Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality (Dave Ketchum)

Kathy Dopp wrote: On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 2:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: results. Generally, voting security people like to use audits that select a sample of votes and look for errors, then they use statistical analysis to estimate the overall error in result probability. That's not nearl

Re: [EM] Pirate Party of Sweden adopts the Schulze method

Juho wrote: They also said: > Condorcet-Schultze med 30% kvotering = Condorcet-Schultze with 30% quotas I just wonder if that adds something to the basic Schulze method. That means that 30% of the people on the list has to have some property. I'm not sure what that property is, but I guess

Re: [EM] Pirate Party of Sweden adopts the Schulze method

Raph Frank wrote: Is it a pure condorcet ordering, or are they adding any PR elements to the list? Using google translate (which did a pretty good job), on those threads, they say it is decided "According to a variant of the Condorcet / Single-Transferable-Vote named Schultz method. Full källko

Re: [EM] just to let you know ...

Juho wrote: In Burlington at least the arguments for Condorcet should be straight forward. People are already ok with ranked ballot based voting. Many of them may feel that in the last election the Condorcet winner should have won. From this point of view Condorcet is just a small modification

Re: [EM] Sincere Condorcet Cycles

robert bristow-johnson wrote: I think it would be possible to replace the points with Gaussians and still have a cyclical outcome. Yes. This means that the strange looking scenario where all the voters are exactly at the same opinion space points as the candidates is not totally unrealistic

Re: [EM] Sincere Condorcet Cycles

I'll get to the rest later, but: robert bristow-johnson wrote: To take an 1D example, the society would be like this: ###### # # ## 0-A--B-1 whereas a "centrist" society is like this: ## ## ##

Re: [EM] Sincere Condorcet Cycles

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Dec 14, 2009, at 12:06 AM, Dan Bishop wrote: robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Dec 13, 2009, at 7:53 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Here's a natural scenario that yields an exact Condorcet Tie: A together with 39 supporters at the point (0,2) B together with

Re: [EM] First Condorcet cycle ever spotted in a national presidential election (!?! apparently)

Warren Smith wrote: I am currently working on writing a paper on this election. In the event you or anybody can find more poll data, that'd help. I'd be especially interested if anybody can find a range-voting-style poll. I'm handicapped by lack of knowledge of the Romanian language. If I'm

Re: [EM] First Condorcet cycle ever spotted in a national presidential election (!?! apparently)

Warren Smith wrote: Hello. It appears the Romanian 2009 presidential election, which just (allegedly) ended with Basescu winning re-election, involved two different Condorcet top-cycles involving 4 candidates. The winner Basescu (elected via plurality+top2runoff) unfortunately probably was the w

Re: [EM] Election Goals & Methods - a review

Dave Ketchum wrote: Runoffs: Essential with FPTP unless one candidate receives a majority vote, for there is too great a chance for best-liked to not receive the most votes. Top-two runoff weakness is the chance for FPTP to have seen true best-liked as third. Of less value for methods that

[EM] Multiwinner unanimity criteria

Here are two multiwinner election criteria: 1. Weak unanimous subelection criterion. If the election is for p seats, and a set of the same (p-1) candidates are ranked above all others by every voter, then the method should pick those (p-1) candidates and elect the remaining candidate by the si

Re: [EM] IRV is best method meeting 'later no harm'?

sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu wrote: Can it be said that Later No Harm (LNH) is satisfied by the variation of IRV that allows candidates to withdraw from contention after the votes are cast? I'm not sure. In the wider picture, the candidates would use the ballot data in order to determine whether

Re: [EM] Helping a candidate in the case of ties

Dave Ketchum wrote: Of course, you have to read the voter's mind to know if the change might have been seen as desirable. I was into tactics. So was I. Consider the monotonicity (mono-raise) criterion, which is defined as: "raising a candidate x on some ballots on which x is listed should n

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Nov 25, 2009, at 3:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: robert bristow-johnson wrote: my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if the case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am dubious about). where there is a Condorcet

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

robert bristow-johnson wrote: my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if the case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am dubious about). where there is a Condorcet winner and that person is elected, is there still possible later harm? As far as I remember,

Re: [EM] IRV is best method meeting 'later no harm'?

