Kevin,
I think the version of DMC that allows voters to rank among unapproved
candidates fails mono-raise, and both versions are vulnerable to Pushover
strategy.
Would you say that that the plain all ranked are approved version
doesn't properly fail mono-raise but instead fails
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sat.Oct.18):
Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current favorite election
method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need complex algorithms to find a
winner.
You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call it
Condorcet,Approval. I think it's
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Your suggested possibilities had best have STRONG arguments
to overpower
known facts:
Yes, I'm aware of this.
Kevin Venzke
__
Do You Yahoo!?
En finir avec le
2008/10/20 Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call it
Condorcet,Approval. I think it's Smith (so it would be Smith,Approval), but
I'm not sure. The method is this: Drop candidates, starting with the
Approval loser and moving
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 18.10.08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Given a Condorcet cycle, how does anyone justify awarding a
winner outside?
Two possibilities:
1. to simplify the definition of the method
2. to satisfy other strategy criteria.
Kevin Venzke
Your suggested possibilities had best have STRONG arguments to overpower
known facts:
EVERY member of the cycle has been compared with each candidate outside,
with the cycle members being voted better liked by the voters in EVERY such
comparison.
DWK
On Sun, 19 Oct 2008 14:39:15 +
Many members of this list prefer a Condorcet method to any other voting
method, especially if it meets Smith. But how vulnerable are ranked methods
to strategic voting?
Consider these two assumptions:
1. Sincere Condorcet cycles would are too rare if used in real elections.
2. Strategies are
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 5:48 PM, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current favorite election
method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need complex algorithms to find a
winner.
What's the difference? The Copeland winner wins, and approval is used
Hi Diego,
--- En date de : Sam 18.10.08, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Compromising is almost unnecessary in River, Schulze or
Ranked Pairs, but
these methods are vulnerable to burying. And still if a
sincere Condorcet
winner exists, these methods have a possibility to elect a
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Sam 18.10.08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 5:48 PM, Diego Santos
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current
favorite election
method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need
complex algorithms to
Given a Condorcet cycle, how does anyone justify awarding a winner outside?
True that deciding the winner among cycle members can be a challenge.
BUT, we know that every candidate outside the cycle has been voted as a
loser to each member of the cycle.
DWK
On Sat, 18 Oct 2008 20:46:11 +
2008/10/18 Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Given a Condorcet cycle, how does anyone justify awarding a winner outside?
True that deciding the winner among cycle members can be a challenge.
BUT, we know that every candidate outside the cycle has been voted as a
loser to each member of the
On Sat, 18 Oct 2008 23:20:07 -0300 Diego Santos wrote:
2008/10/18 Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Given a Condorcet cycle, how does anyone justify awarding a winner
outside?
True that deciding the winner among cycle members can be a challenge.
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