Re: [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties

2013-10-10 Thread Paul Hoffman
to work on that around 1998, they might still have some of that design around. --Paul Hoffman ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength

2013-09-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
Also see RFC 3766 from almost a decade ago; it has stood up fairly well. --Paul Hoffman ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)

2013-09-05 Thread Paul Hoffman
On Sep 4, 2013, at 2:15 PM, Andy Steingruebl stein...@gmail.com wrote: As of Jan-2014 CAs are forbidden from issuing/signing anything less than 2048 certs. For some value of forbidden. :-) --Paul Hoffman ___ The cryptography mailing list

Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes

2010-09-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
vendor keeps that key, usually in cert form, in its trust anchor pile. You should not extrapolate *anything* from the contents of the CA cert except the key itself and the proclaimed name associated with it. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: Folly of looking at CA cert lifetimes

2010-09-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 5:33 PM -0400 9/14/10, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: On Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 08:14:59AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote: At 10:57 AM -0400 9/14/10, Perry E. Metzger did not write, but passed on for someone else: This suggests to me that even if NIST is correct that 2048 bit RSA keys

Re: 2048-bit RSA keys

2010-08-16 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 11:35 AM +1000 8/16/10, Arash Partow wrote: Paul Hoffman wrote: You are under the wrong impression, unless you are reading vastly different crypto literature than the rest of us are. RSA-1024 *might* be possible to break in public at some point in the next decade, and RSA-2048 is a few

2048-bit RSA keys

2010-08-15 Thread Paul Hoffman
are under the wrong impression, unless you are reading vastly different crypto literature than the rest of us are. RSA-1024 *might* be possible to break in public at some point in the next decade, and RSA-2048 is a few orders of magnitude harder than that. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: /dev/random and virtual systems

2010-08-03 Thread Paul Hoffman
a unique state (because they might start within the same refresh. If you need that, you probably want to automatically mix a microsecond-accurate time at the same time. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography

Re: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update

2010-07-17 Thread Paul Hoffman
. insert chide about your criticism of the exact shade of red used on the curtains in the theater --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord

Re: Quantum Key Distribution: the bad idea that won't die...

2010-04-20 Thread Paul Hoffman
, and there is money to be thrown down the drain^w^w^wat them, there will be active development. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord

Re: AES-CBC + Elephant diffuser

2009-11-01 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 2:24 PM +0100 10/29/09, Eugen Leitl wrote: We discuss why no existing cipher satisfies the requirements of this application. Uh-oh. Yeah, we all know what a light-weight and careless person Neils Ferguson is. Who would listen to him? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: Possibly questionable security decisions in DNS root management

2009-10-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com

Re: SHA-1 and Git

2009-08-25 Thread Paul Hoffman
changes needed when one algorithm fails is low. Later software updates that contain other changes can also include new algorithms that are suspected to be good even if all of the original ones fail. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: Certainty

2009-08-23 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 7:10 PM -0700 8/19/09, james hughes wrote: On Aug 19, 2009, at 3:28 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: I understand that creaking is not a technical cryptography term, but certainly is. When do we become certain that devastating attacks on one feature of hash functions (collision resistance) have any

Certainty

2009-08-19 Thread Paul Hoffman
without any hint of preimage attacks, the less certain I am that collision attacks are even related to preimage attacks. Of course, I still believe in hash algorithm agility: regardless of how preimage attacks will be found, we need to be able to deal with them immediately. --Paul Hoffman

Re: Crypto '09 rump session summary?

2009-08-19 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 2:46 PM -0700 8/19/09, Greg Rose wrote: ...some summaries of some of the presentations... More like this, please! The rump sessions have a lot of value (beyond the often-strained attempts at humor). --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: 112-bit prime ECDLP solved

2009-07-20 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 7:54 AM -0600 7/18/09, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote: This involves deciding whether a 192-bit elliptic curve public key is strong enough... Why not just go with 256-bit EC (128-bit symmetric strength)? Is the 8 bytes per signature the issue, or the extra compute time? --Paul Hoffman, Director

RE: HSM outage causes root CA key loss

2009-07-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 11:09 PM +0200 7/14/09, Weger, B.M.M. de wrote: Any other problems? Maybe something with key rollover or interoperability? Bingo. Key rollover has been thinly tested in relying parties. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: MD6 withdrawn from SHA-3 competition

2009-07-06 Thread Paul Hoffman
definition, and they can't make MD6 work within that definition. But that doesn't mean that NIST wouldn't have accepted the fast-enough MD6 with a proof from someone else. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography

Re: MD6 withdrawn from SHA-3 competition

2009-07-05 Thread Paul Hoffman
or not NIST would really rely on the proofs. It was clear they didn't want to withdraw MD6, but that they felt like they had to because of the speed requirement. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing

Re: Factoring attack against RSA based on Pollard's Rho

2009-06-07 Thread Paul Hoffman
* 1024) of brute force? That is a silly reduction; reducing it to anything less than the estimate for NFS (about 80 bits) is not useful. Or, can this attack be combined with NFS? Or...? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

End-of-chapter questions for Practical Cryptography?

