.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hello,
--- En date de : Lun 22.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
At 12:56 AM 12/21/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
[starts with Venzke, then my response, then his]
Mean utility
wish to cast a meaningful vote have
no difficulty in doing so.
If Approval polls prove relatively unable to whittle the field down to
two frontrunners, I would expect more votes on principle and (with it)
more waste of votes.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
insincerity (and thus destroy more
information) than failing monotonicity.
IRV has other issues that can lead to a different conclusion, but that
isn't what I was discussing.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
is easy?
I could conceivably program some voters to insist on being sincere.
(In whatever sense that it is not sincere to vote also for C.) But
it seems to me that this type of voter is a bad thing for Approval,
just as it is under Plurality.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list
for D disappear.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
it more
responsive.
My feeling lately is that it might be better to arrange the incentives
of a method so that a third candidate is likely to be able to gather
enough support, as opposed to simply getting rid of all barriers to
entry, which could tend to leave the two frontrunners unharmed.
Kevin
PROTECTED]
Date: Jeudi 4 Décembre 2008, 13h23
At 09:07 PM 12/2/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
This is the relatively objective method of
assessing election outcome. When it's
easy to
determine, in a real situation, the absolute
individual
voter utilities, fully sincere Range
Voting
don't think it is a step backwards, I can imagine some arguments
against it. I think of the reasons why FPP isn't as bad as it ought to
be in theory, and consider which of those reasons might not apply under
Approval.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
decisions.
This is the implication of the argument that we should
prevent strategic voting as it applies to Range.
To be continued.
Ok.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
determine whether you
are specifically trying to answer them, at any point in time.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
in the first place. It seems to me I'd
rather state why A's original win should be guaranteed. (I think this
direction may lead to SFC or votes-only SFC.)
All things being equal it is desirable, of course.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
argue about what
the sincere vote is, not whether Approval supports the concept at all.
We would find a similar problem if we granted the idea of sincere
cyclical preferences, and then wanted to analyze rank ballot methods
and what sincerity must mean there.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods
Hi Jonathan,
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
It's not an unreasonable
conjecture that Bayrou would have gotten a larger percentage
of first choices (some from Sarkozy and Royal) under IRV.
Could you explain this viewpoint?
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
.
For the latter, I don't think it's clear that if Condorcet can't succeed,
nothing can.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
useful
theory is Range based on? What makes it objective and ideal if not
what I stated above?
I also wonder, what, theoretically, does it look like when Range fails
and gives a poor result. Is such a thing allowed?
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
transitive ranking
of the candidates. Maybe it's harder to believe, but it can't be
disproven. (Though, I don't really think it is harder to believe,
since approval has a plain English meaning.)
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
if nominations can be made directly).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
already say that you
won't win).
There may be something about San Francisco elections that I'm not aware
of.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that it has been
a good thing that the elections have not been conducted by a single
authority.
It's possible to imagine a different American history, if the federal
government had been in a position to cancel or postpone or manipulate the
presidential election.
Kevin Venzke
Election
doesn't allow it any
other way (such as if this is the bottom of the ballot and you can't
approve all candidates).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
. districted single winner contests
2. party-based systems
3. mutlwinner methods
4. delegation
When you use the term parliament, I guess you're only referring to
a legislature to whom the executive is responsible?
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Your suggested possibilities had best have STRONG arguments
to overpower
known facts:
Yes, I'm aware of this.
Kevin Venzke
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Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:29 PM, Kevin Venzke
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Actually even if exactly one candidate had majority
approval, that would
not guarantee that they would win a runoff.
It would depend
calling Possible Approval
Winner (PAW).
35: A
10: A=B
30: BC
25: C
This example is from Kevin Venzke, which he gave to show
that Schulze (also) elects
B and so fails this criterion. It doesn't bother me
very much. MCA and Bucklin elect C.
It's an interesting question I think
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 18.10.08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Given a Condorcet cycle, how does anyone justify awarding a
winner outside?
Two possibilities:
1. to simplify the definition of the method
2. to satisfy other strategy criteria.
