and sometimes the other way around.
Juho Laatu
On Sep 22, 2007, at 23:16 , John Wong wrote:
That sorta answers my question about Landau, but what about the
Schwartz criterion? Is it important?
Date: Sat, 22 Sep 2007 21:50:16 +0930
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED
On Mar 13, 2008, at 1:57 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
As to any specific group, one may question the wisdom of their
selection. To doubt the wisdom of all the groups is to doubt the
wisdom
of humanity.
I think humans are wise but not flawless. They tend to need some
support, e.g. in the form of
--- Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Again, I must apologize for my tardiness, but I've
been away.
Not a problem. I think it is one of the benefits of
email and lists that everyone can keep their own
schedule.
1) if a selection is made, the only person whose
vote is unknown is the
--- Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I hope you'll read (or re-read) the February 4th
post.
I already earlier tried to summarize my viewpoint when
I said As you can see my concerns and possible
improvements that I'd like to study are mainly in the
areas of privacy of the votes and in
It was pointed out to me that this is actually the Burr dilemma. I
should have remembered this example. Just coming to the same
conclusions using a different route. I guess the conclusions are
valid, and in addition to Approval and Range there are some
implications also on the ranked
One observation on clone independence and electing a centrist
candidate using rankings only and when one of the extremists has
majority.
Votes:
51: ACB
49: BCA
C is the winner.
A will be cloned. The votes could be:
51: A1A2CB
49: BCA2A1
C should still be the winner.
B will be cloned. The
--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 7:59 PM
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu
[EMAIL PROTECTED
, 11/11/08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 1:21 PM
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 11:59 PM, Juho Laatu
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
--- On Thu, 13/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think that in order to get anywhere on this path, we
would have to know what it is we actually want from a
runoff.
First I want to note that I don't want to promote runoffs, just to study them.
There are two reasons why
--- On Fri, 14/11/08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Friday, 14 November, 2008, 12:26 AM
On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 10:11 PM, Juho Laatu
[EMAIL
--- On Fri, 14/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
In a condorcet election, the top 2 candidates would be
at the 50% mark
in the 1d policy space.
The runoff would held the voters decide from 2 pretty
good candidates.
This does mean that a party
--- On Sun, 16/11/08, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What I want with this method is a maximally simple
multi-winner method that does not rely on lists but is
focussed on individual candidates and that makes sure that
all large-enough minorities are represented. It is not
important
all the reasonable competitors :-) .)
Juho
Greg
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 5:53 AM, Juho Laatu
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes, it is not intuitive to abandon one's
favourite. What is then intuitive? Burying as a Condorcet
strategy is certainly not intuitive (quite difficult to
understand
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Say that the runoff method is pick first and second
place winners of the base method. Then any strategy
that boosts your preferred candidate to either first or
second place can be used
One could also promote a candidate that is likely to
lose to one's favourite
--- On Sun, 23/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods exist.
Borda-elimination (Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet. Minmax
is quite simple, and everybody who's dealt with sports
knows Copeland (with Minmax tiebreaks). I'll partially
PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tuesday, 25 November, 2008, 1:37 PM
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 23/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods
exist. Borda-elimination (Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet.
Minmax is quite
--- On Tue, 25/11/08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I agree that resistance to Burying is atractive and IRV's big selling
point versus Condorcet methods.
Yes, this may be the strongest selling argument of IRV
against Condorcet. But I think this doesn't yet mean
that Condorcet
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing
*wrong* with voting insincerely (or, equivalently,
strategically), in this sense; a voter has a right to do
their best to achieve an optimum result in a particular
context.
I think it would be better not to
- Yes, I agree with most of this
- Voters should be made aware of the different approaches so that they can use
the intended one (or the one that suits them better)
- Computerized methods could add something (e.g. more sincere input data,
possibility of loops in the strategy changes) to the
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wednesday, 26 November, 2008, 7:53 PM
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi
, 1:17 AM
On Nov 26, 2008, at 1:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing
*wrong* with voting insincerely (or, equivalently,
strategically), in this sense; a voter has a right
to do
their best to achieve an optimum
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, 27 November, 2008, 3:25 AM
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Juho Laatu
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Note that the minmax philosophy is to study paths of
length one. Minmax philosophy says that voter interest
to replace the elected candidate with another is more
relevant than their interest to replace the candidates
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, 27 November, 2008, 9:11 PM
Juho Laatu wrote
.
Juho
--- On Fri, 28/11/08, Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Friday, 28 November, 2008, 2:41 AM
Hallo,
Juho Laatu wrote (28 Nov 2008):
I didn't quite get this. When
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the
request is to mark all candidates that one approves then
placing the cutoff between two main candidates is often
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There are different kind of criteria.
