Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:



 On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:

 * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. 
> Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some 
> world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>

 The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
 ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
 he Schrodinger 
 ​Wave ​E
 quation 
 ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
 somehow it does. ​


 It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone didn't 
 explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.

 Brent

>>>
>>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
>>> based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, in 
>>> this case in other worlds. *
>>>
>>>
>>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the waves. 
>>> It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption that the 
>>> wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong for the 
>>> macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) 
>>> depending where you put the cut.
>>>
>>
>> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
>> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
>> realized.*
>>
>> What do you mean by realize? 
>>
>
>  *Realized = Measured. AG*
>
>
>
> Measured by who? 
>

Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the problem 
seems to metastasize. AG
 

> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave is 
> A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
> being duplicated.
>

If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state (without 
the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to evaluate 
your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am not clear 
how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a tensor 
product? TIA AG

>
> Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws. 
>>
>
> *That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of the 
> measurement problem. AG*
>
>
> Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe correctly 
> (with respect to their first person notion) having done measurement, and 
> got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves perspectives, all we have is a 
> structured collection of relative states (which all exists and are 
> structured in arithmetic, BTW).
>
>
>
>
> An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as the 
>> observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look in the {up 
>> + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down, but if he looks 
>> in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness differentiate, in his 
>> first person perspective, but the solution of the wave describes the two 
>> outcomes realized from the point of view of each observer. You can't decide 
>> to make one of them into a zombie. 
>>
>
>  *I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG*
>
>
> The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?
>
> the evolution is linear and when A looks at the particle: she is described 
> by (A-up up) + (A-down down).   (with of course 1/sqrt(2) everywhere).
>
> the consciousness of A has differentiated into (A-up) and (A-down). With 
> Bohr, one among A-up and A-down mysteriously disappears. With Bohm (one 
> world + a potential simulating the entire Many-world, but "without 
> particles") one among A-up and A-down becomes a zombie, even one lacking a 
> body made of particles, yet, the waves describes them as being alive like 
> you and me, and we can test it (in principle) by making quantum computation 
> with oneself.
>
>
>
>
>
> *So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG*
>>
>> I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in  
order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E quation ​  
about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume  
that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements  
MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results  
of measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement  
will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG



Measured by who? More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state  
up+down: the wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the  
particles. The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are  
you OK to say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that  
the measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that  
NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without collapse, a  
measurement is a first person experience. In this case, it is arguably  
the same as the experience of being duplicated.









Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws.

That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of  
the measurement problem. AG


Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe  
correctly (with respect to their first person notion) having done  
measurement, and got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves  
perspectives, all we have is a structured collection of relative  
states (which all exists and are structured in arithmetic, BTW).






An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as  
the observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look  
in the {up + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down,  
but if he looks in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness  
differentiate, in his first person perspective, but the solution of  
the wave describes the two outcomes realized from the point of view  
of each observer. You can't decide to make one of them into a zombie.


 I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG


The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?

the evolution is linear and when A looks at the particle: she is  
described by (A-up up) + (A-down down).   (with of course 1/sqrt(2)  
everywhere).


the consciousness of A has differentiated into (A-up) and (A-down).  
With Bohr, one among A-up and A-down mysteriously disappears. With  
Bohm (one world + a potential simulating the entire Many-world, but  
"without particles") one among A-up and A-down becomes a zombie, even  
one lacking a body made of particles, yet, the waves describes them as  
being alive like you and me, and we can test it (in principle) by  
making quantum computation with oneself.







So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG
I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware most people  
claims Everett and Copenhagen are differet intepretations, but from  
a metamathematical obvious view: Everett and Copenhagen are  
different theories.


They have identical postulates but Everett adds another non-trivial  
one as I indicated above; namely, that every possible measurement is  
realized, that is measured, in another world. I don't see why you  
insist on denying something so obvious. AG



?

I think you should read Everett. he propose a new formulation of QM,  
and it is copenhagen with the withdrawal of the collapse postulate.


