Re: comp and Maxwell demon
On 16 Jan 2011, at 22:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Thanks for the answer. My question was due to the fact that comp presumably can simulate more than we observe. Let me check if I have understood your answer correctly. I will cite a paragraph from my text http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/12/entropy-and-artificial-life.html We bring a glass of hot water in the room and leave it there. Eventually the temperature of the water will be equal to the ambient temperature. In classical thermodynamics, this process is considered as irreversible, that is, the Second Law forbids that the temperature in the glass will be hot again spontaneously. It is in complete agreement with our experience, so one would expect the same from statistical mechanics. However there the entropy has some statistical meaning and there is a nonzero chance that the water will be hot again. Moreover, there is a theorem (Poincaré recurrence) that states that if we wait long enough then the temperature of the glass must be hot again. No doubt, the chances are very small and time to wait is very long, in a way this is negligible. Some people are happy with such statistical explanation, some not. Have you meant that the Universal Dovetailer will act for such a situation according to Poincaré recurrence? The UD will do that an infinity of times, given that the Poincaré recurrence is a computable process. But the physical laws are sum on first person views, based on a continuum of histories, so to relate thermodynamic to the UD is certainly not obvious at all. The UD is just a way to provide the minimal third person ontology (the 'everything') needed when we assume mechanism, and its role is to build a mathematical formulation of the mind-body problem (if only to illustrate that science has not yet choose between Plato and Aristotle). Bruno on 16.01.2011 17:50 Bruno Marchal said the following: You can simulate it. But you cannot program it. It uses a huge amount of information that it is hard to extract from the environment. I would say. In a larger sense, in which we are ourself Maxwell demon, you can filter it from long computation. They will transform selective information into energy. they will economize. The Universal Dovetailer does generate all possible Maxwell daemons, but I guess they are typically distributed sparsely in the set of all computations. Quantum Maxwell demon? That might explains the origin of life, but that might be a too cheap explanation. I should revised quantum information theory, but I have already hardly the time to do the real thing, which is to extract the quantum information from classical information + self-duplication and other self-perturbation (or to convince others to do the work, or that such a work has to be done to get both the qualia and the quanta). Interesting but hard question. Bruno On 15 Jan 2011, at 18:22, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I am trying to understand what the hypothesis comp is about. It would be interesting to understand whether the Maxwell demon could be simulated or not. Any idea? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: comp, Maxwell demons and Observers
On 16 Jan 2011, at 22:37, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno and Evgenii, -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 11:50 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: comp and Maxwell demon You can simulate it. But you cannot program it. It uses a huge amount of information that it is hard to extract from the environment. I would say. In a larger sense, in which we are ourself Maxwell demon, you can filter it from long computation. They will transform selective information into energy. they will economize. The Universal Dovetailer does generate all possible Maxwell daemons, but I guess they are typically distributed sparsely in the set of all computations. Quantum Maxwell demon? That might explains the origin of life, but that might be a too cheap explanation. I should revised quantum information theory, but I have already hardly the time to do the real thing, which is to extract the quantum information from classical information + self-duplication and other self-perturbation (or to convince others to do the work, or that such a work has to be done to get both the qualia and the quanta). Interesting but hard question. Bruno On 15 Jan 2011, at 18:22, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I am trying to understand what the hypothesis comp is about. It would be interesting to understand whether the Maxwell demon could be simulated or not. Any idea? Evgenii Pardon my interjection. How exactly does it make sense to say that we transform selective information into energy? If information is just a form of energy, such that that phasing can make sense, does it not follow that there should be a unique relationship between the forms of matter that can implement a given information structure and a given material structure? From what I can tell there exists multiple ways that one and the same information can be implemented in matter. It is also true that multiple different information structures can represent one and the same material system. This implies two distinct and irreducible categories: a category of information structures and a category of material structures. There is also a relationship between these two categories, but that relation is not an identity mapping in the usual sense because it is almost always not a bijection. Because of this line of reasoning I am having a hard time understanding how it is that we can make statements like transforming information into energy and think that those kind of statements are sound. I agree. But it is a usual Maxwell demon phrasing. It can be used to explain why deleting a bit of information needs some minial amount amount of energy, and why computing does not need any energy at all. The quantum vacuum gives an example of universal dovetailing which does not use any energy. OTOH, it make sense to me that we can make claims like: we can use information about material systems to induce changes within them that optimize their energy distributions and so forth. We can maintain