Kevin Venzke
would have to be clone
negative.
If you define best candidate according to first round first preferences
then it's unclear why you would have a runoff at all.
The second method isn't clone-independent either, given the possibility
that B could defeat a single A, but lose if A is cloned.
Kevin
A clarification:
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
In the example mentioned, it didn't seem to me that
anybody had majority
approval, in which case it isn't clear who would win a
runoff.
Actually even if exactly one candidate had majority approval
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the
method was to simply
have a runoff between the top two approved candidates
good at strategizing on your behalf
(for all
voters), that it wouldn't pay off to try to manually
use strategy.
Many methods are designed with this goal of course. I could think of this
as the mentality behind the Condorcet criterion.
Kevin Venzke
candidates. Otherwise Condorcet//Approval is not too good here.)
Also, my Improved Condorcet Approval method, does not have favorite
betrayal incentive. However, it's not as nice to explain, and it doesn't
completely satisfy Condorcet.
Kevin Venzke
__
Do
to find a
winner.
What's the difference? The Copeland winner wins, and
approval is used
as the tie-break?
The difference is that in C//A you do not have to be in the Smith set to
win.
Kevin Venzke
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Voting is also very bad. It fails Majority
Favourite and Rich Party
(meaning that it fails Clone-Loser in a way that advantages
factions who field
more candidates).
Just like Antiplurality.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
at least some choice the voters can still make, in the
second round.
But this means more candidates can be nominated. And that means that it
may be somewhat arbitrary which candidates end up as the finalists.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
preference only receives a 60%. Does that mean his top preference is
only 60% of a first preference?
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Jeu 16.10.08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
De: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Objet: Re: [EM] Strategic Voting and Simulating It
À: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Jeudi 16 Octobre 2008, 4h55
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 2:23 AM, Kevin Venzke
method will elect a compromise more often in the absence of a majority
solidly committed to a single candidate, than the method which is not
majoritarian. I am assuming voters are strategic.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
. Equality of
preference and truncation are not implemented, so that many popular
methods cannot even be tested without ignoring their capabilities.
Nomination (dis)incentives can't be examined either.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
of the criterion that doesn't refer to first
preferences. Even your definition refers to first preferences.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
,
hence allowing a
candidate with a majority to in fact lose.
This is avoided by defining the majority criterion to refer to strict
first preferences.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
additional candidates who probably
can't win.
However, I doubt TTR is similar to IRV with respect to nomination
incentive.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that the subsequent voters sound so ready to vote for
whoever is a current frontrunner, when that frontrunner status might be
based on nothing but luck, from getting votes early.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
it as highly useful.
I am not very optimistic about any very expressive ballot formats,
actually. Allowing desired voter behavior isn't the same as encouraging it,
and I think simpler ballots are better for the latter.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
is your introduction to voting systems? I am a little
curious where the Range advocates come from.
Kevin Venzke
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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that truncation will not be used.
(One more reason why A voters should not use burial
strategy is that
if C is stronger than expected then their strategy might
also lead to
electing C instead of B.
If there's any possibility of this scenario, I don't believe people would
use burial.
Kevin Venzke
, essentially
ranking the unknown option above the competition, I consider it hardly
any different from using burial strategy, in terms of its destructive
effect on the outcome.
Kevin Venzke
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virtually
all the time. The only thing you give up is the novelty of being able
to say that voters can and should rank everybody they can. Personally I'd
rather have the method just work well, than have maximum expressiveness.
Kevin Venzke
these issues.
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the alternatives would and should
accomplish nothing (unless you support the third candidate). The only
reason to ask these voters to do that is that it would be nice if we could
say it worked. As strategy advice in this scenario I think it is poor.
Kevin Venzke
Hi,
I didn't realize Chris' last message to me was posted to the list.
Here is my response to it:
--- En date de : Mar 17.6.08, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
De: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Objet: Re: [Election-Methods] Reducing 3-cand elections to 8 scenarios
À: Chris Benham
to win when the two major parties select
candidates who are out of touch with the voters.
Just some ideas.
