[Election-Methods] delegate cascade

know of an earlier source? Is anyone else working with this mechanism? Have there been discussions along similar lines? Please bring me up to date, -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ P.S. The other discussion thread (a broader topic) is: Read any useful research lately

Re: [Election-Methods] delegate cascade

be interesting synergies among all of these. (I hope there are no instabilities.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Continuous elections and their interplay with power structures

that role become institutionalized as a kind of party system, one party in power (X), and the other awaiting a turn (J)? Can anyone see a third way for power to shift? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ The electoral medium is documented at: http://zelea.com/project/votorola

[EM] Delegate cascade and proportional representation

. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Delegate cascade and proportional representation

have a reference for DP? For delegate cascade, see: http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/outline.xht http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#delegate-cascade (very rough, badly needs weeding) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing

Re: [EM] Continuous elections and their interplay with power structures

, and the possibility of a formal power shift. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Continuous elections and their interplay with power structures

often need amendment, of course. (Similar procedures of staged acceptance, cooling off, and amendment can be applied to other types of norm election - for legislation, policy documents, and so forth.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list

Re: [EM] Delegate cascade and proportional representation

Raph Frank wrote: On 8/22/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... But cycles can occur only at the bottom of each casacade, where they result in pools. Pools are equivalent to roots, so d'Hondt (etc.) should still work. Maybe a rule like 1) Find the candidate with the highest

[EM] Decision rings in cascade voting

Raph Frank, in Delegate cascade and proportional representation: Michael Allan: Here the central delegates withdraw their votes from an incumbent office holder (root), in order to form a loop with each other... Well, if my rule is in effect, then candidates can start negotiating

Re: [EM] Continuous elections and their interplay with power structures

. We'll be running continuous elections for Mayor, local MPs, and so forth. Hopefully that will bring some experience into the mix. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] the 'who' and the 'what'

to experiment with another mechanism. The rest of the system (electoral districts, voter lists, trust network, mail and Web interfaces, and so forth) could be used off-shelf. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/home.xht -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods

Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'

on the 'who' and the 'what' in the form of candidates for the ballot, and norms for action? Or would they really (as McLuhan might suggest) be deciding on the whole electoral system? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

[EM] language/framing quibble, and killer apps

changed. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'

legislature. Popular parallel legislation would naturally find its way onto the legislative agenda of the state. Unpopular state legislation would naturally be voted down in the parallel legislature. Party discipline might be undermined. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

Raph Frank wrote: Michael Allan wrote: ... The faults or failings in democracy are located outside of state institutions. ... The fixes and changes are needed elsewhere. Right, if the people are organised, they can change the constitution. That brings to mind organizations like

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

. (Frankly, I'm fed up with your performance in the Council elections. You've just lost my vote. ;) http://t.zelea.com:8080/v/w/ -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

Michael Allan wrote: But I was speaking of overlay networks like Napster... Raph Frank wrote: ...even with a small number of people, it was worth using. You could use it to send files to friends. Yes, that's the key. It's free of scale dependencies. Same for open voting (though I

Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what'

context, the parallel system might vote nation-wide confidence in a candidate for Prime Minister. People would then expect Parliament to follow suit. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

read these shortly, when I doc the network. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

it will be small. On the other hand, with a little patience, it may eventually grow. So there's openings in time, as well as space.) But you agree that every draft ought to have an un-suppressable presence, even if nobody else likes it. That's all I was arguing for. -- Michael Allan Toronto

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

, in order to update its mod time. Alternatively, maybe it automatically goes to that page, rather than the newest revision. The history would be split into older - current - newer. Then the newer (unapproved) revision is not the default view for the casual reader. OK. -- Michael Allan

[EM] (MA-0) A medium of assent for the support of large scale communicative action

at societal scales. Consensus of the population might then decide such questions as the allocation of state power and the promulgation of norms. (I'll post each section separately, as I finish drafting it.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see

[EM] (MA-1) A medium of communicative assent

in which variant bills are drafted in a medium of recombinant text while being simultaneously exposed to delegate-cascade voting. Michael Allan. 2007. Recombinant text. SourceForge.net, project textbender, release 0.2.2, file d/overview.xht. http://sourceforge.net