All measurement are realized in the sense that no superposition ever  
collapse, but that it looks in that way from the first person  
perspective of the observer. he reduces the quantum indeterminacy to  
the classical 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Nov 2017, at 04:09, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 7:05 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:


​> ​it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent  
because it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of  
probabilities. All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born  
rule in MWI have been shown to be circular


But Copenhagen is no better at deriving the Born Rule​ nor is any  
other quantum interpretation​ although Gleason's Theorem says that  
if the quantum wave function is related to probability then​ the​  
square of the absolute value​ is the only one that doesn't produce  
contradictions. So if you're going to have a probability rule  
involving the wave function its got to be the Born Rule, the  
function cubed or anything else just won't do. But the wave function  
itself is 100% deterministic so why involve probability at all?


By invoking the first person indeterminacy ...



I don't have a very good answer to that nor does anybody else​,​  
but the Many Worlds people have made a better stab at it than most:


https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7577


Like this paper illustrate rather well, assuming the Wave.

If we assume Digital Mechanism in cognitive science, the wave itself  
must be retrieved from the logic of computations (sigma_sentences).  
The logic of yes/no computations provides the quantization necessary  
for that, and this confirms the existence of a very general form of  
Gleason theorem operating in (very elementary) Arithmetic.


Bruno




​ John K Clark​






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2017, at 21:57, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 1:36 AM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:



. ​>> ​Does non locality mean the future influences the past as  
Clark alleged?


​> ​No.

​"​realism plus arrow of time preservation and quantum mechanics  
are not compatible. In other words, quantum mechanics cannot be  
completed with any (local or non-local) hidden variables, provide we  
assume the common sense of the arrow of time.​"


https://arxiv.org/abs/0806.2037​



Interesting, but again, that paper assume one world, and use some  
notion of simultaneous (space-like separated) outcomes, which I am not  
even sure can make any sense in a relativistic quantum mechanics  
(without collapse).


My feeling is that Everett relative state theory prevents "non- 
locality" to make any sense in realms which mix special (and general)  
relativity.


Bruno





​John K Clark​






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2017, at 06:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​ The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum  
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY  
theory to be compatible with experimental results, and one of those  
experiments shows the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that  
violation tells us that for ANY theory to be successful at  
explaining how the world works AT LEAST one of the following  
properties of that theory must be untrue:


1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not  
strictly true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:


"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out  
determinism, or hidden variables. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported  
as ruling out, or at least calling in question, realism. But these  
are all mistakes. What Bell's theorem, together with the  
experimental results, proves to be impossible is not determinism or  
hidden variables or realism, but locality, in a perfectly clear  
sense. What Bell proved, and what theoretical physics has not yet  
properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is non-local."


This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, arxiv: 
1408.1826 He says the same thing in his book and numerous other  
articles where he spells this out in considerable detail.


I read his book. It seems to me that he is aware that this works  
clearly only if we assume that measurement have definite outcome, and  
that it does not apply in the MW view. He is rather explicit on this  
in his book. Stathis' quote seems to assess this. I am not sure  
quantum field theory would make any sense with existing physically non- 
local phenomena. That is why also Bernard d'Espagnat distinguished non- 
separability, and non locality, to avoid a possible confusion between  
non-local appearances and action at a distance.


Bruno




Bruce

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Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

Brent Meeker wrote:


>> But Copenhagen is no better at deriving the Born Rule nor is any other
>> quantum
>> interpretation although Gleason's Theorem says that if the quantum wave
>> function
>> is related to probability then the square of the absolute valueis the
>> only one that
>> doesn't produce contradictions. So if you're going to have a probability
>> rule involving
>> the wave function its got to be the Born Rule, the function cubed or
>> anything else just
>> won't do. But the wave function itself is 100% deterministic so
>> why involve probability
>> at all?
>
>
> > Of course the obvious answer to that is, "It's what we observe."


Yes, The Born Rule is the only thing that fits experimental results, but I
was talking about
deriving it from first principles.

John K Clark





 At first it was thought that it's the kind of randomness
based on ignorance and some hidden variable would explain it.  But then it
turned out the hidden variable would have
 be non-local.

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 21/11/2017 12:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local.


