ranking above bottom as approval) such as the
Smith//Approval(ranking) method I endorse?
Or if you think that it is justified for a candidate with a very big approval
score to beat a majority favourite with less approval, why not simply
promote the plain Approval method?
Chris Benham
good about it?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
winner and now IRV elects B, a failure of
mono-raise.
49: ACB
26: BA
25: CB
Chris Benham
__
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think should win this election?
25: AB
26: BC
23: CA
26: C
CA 75-25, AB 49-26, BC 51-49
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
for?
Does top-two runoffs mean a second trip to the polls?
How are the candidates scored to determine the top two? Is it based on the
candidates' scores after the second Bucklin round?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
a voted CW if
there is one.
Some Condorcet-complying methods are clone-proof and some aren't.
Chris Benham
On Apr 17, 2010, at 9:25 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Dave Ketchum wrote (18 April 2010):
Why IRV? Have we not buried that deep enough?
Why not Condorcet which does better with about
or take seriously that actually fails this
criterion?
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (21 April 2010):
I don't know if Juho is still cheering for MinMax as a public proposal. I used
to be against it because of its clone dependence,
but now that I realize
of mono-raise, but probably only in a
complicated not very
likely example.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (8 May 2010):
I have a proposal that uses the same pairwise win/loss/tie information that
Copeland is based on, along with
the complementary information that Approval is based
the members of the Smith set
eligible
for the second round, which uses simple Approval.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that version simply dominate (in terms of desirable criterion
compliances) the QR
you've defined (that uses the FPP order)?
Compared to plain DSC it seems to just gain compliance with Condorcet(Gross)
Loser in
exchange for losing compliance with Irrelevant Ballots.
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke
MAO score is the approval score of the most approved candidate on
ballots that don't approve X).
Elect the undisqualified candidate with the highest top-ratings score.*
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-December/023530.html
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke
of the candidates allowed to win in the first round
B has the highest TR
score and so wins. And in any case on ballots that don't top-rate C (35A,
10A=B, BC) A has
an approval score of 45 so B is the only candidate that is allowed to win in
the first round.
Thanks for taking an interest
Chris
an example of it failing the Plurality criterion. Does it meet
that criterion?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
majority favourite and the big voted raw range winner, and yet
B wins.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that use a fixed number of ratings slots, if
necessary electing the most
approved candidate.*
This is analogous with ER-Bucklin(whole) on ranked ballots:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
who are
mainly interested in
getting their strict favourites elected will and should bullet vote.
What is wrong with that?
Chris Benham
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,I got a second question from one of our
members (actually the same guy which asked for the first time): If I just
it meeting Majority for Solid Coalitions, his Plurality criterion,
mono-raise,
mono-remove-bottom, mono-raise-delete, mono-sub-plump, mono-add-plump,
mono-append and
Later-no-Help.
And failing Clone-Winner, Clone-Loser, Condorcet, mono-add-top, mono-sub-top
and
Later-no-Harm.
Chris Benham
if we take a candidate X's highest gross pairwise
score as X's approval score. Can you see any problem with that?
Chris Benham
- Original Message -
From:
Date: Friday, August 12, 2011 3:12 pm
Subject: Enhanced DMC
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com,
From
vulnerable to Push-over strategy.
(To be fair, Woodall has demonstrated that no Condorcet method can meet
mono-raise-delete.)
Chris Benham
From: Ted Stern araucaria.arauc...@gmail.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc: Forest Simmons fsimm
* strategy was
more apt for the methods I referred to.
Chris Benham
---
I like this. Regarding how approval is inferred, I'm also happy with Forest's
idea of using Range
(aka Score) type ballots (on which voters give their most preferred candidates
the highest numerical
scores
Forest,
the IRV- Condorcet you
describe here is a simpler solution, as long as you allow equal rankings, and
count them as whole (as
opposed to fractional):
I am strongly opposed to allowing equal ranking (except for truncation) in IRV
or IRV-like Condorcet
methods. As I've explained
optimal strategy, so that
isn't relavent.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
Chris Benham
From: fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu
To: C.Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Cc: em election-meth...@electorama.com
or better by voting BA or BC or B this is a failure of the FBC.
Chris Benham
From: fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu
Sent: Wednesday, 23 November 2011 9:01 AM
Subject: Re: An ABE solution
voters to avoid the middle slot. Then the method reduces to Approval, which
middle-rating to make a score of 19,
B has 8 top-ratings and 1 middle-rating to make a score of 17, and A has 5
top-ratings and 2 middle-ratings
to make a score of 12.