[EM] Feeling left out in Sefton

(however illusory). We all had a single vote, and we decided the issue in a day. Suppose detractors are harping on this very point. Can the new process stand up to their attacks? If it is not popular, it will fail. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods

[EM] Practical democracy as a serialized cascade tree

assented to placing X there, by their votes. They had not assented to placing AA.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

it is!). -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Delegable proxy/cascade and killer apps

city server. It doesn't mean just big elections like Mayor. It also opens up the possibility of voting on local issues, such as neighbourhood improvement plans (like the park scenario in my other posts). That may be where the strongest roots will take hold - closest to home. -- Michael Allan

Re: [EM] (MA-2) Societal institution of communicative action

. So we can experiment with different methods of authentication and not risk the overall credibility of the system. Any particular method that proved untrustworthy would simply be devalued by the public - much like a currency floating on international exchange markets. -- Michael Allan Toronto

Re: [EM] Feeling left out in Sefton

Truce Fred, Whatever my critique of Practical Democracy, it may well stem from a misunderstanding. No need digging for the root of it. Peace, -- Michael Allan Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again

, and biased at first. (Not sure it's practical. Doing preliminary tests in Toronto, over the next few months.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - phantom equivalences

. Taken with primary elections [1], this covers the main purpose of a party system. [5] When delegates get bored with voting for assembly members, they start voting on their own legislative bills. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list

Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again

. Please resume...) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again

for Condorcet is an external site using that service. I guess it depends on where you're aiming. You can test resolution mechanisms under simulation in vitro. Why test them in vivo? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again

methods and electors will vote with their feet. There's no telling where they'll be attracted, or whether it'll jive with the test plans. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Idea for a free web service for (relatively) secure online voting

. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/a/manual.xht -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory

://zelea.com/project/votorola/home.xht Anyway, it's something different to consider. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] You Can't Have it Both Ways

the electors of external manipulation? 2. Through what plan of action can we implement the reform? 3. In the act of implementing the reform, what assurance do we have that we ourselves are not manipulating the electors? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/project/votorola

[EM] You Can't Have it Both Ways - the Voters Can

choose. Can't we help them? When it comes to choice, we're supposed to be the pros from Dover. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] You Can Indeed Have it Both Ways - Vol 52, Issue 64

is therefore not just the aim of reform, but also the means. (Note the dependency on self-reflected claims of legitimacy, which is what prompted me to post. I've never approached it from this angle before.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see

Re: [EM] Advanced Voting Systems: the Dirty Little Secret

. London. [2]. Duncan Black. 1969. Lewis Carroll and the theory of games. The American Economic Review. 59(2), p. 210. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Advanced Voting Systems

will think that it *must* be useless or next to useless. But the cost is very low! Have you implemented such a system? Is it attracting participation? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

-- THE STRUCTURING OF POWER AND THE COMPOSITION OF NORMS BY COMMUNICATIVE ASSENT -- Revised from: Michael Allan. 2008. SourceForge.net, project Votorola, release 0.1.12, file d/theory.xht. http

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

University Press. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

by a public ballot in cross-party primaries. (That's what I argue, anyway.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

if the primary was corrupted. Ordinarilly, the secret ballot on election day would filter out most of the corruption (I suppose), delivering the corrected result. But a truly massive corruption could overwhelm the filter, because the prediction would be self-fulfilling, to some extent. -- Michael Allan

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

the results are continuously revealed, and never final. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

-to-peer voting, with no pre-selected candidates c) open ballot d) voting on laws, too -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

not matter if the representatives / proxies change frequently. Hysteresis and other decoupling is provided by the separation of the two types of voting system - the system of public controls (as it were) and the system of administrative power. More in reply to your other message... -- Michael Allan

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

. She can also tell what her secret vote was. 3) The vote is public. What I mean is that also enforced secrecy and free speech can be combined. Michael Allan replied: Not in the public sphere - neither (1) nor (3) is enforceable - only (2) is allowed. It is the nature of the public

