On 16 Jan 2011, at 22:37, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Dear Bruno and Evgenii, -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 11:50 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: comp and Maxwell demon You can simulate it. But you cannot program it. It uses a huge amount of information that it is hard to extract from the environment. I would say. In a larger sense, in which we are ourself Maxwell demon, you can filter it from long computation. They will transform selective information into energy. they will economize. The Universal Dovetailer does generate all possible Maxwell daemons, but I guess they are typically distributed sparsely in the set of all computations. Quantum Maxwell demon? That might explains the origin of life, but that might be a too cheap explanation. I should revised quantum information theory, but I have already hardly the time to do the real thing, which is to extract the quantum information from classical information + self-duplication and other self-perturbation (or to convince others to do the work, or that such a work has to be done to get both the qualia and the quanta). Interesting but hard question. Bruno On 15 Jan 2011, at 18:22, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > I am trying to understand what the hypothesis comp is about. It > would be interesting to understand whether the Maxwell demon could > be simulated or not. Any idea? > > EvgeniiPardon my interjection. How exactly does it make sense to saythat we "transform selective information into energy"? Ifinformation is just a form of energy, such that that phasing canmake sense, does it not follow that there should be a uniquerelationship between the forms of matter that can implement a giveninformation structure and a given material structure? From what Ican tell there exists multiple ways that one and the sameinformation can be implemented in matter. It is also true thatmultiple different information structures can represent one and thesame material system. This implies two distinct and irreduciblecategories: a category of information structures and a category ofmaterial structures. There is also a relationship between these twocategories, but that relation is not an identity mapping in theusual sense because it is almost always not a bijection. Because ofthis line of reasoning I am having a hard time understanding how itis that we can make statements like "transforming information intoenergy" and think that those kind of statements are sound.

`I agree. But it is a usual Maxwell demon phrasing. It can be used to`

`explain why deleting a bit of information needs some minial amount`

`amount of energy, and why computing does not need any energy at all.`

`The quantum vacuum gives an example of universal dovetailing which`

`does not use any energy.`

OTOH, it make sense to me that we can make claims like: "we canuse information about material systems to induce changes within themthat optimize their energy distributions" and so forth. We canmaintain our belief in comp and UD as they apply to information andits structures, such as Boolean and Heyting algebras, but stillconsider that there has to be some form of material implementationpossible at least in principle for it,

`Not at all. That would contradict the movie graph argument. Look at`

`MGA in the archive.`

otherwise we are stuck with the conclusion that the physical worldis just a causally ineffective epiphenomena and with no explanationas to why we necessarily experience it. All forms of monism havethis problem.

`I disagree. A *primitive* physical world just does not exist, and the`

`illusion of why universal numbers believes in a physical worlds is`

`explained by the logic of self-reference, and this in a precise enough`

`way to already compare the physics dreamed by universal numbers with`

`our observation.`

If the distribution of Maxwell daemons is spare in itsdistribution over the set of possible computations, does this notimply that the chances of finding oneself as a Maxwell Daemon to beidentically sparse. If the set of computations is infinite this makethe chance of finding oneself as a MD to be vanishingly small, 1/inf. Does this not seem to indicate against the necessity of everexperiencing oneself as a MD in the first place?

`That is a form of Bayesian reasoning that we have already often`

`criticized in this list. It assumes an absolute measure which makes no`

`sense, imo.`

If we go further and notice that we seem to experience a relativelylong chain of experiences that are MD in nature, does this not makeit even more miraculous given derivation of the statistics ofdistributions of MD in the ensemble of possible computations?

`Only the relative probabilities makes sense to extract fits person`

`plural views.`

What if there is a mechanism that allows for the biasing of thosestatistics such that it is no longer a miracle that we are not justspontaneous Boltzmann Brains. The observer selection ideas of Bostrum

`See also my older papers. Such selection is the base of the first`

`person indeterminacy, and of everything which follows from that.`

`UDA step 7 and 8 already explain that we cannot be 'spontaneous`

`Boltzmann Brains'. If we are machine, we are provably the sum on all`

`'number theoretical 'Boltzmann brains' or universal numbers/`

`computations.`

seem to give us some good clues about this mechanism. Could it bethat a feedback type of relationship might be involved? The choiceof what form the material structure takes as it evolves in timecould be used to select the information representation that bestdescribes it, but this requires a categorical difference betweenmatter and information such that we cannot think of them as justbeing transformable into each other.

`But that is exactly what is provided by the 'material hypostases".`

`Matter is not information. It is information stabilized by a continuum`

`of computations as seen by numbers. I follow you against easy links`

`between energy and information. Both term are very fuzzy and admit`

`quite different sort of formal specifications. Better to use a top`

`down approach which prevents the evacuation of the subject,`

`consciousness and/or the first person views.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.