Warren Smith wrote: Are there any other voting methods besides IRV, meeting the 'later no harm' criterion? Woodall's Descending Solid Coalitions method does. Minmax(pairwise opposition) also does, but it has an awful Plurality failure: 1000: A 1:A=C 1:B=C 1000: B and C wins in MMPO.

Re: [EM] Helping a candidate in the case of ties

Dave Ketchum wrote: This is more detailed work, depending on precise knowledge. Also gets tricky since many changes affect more than one pair of candidates. For a simple example where helping A in A vs B, without disturbing their relationship to other candidates, will help C (could be hoping

[EM] Helping a candidate in the case of ties

It's fairly straightforward to define whether a candidate is helped after a change of ballots if "helping" is limited to win/not win: if the candidate wasn't in the set of winners (ranked first on the social ordering), but is after the modification, the candidate was helped. It is also not that

Re: [EM] strategy-free Condorcet method after all!

would occur. Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: ... I haven't run the data through my simulator yet, but it seems cycles are rare. i have to confess that i am less worked up about what pathologies would result from a Condorcet cycle than i am about what pathologies result from FPTP or IRV (or

Re: [EM] strategy-free Condorcet method after all!

Andrew Myers wrote: I have ballot data from about 1500 elections run using CIVS. But I haven't had the time to write software to package it up nicely. Could you use CIVS itself to quickly determine how many of them had proper Condorcet winners (i.e. Smith set of cardinality one)? That might b

Re: [EM] strategy-free Condorcet method after all!

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Nov 23, 2009, at 1:43 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote: Seems to me that cycles can occur even with sincerity - they relate to conflict among three or more voter views. sure, they "can". but i still question the prevalence of such happening. and with the other me

[EM] n-th order Copeland questions

Call the "iterated" Copeland variant I've mentioned, n-th order Copeland when it's iterated n times. First order Copeland is simply ordinary Copeland. Each such nth order Copeland can be assigned a win and tie multiplier. Call the fully specified variant, (a, b, c)-Copeland, where a is the n

[EM] Does this method have a name, pt II

As part of coding my simulator, I have implemented a Condorcet method that goes like this: A candidate X's victory score is equal to the sum of all victories of X against other candidates. If the pairwise matrix is d, and d[A,B] is the number of voters preferring A to B, then the victory of X

Re: [EM] Another auto districting proposal (Crystal districting?)

Juho wrote: Well, this approach is also complex in the sense that the general optimization algorithms may be as complex as you want, but the optimization algorithms are totally independent of the politics and the basic rules that determine what the final outcome should be (the criterion) can b

Re: [EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying "participation" criterion?

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 01:08 PM 11/17/2009, Warren Smith wrote: It is "fair" if symmetric under permuting the candidates and voters. Conjecture: there does not exist a fair multiwinner proportional representation voting method obeying participation. I don't know how to apply "fair."

Re: [EM] What does "proportional representation" MEAN? And list of known PR methods (know any more?)

Warren Smith wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm asked me what "proportional representation" (PR) means. At this time it is probably unwise to make a too-precise definition since every PR voting method seems to obey a different proportionality theorem. I say you should just assess each th

Re: [EM] Dectecting Clone Sets

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Here's a suggestion for detecting clone sets based on Range Ballots: Define the distance between two candidates as the square root of the sum (over the ballots) of the squared diffference of their respective ratings. If the ballots are approval style, this becomes the sq

[EM] Question regarding Copeland variant

Consider this "iterated Copeland" variant: For the zeroth iteration, each candidate has a score of one. For the nth iteration, set each candidate's score equal to twice the (n-1)th iteration scores of the candidates it beats, plus the scores of the candidates it ties. The winner for the n-th

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

Raph Frank wrote: On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 8:11 PM, Jobst Heitzig wrote: Hello Kristofer, Assume (for the sake of simplicity) that we can get ranked information from the voters. What difference would a SEC with Random Pair make, with respect to Random Ballot? This sounds interesting, but what

