Re: Against Mechanism

2010-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Dec 2010, at 00:02, Rex Allen wrote:



Math causes experiences of math.

H.  I don't see how or why that would be.




If you assume Mechanism, the idea that the brain is Turing emulable,  
then it is a theorem.


And if you assume the classical theory of knowledge, then you can even  
understand how that happens. It happens because universal numbers,  
relatively to infinities of universal numbers, cannot see the  
relationship between they representable proofs and their private and  
non representable truth.


You talk like if Gödel's and Tarski's theorems don't exist. You are  
confusing all the time the notion of mathematical truth, which is not  
representable in any way, with the notion of proofs, which are  
formalizable and can be represented.


Anyway, your theory (which is really only a personal  
phenomenological report) needs to presuppose that we are not Turing  
emulable. This means that  we cannot accept a digital brain or body  
substitution. I respect that opinion, but I am still waiting what is  
your non-mechanistic explanation of consciousness, matter and why a  
majority of humans believe in prime numbers.
To say that consciousness just exists and nothing else is not better  
than to say that God created it all. That explains nothing.


You did not reply to my objection, that if your accidental idealism  
theory is correct, I can only accept it accidentally, making even  
absurd your attempts to convince us. Your very attempt to reason with  
us seems to me to contradict your theory.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2010-12-06 Thread 1Z


On Dec 5, 11:02 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:

 So I would say that time exists within conscious experience, conscious
 experience doesn't exist within time.  All experiences that exist, do
 so eternally and timelessly.  

So  you say, but nothing is experienced *as* eternal


  The thoughts of those life
  forms is not likely to look like random snow, since that would not be useful
  for their survival.

 The contents of thoughts and the survival of the thinker are caused by
 the same thing...the initial conditions and causal laws of the
 universe.

 The contents of thoughts do not cause the survival of the thinker.

They are a practical and high level description of the causes.
The existence of the trees does not disprove the forest

 Like 1Z, you're assigning causal power to abstractions that only exist
 for you.

There is a difference between a high level description and a pure
abstraction

  If I start with thought as primitive, and try to
  explain that thought under accidental idealism I can go no further.  While
  it explains the existence of thought (by definition) it seems like an
  intellectual dead end.

 It's an answer that doesn't generate any additional questions...so
 it's an end in that sense.

But so is any explanation that stops dead somewhere. However,
you object to that. You object to persuing an explanation back
N places only to stop dead -- except where N=0.

 So there can only be one ultimate answer:  there is no reason for the
 way things are.

OK. So why is the N=0 version better than the N0 version?

 That's it.

 Supposed answers that introduce unexplained causal laws or entities
 are vulnerable to the same questions they were introduced to explain.

 What explains the order of our experiences?  Orderly causal laws!  But
 then what explains orderly causal laws?

 You just end up with infinite regress.  Or an unexplained first cause.

Your version of events is unexpected first cause where the cause
is identical to the effect.

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Re: Against Mechanism

2010-12-06 Thread Rex Allen
On Mon, Nov 29, 2010 at 12:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 29 Nov 2010, at 05:15, Rex Allen wrote:
 On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 4:06 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  Would
 you admit then, that a computer which interprets bits the same way as a
 brain could be conscious?  Isn't this mechanism?  Or is your view more
 like
 the Buddhist idea that there is no thinker, only thought?

 Right, my view is that there is no thinker, only thought.

 Ah! The key point where we differ the most. Person is the key concept for
 those who grasp mechanism and its consequences.
 At least you don't eliminate consciousness, but you do eliminate persons.
 Brr...

Once one has abandoned libertarian free will, I don’t see that the
concept of “persons” matters much anyway.



 Meillassoux’s solution uses Cantorian detotalization to counter
 proposed resolutions to Hume’s “problem of induction” that involve
 probabilistic logic depending upon a totality of cases.

 Meillassoux's main point with this digression into Cantorian set
 theory is that just as there can be no end to the process of set
 formation and thus no such thing as the totality of all sets, there is
 also no absolute totality of all possible cases.

 Down the rabbit hole of infinite regress.  Doesn’t seem promising, and
 doesn’t seem necessary.

 Meissaloux seems to ignore that the set of partial computable is closed for
 the Cantorian diagonalization. That is the key technical point which makes
 Church thesis possible and *digital* mechanism so powerful (and computer
 science a science).

If one doesn’t accept that conscious experience is the result of
computable functions, then I don’t see that this is relevant.

So the Church-Turing thesis is basically that everything computable
is computable by a Turing machine.

Further, since an algorithm is a finite string of characters from a
finite alphabet, the number of computable functions is countable.

You can’t use Cantorian diagonalization in this case because doing so
would require you to write a computable function that could generate a
list of the other computable functions, and then create it’s own
output for input “n” by sampling the nth output of the nth computable
function and adding 1 - with the problem being that because of the
halting problem you can never generate a list of *only* the computable
functions.

Which means that Meillassoux’s idea won’t work *if* one assumes that
conscious experience is computable...since in that case there is, in
some sense, a set of possible conscious experiences.

But if one doesn’t start from the assumption that conscious experience
is computable, then your point has no bearing on Meillassoux’s
argument.  Right?

And, as an accidentalist, I don’t assume that conscious experience is
computable.

While some sequences of experience may have aspects that lend
themselves to being accurately described via computable functions, I
see no reason to accept that *all* aspects of *all* experiences are
thus describable.

So...an interesting argument, but I think not applicable.

Rex

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Re: Against Mechanism

2010-12-06 Thread Brent Meeker

On 12/6/2010 8:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Mon, Nov 29, 2010 at 12:09 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be  wrote:
   

  On 29 Nov 2010, at 05:15, Rex Allen wrote:
 

  On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 4:06 PM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com  wrote:
   

Would
  you admit then, that a computer which interprets bits the same way as a
  brain could be conscious?  Isn't this mechanism?  Or is your view more
  like
  the Buddhist idea that there is no thinker, only thought?
 


  Right, my view is that there is no thinker, only thought.
   


  Ah! The key point where we differ the most. Person is the key concept for
  those who grasp mechanism and its consequences.
  At least you don't eliminate consciousness, but you do eliminate persons.
  Brr...
 

http://www.smbc-comics.com/#comic

Brent

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