Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally agreed-upon description of consciousness - applied in the lit as all variations of an unidentified thing anyone needs to his theory. I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides' and directs activity accordingly. I identified it as acknowledgement of and response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory term, but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent position to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is one's feeling of SELF (of I) (which makes sense). We'll probably be old men (QTI-like ancient) by the time there is any concensus on the subject. I operationally define consciousness in terms of Bostrom's reference class - ie the property of there being something for it be like (references of Nagel's What is to be like bat - if bats are consciousm the question is answerable, if not then there is nothing that it is like to be a bat). Note that this is _not_ equivalent to self-awareness, which is the feeling of self you talk about. Mind you, self-awareness does seem to be necessary for consciousness in order to prevent the Occam catastrophe, which I mention in my book, and probably on this list. Process is covered by my TIME postulate, which I've been deliberately somewhat vague on. It essentially says that experienced observer moments can be placed into an ordered set (mathematical notion of ordering - for every experienced observer moment, all other experienced moments must exist in the past or the future of that one). This leaves open a wide variety of time structures (continuous, discrete, rational and so on), and indeed all structures called timescales is included. However, it dismisses things like 2D time, so it could potentially be wrong. My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. Poor old Nick Bostrom and the other pompous academic fools are all so confused because they think consciousness is reducible to physical time. This is the source of all the confusion about anthropic reasoning and observer moments. Consciousness is *not* reducible to physical time, but is *another* time dimension super-imposed over the top of (supervening on but not reducible to) physical time. As I said in my previous post: 'Consciousness is movement of mathematical continuants through mathematical configuration space' (i.e. a higher dimensional - abstract - time). If the academics didn't spend all their time jetting around the world on elaborate conferences and trying to impress us all with fancy 'papers' and 'lectures' filled with worthless verbiage they would have realized that time had more than one dimension and that consciousness should be directly equated with an extra dimension long ago. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. They can also be both right if they're held to be emergent concepts (in the precise form of the term I use). Extra dimensionality is not needed. Poor old Nick Bostrom and the other pompous academic fools are all so confused because they think consciousness is reducible to physical time. I find this suprising. I've never seen any of Bostrom's writings that indicates this. This is the source of all the confusion about anthropic reasoning and observer moments. Consciousness is *not* reducible to physical time, but is *another* time dimension super-imposed over the top of (supervening on but not reducible to) physical time. As I said in my previous post: 'Consciousness is movement of mathematical continuants through mathematical configuration space' (i.e. a higher dimensional - abstract - time). If the academics didn't spend all their time jetting around the world on elaborate conferences and trying to impress us all with fancy 'papers' and 'lectures' filled with worthless verbiage they would have realized that time had more than one dimension and that consciousness should be directly equated with an extra dimension long ago. I take it then that you're spending all your time jetting around the world to sit in on conferences where pompous academics present worthless papers filled with verbiage. Half your luck! I'm not an academic myself, and rarely get an opportunity to attend conferences. But in these lean times, not many of my academic colleagues do either. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. They can also be both right if they're held to be emergent concepts (in the precise form of the term I use). Extra dimensionality is not needed. The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The debates over A-Theory of time and B-Theory of time strike me as similar to the debates over whether light was particles or waves. I think the trick is to seperate 'time' into several different components - there's a mathematical scaffolding which *doesn't* flow (the block universe of the B-Theorists) and there's something else which *does* flow (I think it's conscious -sentient - observer moments). All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest above, you can't do this. Poor old Nick Bostrom and the other pompous academic fools are all so confused because they think consciousness is reducible to physical time. I find this suprising. I've never seen any of Bostrom's writings that indicates this. Bostrom's writings appear to grant validity to anthropic reasoning (which I think is bunk) and also appear to identify consciousness (sentient observer-moments) with pre-existing computations in the block-universe. As I suggested above, consciousness is not reducible to physical processes and this is what invalidates anthropic reasoning. This is the source of all the confusion about anthropic reasoning and observer moments. Consciousness is *not* reducible to physical time, but is *another* time dimension super-imposed over the top of (supervening on but not reducible to) physical time. As I said in my previous post: 'Consciousness is movement of mathematical continuants through mathematical configuration space' (i.e. a higher dimensional - abstract - time). If the academics didn't spend all their time jetting around the world on elaborate conferences and trying to impress us all with fancy 'papers' and 'lectures' filled with worthless verbiage they would have realized that time had more than one dimension and that consciousness should be directly equated with an extra dimension long ago. I take it then that you're spending all your time jetting around the world to sit in on conferences where pompous academics present worthless papers filled with verbiage. Half your luck! I'm not an academic myself, and rarely get an opportunity to attend conferences. But in these lean times, not many of my academic colleagues do either. I'm not an academic. In fact the more time I've spent around these folks (on various internet mailing lists) the more they irritate me. They just ain't any fun. um now why does your sig say 'professor Russell Standish', Mathematics with a academic address given? ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest above, you can't do this. I'm not entirely sure what to make of what you say here, except that it seems to be a criticism of the ASSA (that each observer moment is selected independently of any other from an absolute measure distribution). Bostrom's writings appear to grant validity to anthropic reasoning (which I think is bunk) and also appear to identify consciousness (sentient observer-moments) with pre-existing computations in the block-universe. As I suggested above, consciousness is not reducible to physical processes and this is what invalidates anthropic reasoning. Not all anthropic reasoning maps consciousness to specific physical processes... um now why does your sig say 'professor Russell Standish', Mathematics with a academic address given? ;) Its an adjunct position, which mainly means they don't pay me anything, or give me an office. The main advantages for me are access to a uni library (and more importantly the electronic journal subscriptions), and access to supercomputers for running simulations (I still have to apply, but it doesn't cost me anything). The main advantage to the school is some credit for my publications (which is worth real money)! Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. They can also be both right if they're held to be emergent concepts (in the precise form of the term I use). Extra dimensionality is not needed. The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point about a block universe is that there is no A-series, not that there is a B-series. This asymmetry makes the situation unlike W/P duality. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: To observe is to......
On Oct 11, 7:14 am, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This sound like your experiential field is a play performed in the Cartesian theater fof the edification of the observer.No, it's better visualised as 'being a not-mirror' :-) Imagine you embedded a mirror in your head, but you were only interested in everything the mirror was not. That is, the image in the mirror is manipulating the space intimately adjacent to the reflecting surface. Keep the space, throw the reflecting surface and glass away. What you are interested in is 'being' that space, not the mirror. When you do that the 'movie screen' that is the experiential field becomes part of you. Yes it's a play, only 1 viewer who literally 'is' the theatre, no regressing homunculi. Oddly, I think I *see* what you mean (and I use the term advisedly). One of the problems we experience in discussing these issues (certainly I do, anyway) is the lack of a really effective way to share powerful *visualisations* of what we're proposing. Not everything we're trying to express is formalisable (at this stage anyway) in mathematical or strictly logical terms. I've tried to express before this image of the relationship between what-is-functioning-as-perceiver and what-is-functioning-as-percept, and the picture in my head was always something like you describe. And the key aspect is that you *are* this relationship, your grasp of the situation is unmediated, there is no regress. For me, this is the primary intension of 'exists', and it lies at the heart of what I confusingly referred to as 1-person primacy - meaning only that you can't come by any of this unless you *are* the entity in question. The commitment is total - there is no way of climbing outside of this to study the situation 'objectively'. David Brent Meeker: snip Observation involves (necessitates) the AGI having experiences, some of which are an experiential representation of the external world. The process of generation of the experiential field(s) involves the insertion of the AGI in the chain of causality from that which is observed 'out there' through the external world to the sensing surface, impact (causal interaction) measured by sensing, transport (causality again) of the measurement through the AGI to the brain where the measurement participates in the causality that is the creation of the experiential field. So that is what is *involved* in creating the experiential field. But what is the field? I understand it is a representation of the external world, but what about it makes it a representation? I hope you're not going to say because the observer recognizes or uses it as such.The fields: In the case of visual field: virtual bosons as photons In the case of aural fields: virtual bosons as phonons In the case of touch fields: virtual bosons as touchons :-) In the case of touch fields: virtual bosons as tasteons :-) I don't know the details of the various bosons yet, but there is an infinity of possibilities as the virtual bosons are arbitrarily configurable by the spatiotemporal behaviour of the neural membranes involved. This is virtual matter in the same sense that all the members of the standard model depict matter i.e. boson is to matter as virtual boson is to virtual matter. It is by virtue of the existence/reality of the _entire_ causal chain that the experiential field can be created and be called observation of the external world. (Clearly experiential fields can also be created as hallucinations/dreams, without the full causality chain - but that is not the 'observation' we are talking about). In making use of the complete causal chain the