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

Jobst Heitzig wrote: Hello Kristofer, you wrote: You could probably devise a whole class of SEC-type methods. They would go: if there is a consensus (defined in some fashion), then it wins - otherwise, a nondeterministic strategy-free method is used to pick the winner. The advantage of yours

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Kristofer, both Approval Voting and Range Voting *are* majoritarian: A majority can always get their will and suppress the minority by simply bullet-voting. So, a more interesting version of your question could be: Which *democratic* method (that does not allow any sub

Re: [EM] NESD and NESD* properties of a single-winner voting method

Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Warren, I don't seem to understand the definition: A single-winner voting system "fails the NESD property" if, when every honest voter changes their vote to rank A top and B bottom (or B top and A bottom; depends on the voter which way she goes), leaving it otherwise u

Re: [EM] About non-monotonicity and non-responding to previous posts...

Dave Ketchum wrote: Trying some fresh thinking for Condorcet, and what anyone should be able to see in the X*X array. I am ignoring labels such as Schulze and Ranked Pairs - this is human-doable and minimal effort - especially with normally having a CW and most cycles having the minimal three

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting? (long)

Matthew Welland wrote: So, to re-frame my question. What is the fatal flaw with approval? I'm not interested in subtle flaws that result in imperfect results. I'm interested in flaws that result in big problems such as those we see with plurality and IRV. IMHO, it is that you need concurrent

Re: [EM] About non-monotonicity and non-responding to previous posts...

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Nov 5, 2009, at 1:35 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: robert bristow-johnson wrote: i don't think a sequence of elimination rounds would be okay, but the method of picking the biggest loser for each round needs to be debated. i am not sure what wou

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

Warren Smith wrote: It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal improvement of other methods is fairly small. Can anyone point me to analysis, preferably at a layman level, that contradicts or supports this

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

Raph Frank wrote: On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 8:12 PM, Matthew Welland wrote: It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal improvement of other methods is fairly small. The recommended strategy in approval is

Re: [EM] Brian Olson's multiwinner IRNR idea seems busted

Warren Smith wrote: I sent Brian what I believe is a counterexample to proportionality for both his suggested method, and a wide class of ways to try to generalize it. I won't give the details here, since mixed in with a lot of other crud I emailed him. But quickie crude sketch is: Consider 2

Re: [EM] Proportional Representation from Ratings Ballots

Warren Smith wrote: On 11/5/09, Warren Smith wrote: --Olson's method fails. Suppose voter #1 votes (1,0,0,0,...0) "plurality style". If canddt#1 is eliminated, the ballot then becomes unnormalizable. I assume Olson deals with that by throwing it in the garbage. More seriously: If canddt#1 inste

Re: [EM] STV - the transferrable part is OK (fair), the sequential round elimination is not

Raph Frank wrote: On Tue, Nov 3, 2009 at 7:41 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Raph Frank wrote: If there are 5 seats and you have 20%+ of the votes, you are guaranteed to get 1 seat under both d'Hondt and Droop. There is a typo there, I meant 4 seats and 20%+ (I replied in a diff

Re: [EM] STV - the transferrable part is OK (fair), the sequential round elimination is not

James Gilmour wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm > Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2009 3:27 PM Juho wrote: If one really wants a two-party system and doesn't want voters to change that fact then one could ban third parties and accept only two. That would solve the spoiler problem :-). Who

Re: [EM] STV - the transferrable part is OK (fair), the sequential round elimination is not

Juho wrote: If one really wants a two-party system and doesn't want voters to change that fact then one could ban third parties and accept only two. That would solve the spoiler problem :-). Who is this "one"? Since that one is at odds with the voters, that's not very democratic, is it? I gu

Re: [EM] STV - the transferrable part is OK (fair), the sequential round elimination is not

Raph Frank wrote: On Mon, Nov 2, 2009 at 8:56 PM, Juho wrote: I agree that DPC is a nice criterion. In practice I'm not that strict since I believe also methods that are close to DPC work quite well. For example basic d'Hondt with party lists may be close enough to PR although that method sli

Re: [EM] STV - the transferrable part is OK (fair), the sequential round elimination is not

