Stathis writes
Lee Corbin writes:
I anticipate that in the future it will, as you say so well,
be shown that appropriate brain states necessarily lead to
conscious states, except I also expect that by then the
meaning of conscious states will be vastly better informed
and filled-out
Stathis: Now, I think you
will agree (although Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this
excellent understanding of the processes giving rise to human
conscious experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea
what the experience is actually like.
Jonathan Colvin: No, I'd
Patrick Leahy wrote
To answer [the] initial question: interference effects are not branches.
Actually they imply the absence of effective branching.
You don't get branching in time because time is a parameter, not an
observable: this means that there is no quantum uncertainty about what
Lee Corbin writes:
But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
implemented on a computer.
We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
we start doing either of these things, we are replacing
It looks as though you advocate a role for each of these:
observables
measurements
detectors
and for all I know
observers
It seemed to me that MWI allowed me to get away with a considerable
simplification. Gone were observers and even observations. Even
measurements, I discard.
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
SNIP
Consider these two parallel arguments using a version of the anthropic
principle:
(a) In the multiverse, those worlds which have physical laws and
constants very different to what we are used to may greatly predominate.
However, it is no
Le 25-mai-05, à 13:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Lee Corbin writes:
But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
implemented on a computer.
We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
we
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, May 24, 2005 at 10:10:19PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
Lewis also distinguishes between inductive failure and rubbish
universes as two different objections to his model. I notice that in
your articles both you and Russell Standish more
It was "contemptuous" of the information on decoherence, which is what popped up, when I clicked on the link. In particular the Julian Barbouresque "timelessness" prattle, "there are no particles", "there are no quantum jumps", etc. which seems far outside the definition of "decoherence". When I
-Original Message-
From: Patrick Leahy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 12:25 PM
To: Lee Corbin
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Observables, Measurables, and Detectors
It looks as though you advocate a role for each of these:
observables
measurements
Patrick Leahy wrote:
66~~
* White Rabbit: cognizable universes require a high degree of regularity for
the survival of SAS (not to mention evolution), as above. Hence induction in
any cognizable universe will work most of the time (which is all it does
anyway), for a sufficient set of
- Original Message -
From: Patrick Leahy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Alastair Malcolm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: 24 May 2005 22:10
Subject: Re: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark
.
.
This is very reminiscent of Lewis' argument. Have you read his book? IIRC
he
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Benjamin Udell wrote:
The induction-friendly universe with so much detectable rubbish that a
wide variety of phenomena cannot be unified into a simple theory sounds
like a universe where induction works but surmise, or inference to the
simplest explanation, faces grave
Plaga's paper has been published:
''Proposal for an experimental test of the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics''
Found.Phys. 27 (1997) 559
arXiv: quant-ph/9510007
-Defeat Spammers by
launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
aet.radal ssg wrote:
From the initial page from the included link to the archive: I'm no
physicist so I don't know for sure that these implications would
follow, but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is consistent
with the basics of quantum mechanics. The fact that this paper
Le 25-mai-05, à 17:59, aet.radal ssg a écrit :
From the initial page from the included link to the archive: I'm no
physicist so I don't know for sure that these implications would
follow, but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is
consistent
with the basics of quantum mechanics.
Stathis: I don't know if you can make a sharp distinction between the
really weird universes where observers never evolve and the
slightly weird ones where talking white rabbits appear now
and then. Consider these two parallel arguments using a
version of the anthropic principle:
(a)
**
Interleaving;
***
Bruno: But we can photosynthesize. And we can
understand why we
cannot travel at the speed of light. All this by
using purely
3-person description of those phenomena in some
theory.
Paddy writes
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
(b) In the multiverse, those worlds in which it is a frequent occurrence
that the laws of physics are temporarily suspended so that, for example,
talking white rabbits materialise out of thin air, may greatly
predominate. However, it is no
Paddy writes
A new branch starts, or decoherence obtains, or an irreversible
transformation occurs, or a record is made. They all seem the
same to me. Why not?
My main motivation is to get as far away from Copenhagen as possible,
and so thereby get free of observers and observations,
Richard writes
How, essentially, does this differ from the casino game of
roulette?
SNIP
And there are people who are good at it. Everyone calls them lucky which
really doesn't explain much. Some of us routinely choose the wrong queue,
others get the correct one (queuing theory and
At 08:51 PM 5/25/2005, Lee Corbin wrote:
At 09:33 PM 5/25/2005, you wrote:
Richard writes
How, essentially, does this differ from the casino game of
roulette?
SNIP
LC: I don't believe that there are lucky people, except as a perfectly
ordinary and expected random fluctuation.
RM:
I could not find who suggested Plaga's paper recently, but
thanks to whoever it was. Whether Plaga is right or wrong,
his introductory remarks and general presentation are
simply superb.
There is even the very noteworthy (or humorous, I can't decide)
sentence which reads Independent of what one
On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 02:11:56PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
If you mean by failure of induction, why an observer (under TIME)
continues to experience non-rubbish, then that is the white rabbit
problem I deal with in section 3. It comes down to a robustness
property of an observer, which
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