I am not sure what that means, but I can imagine this could make  
sense in the "one-world" hypothesis, not much in many-worlds, still  
less in many-computations.


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local because it involves two  
particles without specifying any particular separation. Because the  
singlet requires both particles, it is clearly non-separable -- it  
cannot be explained by the purely local properties of the individual  
particles. Non-separability means that changing one of the particles  
influences the other 'instantaneously'. That is non-locality.


A simple argument is that any experimental set-up showing a non- 
locality can be simulated by a classical (local) computer, and the  
simulated observer(s), like all the Bob-Alice pair we get, will all  
(the majority) describe an apparent non-locality, despite we,  
looking patiently at the whole emulation will see that there are  
none.


That argument has been debunked by Brunner et al, arxiv:1303.2849



If that is correct, then Church's thesis is false. Hard to believe.  
Note that a seemingly similar (to Brunner) argument is in Friedman's  
book, but it is invalid. All known quantum phenomenon are computable.  
The one non computable requires a non computable Hamiltonian, of some  
ad-hoc waves, like Nielsen's e-iOt, with O being Chaitin's number. If  
we are digital machines, we can't even recognize as non computable  
such phenomenon.






It actually has nothing to do with whether people meet or not - it  
describes a situation which explicitly violates Einstein's notion  
of local realism: the state of one of the entangled pair is not  
separable from the state of the other distant particle. Non- 
separability here implies non-local influence, or simple non- 
locality. The attempt to claim that non-separability does not  
imply non-locality is mere verbal gymnastics, with no physical  
content.


The singlet state does not describe one pair, but an infinity of  
pairs, having spin (say) in all directions, but correlated in all  
the case verifiable by Bob and Alice when they can interact. I  
would say.


That is a complete misrepresentation of the situation. Only one pair  
is necessary. You are confusing 'pairs' with the rotational symmetry  
of the singlet state, and that is your continuing egregious error.


I beg to differ on this. Not reading the singlet state in that way is  
what makes you believe (egregiously?)  in action at a distance, which  
honestly is close to non-sense to me.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 21/11/2017 12:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 18/11/2017 12:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Nov 2017, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/15/2017 7:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Nov 2017, at 21:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/14/2017 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Nov 2017, at 22:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 14/11/2017 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Nov 2017, at 23:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

What really annoys me is the continued claim that many  
worlds eliminates the need for non-locality. It does not,  
and neither Bruno nor anyone else has ever produced a  
valid argument as to how many worlds might restore locality.


But nobody has proved that there is non locality in the  
MWI. EPR-BELL proves non-locality apparant in each branch,  
but the MWI avoids the needs of action at a distance to  
explains them. Once Alice and Bob are space-separated,  
their identity are independent. It makes no sense to talk  
of each of them like if they were related, (unless you  
correlate them with a third observer, etc) If they do  
measurement, some God could see that they are indeed no  
more related, but if they decide to come back to place  
where they can compared locally their spin, they will  
always get contact to the corresponding observer with the  
well correlated spin. The independent Alice and Bob will  
never meet because they can't belong to the same branch of  
the multiverse, by the MWI of the singlet state. So Mitra  
is right. Although Bertlmann's socks are tyically not  
working for Bell's violation in a MONO-universe, it works  
again in the MWI, applied in this case to the whole singlet  
state.


Bell has proved non-locality in MWI, every bit as much as in  
each branch separately. You appear not to have grasped the  
significance of the scenario I have argued carefully. Alice  
and Bob are not space-like separated in the scenario I  
outlined. Alice and Bob are together in the same laboratory  
when the second measurement is made. They are necessarily in  
the same world before, and branch in together according to  
Bob's result. Your mumbo-jumbo about them only being able to  
meet in appropriate matching branches does not work here,  
because they are always in the same branch. And there is no  
reason to suppose that their results in some of those  
branches do not violate conservation of angular momentum.


I have no clue what you mean. The singlet state guaranties  
the conservation of angular momentum in all worlds. The  
singlet state describes an infinity of "worlds",  and in each  
of them there is conservation of angular momentum, and it has  
a local common cause origin, the same in all worlds.