Kevin Venzke
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Election
that it
does?
Specifically it seems to me that if you just elect the top X FPP candidates
in an X-seat election, you maximize the number of voters that got their
favorite elected.
Kevin Venzke
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Hi,
--- Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Apr 17, 2008, at 16:39 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
The claim that I don't recall having seen before is that in
Range and
Approval it makes sense to the parties not to nominate multiple
candidates.
I've made this claim as well. When
on a 1D spectrum, I'd say
that's ok. The first problem is self-correcting, and the second one
shouldn't be all that common.
Kevin Venzke
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artificially votes C=bottom (but aside from that, all votes
unchanged). Here C denotes the Black-winner with honest votes. Then: with
probability#8594;100% in the #voters#8594;#8734; limit, the new winner
will be neither
C nor X. And when it is not X, that means burial does not work.
Kevin Venzke
, and did not vary by voter. Thus the fact
that candidates 0 and 1 are considered frontrunners is not a strategic
decision made by the voters, it is the information provided to them.
Kevin Venzke
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their strategy based on this arbitrary information, you can see
how the method behaves then voters have very flawed information. It is a
worst case as I already said. Obviously this is not the sole situation
under which strategy should be studied.
Kevin Venzke
is friendly to it. I'm not
totally sure.
As far as my strategy simulation is concerned, this rule change raises the
question of how voters should evaluate the possibility that they elevate a
candidate to the top spot on first preferences only to see him lose due to
pairwise opposition.
Kevin Venzke
Chris,
--- Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin,
Kevin Venzke wrote:
As far as my strategy simulation is concerned, this rule change raises
the
question of how voters should evaluate the possibility that they elevate
a
candidate to the top spot on first preferences only
and
should realize that when they alter their votes, they have a big effect on
the outcome. This can be helped somewhat by running with more factions.
That's all I've got for now.
Kevin Venzke
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this is a somewhat interesting read. Any thoughts?
Kevin Venzke
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this to be
interpreted as have the government make this decision not let the other
voters make this decision.
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to dodge responsibility or give the decision more
legitimacy. To prevent gaming the procedure I would prefer that the measure
can't be passed (or definitively defeated) only by a small number of voters
who strongly support (or oppose) it.
Kevin Venzke
Daniel,
--- daniel radetsky [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Jan 10, 2008 7:46 PM, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Plenty of incompatibilities have been proven at least with rank ballot
methods.
Well, there you go.
I doubt there's good reason to be optimistic about getting
of incompatibilities have been proven at least with rank ballot
methods. I doubt there's good reason to be optimistic about getting around
many of these incompatibilities by changing the ballot type.
Maybe you have something specific in mind though.
Kevin Venzke
) at preventing the strategy
from working.
Any thoughts?
Kevin Venzke
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information is on the new ballot. I can barely think how to do this, let
alone how to do it when Smith compliance is also needed.
Kevin Venzke
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the method does its best to get you what you want.
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that it's debatable?
You should remember from past discussions why the claim that Condorcet
voting ... is nowhere near as utilitarian as range voting was criticized.
Ask Warren.
Kevin Venzke
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and Preference) they
also propose Bucklin, understanding that all ranked candidates should be
considered approved.
From the abstract and introduction: Information on the rankings and
information on the approval of candidates in an election ... are [both]
important in the determination of social choices.
Kevin
if I
could not stand to the side as an observer and agree that the method gave
proper results.
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rank B at all, B can still win.
Here is a simple example:
7 BC
5 C
8 A
What do you think? Is there good evidence and logic available for a method
to decide that B is the best candidate to win?
Kevin Venzke
_
Ne
(serious) method with more straight-forward strategy
than Approval.
This weekend I'm trying to design a simulation to examine strategy under
two-round runoff methods and am finding it very tricky.
Kevin Venzke
_
Ne
under any method, let alone ALL methods.
And while you'd be discussing this, the lawyers on the other side would be
pointing out that Range can fail to elect the voted first preference of a
majority. This issue would be a significant hurdle, do you agree?
Kevin Venzke
to find other Condorcet
methods that satisfy criteria that they don't.