Juho wrote: On Nov 2, 2009, at 4:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote: Is this acceptable PR? I hope your answer is "of course not" (if it isn't, we can have that discussion). I note that a two-party system can be seen as one style of democracy that may be chosen intentionally. But if the target is

Re: [EM] STV - the transferrable part is OK (fair), the sequential round elimination is not

James Gilmour wrote: Kathy Dopp > Sent: Friday, October 30, 2009 4:45 PM A fair proportional multiseat STV representation system could be made by eliminating STV's elimination rounds but using the rank choices to transfer partial votes to a 2nd choice candidate in cases where more voters than n

[EM] A less artificial multiwinner Kemeny method

In an earlier message, "A multiwinner election method based on Kemeny", I detailed an extension of the idea of Kemeny-Young to handle multiple winners, by assigning each voter to a candidate rank to which the Kemeny distance between his ballot and the candidate rank was the least, and using the

[EM] Divisor method equivalence

Hello all, Could someone show me a proof of how the Sainte-Laguë and Webster's method are equivalent? On the surface of it, each method has an approach that's quite different from the other: Sainte-Laguë divides subsequently by (1, 3, 5, 7, etc), while Webster's finds the correct divisor/mult

Re: [EM] Bolting proportionality onto the Kemeny method

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Then a. is closest to 32 and b. is closest to 68, and with two to elect and the Droop quota being 33.3^, the two winners should come from a. (C and D). Okay, that teaches me not to write while tired. This should be: the two winners should come from b", sin

[EM] Bolting proportionality onto the Kemeny method

Here's a way of "bolting on" proportionality or PR behavior to the multiwinner Kemeny method I described earlier. I call it "bolting on" because it's fairly rudimentary and not very elegant, but it could in principle be used for any type of proportionality: As you may recall, the multiwinner K

Re: [EM] A multiwinner election method based on Kemeny

Jameson Quinn wrote: What if you have to elect two with the following voters: 99: A>B>C 1: C>B>A The two winning orders are A>B>C and C>B>A - sum of distances is 0. So A and C win. Yet I think most of us would agree that the correct proportional winners are A and B. I see your point. The pr

[EM] A multiwinner election method based on Kemeny

I continue to tinker with vector quantization, and in doing so, I've found a multiwinner version of Kemeny. Some of the ideas for it, I've mentioned before, but it might still be useful. As with Kemeny, we define the Kemeny distance metric between two orders to be the sum of pairs where the orde

Re: [EM] Summable opinion space discovery.

Dan Bishop wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: While trying to find a solution to another problem, I discovered something that might be used to opinion space from ballots (and the candidates' position in that space) in a summable manner. Consider a rating- or approval matrix m, wh

[EM] Summable opinion space discovery.

While trying to find a solution to another problem, I discovered something that might be used to opinion space from ballots (and the candidates' position in that space) in a summable manner. Consider a rating- or approval matrix m, where m{voter_1, A} is voter_1's rating or approval (0 or 1) o

[EM] Staggering elections (was: Re: Holding byelections with PR-STV)

Raph Frank wrote: On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 9:22 PM, Juho wrote: The hysteresis function may increase the strategic opportunities since voters could trust that old representatives will be elected in any case and they could try free riding. But in real life small hysteresis may well not be too pro

[EM] Strategy question

In Plurality, the correct strategy is to vote for the frontrunner that's closest to your point of view, so as not to split the vote. Now, my question is: what is the correct strategy with a voting system that gives you two votes of equal weight? Assume access to a poll so the voters know who th

Re: [EM] Range Voting "unbeatable"?

Raph Frank wrote: However, can minimax be applied in a single step "game"? Sure. Consider the dictator game: the first player proposes a share of an integer amount of money, and the second either agrees or disagrees. If the second agrees, he gets (total - share) and the first gets share, oth

Re: [EM] Range Voting "unbeatable"?

Raph Frank wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:10 PM, Warren Smith wrote: What you could do is take a "poll" and have 10 random voters. You then work out optimal assuming that they are the electorate. --there is no such thing as "optimal strategy" in games with >=3 players. Game theory breaks do

Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 62, Issue 10

James Gilmour wrote: It is extremely important to refer to STV as the SINGLE Transferable Vote, because each voter must have only one vote to ensure PR. This distinguishes STV from all multiple vote systems, like Multi-Member-FPTP or the Cumulative Vote. It is also important to emphasise the S

Re: [EM] Range Voting "unbeatable"?