If one decides the winner based on one single
vote a method that would elect the least
preferred candidate would be bad. Things get
however more complex with group opinions that
This is in a way a positive message. It says
also that people tend to make independent
decisions, and that many such strategic threats
that require coordinated and systematic
behaviour are not dangerous in this kind of
environments.
One reason behind the non-mathematical answers
is of course also
--- On Tue, 2/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think it depends on the society and its rules (and
the method and election in question) if insincere voting is
considered to be wrong or not. In many cases the
society will benefit if insincere voting is generally not
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and
that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure if it
would withstand strategy (there's that hard to
estimate the amount of strategy that will happen
again), and the Minmax
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One approach to sincerity is to compare
voter
behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval
if the
request is to mark all candidates that one
approves then
placing the cutoff between two main candidates is
In the Yee/B.Olson diagrams Condorcet
methods give quite ideal results. I
proposed ages ago that one might
study also voter distributions that
give cyclic preferences. That would
show also some differences between
different Condocet methods. I'll try
to draft some simulation scenarios.
In a
--- On Sun, 14/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and
that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure
if it
would withstand
--- On Mon, 22/12/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
The two situations I had in mind were:
Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R;
centrist candidate M
Election 1
35% DM; 33% RM; 32% M
Election 2
48% DM; 47% RM; 5% M
M is the Condorcet winner in both
One more approach is to allow ranked
ranking preferences, e.g. ABCDEF.
Juho
--- On Fri, 26/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
To:
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
IRV has been
used for public elections for many decades in several
countries. In contrast, despite having been around for
about 220 years, the
Condorcet voting system has not been used in any public
elections anywhere, so
--- On Wed, 24/12/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
The myth that single-member-district voting systems
work well for assembly elections when there are
only two parties in very
persistent. We must all work together and do everything we
can to kill it off because it is just a
--- On Fri, 2/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Reverse Condorcet: If the election is (n-1, n) and
there's a Condorcet loser, all but the Condorcet loser
should be elected.
Example:
- 10 Republican candidates, one Democrat candidate
- 55% support to Republicans
- 45%
One comment on concerns related to IRV's
decision between the last two candidates
on if that decision is a majority decision.
Many ballots may have exhausted before the
last round. As a result one may claim that
the last round decision was not a majority
decision.
The point is that in all
--- On Tue, 6/1/09, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
If the vote for any one candidate equals or exceeds
the votes of all the other candidates combined, that
candidate shall be
declared elected.
Here you will see there is no reference to a
quota, nor is there any reference
--- On Tue, 6/1/09, Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com wrote:
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
How should we see other methods like Range
and Condorcet in this light?
That is not a valid comparison because, unlike IRV/STV,
both Range and
Condorcet methods consider *all* rankings
--- On Fri, 9/1/09, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
The whole concept of strategic voting is flawed when
applied to Range. Voters place vote strength where they
think it will do the most good -- if they think.
Words where they think it will do the most
good sound like
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Paul Kislanko kisla...@airmail.net wrote:
Arrr. Explain, someone, anyone, how MM can change an (A
B) to an (A B C)
possible winner set by adding voters for A.
One way to say this is that since in the
first example there was a set of voters
(26 AB, 25 BA) that had a
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Let's consider the first election first, with
truncation extended to full preference:
26: A B C
25: B A C
49
Here's one comment. The topmost thoughts in
my mind when thinking about this approach
is that 1) the principles are good and 2)
making the votes public limits the usability
of the method. Traditionally secret votes
have been a building block of democracies.
Public votes work somewhere but not
] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard? JL
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Monday, 12 January, 2009, 12:20 AM
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu
juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
If there is a set of voters that form a
majority and they all prefer all candidates
--- On Tue, 13/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Any sort of voter-reconfigurable proxy democracy has the
kind of feedback that enables coercion or vote-buying. In
order to verify that a certain voter votes a
certain way, the candidate or party in question can tell the
--- On Tue, 13/1/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: The first thing in my mind would not be to limit
contacts
between legislators and lobbyists but to limit too
heavy
bindings, maybe most notably monetary dependencies.
One
could limit
--- On Sat, 17/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
1) Most countries of the world have
decided to base their democratic
processes on secret votes. It would
be difficult to change their current
principles.
It's true that most of them decided to use *private
--- On Fri, 16/1/09, Jobst Heitzig heitzi...@web.de wrote:
To determine how I should vote, is that quite complicated
or does it depend on what I think how others will vote?
Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently easy to
determine from my preferences and independent of the other
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
I believe the practice/principle of having
secret votes also often implies interest
in allowing people to vote as they
privately think. Difference between public
and private opinions is thus often seen to
mean some sort of
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 17, 2009, at 10:38 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell
jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
The mail contained quite good
definitions.
