Re: [cryptography] this house believes that user's control over the root list is a placebo

Hi, Any model that offers a security feature to a trivially tiny minority, to the expense of the dominant majority, is daft. The logical conclusion of 1.5 decades worth of experience with centralised root lists is that we, in the aggregate, may as well trust Microsoft and the other root

Re: [cryptography] this house believes that user's control over the root list is a placebo

Hi, The most common security breach is probably that a government or powerful private group launches a man in the middle attack. Are CAs going to report that? Seems unlikely. The key word in your sentence is probably. Just how much is that? I'm not saying I'm not with you in the general

Re: [cryptography] ssh-keys only and EKE for web too (Re: preventing protocol failings)

probably still have to disable password access. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [cryptography] An appropriate image from Diginotar

www.bloemendaal.nl (29 rows) [1] We'll make the datasets public soon-ish. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

[cryptography] Symantec gets it wrong

Hi, I (still) cannot believe how Symantec reacts to the DigiNotar breaches - basically ignoring the known shortcomings: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/why-your-certificate-authority-matters Marketing department speaking, no doubt. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network

Re: [cryptography] Symantec gets it wrong

help you if DigiNotar is hacked afterwards and certificates for your domain issued. I am no good at predicting customer behaviour, but why should customers opt for the more expensive solution then? Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

(it is passive monitoring data from a large regional ISP). In our scanning data, we find that only about 18% of certificates have both a valid chain plus the correct hostname (wildcarded or not) in their CNs or SANs. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

for the Top 1K or so, too, but it does remain a relative popularity. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

. I would also be very interested to hear from where that happened, and if you can give us a traceroute... Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP

[cryptography] MD5 in MACs in SSL

. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

it directly from Windows, maybe polling MS? Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

were valid (chain, host name) for the thus protected login site. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [cryptography] Math corrections

Hi, Are there weaknesses in PKI? Undoubtedly! But, there are failures in every ecosystem. The intelligent response to certificate manufacturing and distribution weaknesses is to improve the quality of the ecosystem - not throw the baby out with the bath-water. And how do you propose to go

Re: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL trusted root CA reliability (S Korea)

Hi, In the EFF dataset of the full IPv4 space, I find 773,512 such certificates. Could these be from the bizarro Korean DIY PKI (the NPKI) that they've implemented? Could you post (or email) some of the certs? I don't think so. Here is a list of COUNT(issuers), issuers from the EFF

Re: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL trusted root CA reliability (S Korea)

://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2011/program.htm Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

[cryptography] Data sets: certificates that are different from two scanning locations

Good day, We have just uploaded the following data sets we mention in our IMC paper. Certificates found different between location China-1 and TUM, Apr 2011 Certificates found different between location China-2 and TUM, Apr 2011 Certificates found different between location Moscow and TUM, Apr

Re: [cryptography] Data sets: certificates that are different from two scanning locations

On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 11:18 PM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de mailto:h...@net.in.tum.de wrote: Good day, We have just uploaded the following data sets we mention in our IMC paper. Certificates found different between location China-1 and TUM, Apr 2011 Certificates

Re: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL trusted root CA reliability (S Korea)

- Sitting ourselfs in different geographic locations when performing data collection should be done using different methods (use of proxy's, people from different countries submitting their certificates views..???). Sorry, I don't quite get that? Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network

Re: [cryptography] fyi: another TLS/SSL certs-in-the-wild survey (Holz et al)

Using Active and Passive Measurements Ralph Holz, Lothar Braun, Nils Kammenhuber, Georg Carle Technische Universität München -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description

Re: [cryptography] really sub-CAs for MitM deep packet inspectors? (Re: Auditable CAs)

). Would the MitM-ing sub-CAs take the fall? (lose license and invested funds) We're actually about to release a little tool that does exactly that, report the encountered MitM for further scrutiny. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität

Re: [cryptography] really sub-CAs for MitM deep packet inspectors? (Re: Auditable CAs)

, and we've just followed up on it. We've proposed a talk at berlinsides, let's see if that works out. :-) Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP

Re: [cryptography] so can we find a public MitM cert sample? (Re: really sub-CAs for MitM deep packet inspectors?)

. :-/ Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography

[cryptography] Another CA hacked, it seems.

Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography

Re: [cryptography] Another CA hacked, it seems.

stand. :-) Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cryptography mailing list

Re: [cryptography] Chrome to drop CRL checking

online revocation checking. -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cryptography mailing list

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

whether they are dropping CAs or not. iang ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

them? -- have not yet publicly stated that they have never issued such certs. I think giving them a chance at amnesty is a better strategy. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

for past mistakes, *and* take precautions they are not repeated. That's a net gain in security for everyone, and that's why I was against kicking out TrustWave. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

-- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cryptography

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

of an unauthorized one, where in this case authorized means the administrator of the client node positively agreed to have that node's traffic MITMed. Yes, fully agreed. But I still think pulling their root would have given the wrong incentive to CAs. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

want clients have to register with our server and obtain an identity. That's a sore point. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF signature.asc

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

back. This is still not too bad DoS-wise, but it allows to send forged traceroute results. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF signature.asc

Re: [cryptography] how many MITM-enabling sub-roots chain up to public-facing CAs ?

, especially the states with a death penalty, and the UK and/or DE? Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital

Re: [cryptography] Duplicate primes in lots of RSA moduli

evidence here. It would be conclusive if they compared keys created with the help of the same source of randomness and primality testers. Interestingly, in their own conclusions section they do not reiterate the above statement. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische

[cryptography] On the duplicate RSA keys issue

Hi, the following blog post, which documents similar efforts, sheds some light, I think: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/nadiah/new-research-theres-no-need-panic-over-factorable-keys-just-mind-your-ps-and-qs Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität

Re: [cryptography] can the German government read PGP and ssh traffic?

in the face of the constitution and actually so badly written it violates some of the really important and very distinct guidelines that the courts have given us. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805

Re: [cryptography] Why using asymmetric crypto like symmetric crypto isn't secure

Hi, In the past there have been a few proposals to use asymmetric cryptosystems, typically RSA, like symmetric ones by keeping the public key secret, the idea behind this being that if the public key isn't known then there isn't anything for an attacker to factor or otherwise attack. Turns

Re: [cryptography] Interactive graph of the CA ecosystem

: That information can be found in the Mozilla spreadsheet that Kathleen Wilson maintains in Google Docs. A Google search of moz.dev.sec.pol should yield it. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München Phone +49 89 28918043 http://www.net.in.tum.de/de

Re: [cryptography] another cert failure

Hi, On 01/05/2013 12:29 PM, Ben Laurie wrote: Unless all the people who saw it happened to be running Chrome, then it seems quite likely it was used maliciously, surely? The problem is that there are many values that both legitimately and maliciously can take. Turktrust's argument seems to be

Re: [cryptography] How much does it cost to start a root CA ?

Hi, Is inclusion of a root CA in the major browsers a shall issue process ? hat is, you meet the criteria and you get in ? Or is it a subjective, political process ? The process varies between browser vendors, with baseline requirements established in the CAB Forum. Audits are usually

Re: [cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)

. But why CT? It is a very useful monitoring tool, and has some advantages over Sovereign Keys. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München Phone +49 89 28918043 http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83

[cryptography] Q: CBC in SSH

? Grateful for any pointers. Thanks, Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München Phone +49 89 28918043 http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [cryptography] someone should make openssh keys expire

Hi, On 04/09/2013 04:05 AM, Tom Ritter wrote: Somebody did ;) http://www.sshark.org/ Could I shamelessly self-advertise our notary service for SSH host keys? ralph@firenze:~$ dig -t TXT 131.159.15.12.cbssh.net.in.tum.de ;; ANSWER SECTION: 131.159.15.12.cbssh.net.in.tum.de. 21600 IN TXT {ip:

Re: [cryptography] Validating cryptographic protocols

The state of the art is represented by: - ProVerif (represent protocols by Horn clauses and analyzes them doing over-approximation) http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/proverif/ - Scyther (symbolic backwards search) http://people.inf.ethz.ch/cremersc/scyther/index.html -

Re: [cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

fixing at the moment. [1] https://addons.mozilla.org/de/firefox/addon/certificate-patrol/ [2] http://www.net.in.tum.de/fileadmin/bibtex/publications/papers/holz_x509forensics_esorics2012.pdf [3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=29h21n-tyfEt=46m26s Ralph -- Ralph Holz I8 - Network Architectures

Re: [cryptography] what has the NSA broken?

that. Ralph -- Ralph Holz I8 - Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ Phone +49.89.289.18043 PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF ___ cryptography mailing list

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] TLS2

the Alexa range. Granted, many of those hosts may not be VHosts. Does Google have better data on that? Ralph -- Ralph Holz I8 - Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ Phone +49.89.289.18043 PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] TLS2

information from zone files (which we have, but I don't have the time to do it). [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication Yes, but our scans back then did not determine deployed server versions. Ralph -- Ralph Holz I8 - Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität

Re: [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides

information that is deeply in the public interest. All the best, Jacob ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography -- Ralph Holz I8 - Network Architectures and Services