Jameson Quinn wrote: 3) Create (by hand or using genetic programming) and test "strategy heuristics", by which a given voter can use the polling (and knowledge of the underlying probabilistic models) to estimate the expected value of various strategic options, assuming all similar voters use t

[EM] Set proportionality criterion for divisor methods?

Would this work as an analog of Droop proportionality, but for voting methods based on divisor list methods? With a given divisor p, if X voters vote Y candidates above all others, then at least min(Y, f(X/p)) of the candidates in this set should be elected, where f is a rounding function (sim

Re: [EM] Explaining PR-STV

Markus Schulze wrote: Hallo, I would explain proportional representaion by the single transferable vote as follows: 1) Each voter gets a complete list of all candidates and ranks these candidates in order of preference. 2) Suppose M is the number of seats and V is the number of votes. If there

Re: [EM] Kristofer Munsterhjelm suggests multiwinner voting method

Warren Smith wrote: It's an interesting question whether there can be a proportional multiwinner voting method without needing to use "reweighting"... but this is not it. "Asset voting" works http://rangevoting.org/Asset.html but it is "unconventional." --Actually, now that Kris.Munk. point

Re: [EM] Combing Reweighted range/score voting and PR-STV

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Maybe one could do something like that exhaustive search for Webster-based methods: Increase the divisor until the constraints only satisfy a single council, then pick that one. Each solid coalition would form a constraint of the form "elect at least roun

Re: [EM] Combing Reweighted range/score voting and PR-STV

Raph Frank wrote: On Tue, Aug 18, 2009 at 10:11 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Without reweighting, the method might be more monotone than STV is. I am not sure. However, that seems reasonable. However, while the Droop proportionality criterion holds for such a method (as long as the

Re: [EM] Kristofer Munsterhjelm suggests multiwinner voting method

Warren Smith wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm: A possible reweighting-free method could work like this: 1. Construct a social ordering based on Range ballots. Call this ordering (fixed from here on), X. 2. Count the input ballots, Plurality style 3. If a candidate is supported by more than a Droop

Re: [EM] Combing Reweighted range/score voting and PR-STV

Raph Frank wrote: This method would provide guaranteed Droop proportionality while still have range/score like effects. It is basically PR-STV for electing the candidates but RRV for deciding who to eliminate. So, 1) Voter casts range/score vote 2) Ranked ballot can be inferred 3) Run PR-STV a

[EM] Multiwinner Yee diagrams

I've added support for Yee diagrams to my election program. Because I've already implemented a number of multiwinner methods, this let me render multiwinner Yee diagrams for them. If you want to browse, just go here: http://munsterhjelm.no/km/elections/multiwinner_yee/ The elections are (2,5

Re: [EM] 'Shulze (Votes For)' definition?

Chris Benham wrote: What I don't understand is the difference between "winning votes" (which I'm familiar with) and "votes for", as they are both defined on page 13 of Marcus Shulze's paper, pasted below. http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf Example 3 (/winning votes/): When the st

Re: [EM] multiwinner election space plots

Brian Olson wrote: On Aug 13, 2009, at 9:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Brian Olson wrote: http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20090810/ I think a few of these plots show Single Transferrable Vote behaving badly in the same ways IRV does, with discontinuities and irregular solution

Re: [EM] multiwinner election space plots

Brian Olson wrote: http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20090810/ I think a few of these plots show Single Transferrable Vote behaving badly in the same ways IRV does, with discontinuities and irregular solution spaces. I also ran Condorcet and IRNR using combinatoric expansion. Combinatori

Re: [EM] Electowiki relicensed to Creative Commons Share Alike 3.0

Rob Lanphier wrote: Let me know if you have any questions. Have you fixed that SQL bug which keeps us from reading most of Electowiki's articles, as well? If not, the relicensing doesn't really help, since we can't make use of the material. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://ele

