Re: Russell's book
Le 14-sept.-06, à 00:52, Russell Standish a écrit : That the experience of time is necessarily experienced by all conscious points of view is to my knowledge not even addressed by other philosophers. Even Bruno seems to skirt the issue, ? (I think that consciousness is needed for *all* experience, not just experience of time). although there is an appearance of temporality with the S4Grz logic. Yes, the S4Grz (and actually the S4Grz1, but also the X* and X1*) can be seen as first person or subjective time logic, and they are close to Brouwer's theory of time/consciousness, which has a long story from Heracliteus, StAugustin, Bergson, Brouwer, etc. Except that most of those philosopher, perhaps like David and George, makes such a first person time primitive. With comp, the experience of Space is more problematic. So I've simply made a conjecture that experience of time is necessary for consciousness, and tried to dilute the strength of that conjecture as far as possible. I do think that subjective time is inseparable from consciousness, or at least from mundane consciousness ( as opposed to some ecstatic high level form of experience sometimes described by mystics as being beyond time). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Le 16-sept.-06, à 23:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : Bruno wrote Colin Geoffrey Hales a ��it : 5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside world. And you *know* that? We can *bet* on a independent reality, that's all. Justifiably so assuming comp, but I think you don't. Self-referentially correct machine can *only* bet on their self-referential and referential correctness. Bruno I don't assume COMP. The idea that this is necessary to hold a position on anything is, for me, simply irrelevant and preumptuous that COMP is able to make any useful predictions. My point is that COMP is a so big assumption that it does make verifiable predictions. COMP is not an empirically supportable position, no matter how elegant it may look. But is there any empirically reason to disbelieve in it? Fromthe UDA you can show that to make comp false you need to introduce actual infinities in the subject. I know only Penrose for having try to do that, unsuccessfully. I would consider it so if it could predict the existence and properties of brain material. But that is exactly my modest (UDA) point. Comp has to predict the (apparent) existence of the brain, atoms ... I show why. Then I show how and got results in the arithmetical UDA (or lobian interview). Having said that yes you are right that 'betting' on an independent reality is all we can dothis is an empirical matter. All right. Note that if you believe in primitive physicality, you are quite coherent by abandoning comp. Whatever it is that enables vast legions of scientists to do their job (deines their job), relentlessly for hundreds of yearsthat mutually eqisitely produced, shared delusion called the natural world that thing... that we appear to be within and constantly demonstrate it via creation of novel technology that seems to operate within it That is worth betting on...the process of consideration that it may not be there is of no practical value. I do agree with you, but let us not confuse the two following bets: a) Betting on an independent reality (like I do) b) Betting on a material primitive world (like I do not). I have always feel myself as a REALIST scientist. But then I argue that if comp is true, then physical stuff emerge from a deeper non material reality, like for example (assuming comp) the relation between numbers. Perhaps even Stephen Hawking points in that direction with his beautiful selected basic papers: God created the Integers. But I'm not sure you have really 'got' what I mean by 'it does not know there is an outiside world'. This is a practical matter. Brain material does something special...which enables an internal literal phenomenal mapping of the universe outside the scientist. The Turing machine is a collection of abstractions with an ASSUMED relationship to the outside world. Anything talking about anything supposedly outside itself makes such an assumption. Until we know what that physics is any argument assuming the lack of that special physics is simply going to take you down the usual argument path of assumption. Only when we isolate the real physics of phenomenal consciousness in brain material can we then make any valid judgement as to its necessity in intelligence. Until then I hole all discussion based on assumption of computational (as-if) substrates as invalid or at least interesting but of little practical use at this stage. No problem. --- TURING TEST. The turing test always infuriates me. Since when does dumbing a human down to the point of looking like machine X prove that machine X has consciousness? I just don't get it. Turing was really not searching any proof there. When you give the machine that faculties of a human and make it do what humans do ...I I believe getting them both to do science is the appropriate ttest... then the Turing test is a complete irrelevance based on an assumption that the presence of the physics of phenomenal consciousness is optional in intelligence. It is an empirical reality that when you alter phenomenal consciousness then scientific behaviour is altered. No further argument is needed. The turing test is not a test of consciousness. I'm not sure what it is a test of, but it is certainly not a test of consciousness. I think Turing would agree here, except that it would have add that such a test is the better thing you can ever have to evaluate the plausibility of the presence of consciousness (without being influenced by the prejudices based on body shapes). I am less sure because with the technical progress only arbitrary longer test can make sense. I know someone who did took some program for a conscious being after a short conversation with it! Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
