This was a good overall description of party list proportional
representation. I wrote few (actually quite many) minor comments below.
On 4.7.2011, at 2.06, James Gilmour wrote:
First we have to recognise that there is no one voting system called party
list proportional representation.
On 4.7.2011, at 4.08, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks for the responses. In response to the party leaders having too
much control, I believe it is possible to make party-lists on the
fly from voters' own rank choice ballots in a way that the most voters
would naturally support -- which would put
On 3.7.2011, at 20.34, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:33 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I do not like this system and believe it is improper to call it
Condorcet. It seems to have all the same flaws as IRV -
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 1:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Let me pull an old example again:
45: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
10: Center Right Left
If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it
seems most fair to elect
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?
On 4.7.2011, at 4.08, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks for the responses. In response to the party leaders having too
much control, I believe it is
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 1:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Let me pull an old example again:
45: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
10: Center Right Left
If there's one seat, Center is the CW; but if you want to elect two, it
seems most
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks for the responses. In response to the party leaders having too
much control, I believe it is possible to make party-lists on the
fly from voters' own rank choice ballots in a way that the most voters
would naturally support -- which would put the control into voters'
Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others.
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. The Droop
quota seems to go hand in hand with IRV and
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 9:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
You could make a party list system that would arrange the list after the
election, yes. This would have a ballot where you first pick a party and
then order the party's candidates.
Yes, the open party list
The nice feature of existing party list methods is that it allows the
election of a large number of candidates to a large national body of
legislators without requiring voters to rank individually a huge
number of candidates.
Yes, this is the main reason for people who favor party list
On 4.7.2011, at 16.33, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times.
If you want the most popular single candidates to be elected
Kathy Dopp Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 2:53 PM
However, either the election method used within each party to
determine the list orders would be majoritarian (in which case the
system isn't proportional beyond the party level),
Plurality is how it is done I believe. To have PR within
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others.
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. The Droop
quota seems to go hand
On 4.7.2011, at 16.53, Kathy Dopp wrote:
That is an interesting idea that would require a different ballot type
than in existing party list systems whereby one could rank all the
candidates within a particular party one votes for.
I just note that if we combine party lists and candidate
Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 4:30 PM
(Of course the idea of having proportionally ordered
candidate lists in a closer list election would make voting
in the actual election even simpler. But then one would need
to have a primary to find the ordering for each party.)
But that
Jameson Quinn Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 5:03 PM
As I said in my last message, asset-like systems can let you
have your cake and eat it, if you trust your favorite
candidate to agree with you in ranking other candidates. This
is fundamentally different from trusting your party, because
2011/7/4 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk
Jameson Quinn Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 5:03 PM
As I said in my last message, asset-like systems can let you
have your cake and eat it, if you trust your favorite
candidate to agree with you in ranking other candidates. This
is
On Jul 4, 2011, at 12:28 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/7/4 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk
Jameson Quinn Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 5:03 PM
As I said in my last message, asset-like systems can let you
have your cake and eat it, if you trust your favorite
candidate to agree with
Hello,
I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years
ago. How is everyone doing?
I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good
one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so,
what the problems are with it, if
A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a
majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that
Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd
disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects
Jameson Quinn wrote:
With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right
off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of
IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads
inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an
On 4.7.2011, at 18.59, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 4:30 PM
(Of course the idea of having proportionally ordered
candidate lists in a closer list election would make voting
in the actual election even simpler. But then one would need
to have a primary to
To be clearer:
In your scenario 55% of people hate 50% of the winners and 45% hate
(ranked last) 50% of the winners. If the Center and Right win, only
45% of the voters hate 50% of the winners and everyone else is happy.
In summation:
In your example, applying the Droop quota criteria, 100%
One possible unwanted feature in Asset like methods is that they make it
possible for the candidates to trade with the votes. The voters may trust their
candidate, but they should not trust them too much, since in extreme cases they
might even sell their valuable vote assets to someone.
One
Kathy Dopp Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 10:40 PM
James, As someone on this list already pointed out, such a
system as you suggest does *nothing* to ensure
proportionality *within* the party list because the list of
candidates could all have been chosen by either the leaders
or the
My point was to show how the problems of Asset could be fixed and that
there is a continuum of methods between Asset and basic list methods.
Exactly. And the common advantage is that they simplify the task for at
least some voters, without requiring artificial party divisions. Divisions
and
Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized
that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar
to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I
consider a major defect.
OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed
On 5.7.2011, at 3.09, Russ Paielli wrote:
Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized
that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to
IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider
a major defect.
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