Hi,
2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> > On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> > > On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >
> > >> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> observable state at t
> > >> is sufficient to predict t
On 10/4/2011 6:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb wrote:
This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig
wants add to this that there is additional information wh
On 10/4/2011 8:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
state at t
is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt
On Oct 4, 9:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> > This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> > observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig
> > wants add to this that there is additional inform
On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> >> observable state at t
> >> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this
On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig
> wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p
> observable and which makes a
On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
state at t
is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there
is
additional information which is not 3-p o
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
> state at t
> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that
> there is
> additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a
> diff
On 10/4/2011 4:20 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our
laws to be the same for everyone at every time and place. This is
our idea of "laws". I'm sure you're familiar with Noether's
theorem and how s
Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand.
Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't
mean a pile of gray and white matter.
Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Is
digital more nonphysical than artificial?
On T
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in
terms of
+,*,N.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in
terms of
+,
On 10/4/2011 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our laws to be the same
for everyone at every time and place. This is our idea of "laws". I'm sure you're
familiar with Noether's theorem and how she showed that conservation of moment co
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) :
>>>
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
>
>
> The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thoug
On 10/3/2011 11:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could
go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing
due to the various physical factors that make neurons
On 10/4/2011 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/3/2011 8:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
Let me try to be sure that I understand this comment. When you
write: "they will all see the same laws" are you referring to those
invariant quantitie
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) :
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought
construct
which essentially reveals its own emptiness. What c
On 03 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing
everything on
computations.
This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions
without extra magic, o
On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/3/2011 8:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
Let me try to be sure that I understand this comment. When you
write: "they will all see the same laws" are you referring to
those invariant quantities and relations/functions with respec
On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/3/2011 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 00:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2011 7:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Oct 2, 2011 at 3:01 AM, meekerdb
wrote:
It's a strange, almost paradoxical result but I think observer
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:27, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Ok, so this is where I would disagree. It only seems that to define
a computation you need to look at the time evolution, because a
snapshot doesn't contain enough information about the dynamics of
the system. But here one considers all of
On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote:
From page 17
"It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to
deny the
initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular
program can
generate conscious awareness in the first place."
What about the possibility
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:29, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
I agree with Craig, although the way he presents it might seems a bit
uncomputationalist, (if I can say(*)).
Thoughts act on matter all the time. It is a selection of histories
+ a
On 04 Oct 2011, at 01:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 05:31:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The states are countable, but not the (3-)states + the neighborhhood
of (infinite) computations that you are mentioning yourselves.
Not sure if I see where is the problem. It seems
On Oct 4, 8:54 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg
>
> > On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > > The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> > > binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> > > synapse when the presyna
2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
> > The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> > binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> > synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on.
>
> It's the 'and so
On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on.
It's the 'and so on' where your explanation breaks down.
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