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it to the second round but loses,
have I been treated unequally because I never had a chance to vote for my
second preference?
I guess one could hold such opinions, but top-two runoff is not such a rare
method in the world.
Kevin Venzke
are
contingency choices) would paint a broader picture about IRV, but the
fact that e.g. Dave Ketchum doesn't value these advantages, doesn't in my
mind undermine his criticisms...
Kevin Venzke
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Hi Kathy,
--- Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2007 19:33:27 +0100 (CET)
From: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Election-Methods] RE : Re: IRV ballot is at least as fair as
FPTPballot
Yes some voters have second-choice considered
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
At 11:18 PM 12/23/2007, rob brown wrote:
On Dec 23, 2007 7:28 PM, Kevin Venzke
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
For Range to work as well as hoped, it is important that voters do *not*
realize how to vote effectively
exception. Maybe Bucklin.
But I don't think any pairwise-oriented method would stand a chance of
meeting your criteria if IRV doesn't.
Kevin Venzke
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Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
At 09:47 AM 12/25/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
[...] Range, voted with full strategic
effect, reduces to Approval Voting, which may reduce to bullet
voting. It *still* is not Plurality, because it only takes a few
percent of voters
to do better than this.
For Range to work as well as hoped, it is important that voters do *not*
realize how to vote effectively. Or, that they choose not to.
Kevin Venzke
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Condorcet than under IRV.
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substantially change the situation by using a
different multi-winner rule, though. It's more a characteristic of this
pairing of ballot format and purpose.
I'm not sure what a good analogy would be in the single-winner case.
Kevin Venzke
utility
or at least distribute it more evenly, over time.
Kevin Venzke
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occurrence of favorite betrayal incentive under
it...
I could not support a Borda-based method because Borda's mechanism strikes
me as unreasonable. It doesn't make sense for scoring to be dependent upon
the number of candidates representing some policy.
Kevin Venzke
).
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legitimacy of the winner.
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it.
Note that under WV, the optimal strategy doesn't depend on estimating what
the C voters will do.
I plan to tinker with the scenario tomorrow and see if I can find anything
else of interest.
Kevin Venzke
_
Ne
do.
It's sort of a prisoner's dilemma, since the A and C factions are both
happier on average if they agree to an AC coin flip.
Kevin Venzke
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A to B.
In this case? Doesn't it matter what you do with the information? I'm not
a fan of letting voters provide more data if the method won't do anything
with it.
Kevin Venzke
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that Bucklin fails monotonicity? Are you assuming a certain
treatment of equal rankings?
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Election
; 5644 AC; 5446
BA.
A wins the cycle because A's loss to B is the weakest loss.
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-en/jne/BR/case-studies/esy_br
http://countrystudies.us/brazil/100.htm
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/desposato.pdf
Kevin Venzke
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Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
At 01:16 PM 9/28/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
If that were shown to be incorrect, though, then at least James
Green-Armytage's article could be usefully cited on this topic. I don't
think he mentions IRV specifically, but he discusses
James,
--- James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin Venzke Sent: 28 September 2007 15:23
What are the best articles or books that can be cited here?
Voting Matters is not highly respected on Wikipedia.
Kevin, could you please elaborate on your comment about Voting matters
Hello,
What are the best articles or books that can be cited here? Voting Matters
is not highly respected on Wikipedia.
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
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Howard,
--- Howard Swerdfeger [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Not peer review, but Ka ping yee of...
http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
has run sum simulations of election systems in 2d space
and it shows quite a few problems with IRV.
these guys (warren smith) also have some Yee diagrams
Rob,
--- Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin Venzke wrote:
The defeats are AB, BC, A=C. What reasoning do you use to find that
B and C are in the Landau set? I gather I don't have a complete
understanding of what Landau refers to, but I'm very surprised if the
definition
it becomes an Approval election with two Approvals allowed.
And if this does not produce a majority winner, then the third rank
was added in as well.
Is this sort of information regarding U.S. Bucklin elections available
online? How did you get it?
Kevin Venzke
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