oberver has access (inherits some of the properties of) to that which is observed. This sound like your experiential field is a play performed in the Cartesian theater fof the edification of the observer.No, it's better visualised as 'being a not-mirror' :-) Imagine you embedded a mirror in your head, but you were only interested in everything the mirror was not. That is, the image in the mirror is manipulating the space intimately adjacent to the reflecting surface. Keep the space, throw the reflecting surface and glass away. What you are interested in is 'being' that space, not the mirror. When you do that the 'movie screen' that is the experiential field becomes part of you. Yes it's a play, only 1 viewer who literally 'is' the theatre, no regressing homunculi. It's just that the brain material (neurons) paints the space like the mirror did. BTWEach neuron is like a single paintbrush and they all paint in parallel real time. Neurons to not have to actually 'fire' to paint. There are no particles actually traveling anywhere. If you slice occipital with a scalpel early damage would interfere with learning and ability to report contents of vision... but not necessarily the visual field itself. It'd take a
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable, and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own. I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable, That's just my point. It's not the fact that is is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something inexpressible. and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication. Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Make your mind up. You said 'see a square' not 'squareness'. Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. Yes, fine, no problem of course, so why discuss this example? I specifically said '1-person experience', and in the case of 'see a square' (your choice) let's try the hard one - i.e. communicate the experience of seeing a particular square, not the concept of squareness. So, for example, you can say 'look at that square', I look at it, I see the square, I instantiate it, I have an analogous 1-person experience. OK? Come to think of it, even in your example of squareness, I have to instantiate *something*, otherwise your explanation won't register with me. And this something is *my* private something, as it happens *derived* from your communication - it isn't literally what you 'had in mind', because this is private to *you*. Frankly, I think if you quibble about this, you must have some other notion of 1-person in mind. But will we ever know? David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable,That's just my point. It's not the fact that is is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something inexpressible. and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication.Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest above, you can't do this. I'm not entirely sure what to make of what you say here, except that it seems to be a criticism of the ASSA (that each observer moment is selected independently of any other from an absolute measure distribution). The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a fully formed or consistent fashion, then you cannot apply standard statistical reasoning about the chances of an 'observer moment' being instantiated. Re-read what I said. I was disputing the block universe as reagrds observer moments. If Observer moments don't actually exist until we come to them via the river of time, then they cannot be reasoned about using standard statistical methods to talk about pre-existing frequencies. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
1Z wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point about a block universe is that there is no A-series, not that there is a B-series. This asymmetry makes the situation unlike W/P duality. My point was that the philosophers could be wrong ;) i.e a block universe does *not* have to mean that there is no A-series. I'm pointing out the possibility that that there could be *both* a block universe *and* an A-Block. I pointed out that this could be possible if time had several different components or dimensions associated with it. If both a block universe and an A-series is possible, then the philosophy debate over whether time flows or not would be exactly like the debate over whether light is particles or waves. Every-one thought it had to be one or the other, but it turned out to be both. Analogously, every-one thinks time is *either* an A-series *or* a B-series, but I'm saying it *can* be both. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 03:38:13AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest above, you can't do this. I'm not entirely sure what to make of what you say here, except that it seems to be a criticism of the ASSA (that each observer moment is selected independently of any other from an absolute measure distribution). The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a fully formed or consistent fashion, then you cannot apply standard statistical reasoning about the chances of an 'observer moment' being instantiated. Re-read what I said. I was disputing the block universe as reagrds observer moments. If Observer moments don't actually exist until we come to them via the river of time, then they cannot be reasoned about using standard statistical methods to talk about pre-existing frequencies. Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to have some notion of time that his Great Programmer lives in. I'm not sure what the status of Tegmark's ensemble is, but I doubt there is any external temporality in that. I suspect in that case you would disagree with most of the ensemble theories discussed here then. OTOH, if we're looking at it in terms of an emergent duality picture like I suggested, the observer moments do exist in the block multiverse, but when asking about appearances this is irrelevant, and one can only ask the question what is the probability distribution of my next observer moment. This is the RSSA. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