2009-05-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
on this list used the book to teach a class? If so, did you create a list of discussion questions? Or, do people know profs who have used the book to teach? Any pointers are appreciated. --Paul Hoffman - The Cryptography Mailing

Re: 80-bit security? (Was: Re: SHA-1 collisions now at 2^{52}?)

2009-05-08 Thread Paul Hoffman
on this list and in the press are sloppy about security decisions that involve periods of time longer than about a year. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: Has any public CA ever had their certificate revoked?

2009-05-08 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 6:02 PM +0200 5/8/09, R. Hirschfeld wrote: Date: Tue, 5 May 2009 10:17:00 -0700 From: Paul Hoffman paul.hoff...@vpnc.org the CA fixed the problem and researched all related problems that it could find. From what I've read of the incident (I think it's the one referred to), Comodo

Re: Has any public CA ever had their certificate revoked?

2009-05-06 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 1:02 AM +1200 5/7/09, Peter Gutmann wrote: Paul Hoffman paul.hoff...@vpnc.org writes: Peter, you really need more detents on the knob for your hyperbole setting. nothing happened is flat-out wrong: the CA fixed the problem and researched all related problems that it could find. Perhaps you

Re: Has any public CA ever had their certificate revoked?

2009-05-05 Thread Paul Hoffman
should be ready to answer who will benefit from the punishment and in what way should the CA be punished. (You don't have to answer these, of course: you can just mete out punishment because it makes you feel good and powerful. There is lots of history of that.) --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN

Re: Has any public CA ever had their certificate revoked?

2009-05-05 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 6:44 PM -0400 5/5/09, Jerry Leichter wrote: On May 5, 2009, at 1:17 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: ...This leads to the question: if a CA in a trust anchor pile does something wrong (terribly wrong, in this case) and fixes it, should they be punished? If you say yes, you should be ready to answer

Re: Obama's secure PDA

2009-01-26 Thread Paul Hoffman
on security issues. http://gcn.com/articles/2009/01/23/obama-gets-super-secure-smartphone.aspx I too would like to hear more information on this, particularly the crypto that is known to be used on the Edge. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow

2009-01-20 Thread Paul Hoffman
that there is a straight-line loss of bits, you would have to be believing that the attack is much worse for SHA2/384 than it was for SHA2/256 in order to bring the output down to the level that I need. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

RE: MD5 considered harmful today, SHA-1 considered harmful tomorrow

2009-01-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
trust and why. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com

Re: Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk

2009-01-02 Thread Paul Hoffman
. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com

Re: TLS Server Name Indication and IDNA?

2008-10-24 Thread Paul Hoffman
the pain is avoided: Yes+. That's why we designed IDNA that way. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Cube cryptanalysis?

2008-09-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 11:08 AM -0700 8/21/08, Greg Rose wrote: Adi mentioned that the slides and paper will go online around the deadline for Eurocrypt submission; it will all become much clearer than my wounded explanations then. There now: http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/385 --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN

Re: once more, with feeling.

2008-09-10 Thread Paul Hoffman
is that people who have more stake in the game (Mozilla Inc.) have spent longer thinking about this than we give them credit for and come to the design decisions that they have. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography

Re: once more, with feeling.

2008-09-08 Thread Paul Hoffman
have similarly poor security. Knowing this, do you wish to continue anyway? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Voting machine security

2008-08-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
that is is quite expensive. I suspect that nearly everyone in the country would be happy to pay an additional $1/election for more reliable results. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

2008-08-08 Thread Paul Hoffman
. I understand most current browsers support OCSP. ...and only a tiny number of CAs do so. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL

Re: Kaminsky finds DNS exploit

2008-07-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
to above), code changes and a universal rollout in all DNS software (which you allude to at the end), and stable rollout of the DNSSEC trust anchor system in every significant zone and all resolvers. FWIW, only the latter has anything to do with this mailing list... --Paul Hoffman, Director

Re: Kaminsky finds DNS exploit

2008-07-09 Thread Paul Hoffman
make nearly as much difference as a diligent security expert with a good name. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Strength in Complexity?