I didn't
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
If private and public opinions differ, then which
is the
manipulated one?
If they deviate it is hard to imagine
that the private opinion would not be
the sincere one.
That's because you are thinking
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 18, 2009, at 5:13 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell
jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
- Why was the first set of definitions
not good enough for Approval? (I read
rank as referring
are not important
but their stability and usefulness is.
Juho
--- On Tue, 20/1/09, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
At 01:38 AM 1/18/2009, Juho Laatu wrote:
I don't quite see why ranking based
methods (Range, Approval) would not
follow the same principles/definitions
as rating based
OK. I interpret this to mean that sincerity
referred to the sincere opinion that might
not even exist. And that this makes it a
difficult term to define (for all methods).
Or maybe it in this case would be just a
difficult term to use (not necessarily to
define).
For a voter that doesn't have a
--- On Thu, 22/1/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
Anyway maybe a non-manipulable method requires
1) a simple method to convert honest preferences into valid
votes
2) this method may not use info about other voters
3) If everyone else uses this method, then it is in your
interests
OK. Then the model is one where the
voters may have various opinions on
various matters but that doesn't
necessarily mean that they would
have a complete ordering of the
candidates.
I can imagine that I could have e.g.
cyclic opinions on food when there
are three alternatives and three
properties
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
I think current systems rely on
private voting and public discussion
(although different than the proxy
based discussion). It may be possible
to enrich this with better mutual
discussion / delegable voting rights
without
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
with these counter-features:
a) continuous results, with shifting votes
Maybe mostly positive, but also
something negative.
Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy
with the
government's voting
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
I try to summarize my comments in the
form of some rough definitions.
A simple method requires
1) a 'simple' method to convert honest
preferences into optimal votes
A zero-info method
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
d) voting on laws, too
I read this as allowing individual
voters to vote directly too, without
any proxies between them and the
decisions (on laws and on anything).
Quite OK but I have
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What I mean is that it may quite OK
to assume that people are able to
find some preference order when
voting. And therefore we can force
them to do so.
If we regard
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What I mean is that it may quite OK
to assume that people are able to
find some preference order when
voting. And therefore we can force
them to do so.
How can
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, January 26, 2009 12:29 AM
What I mean is that decision making
is such a natural part of everyday
life that people are very used to
that. Often they even enjoy making
decisions (e.g. when
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 11:10 AM, Juho Laatu
juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Another approach to offering more
flexibility (maybe not needed) and
more strategy options (maybe not
wanted) is to allow the voter to
fill the pairwise
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Two
specialized voting systems that intercommunicate (state and
public)
can give better results than one system, on its own.
There are both positive and negative factors.
The public vote is maybe more
sincere
in the sense that
...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Another approach to offering more
flexibility (maybe not needed) and
more strategy options (maybe not
wanted) is to allow the voter to
fill the pairwise matrix entries
in whatever way. This means that
also cycles can be recorded.
One can
--- On Wed, 28/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
A = 1000
B = 200
max_support = 100
C = 50
approval = 30
D = 1
min_support = 0
E = 0
F = -100
max_preference_strength = 10
Approval interpretation is A=B=CD=E=F.
Range
--- On Thu, 29/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
But I think people [a] also try to keep
the internals of their head in good
order. They don't voluntarily become
irrational inside. Many [b] believe that
they are almost always right and
consistent, and want
--- On Wed, 28/1/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 8:39 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
The construct the assembly and then let it
vote approach might be
reducible to ordinary Bayesian Regret. The idea would
be this: single-winner
BR
--- On Sat, 31/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
(I hope the role of public image
doesn't get so strong that people
would start thinking that their
whitened teeth and wide smile are
what they are, more than their
internal thoughts. :-)
All of us
--- On Sat, 31/1/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: People are not always good at reason based free
discussions.
How could they be? What, in our political systems,
encourages reason based discussions? The method
I've outlined cultivates such
--- On Sun, 1/2/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
(I hope the role of public image
doesn't get so strong that people
would start thinking that their
whitened teeth and wide smile are
what they are, more than their
internal thoughts
--- On Tue, 3/2/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
3. Eventually reason prevails. The dwellers in
the favelas and
the peasents in the villages (despite long
suppressed bitterness
and anger)
Juho Laatu wrote:
No need to be suppressed nor angry. Some
may be but better
use of that power is
enhanced
(b.2).
I read this as an interest and
possibility to use IT to strengthen
the DD chain.
Juho Laatu wrote:
1. Someone posts the question, What
voting method ought
Helsinki to use in Council elections?
2. All kinds of opinions are expressed
--- On Fri, 13/2/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
re: I meant that it is typically easier to build on
what one has
than to tear down the existing system and replace it
with
some new system that is meant to be ideal.