Chris Benham
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
Sent: Friday, 25 November 2011 5:39 AM
Later-no-Harm and Invulnerability to Burial to either
the Condorcet or FBC
criteria.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that
meets the FBC.
Chris Benham
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: C.Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Cc: em election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Wednesday, 25 January 2012 5:11 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Two more 3-slot FBC/ABE solutions
In fact
).
In the example Losing Votes elects A. Winning Votes elects C which I'm fine
with, but I don't
like Winning Votes for other reasons.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
CWP, but it is far too complicated
with not enough bang for buck. I prefer Smith//Approval (ranking), or a
method
that Forest and I discussed a while ago. It is a bit better (and more elegant)
than
Smith//Approval, and nearly always gives the same winner.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods
the defeat of the candidate whom it
votes over all of the other candidates.
[end of Weak Participation definition]
Mono-add-Top.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Mono-add-top_criterion
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 16 Nov 2012 07:29:52 -0800, Chris Benham wrote:
It isn't a big deal if Ranked Pairs or River are used instead of
Schulze. Losing Votes means that the pairwise results are weighed
purely by the number of votes on the losing side. The weakest
defeats are those with the most votes
winner.
Chris Benham
I wrote (Tues.20 Nov 2012):
I have an idea for a not-very-sinple FBC-complying method that behaves like ICT
with 3 candidates, but better
handles more candidates and ballots with more than 3 ratings-slots or ballots
that allow full ranking of the candidates.
*Voters rank
of the ballots. Given that we are seeking to
convert supporters
of FPP (and to I hope a lesser extent, IRV), I think that is a marketing
advantage.
Chris Benham
But there is no case for electing B, other than
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
their Favourite elected versus the sincere
CW.
The Losing Votes method I advocate goes for the latter.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Now the top-2 runoff is between Right and Centre-Right and Centre-Right wins
51-49.
Seven voters have succeeded with a Compromise strategy.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
for A.
This destroys the incentive for parties to field 2 candidates, and greatly
reduces the Push-over incentive
(to about the same as in normal plurality-ballot Top-2 Runoff).
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
post) of the Plurality criterion is
wrong.
Chris Benham
Benjamin Grant wrote (17 June 2013):
OK, let's assume that as defined, Bucklin fails Participation.
Let me specify a new criteria, which already either has its own name that I do
not know, or which I can call Prime Participation
ballots then Y wins in the second round.
Chris Benham
At 03:58 PM 6/17/2013, Chris Benham wrote:
Benjamin,
The criterion (criteria is the plural) you suggest is not new. It
is called Mono-add-Top, and comes from Douglas Woodall.
It is met by IRV and MinMax(Margins) but is failed by Bucklin
criterion.
The method meets the Condorcet criterion and Mono-add-Top. It has been promoted
here by Juho Laatu.
Chris Benham
Ben grant wrote (24 June 2013):
As I have had it explained to me, the Plurality Criterion is: If there are two
candidates X and Y so that X has more first place
indicator of which candidates are really weak.
So I don't see compliance with the Favorite Betrayal Criterion as pointless.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
will always pairwise beat the Bucklin (or Majority Judgement) winner.
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (19 June 2013):
Here's the current version of the article. Note the new paragraph on strategy
at the bottom.
-
Majority Approval Voting (MAV) is a modern,
evaluativehttp://wiki.electorama.com
advice from them)
doing cynical preference-swap deals, motivated by nothing but increasing the
chance that they will get an extra seat (by having the biggest surplus fraction
of a quota).
I hope that helps.
Chris Benham
Vidar Wahlberg wrote (26 June 2013):
Greetings!
I'm new here, I'm
-electorama.com/2012-January/029577.html
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (27 June 2013):
2013/6/26 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Jameson,
I don't like this version at all. These methods all have the problem that the
voters have a strong incentive to just submit approval ballots, i.e. only
the Later-no-Harm criterion.
The problem you allude to I am sure would affect very few seats.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
care that it fails FBC?Condorcet//Approval is
pretty simple (and IMO quite good).
Am I right in assuming that you only like methods that meet FBC or Condorcet
and maybe Mono-raise? And/or are biased towards electing centrists? And for
some or all of these reasons you don't like IRV?
Chris Benham
clear.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
/candidate
will represent other voters.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
tied up in the quotas of definitely elected
candidates have no other say in who is elected or eliminated.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
.
It is much simpler than Meek to explain and operate, but seems (from some
examples I've seen) to give Meek-like results.
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 07/02/2013 07:09 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
I am sure this meets Droop Proportionality for Solid Coalitions.
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (3 July 2013):
Does that mean that the method reduces to largest remainders Droop when
the voters vote for all candidates of a single party each
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