... There can be no useful relation between a model that assumes a
maximum of purposive rationality and a reality that demonstrates
none. No voter ever attempts to improve her standing in the
electoral game, because no single vote ever affects the outcome
of a typical election.
Warren
You for instance, Warren. You are not deluded.
There's a difference between realizing your own cognitive biases, and
wanting to overcome them. And there's another difference between wanting and
actually overcoming them. Just ask any addict.
JQ
Election-Methods mailing list - see
Warren, Jameson and Kristofer,
For my part, I argue that Nash can *never* be applied within the
context of voting. The reality as evidenced by the empirical data
(in vivo) invalidates the basic assumptions of Nash. Individual
voters are *not* attempting to affect the outcome of
Warren Smith wrote:
... I think you are pretty much right... But I think there is a
deeper truth First of all, as I said in the ESF thread quoting
Selten, it is interesting to consider the consequences of
maximally-rational behavior, even if humans aren't it. Second,
there is the
Michael Allan wrote:
I think it misses the main point. For your part, you and Raph hope to
apply Nash's model within the context of voting. You therefore tweak
that context in vitro by adding a little indeterminacy, such that Nash
can grapple with it for analytical purposes. Alternatively,
1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition. In a
typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the
result. The effect is exactly zero.
2. Voters nevertheless turn out in large numbers.
It follows that the individual voter is *not* attempting to
... Consider these two facts:
1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition. In a
typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the
result. The effect is exactly zero.
2. Voters nevertheless turn out in large numbers.
It follows that the
I'm trying only to post on the election science foundation re this
topic, so please look there:
http://groups.google.com/group/electionsciencefoundation
There are a lot of developments there.
However since I see a bunch of comments built up at electorama, I will
try to process them now a bit and
Jameson Quinn wrote:
This is a great idea at its heart, but I can see a couple of
problems which need fixing. ...
I will argue the opposite, that Raph and Warren's attempt to redeem
Nash is itself unredeemable.
To be clear: in the Gandhi/Hitler case, the situation where 100%
vote Hitler
On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 11:06 AM, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
It's also an indication of the problem. Consider these two facts:
1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition. In a
typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the result.
The effect is
Hello,
Warren Smith wrote:
For example, consider a 2-way election Gandhi vs Hitler in which
everybody votes
for the (unanimously agreed to be) worst choice: Hitler.
Well, that is a Nash equilibrium because no single voter can change
the election result!
Indeed, essentially every possible
I wonder what your goal is in reducing the number of Nash equilibria in
an election. If you're trying to use the modified election method as a
model for studying the old method, then you might also look at some
alternative types of equilibria which are more restrictive than the Nash
2010/4/14 Thomas von der Elbe thomasvondere...@gmx.de
Hello,
Warren Smith wrote:
For example, consider a 2-way election Gandhi vs Hitler in which everybody
votes
for the (unanimously agreed to be) worst choice: Hitler.
Well, that is a Nash equilibrium because no single voter can change
re: People vote for social reasons. In particular, voting
appears to have a largely communicative rationality behind
it. People like to express themselves. They also see it as
their social duty, and so they feel bound try their best
(despite the hurdles we sometimes put in
Warren Smith wrote:
Well, that is a Nash equilibrium because no single voter can
change the election result! ... Nash says almost nothing about
voting. It is worthless. ... But now here is a very simple and
highly effective fix ... Have each voter cast, not one vote but
rather each voter
Have each voter cast, not one vote but rather each voter casts a
standard gaussian random variable number of votes of each possible
type. The voter does not get to control her vote, she only gets to
control the mean of the Gaussians. So for example, in the
Gandhi-Hitler example, she can
On Tue, Apr 13, 2010 at 5:02 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
This is a great idea at its heart, but I can see a couple of problems which
need fixing. For one thing, you didn't specify that the sum of the means for
all vote types must be 1.
Actually, it would probably be
My proposal resolves most of those issues, after the votes are cast,
each ballot has a probability of p to be excluded from the count.
That works out to be the same as the poisson proposal, in the limit as voter
number - infinity and p - 1. I think that the poisson proposal leads to
cleaner
John Nash's idea for trying to salvage multiplayer game theory,
was the so-called Nash equilibrium. A situation is an Nash eq. if
each player cannot improve her expected utility (payoff at end of
game) by altering her strategy (with all other player strategies
assumed to stay fixed). Nash's
At 01:11 PM 4/12/2010, Warren Smith wrote:
I am not sure what the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria?) are, but I
am sure that
honest voting is not it, because each individual voter finds burial to
be an improvement. Presumably the Nash strategy in that scenario
will be a probability-mixture of
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