If QLTD isn't cloneproof (and it isn't), then the result won't be
either, hence we could just as well go with first preference Copeland
(unless that has a flaw I'm not seeing).
What is supposed to be the attraction of first preference Copeland?
And how do you define it exactly?
The
Chris Benham wrote:
At one stage Woodall was looking for the method/s that meet as many of
his monotonicty properties as possible while keeping Majority
(equivalent to Majority for Solid Coalitions). That is what led him to
Quota-Limited Trickle Down (QLTD) and then Descending Acquiescing
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates
are ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the
voter's specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm in this?.
The harm is that voter's
On Jul 17, 2008, at 20:10 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Chris:
Truncation should be allowed, so no-one has to fill out rankings
if they
don't want to.
Total agreement there.
My suggestion is to try to adapt an idea from information theory:
when
designing a system for conveying information
I think Smith (or Shwartz),IRV is quite a good Condorcet method. It
completely fixes the failure of Condorcet while being more complicated
(to explain and at least sometimes to count) than plain IRV, and a Mutual
Dominant Third candidate can't be successfully buried.
But it fails
- Original Message -
From: Chris Benham
Date: Saturday, July 12, 2008 11:01 pm
Subject: Re:A Better Version of IRV?
To: EM
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates
are ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or
At 02:01 AM 7/13/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are
ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's favorite or perhaps, as Steve
Eppley has suggested, by the voter's specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are ranked
(later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the voter's specified
public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm in this?.
The harm is that voter's votes
I don't see how IRV's failure to elect the Condorcet candidate is
necessarily linked to its non-monotonicity.
There are monotonic (meets mono-raise) methods that fail Condorcet, and
some Condorcet methods that fail mono-raise.
(For information: I think Bucklin would be an example of the
At 02:01 AM 7/13/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are
ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the voter's
specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm
On Sun, 13 Jul 2008 23:37:28 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:01 AM 7/13/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are
ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the voter's
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Again, why NOT Condorcet?
Its' ballot is ranking, essentially the same as IRV, except the
directions better be more intelligent:
Rank as many as you choose - ranking all is acceptable IF you choose.
Rank as few as you choose - bullet voting is acceptable if that
On Jul 12, 2008, at 1:11 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Chris Benham replied:
This particular horrible idea would create a strong incentive
for the major power-brokers
to sponsor the nomination of a lot of fake candidates just to
collect votes for one or other
of the major parties.
Am I mising
Forest Simmons wrote (Sun Jul 6 16:36:32 PDT 2008 ):
There is a lot of momentum behind IRV.? If we cannot stop it,
are there some tweaks that would make it more liveable?
Someone has suggested that a candidate withdrawal option would
go a long way towards ameliorating the damage.
Here's
Again, why NOT Condorcet?
Its' ballot is ranking, essentially the same as IRV, except the directions
better be more intelligent:
Rank as many as you choose - ranking all is acceptable IF you choose.
Rank as few as you choose - bullet voting is acceptable if that
completes a voter's
]
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2008 3:48 PM
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV? (Terry Bouricius)
Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2008 09:36:27 -0400
From: Terry Bouricius [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Dear Kathy Dopp,
Please stop referring to your report on IRV
Forest Simmons wrote (Sun Jul 6 16:36:32 PDT 2008 ):
There is a lot of momentum behind IRV. If we cannot stop it, are there some
tweaks that would make it more liveable?
Someone has suggested that a candidate withdrawal option would go a long way
towards ameliorating the damage.
Here's another
before even considering it.
Terry Bouricius
- Original Message -
From: Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 7:31 PM
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV?
Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2008 23:36:32 + (GMT)
From
On Mon, 7 Jul 2008 17:31:34 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2008 23:36:32 + (GMT)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
There is a lot of momentum behind IRV. If we cannot stop it, are there some
tweaks that would make it more liveable?
Hi Forest.
I think we can stop that madness. I
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