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

system design is natural, and whether it's useful. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

through the delegate, and the overall flow in the cascade - follows from the individual votes. Does this answer? Or are you interested in technical details of proving the individual votes? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

will listen to A and B. She will talk to X on their behalf. So there will be lots of talking. That's one reason why this type of voting will fit in the public sphere, which is essentially a space for talking. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

there? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent!

to label this - NONproductive! Well, you haven't read the original post. The word 'proxy' occurs only where I cite Abd. Please read it, and then share your critique. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

no big deal, I've only made a few changes here and there. But they listen to me. The drafter I'm voting for (she has a lot of votes) she's using my changes! And so on, down the line. It's kind of fun. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election

Re: [EM] STV and weighted positional methods

, then the assembly will be (in some sense) ideally constituted. This will also work in single winner elections. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] language/framing quibble

propose has problems, and when they are raised you tend to respond with a level of passion that others perceive as anger. (Your proposal is interesting, all the same.) Best, -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em

[EM] Time of trouble? Or put a lid on it?

of inequality that our economic system seems to require, in order to keep on functioning and producing goods? And globally, if we open democracy to all the world's people, are we also prepared to open our borders to them? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods

Re: [EM] Time of trouble? Or put a lid on it?

, which contains the text Aristotle's fundamental assumptions... the rise of industrialism... Both for good and evil, therefore, the day of the cultured gentleman is past. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em

[EM] To see oursels as ithers see us

election methods have been proposed that are similar, either in purpose or technique, to your own practical democracy? Of those most similar, what are their compartative strengths and weaknesses? P.S. Do you still prefer a CC for list posts? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http

[EM] Time of trouble - Premise 2

://zelea.com/project/votorola/compare.xht -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Partisan Politics, or Rising Above It

transforming their structure. How did they do that? Can the trick be repeated? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Partisan Politics, or Rising Above It

transformed the workings of our institutions, without transforming their structure. How did they do that? Can the trick be repeated? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Partisan Politics, or Rising Above It

to their representatives that do have somewhat different interests. (Maybe this comes under T(m), which asks of T, What are the expected consequences? What good? What evil?) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list

Re: [EM] Partisan Politics, or Rising Above It

, narrow context. This subthread (Rising Above It) is not concerned with the narrow context. You will be challenged here, if you attempt to fall back on it. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Partisan Politics, or Rising Above It

.html -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Partisan Politics (Non-Combatants Welcome)

method. Later we can talk about the comparative rights and wrongs of it, if you allow. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Partisan Politics - Excuse Me

. Mi. Yes please, tell us about it. Fr. Well, it goes like this, ... [1] http://www.robertburns.org/works/97.shtml (PS. Thank you, but no need to CC me. I read all posts to the list.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

Re: [EM] Time of trouble - Premise 2

. I don't know if it spoke for good or ill.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Many candidates (Re: language/framing quibble)

quibble My purpose is to devise a practical method of asking the people of Owego who they want as their mayor. Fred Gohlke's approach would also be out of scope. Practical Democracy is tree based. It is also (emphatically) a primary. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http

Re: [EM] Many candidates (Re: language/framing quibble)

is fixed ... Unfixing it would yield a continuous series of parallel runoffs, which is the delegable proxy - or liquid democracy, or delegate cascade. (Assuming this is in scope.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

Re: [EM] Time of trouble - Premise 2

, and it has not been refuted. But neither has it been accepted as a basis for further discussion. In this, we have a choice. Meanwhile, we build the IT, and, if it works, we make DD a fact. In this, however, we have no choice. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com

Re: [EM] language/framing quibble

Transformation of the Public Sphere. Translated by Thomas Burger, 1989. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. p. 202-203. http://books.google.ca/books?id=e799caakIWoCpg=PA202 -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

[EM] Time of trouble

, but the outward form of RD remains. Moreover, the ideals of RD are more fully realized. So it cannot be a revolution. The necessary revolutions occured centuries ago, in England, America and France.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

Re: [EM] critical theory - election methods as a remedy

will always have the final say, of course.) [1] http://zelea.com/project/votorola/home.xht [2] http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2009-March/024260.html -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