Re: [EM] Redistricting, now with racial demographics

Brian Olson wrote: I've updated my redistricting site ( http://bolson.org/dist/ ) to include the racial breakdown of all current congressional districts (sometimes interesting by itself) and that of the compactness based districts I have come up with. If you want you can jump directly to http:

Re: [EM] Forced strictly-dishonest strategy is common in Schulze-beatpaths voting

Dan Bishop wrote: You can't just assume that people would vote strategically in Schulze elections because they vote strategically in Plurality elections. The question of what strategy will be used and to what extent is a quite difficult one. On one hand, individually speaking, voting is not "w

Re: [EM] Strategic voting in Condorcet & Range N-canddt elections - boiled down (& Ketchum reply)

Warren Smith wrote: REMARK 1: Range is known to be better than every rank-order ballot voting system for honest voters under the "RNEM" probability model, where "better" is measured by Bayesian Regret. This proven by WD Smith in recent papers for each N=3,4,5,...,31. Permitting rank-order ballot

Re: [EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Chris Benham wrote: And I have to reply to myself. Warren Smith wrote that, not Chris Benham. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Chris Benham wrote: The trouble is, range voting is simple. Simple enough that you can reach a pretty full understanding of what strategic range voting is. (Which is not at all trivial, but it can pretty much be done.) In contrast, a lot of Condorcet systems including Schulze are complicated.

Re: [EM] Schulze

Warren Smith wrote: The Schulze-beatpaths page Arpad was probably thinking of was http://rangevoting.org/SchulzeExplan.html The information thing now is summarized here http://rangevoting.org/PuzzInfo1.html which will be a future "puzzle"... I think you should say that ranked ballots with equa

Re: [EM] Some myths about voting methods

Paul Kislanko wrote: No, no no no NO. Now you're introducing counting algorithms. Which have to have pre-processed the ballots to produce the summary in a compacted format. You MUST consider how to use ONE ballot to represent A>B>C in a three-candidate race. You cannot do it with less than 6 bit

Re: [EM] Some myths about voting methods

Paul Kislanko wrote: The number of possible votes is not the same as the amount of information in a single ballot. With 3 candidates, there are indeed 8 possible ballots, but any one ballot can be encoded in 3 bits, since any particular choice requires only that many to represent it. Ranked ball

[EM] Setwise Highest Average: A simple Sainte-La guë based multiwinner system that reduces to DAC/DSC

While trying to make Set Webster into something better (an less underdetermined), I've been making various experimental multiwinner methods. Most of these are no good - for instance, trying to optimize the pairwise properties mentioned on Warren's apportionment page, only with regards to sets r

[EM] Further investigations into Set Webster

So I finally made my source code interface with my multiwinner evaluation program. Doing so, I could have the method construct solid coalitions directly, instead of having to do it manually. After experimenting, a few things become apparent: The method is better than STV on really large assemb

[EM] More about the Webster-ish method, and implementation

All this talk about IRV/STV being arbitrary and unfair inspired me to try to actually implement my Webster/DSC hybrid, wich I've named Set Webster. The general idea remains the same: Sort solid (or acquiescing, or half-solid, depending on how you want) coalitions in order from most voters to l

Re: [EM] British Colombia considering change to STV

Ofc, then you can't use the ballot imaging idea ... or you > need some > way of covering the selections. Removing hopeless candidates has problems too. Maybe they themselves want publicity since they want to grow to strong candidates. It is possible to set stricter limits on who can become a can

Re: [EM] PR-STV with approval based elimination

Dan Bishop wrote: You could use Plurality (with vote-splitting between equally ranked candidates) to determine surpluses and a different method to determine eliminations. For example, [snip] So the winning set is {Andre, Escher, Gore}. Coincidentally, the same as the CPO-STV result. Yes

Re: [EM] British Colombia considering change to STV

Raph Frank wrote: On Sat, May 2, 2009 at 11:33 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: It practice that seems to set the limits to max 4 and min 2 parties/groupings per constituency represented in the Dail. \ The small constituency sizes do hurt the s

Re: [EM] PR-STV with approval based elimination

Raph Frank wrote: On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 6:53 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: If there are two seats and the "left" and "right" factions are of equal size, and both have respective centrists, the outcome should have a "left centrist" (which is close to the me

