On 16 Jan 2011, at 22:37, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno and Evgenii,

-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 11:50 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: comp and Maxwell demon

You can simulate it. But you cannot program it. It uses a huge amount
of information that it is hard to extract from the environment. I
would say.
In a larger sense, in which we are ourself Maxwell demon, you can
filter it from long computation. They will transform selective
information into energy. they will economize.
The Universal Dovetailer does generate all possible Maxwell daemons,
but I guess they are typically distributed sparsely in the set of all
Quantum Maxwell demon? That might explains the origin of life, but
that might be a too cheap explanation. I should revised quantum
information theory, but I have already hardly the time to do the real
thing, which is to extract the quantum information from classical
information + self-duplication and other self-perturbation (or to
convince others to do the work, or that such a work has to be done to
get both the qualia and the quanta).
Interesting but hard question.


On 15 Jan 2011, at 18:22, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> I am trying to understand what the hypothesis comp is about. It
> would be interesting to understand whether the Maxwell demon could
> be simulated or not. Any idea?
> Evgenii

Pardon my interjection. How exactly does it make sense to say that we "transform selective information into energy"? If information is just a form of energy, such that that phasing can make sense, does it not follow that there should be a unique relationship between the forms of matter that can implement a given information structure and a given material structure? From what I can tell there exists multiple ways that one and the same information can be implemented in matter. It is also true that multiple different information structures can represent one and the same material system. This implies two distinct and irreducible categories: a category of information structures and a category of material structures. There is also a relationship between these two categories, but that relation is not an identity mapping in the usual sense because it is almost always not a bijection. Because of this line of reasoning I am having a hard time understanding how it is that we can make statements like "transforming information into energy" and think that those kind of statements are sound.

I agree. But it is a usual Maxwell demon phrasing. It can be used to explain why deleting a bit of information needs some minial amount amount of energy, and why computing does not need any energy at all. The quantum vacuum gives an example of universal dovetailing which does not use any energy.

OTOH, it make sense to me that we can make claims like: "we can use information about material systems to induce changes within them that optimize their energy distributions" and so forth. We can maintain our belief in comp and UD as they apply to information and its structures, such as Boolean and Heyting algebras, but still consider that there has to be some form of material implementation possible at least in principle for it,

Not at all. That would contradict the movie graph argument. Look at MGA in the archive.

otherwise we are stuck with the conclusion that the physical world is just a causally ineffective epiphenomena and with no explanation as to why we necessarily experience it. All forms of monism have this problem.

I disagree. A *primitive* physical world just does not exist, and the illusion of why universal numbers believes in a physical worlds is explained by the logic of self-reference, and this in a precise enough way to already compare the physics dreamed by universal numbers with our observation.

If the distribution of Maxwell daemons is spare in its distribution over the set of possible computations, does this not imply that the chances of finding oneself as a Maxwell Daemon to be identically sparse. If the set of computations is infinite this make the chance of finding oneself as a MD to be vanishingly small, 1/ inf. Does this not seem to indicate against the necessity of ever experiencing oneself as a MD in the first place?

That is a form of Bayesian reasoning that we have already often criticized in this list. It assumes an absolute measure which makes no sense, imo.

If we go further and notice that we seem to experience a relatively long chain of experiences that are MD in nature, does this not make it even more miraculous given derivation of the statistics of distributions of MD in the ensemble of possible computations?

Only the relative probabilities makes sense to extract fits person plural views.

What if there is a mechanism that allows for the biasing of those statistics such that it is no longer a miracle that we are not just spontaneous Boltzmann Brains. The observer selection ideas of Bostrum

See also my older papers. Such selection is the base of the first person indeterminacy, and of everything which follows from that. UDA step 7 and 8 already explain that we cannot be 'spontaneous Boltzmann Brains'. If we are machine, we are provably the sum on all 'number theoretical 'Boltzmann brains' or universal numbers/ computations.

seem to give us some good clues about this mechanism. Could it be that a feedback type of relationship might be involved? The choice of what form the material structure takes as it evolves in time could be used to select the information representation that best describes it, but this requires a categorical difference between matter and information such that we cannot think of them as just being transformable into each other.

But that is exactly what is provided by the 'material hypostases". Matter is not information. It is information stabilized by a continuum of computations as seen by numbers. I follow you against easy links between energy and information. Both term are very fuzzy and admit quite different sort of formal specifications. Better to use a top down approach which prevents the evacuation of the subject, consciousness and/or the first person views.



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