our belief in comp and UD as they apply to information and its structures, such as Boolean and Heyting algebras, but still consider that there has to be some form of material implementation possible at least in principle for it, Not at all. That would contradict the movie graph argument. Look at MGA in the archive. otherwise we are stuck with the conclusion that the physical world is just a causally ineffective epiphenomena and with no explanation as to why we necessarily experience it. All forms of monism have this problem. I disagree. A *primitive* physical world just does not exist, and the illusion of why universal numbers believes in a physical worlds is explained by the logic of self-reference, and this in a precise enough way to already compare the physics dreamed by universal numbers with our observation. If the distribution of Maxwell daemons is spare in its distribution over the set of possible computations, does this not imply that the chances of finding oneself as a Maxwell Daemon to be identically sparse. If the set of computations is infinite this make the chance of finding oneself as a MD to be vanishingly small, 1/ inf. Does this not seem to indicate against the necessity of ever experiencing oneself as a MD in the first place? That is a form of Bayesian reasoning that we have already often criticized in this list. It assumes an absolute measure which makes no sense, imo. If we go further and notice that we seem to experience a relatively long chain of experiences that are MD in nature, does this not make it even more miraculous given derivation of the statistics of distributions of MD in the ensemble of possible computations? Only the relative probabilities makes sense to extract fits person plural views. What if there is a mechanism that allows for the biasing of those statistics such that it is no
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On Jan 12, 10:50 pm, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great
culturally maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet
again, the participant doesn;t even know they are doing it. Garrett
says
/The key is that observers are just a particular type of information,
as is everything else. That is, we assume that the Physical Church
Turing Thesis (PCTT) ..blah blah blah
/
WRONG WRONG WRONG.
The author has somehow remained completely uninformed by the real
message in the consciousness material cited in the article.
*Observers are NOT just a particular type of information*
The word information _was defined by an observer_,
The word observer was defined by an observer. Cannot observers
describe themselves exactly? Is a description necessarily inaccurate
because it is a description? Are observers not observers because
they define themselves as observers, and their descriptions
are necessarily wrong?
a human, USING
observation. Like every other word it's just a metaphoric description of
as thing, with meaning to a human. No matter what logical steps one
proceeds to enact from this juncture, you are not describing anything
that can be used to build or explain an observer. You are merely
describing what an observer will see.
What does it take to get something so simple across to physics?
I'll have yet another go at it.
Consider a SET_X = {BALL1, BALL2, BALL3, BALL4}
This is a traditional 3-rd person (3P) view of the set created by a
scientific act of OBSERVATION of the set of balls.
BALL SET SCIENCE then proceeds to construct very clever mathematical
descriptions of set member behaviour.
BUT
If you are the observer = BALL1, INSIDE SET X, the very act of
observation results from the 1ST PERSON (1-P) relationship between [you,
observer = BALL 1 ] and [the rest of the set, from within SET_X]. This
description is not the same as the above description of SET_X
Merely being different is not much of an issue. A 2D perspective is
differerent to a 3D model, but given a 3D model of something you
can derive any 2D perspective you like. You need to explain
why a 1p observation is not similarly derivable from the 3p
perspective
Can't
anyone see that ?? The ability to observe anything arises from that
circumstance, not from the 3P-circumstance constructed by having observed
*Why* can't you have 3P descriptions of observers and observations?
Science has not even begun to characterise SET_X in the 1P way.
Maybe you could say what the explanatory gap is.
=
Every single attempt so far in science has the following generic form.
I am human scientist FRED. How we humans do observation is a real
mystery. I like mysteries. And I am really good at maths. I will do the
very clever maths of observation. Now where do I begin...ASSUMING
OBSERVATION ... blah blah blah.
Then off we go into the weeds, YET AGAIN.
FRED just doesn't get the difference between 1-P and 3-P. It's a
systemic blindness.
I'll just crawl off and fume for a while. I'll be OK soon enough! :-)
Colin Hales
if you can't formulaically predict/build an observer with what you
produced, you haven't explained observation and you don't really
understand it
ronaldheld wrote:
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf
Any comments?
Ronald
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Re: comp and Maxwell demon
on 17.01.2011 14:00 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 16 Jan 2011, at 22:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Have you meant that the Universal Dovetailer will act for such a situation according to Poincaré recurrence? The UD will do that an infinity of times, given that the Poincaré recurrence is a computable process. But the physical laws are sum on first person views, based on a continuum of histories, so to relate thermodynamic to the UD is certainly not obvious at all. The UD is just a way to provide the minimal third person ontology (the 'everything') needed when we assume mechanism, and its role is to build a mathematical formulation of the mind-body problem (if only to illustrate that science has not yet choose between Plato and Aristotle). Let me write down how I understand this. The 3rd person view gives us a complete Universe of numbers and the 1st person view perceives just a part of it. Is this correct? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