2008-07-02 Thread Paul Hoffman
of opacity. So, I agree with Peter that that article is probably correct about protocols. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Protection mail at rest

2008-06-02 Thread Paul Hoffman
uncomplicated, modulo initial setup. And, if you want to host on FreeBSD instead of Linux, see http://www.rootbsd.net/. Same price, good service. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe

Re: The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
-useful addition to the entropy pool. The first bit makes it sound like the stuff was absolutely critical to the entropy of produced keys. Which one is correct? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing

Re: The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 10:25 AM +0100 5/15/08, Ben Laurie wrote: Paul Hoffman wrote: I'm confused about two statements here: At 2:10 PM +0100 5/13/08, Ben Laurie wrote: The result of this is that for the last two years (from Debian's Edgy release until now), anyone doing pretty much any crypto on Debian

Re: The perils of security tools

2008-05-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
More interesting threadage about the issue here: http://taint.org/2008/05/13/153959a.html, particularly in the comments. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: SSL/TLS and port 587

2008-01-23 Thread Paul Hoffman
? It seems like a pretty flimsy straw man. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: SSL/TLS and port 587

2008-01-23 Thread Paul Hoffman
that SSL/TLS can protect email privacy, That's not what I asked, of course. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Fixing the current process

2007-10-10 Thread Paul Hoffman
and the other two could wither over the ensuing decades. If we're lucky. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: more SHA-1 progress?

2007-08-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
from last week. I watched the webcast of the rump session, and Christian Rechberger said that they think they will get 2^60ish with a new technique. He did not describe the technique in any detail. Offline, he has told me that there will be papers published. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN

Re: Fwd: Potential SHA 1 Hack Using Distributed Computing - Near Miss(es) May be Good Enough

2007-08-15 Thread Paul Hoffman
new cryptanalytic methods... sounds great, but is meaningless without specifics. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Fwd: Potential SHA 1 Hack Using Distributed Computing - Near Miss(es) May be Good Enough

2007-08-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
, or what. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: New article on root certificate problems with Windows

2007-07-21 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 7:58 PM +1200 7/20/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Paul Hoffman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: At 2:45 AM +1200 7/20/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: |From a security point of view, this is really bad. From a usability point of |view, it's necessary. As you can see from my list of proposed solutions

Re: New article on root certificate problems with Windows

2007-07-19 Thread Paul Hoffman
are about to put it back in. Note that I did not criticize the practice of starting with a zillion roots that Microsoft trusts. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: Quantum Cryptography

2007-07-03 Thread Paul Hoffman
the cost of the end boxes for still-useful DH. Oh, and all the above is ignoring that DH works over multiple hops of different media, and quantum crypto doesn't (yet, maybe ever). --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: ad hoc IPsec or similiar

2007-06-26 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 2:49 PM -0500 6/26/07, Nicolas Williams wrote: On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 10:43:16AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote: This was discussed many times, and always rejected as not good enough by the purists. Then the IETF created the BTNS Working Group which is spending huge amounts of time getting

Re: ad hoc IPsec or similiar

2007-06-26 Thread Paul Hoffman
this other actually secure stuff). Whereas I was in the camp of liking the name very much for the very reason that this thread was started: because it lets you encrypt an arbitrary conversation with essentially no startup cost. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: Quantum Cryptography

2007-06-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
the attacker has the ability to perform 2^128 or more operations, which he doesn't. Which part of the word useless is not apparent here? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: ad hoc IPsec or similiar

2007-06-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
by the purists. Then the IETF created the BTNS Working Group which is spending huge amounts of time getting close to purity again. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: Quantum Cryptography

2007-06-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

SSL certificates for SMTP

2007-05-24 Thread Paul Hoffman
years ago. As far as I know, there isn't even a way to store mail routing information in X.509 certificates. Why would you need to? SMTP-over-TLS only identifies the system to whom you are speaking. No routing inforation is needed or wanted. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: 307 digit number factored

2007-05-23 Thread Paul Hoffman
For the math weenies on the list, see the full announcement here: http://listserv.nodak.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0705L=nmbrthryT=0P=1019. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe

Re: 307 digit number factored

2007-05-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
migration. That's good of you not to expect it, given that zero of the major CAs seem to support ECC certs today, and even if they did, those certs would not work in IE on XP. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: 0wned .gov machines (was Re: Russian cyberwar against Estonia?)

2007-05-21 Thread Paul Hoffman
on those machines. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question

2007-04-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
professionals without any negative consequences? Because doing so can get things finished earlier and/or make a more efficient protocol. Same as it ever was. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: DNSSEC to be strangled at birth.

