On 1/7/13 4:04 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods are
currently known that are reasonably good and don't require districts,
parties, or candidates that are capable of making decisions (I'm
looking at you, asset voting).
I will once again
On 4/14/12 8:31 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 4/14/12 3:45 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Hello!
¿How fare you?
It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster
is on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field
is so polarized that the voters idiotically
On 3/4/12 5:44 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
On Sun, Mar 4, 2012 at 3:44 PM, Richard Fobes
electionmeth...@votefair.org wrote:
Finally, after reading the articles cited by Warren Smith (listed at the
bottom of this reply) plus some related articles, I can reply to his
insistence that
Someone set up an online poll on CIVS regarding people's favorite voting
methods. The results are tabulated using Condorcet methods but the
ballots are available in case you want to analyze them with some other
method. It permits write-ins, too.
To vote or to see the results, go to:
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Rob LeGrand wrote:
Markus wrote:
the runtime to calculate the strongest path from
every candidate to every other candidate is O(C^3).
However, the runtime to sort O(C^2) pairwise defeats
is already O(C^4). So you cannot get a faster
algorithm by sorting the pairwise defeats.
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, matt welland wrote:
A ranked system cannot give the feedback that all the candidates are
disliked (e.g. all candidates get less than 50% approval). It also
cannot feedback that all the candidates are essentially equivalent (all
have very high approval)
Ironically by
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Michael Allan wrote:
Dear Juho and Fred,
Your vote never made a difference. Most people feel uncomfortable
or perplexed in this knowledge, and I think the feeling indicates
that something's wrong.
Juho Laatu wrote:
I'm not sure that most people feel uncomfortable with
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
Dodgson and Kemeny done right (F.W.Simmons)
-Warren D. Smith, Sept 2011--
Simmons claims he had posted something called Dodgson done right
which gets around the problem that with Dodgson voting it is NP-hard
to find the winner,
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
It is simply false to say SODA's simplicity (for either the voter, or
the counters)
beats any other system I know of.
It is less simple than plain approval voting. Full stop.
If you persist in making ludicrous statements, then you will hurt your
Python is a bit nicer than Perl, but if you implement your voting method
in Perl, you can plug it into CIVS. Then people can and will start using
it for real polls.
For the software see:
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/w8/~andru/civs/changelog.html
Cheers,
-- Andrew
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Juho
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
As I wrote a couple days ago, I strongly suspect that any vote
counting rules beyond simple addition will be extremely difficult to
sell on a large scale. IRV may be a counterexample, but I suspect that
(1) it has only been adopted in very liberal
On 7/7/11 3:54 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you
probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up
and put things in perspective.
Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and
they have been
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
...I eventually realized I was kidding myself to think that those
schemes will ever see the light of day in major public elections. What
is the limit of complexity that the general public will accept on a
large scale? I don't know, but I have my doubts
On 7/22/64 11:59 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 24, 2011, at 6:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
About six years ago Toby Nixon asked the members of this EM list for a
advice on what election method
to try propose in the Washington State Legislature. He finally settled
on CSSD beatpath. As near
James Green-Armytage asked
Quick question for everyone: Do you happen to know when the method
described in the subject line (eliminate the plurality loser until
there is a Condorcet winner) was first proposed?
This idea is implemented as part of the CIVS voting service, where it is
called
On 1/30/11 2:39 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Strike my previous reply... Didn't notice that #6 pairwise beat #1,
but pairwise lost to #2-#5.
Here's a case where I'd actually like to see instead of the pairwise
matrix the matrix that shows counts of votes for #1, #2, ... #5. In
particular, which is
wrote:
How is #1 not a Condorcet Winner, since #1 pairwise-beats every other
alternative?
*From:* election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] *On Behalf Of
*Andrew
Here is an unusual case from a real poll run recently by a group using
CIVS. Usually there is a Condorcet winner, but not this time. Who should
win?
Ranked pairs says #1, and ranks the six choices as shown. It only has to
reverse one preference. Schulze says #2, because it beats #6 by 15-11,
I thought people might find these useful/fun to look at. Click on show
details to get access to the ballots where available.
12 Modern Philosophers: Which Ones Are Likely to be Read in 100 Years?
(13 choices, 413+ voters, ballots available)
Peter,
Thanks for your comments. I'll address them inline.
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear Andrew Myers,
this method looks interesting, as it is proportional, Condorcet and non
STV-like.
You write on your web-page, that: the correctness of the algorithm
depends
If you are looking for a proportional Condorcet method, I will also
recommend the proportional election method that I developed. It is not
STV-like, but it achieves proportionality when there are blocs of
voters. It has the added advantage that it is already built into a
running Internet
it worked in the Soviet Union, and I'm sure the Czechs are familiar with
the history.
-- Andrew
-
Andrew Myers
Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Asset doesn't resemble what the Soviets had in the least There is
no party control, parties become unnecessary with Asset.
Abd,
The phrase parties become unnecessary is redolent of utopian idealism.
Parties will exist. Or do you think somehow
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
However, I strongly urge people who attempt to analyze the situation
and to propose reforms to:
1. Keep it simple. An extraordinarily powerful system for fully
proportional representation consisting of a seemingly-simple tweak on
Single
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Warren Smith has a copy of Tideman's election archive, as well as some
other data, here: http://rangevoting.org/TidemanData.html
I haven't run the data through my simulator yet, but it seems cycles
are rare.
There's also a database of STV elections at
Warren Smith wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm asked me what proportional representation (PR) means.
At this time it is probably unwise to make a too-precise definition
since every PR voting method seems to obey a different proportionality
theorem. I say you should just assess each theorem on a
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Notice that the requirement of Arrow that social preferences be
insensitive to variations in the intensity of preferences was
preposterous. Arrow apparently insisted on this because he believed
that it was impossible to come up with any objective measure of
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal
(vs cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it
preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
Arrow's Theorem seems like a red herring in the context of the
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't have his proof in front of me (I'm on the road), but I'm pretty sure
that it assumes ordinal ranking.
It seems fairly obvious that the theorem also holds for ratings, because
ratings can be projected onto rankings without affecting any of Arrow's
criteria.
I thought people might enjoy seeing what happens when you have roughly a
thousand people rank-order 48 candidates, and combine the results with
various Condorcet methods. In this case, it's an attempt to determine
the 20 most influential philosophers of all time.
Juho wrote:
Use of arbitrary preferences is interesting but rather theoretical,
and the changes in the outcome might be marginal (at least in typical
public elections). Any more reasons why it should be allowed?
(In regular public elections also the complexity of the ballots might
be a
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