That's a really interesting idea. I'd love to read your paper when it's
available.
On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 10:31 AM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote:
Hi,
I am currently doing a write-up that dives into some of the more formal
aspects of authentication. In particular, I am wondering when
Isn't it obvious? (I mean, there is some value in formalizing the model,
but still...)
Consider authentication of A to B. If there is nothing distinguishing
(impersonator) Mallory from (honest) A, then anything A can do can also be
done by Mallory.
On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 1:31 PM, Ralph Holz
Consider authentication of A to B. If there is nothing distinguishing
(impersonator) Mallory from (honest) A, then anything A can do can also be
done by Mallory.
You still need to know that you want to communicate with someone named
Mallory, which is a piece of information that predates the
My suggestion is that you research the history of (cryptographic)
authentication, mutual authentication (thanks Wikipedia for that phrase)
and MITM. (Maybe you already have done that, though?)
I can at least point out that spy agencies have known for many many decades
that you can not securely
I assume you're talking about confidentiality and authenticity. If all you care
about is authenticity then you can proceed under the assumption that the
channel /may/ be authentic and then later perform the authentication to
retrospectively authenticate it. This is obviously duh, but it's also
Consider a network of N nodes each given an id from 1 to N, each node uses
a protocol where any message it receives it decrypts with it's id. All
messages get sent to every node instantly, and decryption has a very high
cost.
Node A wants to send a message to another node (node A just chooses an
How do the does node A know node B's ID and that the ID is really the one of
the B he/she wants to communicate with? Isn't the ID really just the shared
secret (credentials) Ralph mentions in his question?
--Felix
From: cryptography [mailto:cryptography-boun...@randombit.net] On Behalf Of
From the new Washington Post Article
According to a separate “User’s Guide for PRISM Skype Collection,” that
service can be monitored for audio when one end of the call is a
conventional telephone and for any combination of “audio, video, chat, and
file transfers” when Skype users connect by