2007-04-06 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 7:26 PM -0400 4/5/07, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: On Thu, Apr 05, 2007 at 07:32:09AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote: Control: The root signing key only controls the contents of the root, not any level below the root. That is, of course, false, This is, of course false. In order to control

Re: DNSSEC to be strangled at birth.

2007-04-06 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 7:54 PM -0400 4/5/07, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: On Thu, Apr 05, 2007 at 04:49:33PM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote: because, with it, one can sign the appropriate chain of keys to forge records for any zone one likes. If the owner of any key signs below their level, it is immediately

Re: DNSSEC to be strangled at birth.

2007-04-06 Thread Paul Hoffman
/ months will be spent finger-pointing instead of fixing. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: DNSSEC to be strangled at birth.

2007-04-05 Thread Paul Hoffman
in the ISP community even before this event: many are not sure they trust ICANN itself, much less its current sponsor. Note that I'm not supporting the US signing the root in the least. I'm just saying that predicting doom is grossly premature. /anti-rant --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: more on NIST hash competition

2007-01-26 Thread Paul Hoffman
after SHA-1 needs to stop being used. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: more on NIST hash competition

2007-01-25 Thread Paul Hoffman
are in the second group. It looks like NIST sided with the first group, but it will be interesting if the folks in the second group are vocal during the coming few years. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: SC-based link encryption

2007-01-05 Thread Paul Hoffman
it down one layer in the stack. At least that way you'll know the security properties of what you create. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: How important is FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cert?

2006-12-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
a good one. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: How important is FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cert?

2006-12-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
algorithm like AES, there are probably a dozen people on this mailing list who could sanity check your product's implementation of AES (and probably even of key storage) in less than 50 hours of consulting time, --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: signing all outbound email

2006-09-09 Thread Paul Hoffman
to signing all outgoing mail, not looking to see oh, if it is James, don't sign it because he won't like it. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography

Re: signing all outbound email

2006-09-07 Thread Paul Hoffman
not. The receiving MTA *and/or* MUA can verify signatures. That is clearly covered in the protocol document. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL

Re: Phil Zimmerman and voice encryption; a Skype problem?

2006-05-22 Thread Paul Hoffman
. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use

2006-02-24 Thread Paul Hoffman
email -- I even let you choose any secure method that you want. Yes, I could. But I won't bother. :-) --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography

Re: NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use

2006-02-23 Thread Paul Hoffman
actually work but no one uses it. They briefly say why: key management. Not being easy enough to use is quite different than NOT actually working. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-12 Thread Paul Hoffman
at the Paris IETF meeting was that the IETF should *not* propose solutions to the problem. That is why the BOF did not turn into a Working Group and why there has been little discussion of the proposed solutions in the relevant IETF working groups. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: crypto wiki -- good idea, bad idea?

2005-12-12 Thread Paul Hoffman
, but doesn't have the personpower to do so in a predictable fashion. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: RNG implementations and their problems

2005-12-04 Thread Paul Hoffman
and change the paramters to your heart's content (assuming you have root privs). (...Other Linux-specific complaints elided...) --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: [Clips] Banks Seek Better Online-Security Tools

2005-12-03 Thread Paul Hoffman
the willies when I see the security clue of the folks running the site. FWIW, I have never had a problem changing my password to something very long and all-alphabetic, even if I don't include at least one capital letter and one digit or whatever the CYA rules for passwords are these days. --Paul

Re: ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-17 Thread Paul Hoffman
protocol with many within-packet and within-stream dependencies. These cannot be resolved by proper programming tools unless those tools are specifically crafted for IKE. SSL/TLS probably suffers the same fate. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium

Re: ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-15 Thread Paul Hoffman
that it applies to some SSL/TLS implementations, of course using very different malformed packets. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL

Re: ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-15 Thread Paul Hoffman
. Humorously, security folks seem to have ignored this when designing our protocols. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: PKI too confusing to prevent phishing, part 28

2005-09-26 Thread Paul Hoffman
secure. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: ECC patents?

2005-09-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
? --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: ECC patents?

2005-09-13 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 9:32 AM -0700 9/12/05, James A. Donald wrote: It has been a long time, and no one has paid out money on an ECC patent yet. That's pretty bold statement that folks at Certicom might disagree with, even before http://www1.ietf.org/proceedings_new/04nov/slides/saag-2/sld1.htm. --Paul

Re: Another entry in the internet security hall of shame....

2005-09-01 Thread Paul Hoffman
. Bingo. --Paul Hoffman, Director --VPN Consortium - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]