Re: [EM] critical theory - election methods as a remedy

[That is a fundamental tenet of Practical Democracy, as proposed.] I missed your specification of vote shifting. In which post was it? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Implementing Practical Democracy with Votorola

for each candidate norm. The results might guide officials in their choices of which laws to pass, which plans to execute, and which policies to follow. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Implementing Practical Democracy with Votorola

.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Practical Democracy (and primary rule making) with Votorola

-- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Practical Democracy (and primary rule making) with Votorola

that your work might be of great interest to the people at that site. You can find them at: http://www.world-wide-democracy.net/Wiki/WddmWikiMain You might mention it to them, if you think so. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http

Re: [EM] Practical Democracy (and primary rule making) with Votorola

Thank you! Your comments are generous. Best, - M Fred Gohlke wrote: Here's a copy of my post on the WDDM site: Good Morning, All I haven't been active for some time. One factor is that I've lost contact with Roy Daine, who was one of the clearest thinking advocates of Direct Democracy

Re: [EM] Practical Democracy (and primary rule making) with Votorola

with it. (If anyone has questions on how to do that, just ask and I will help.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Practical Democracy (and primary rule making) with Votorola

in private conversation. She agrees so strongly, that she pulls out her iPhone, raises a new issue on the pollserver, and casts the initial vote for you. Your opinion then becomes the focus of a wider attention, and the potential nucleus of a future consensus. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521

[EM] Influence of a single vote (was Voting strategy etc.)

. (What's also interesting is the objective perspective of manipulation. But that means looking at the influence of money and power, and not votes per se.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Influence of a single vote (was Voting strategy etc.)

. It will not allow the worst excesses of government to be foisted upon it, for example. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] A different strategyproofness notion

and reality vanish. A candidate is either a frontrunner, or is not. Labels to the contrary will be ignored, and will have no effect on the results. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 Skype michael_c_allan http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval andrange voting?

for it. They are therefore defined as steering media. The archetypal steering medium is money, which serves as a substitute for inter-communicative bartering. [ref. Vol. 2 of above] -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 Skype michael_c_allan http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods

Re: [EM] proxy ideas: continual consideration, and proxy committees

to avoid the systematic biases that would be introduced by a more centralized scheme. Very best, -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes

would shift his vote to someone else. ;-) (I agree with Abd. Nash equilibria may be less meaningful in situations where people can speak with each other, reach understandings and coordinate their actions. Voting methods might better take *that* capability as their touchstone.) -- Michael Allan

Re: [EM] proxy ideas: continual consideration, and proxy committees

themselves. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes

! Or am I wrong? -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes

reasons for voting. (Why do people keep doing it? What do they hope for?) We could re-build our theories and re-design our voting methods accordingly. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Why do voters vote?

make the *form* of the vote flexible enough to contain the rational *substance* (the particular why) without distorting it. Then the sum of all these high-fidelity votes might amount, in the end, to a substansive democracy. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election

[EM] How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes

theory. We ought therefore to investigate the real reasons for voting (separate thread Why do voters vote?) with an eye to improving our methods, facilities, etc. This conclusion seems inescapable. Or am I wrong? -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election

Re: [EM] Idea Proposal: Listening Democracy

legislatures based on DP (aka delegate cascade), together with some grounding in social theory: http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes

is missing, because from the perspective of the socially motivated voter, they are extremely anti-social. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes

in local, state or federal elections? Has your vote ever affected the outcome? (I admit that I still vote, though it has no effect.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] direct / proxy voting paper, now online -- requesting comments

://metagovernment.org/pipermail/start_metagovernment.org/ -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ -- http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2010-March/025740.html 2A. Basic system

Re: [EM] legislature size

are probably competent to take on both roles - official and elector-initiated legislation - simultaneously. * A possible method is outlined here: http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#action-norm -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Michael Rouse wrote: If you

[EM] Election method simulator code - revision control

, for example: http://zelea.com/var/db/repo/ -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Duane Johnson wrote: Git and GitHub has the largest mindshare among open source developers that I am aware of (I come from the open source dev community, not academia). If you want to be discovered

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