On 16 Jan 2011, at 22:37, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno and Evgenii,
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 11:50 AM
Subject: Re: comp and Maxwell demon
You can simulate it. But you cannot program it. It uses a huge amount
of information that it is hard to extract from the environment. I
In a larger sense, in which we are ourself Maxwell demon, you can
filter it from long computation. They will transform selective
information into energy. they will economize.
The Universal Dovetailer does generate all possible Maxwell daemons,
but I guess they are typically distributed sparsely in the set of all
Quantum Maxwell demon? That might explains the origin of life, but
that might be a too cheap explanation. I should revised quantum
information theory, but I have already hardly the time to do the real
thing, which is to extract the quantum information from classical
information + self-duplication and other self-perturbation (or to
convince others to do the work, or that such a work has to be done to
get both the qualia and the quanta).
Interesting but hard question.
On 15 Jan 2011, at 18:22, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> I am trying to understand what the hypothesis comp is about. It
> would be interesting to understand whether the Maxwell demon could
> be simulated or not. Any idea?
Pardon my interjection. How exactly does it make sense to say
that we "transform selective information into energy"? If
information is just a form of energy, such that that phasing can
make sense, does it not follow that there should be a unique
relationship between the forms of matter that can implement a given
information structure and a given material structure? From what I
can tell there exists multiple ways that one and the same
information can be implemented in matter. It is also true that
multiple different information structures can represent one and the
same material system. This implies two distinct and irreducible
categories: a category of information structures and a category of
material structures. There is also a relationship between these two
categories, but that relation is not an identity mapping in the
usual sense because it is almost always not a bijection. Because of
this line of reasoning I am having a hard time understanding how it
is that we can make statements like "transforming information into
energy" and think that those kind of statements are sound.
I agree. But it is a usual Maxwell demon phrasing. It can be used to
explain why deleting a bit of information needs some minial amount
amount of energy, and why computing does not need any energy at all.
The quantum vacuum gives an example of universal dovetailing which
does not use any energy.
OTOH, it make sense to me that we can make claims like: "we can
use information about material systems to induce changes within them
that optimize their energy distributions" and so forth. We can
maintain our belief in comp and UD as they apply to information and
its structures, such as Boolean and Heyting algebras, but still
consider that there has to be some form of material implementation
possible at least in principle for it,
Not at all. That would contradict the movie graph argument. Look at
MGA in the archive.
otherwise we are stuck with the conclusion that the physical world
is just a causally ineffective epiphenomena and with no explanation
as to why we necessarily experience it. All forms of monism have
I disagree. A *primitive* physical world just does not exist, and the
illusion of why universal numbers believes in a physical worlds is
explained by the logic of self-reference, and this in a precise enough
way to already compare the physics dreamed by universal numbers with
If the distribution of Maxwell daemons is spare in its
distribution over the set of possible computations, does this not
imply that the chances of finding oneself as a Maxwell Daemon to be
identically sparse. If the set of computations is infinite this make
the chance of finding oneself as a MD to be vanishingly small, 1/
inf. Does this not seem to indicate against the necessity of ever
experiencing oneself as a MD in the first place?
That is a form of Bayesian reasoning that we have already often
criticized in this list. It assumes an absolute measure which makes no
If we go further and notice that we seem to experience a relatively
long chain of experiences that are MD in nature, does this not make
it even more miraculous given derivation of the statistics of
distributions of MD in the ensemble of possible computations?
Only the relative probabilities makes sense to extract fits person
What if there is a mechanism that allows for the biasing of those
statistics such that it is no longer a miracle that we are not just
spontaneous Boltzmann Brains. The observer selection ideas of Bostrum
See also my older papers. Such selection is the base of the first
person indeterminacy, and of everything which follows from that.
UDA step 7 and 8 already explain that we cannot be 'spontaneous
Boltzmann Brains'. If we are machine, we are provably the sum on all
'number theoretical 'Boltzmann brains' or universal numbers/
seem to give us some good clues about this mechanism. Could it be
that a feedback type of relationship might be involved? The choice
of what form the material structure takes as it evolves in time
could be used to select the information representation that best
describes it, but this requires a categorical difference between
matter and information such that we cannot think of them as just
being transformable into each other.
But that is exactly what is provided by the 'material hypostases".
Matter is not information. It is information stabilized by a continuum
of computations as seen by numbers. I follow you against easy links
between energy and information. Both term are very fuzzy and admit
quite different sort of formal specifications. Better to use a top
down approach which prevents the evacuation of the subject,
consciousness and/or the first person views.
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