But it's not a sufficient 'hidden' variable to explain the  
space-like correlation of measurements.


If the the explanation is based on hidden variable, per branch,  
then there will be non-locality. But the many universe are not  
really hidden variable in the sense of EPR-Bell's, which  
assumes Alice and Bob have the same identity and keep it, when  
they do the space-like measurement, but it seems to me that  
this is a wrong interpretation of the singlet state when we  
suppress any possible collapse. If Alice and Bob are space-like  
separated, they will later only access to the Bob and Alice  
they will locally be able to interact with, and those are "new"  
people, not the original couple.


But that's the point of Bruce's version in which the  
measurements are time-like.  Alice and Bob will have continuity  
of identity and, as he argues, the explanation for the  
correlation of results being stronger than classical must be the  
same.


But there are the same. The singlet state explains this too. The  
mystery is in the apparent space-like separation, where it looks  
like a physical action at a distance plays some role, except that  
this has not been proved in the MW theory.


Again you appeal to the 'apparent space-like separation'. As Brent  
said, the point of my time-like example was that there is no space- 
like separation at any time, so that escape is not available to you.


Without space-like separation, I don't see why invoke a physical  
action at a distance at all.


No, as I pointed out in my original post, a local hidden variable  
explanation for the time-like correlations is available.


I am not sure of this. A local theory can exist, but it will  
contradict QM.




That would mean no more than that QM is incomplete.


It means QM is false, given that QM entails space-like correlation.



The problem is that this explanation is not available in the space- 
like case, and you cannot use one explanation in one place when it  
doesn't work elsewhere.


OK. We agree.



When the singlet particles are produced before separation, they  
cannot know whether they are going to be measured at space-like or  
time-like separations: any hidden 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. 
 Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some 
 world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
 insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*

>>>
>>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>>> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
>>> he Schrodinger 
>>> ​Wave ​E
>>> quation 
>>> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
>>> somehow it does. ​
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone didn't 
>>> explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
>> based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, in 
>> this case in other worlds. *
>>
>>
>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the waves. 
>> It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption that the 
>> wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong for the 
>> macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) 
>> depending where you put the cut.
>>
>
> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
> realized.*
>
> What do you mean by realize? 
>

 *Realized = Measured. AG*

Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws. 
>

*That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of the 
measurement problem. AG*

An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as the 
> observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look in the {up 
> + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down, but if he looks 
> in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness differentiate, in his 
> first person perspective, but the solution of the wave describes the two 
> outcomes realized from the point of view of each observer. You can't decide 
> to make one of them into a zombie. 
>

 *I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG*

> *So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG*
>
> I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware most people claims 
> Everett and Copenhagen are differet intepretations, but from a 
> metamathematical obvious view: Everett and Copenhagen are different 
> theories.
>

*They have identical postulates but Everett adds another non-trivial one as 
I indicated above; namely, that every possible measurement is realized, 
that is measured, in another world. I don't see why you insist on denying 
something so obvious. AG*
 

> Everett is the SWE, and Copenhagen is SWE + collapse. We might accept that 
> Everett theory has not yet justify all aspects of what could be the 
> physical reality (and provably so if we assume digital mechanism in 
> cognitive science), but, to be short, it is less crazy than any theory 
> making the collapse into a physical phenomenon.
>

 *Why crazy? What we seem to observe IS collapse; that is, all 
probabilities evolving to zero except the measured probability evolving to 
1, by an as-yet unknown physical process. AG  *

> *I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of the 
>> Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the possible universes 
>> finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will be, or have been, realized. 
>> AG*
>>
>>
>> OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state, 
>> many-worlds, etc.).
>>
>
> *Too much parsing! I was trying to explain that the Multiverse of String 
> Theory is manifestly *different* from the Many Worlds of the MWI. AG *
>
>
> Yes. you are right on this. In string theory with collapse (if this could 
> even make sense), you have 10^500 physical realities. In string theory 
> without collapse, you have (10^500 * Infinity) physical realities, at first 
> sight (with mechanism they are just "coherent dreams" (sigma_1 true 
> sentences seen in the Bp & ~Bf mode) by Numbers).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>
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