Saibal Mitra wrote:
If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is
death, that
branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum
mechanics
doesn't
imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could never
fall
asleep!
This latter statement
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
QM or QTI do not imply
that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
*experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you wake
up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you die
in your sleep -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000
Jesse Mazer wrote:
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be
the last conscious being in
Le 14-avr.-05, à 01:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
Nick Prince writes:
If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal
but
also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so
since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we
live on - the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
QM or QTI do not imply
that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
*experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you
wake
up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if
Le 14-avr.-05, à 09:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some
worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the
consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max
Tegmark aknowledged this in a
I more or less agree with Jesse. But I would say that the measure of
similarity should also be an absolute measure that multiplied with the
absolute measure defines a new effective absolute measure for a given
observer.
Given the absolute measure you can define effective conditional
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes
Here is my definition: a decision I make is free when I feel that I
could
have decided otherwise.
Is the question of free will just a matter of definitions? Definitional
arguments are sterile and have no meaning. If I define free will to be
a 14
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
This is more or less the point I was trying to make: philosophical
discussion leads to a troubling entaglement that seems to lead to
contradictions. I return to what I called a definition but I should
probably have called a description of the basic phenomenon we
-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 11:25 AM
To: Hal Finney
Subject: RE: Free Will Theorem
-Original Message-
From: Hal Finney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 4:25 PM
To:
Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where
you were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through
some means so that there are universes where your consciousness exists
at the very beginning? I don't really believe this, but the logic seems
to
Hal Finney writes:
On the other hand, I might aknowledge that my feeling of freedom is not
actually consistent with the particular interpretation of the term
freedom
the philosopher is trying to foist on me. In other words, if freedom
means
not bound by determinism or randomness, then I
Jesse Mazer writes:
I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the
only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is
this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI
is true, your consciousness will survive until the
Danny Mayes writes:
Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where you
were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through some
means so that there are universes where your consciousness exists at the
very beginning? I don't really believe this, but
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the
only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is
this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI
is true, your
I see no reason why consciousness must necessarily be sequential in
time, maybe once you begin to die your consciousness decreases till it
matches some other being. I don't see why that couldn't just as well be
earlier in time as later. Maybe consciousness just flows in a cycle. In
fact if our
snip
Stathias:
Yes, everything that can happen, does happen, somewhere in the
multiverse.
There will certainly be a world where you get smarter and
smarter, and ultimately you know everything. But at any point
in the development of the multiverse, you are (1) certain to
find yourself alive,
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 7:38 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no
means clear that just because
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