
> perhaps,
Forwarded with permission.
So there *is* a BTNS implementation, after all. Albeit
only for OpenBSD -- but this means FreeBSD is next, and
Linux to follow.
- Forwarded message from Andreas Davour -
Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 09:10:44 -0700 (PDT)
From: Andreas Davour
To: Eugen Leitl
Just got word from an Openswan developer:
"
To my knowledge, we never finished implementing the BTNS mode.
It wouldn't be hard to do --- it's mostly just conditionally commenting out
code.
"
There's obviously a large potential deployment base for
BTNS for home users, just think of Openswan/Open
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
Security and Pervasive Monitoring
The Internet community and the IETF care deeply about how much we can trust
commonly used Internet services and the protocols that these services use.
So the reports about large-scale monitoring
1 - 100 of 109 matches
Mail list logo