That is unquestionably true. However, the attempt
--- On Fri, 13/2/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com replied to Fred Gohlke:
T(p) Practical: What is the practice?
In principle, is it feasible?
T(q) Probable: What is the method of
transformation? Is it likely,
in fact, to happen?
T(m) Moral: What are the
--- On Tue, 17/2/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Whether or not the US is a democracy is a semantic
question.
I use this term roughly so that a country
is democratic if people are able to make
change x if they are determined to make
x happen. There should be no fear of coup,
--- On Mon, 16/2/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
I read A - B as if A is widespread
then also B is or will be widespread.
This could cover also cases B is
likely to be widespread...
Yes, it's a causal operator. So the relation A
- B means if A
then B. (It ought to be
--- On Wed, 25/2/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: Probably one can not avoid formation of some kind
of
groupings or parties, and of course they may also
contribute
positively. Just need to avoid the numerous common
pitfalls
/
--- On Thu, 26/2/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Tue, 17/2/09, Fred Gohlke
fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Whether or not the US is a democracy is a semantic
question.
I use this term roughly so that a country
is democratic
--- On Wed, 4/3/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
... Are there any strong reverse
mechanisms, or blocks, that
would be likely to prevent a quorum?
- Having too many too uninteresting
elections
- Having several competing IT systems
- The opposite of novelty,
Is the target here to have a method
that would allow and encourage having
multiple candidates? (to allow the
people of Owego to select the winner
themselves instead of others/parties
telling them what their choices are)
This can be taken as an independent
challenge. Which methods / systems
lead
--- On Fri, 6/3/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Is the target here to have a method
that would allow and encourage having
multiple candidates? (to allow the
people of Owego to select the winner
themselves instead of others/parties
telling
--- On Fri, 6/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: [my comment] If we design a process that does not
require
campaigning, the evils of campaigning will be
avoided.
[you asked] How will you do that?
The method outlined in my February 4, 2008
--- On Fri, 6/3/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Several cents might make a dollar.
There are many small problems that
together may make the system fall
short of the planned ideal state.
Or that together, might not.
In arguing that DD is probable, we
--- On Sun, 8/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: Yes, that method reduces campaigning since all
decisions are
very local. The answer in
this case seems to be to reduce
the number of candidates that each
voter can vote.
The purpose of
--- On Mon, 9/3/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
1. Premise an IT-based DD
2. Discuss its potential consequences
Ideals are the theme of (1), particularly in its design and
purpose.
The falling-short of those ideals (and worse) is the theme
of (2).
Maybe my approach is
--- On Tue, 10/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: (Exchange of ideas could be also weak in many
triads.)
I wonder why you think the point worth mentioning? Is
it not self-evident?
Yes, quite self-evident. I just
noted it since I wondered at what
--- On Sat, 14/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: ... I wondered at what level in the society the
discussions
yield best results and where they
will stimulate new
discussion.
At all levels!
At the very first level, when three people
--- On Wed, 18/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
I've been on the fence about whether or not it is
appropriate for me to respond to your last message on this
thread. Since I'm aware you ... value many of the
political systems of today higher than ... I
--- On Sun, 22/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: Our political systems do have serious problems but on
the
other hand we are somewhat above
'the laws of jungle'.
We may be ... somewhat above 'the laws of the jungle',
but that's no testament
--- On Wed, 25/3/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
Lam wrote:
IRV can be made sort of summable:
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2001-September/006595.html
Buddha Buck replied with an IRV example that much more
clearly explained
--- On Wed, 25/3/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Mar 25, 2009, at 12:19 AM, Juho
Laatu wrote:
Yes, good question. IRV votes thus don't
take excessive amount of space and can be
compressed and can be summed up (although
not very compactly).
Possible answers
--- On Wed, 25/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/soldoutreport.htm
It describes how the financial sector bribed our
representatives to produce the monstrosity that now engulfs
us. The article provides a link to the full report (a
3MB
Yes, direct dependency on money and
the donors to become elected may be
one of the key problems here. (Other
interesting areas areas of study
could be e.g. human interests and
weaknesses.) There are many approaches
and tricks one could use to reduce the
money related dependencies but maybe
there
--- On Sat, 28/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: I'd encourage maintaining some separation of the
political
and business segments of the
society..
How would you go about accomplishing that?
I think there are many options. One
could start for
There were thus 8984 votes out of which
- 4 were listed as invalid in the official
results. These seem to be blank votes.
- 6 votes that contained ties. 4 of these
were exhausted at the first round. According
to Terry Bouricius 3 of these were found not
to be ties after all in the partial
7550
2006 Council Mayor al with
IRV 9865
- Original Message -
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2009 5:34 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Burlington 2009 IRV election valid ballot
rate
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