Re: [EM] PR-STV with approval based elimination

Jonathan Lundell wrote: On May 1, 2009, at 6:02 AM, Raph Frank wrote: 2009/5/1 James Gilmour : One problem with abandoning LNH is that it opens the way for strategic voting, that is, when a voter ranks the candidates in some order other than the sincere 'first to last' order of preference be

[EM] Webster-flavored multiwinner method

I've been meaning to show this, but I haven't tested and implemented it yet. Still, perhaps it would give good results. The method is as follows. First, determine ranked votes' solid coalitions, as in DSC and DAC. Then determine the divisor d. Each coalition deserves the minimum of the number

Re: [EM] British Colombia considering change to STV

Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Apr 30, 2009, at 8:38 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Kathy Dopp wrote: STV has *all* the same flaws as IRV but is even worse. It is unimaginable how anyone could support any method for counting votes that is so fundamentally unfair in its treatment of ballots and

Re: [EM] British Colombia considering change to STV

Kathy Dopp wrote: STV has *all* the same flaws as IRV but is even worse. It is unimaginable how anyone could support any method for counting votes that is so fundamentally unfair in its treatment of ballots and produces such undesirable results. The reason is very simple: the Droop Proportiona

Re: [EM] Semiproportional Bucklin method

Dan Bishop wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: I think this can be used to make a proof that a summable multiwinner method can't let you actually discover all the Droop sets. The idea would be something like this: say that the method does, and it's summable. Then you can, by a comb

Re: [EM] Semiproportional Bucklin method

Sorry about replying to my own post, but: Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > which contains the proper Droop sets (the permitted outcomes are {A D}, {A E}). The problem with this is that in the worst case, there are 2^n possible subsets, and you have to keep track of all of them when summing

Re: [EM] Semiproportional Bucklin method

Raph Frank wrote: On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 10:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Round 1: {A}: 25 to be elected: 1, already elected: 0 but {A B}: 14 to be elected: 0, already elected: 0 I think the problem is that you need to be able to work out the total number of voters who

Re: [EM] Semiproportional Bucklin method

Raph Frank wrote: On Sat, Apr 25, 2009 at 11:15 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: A Droop set is a set from which, according to the DPC, at least one candidate must be elected. It's analogous to a solid coalition, only with a Droop quota. Ok, I think I have a example of it failing.

Re: [EM] Semiproportional Bucklin method

Raph Frank wrote: On Sat, Apr 25, 2009 at 4:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Clearly, it detects a Droop set when one exists, since the definition of the Droop set is that at least a Droop quota vote these ahead of all others - not necessarily in the same order, but Bucklin equalizes the

Re: [EM] Semiproportional Bucklin method

Raph Frank wrote: On Sat, Apr 25, 2009 at 1:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Start as Bucklin. Call each step a "round". A set of q candidates has a support equal to the support of that candidate in the set that has the least support. So, for instance, the set {A, B, C} has sup

[EM] Semiproportional Bucklin method

First, I have been trying to construct proofs that various methods pass mutual majority. So far, I've managed to make proofs for elimination methods where the base method passes Majority (I've mentioned that proof before), for methods that are Smith (really just showing that Smith is a subset o

Re: [EM] FYI: Tacoma park IRV vote data

Jonathan Lundell wrote: C wins by 70/93 = 75.3% of the votes. What a landslide! (Schulze and MAM gives A > D > C > B, and IRV gives A > B > C = D.) That's really a mischaracterization of IRV. IRV (and STV in general) does not produce a candidate ordering. It simply finds a winner by interpr

Re: [EM] FYI: Tacoma park IRV vote data

Kathy Dopp wrote: Notice how typically, Fair Vote claims that they found majority winners by manipulating the definition of majority to mean only those voters left standing by the final counting round. I wonder whether, if one were to make a "maximally wrong" IRV-type method that eliminated t

Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood

Juho Laatu wrote: Actually it may be a quite good strategy in IRV not to rank those favourite candidates that do not have a chance but to rank only those candidates that have a chance. This increases the probability that one's most favoured candidates with chances of winning the election are not

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