RE: UDA revisited and then some
In addition to spectrum reversal type situations, where no change is noted from either 3rd or 1st person perspective (and therefore it doesn't really matter to anyone: as you say, it may be occurring all the time anyway and we would never know), there is the possibility that a change is noted from a 1st person perspective, but never reported. If you consider a practical research program to make artificial replacement brains, all the researchers can ever do is build a brain that behaves like the original. It may do this because it thinks like the original, or it may do it because it is a very good actor and is able to pretend that it thinks like the original. Those brains which somehow betray the fact that they are acting will be rejected, but the ones that never betray this fact will be accepted as true replacement brains when they are actually not. Millions of people might agree to have these replacement brains and no-one will ever know that they are committing suicide. Stathis Papaioannou > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: UDA revisited and then some > Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2006 12:27:37 +0100 > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > > Le 01-déc.-06, à 10:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > > > > > Bruno Marchal writes: > > > >> > >> > >>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to > >>> consciousness but > >>> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal. > >> > >> > >> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is > >> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF > >> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a > >> (1-person) spectrum reversal. > >> > >> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the > >> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, > >> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!). > >> > >> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This > >> means > >> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal, > >> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either > >> > >> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an > >> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum > >> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying > >> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay > >> her > >> doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?) > > > > I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd > > person > > behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean > > copying > > a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified > > for ordinary > > day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level > > which preserves > > 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, > > suppose > > you carried around with you a device which monitored all your > > behaviour in great > > detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your > > actual > > behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device > > might be > > able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take > > over control of > > your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the > > substitution > > had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether > > this copy > > experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to > > be blue as > > you do before the substitution. > > > > Thanks for the precision. > It *is* as reasonable to ask such a question as it is reasonable to ask > if tomorrow my first person experience will not indeed permute my blue > and orange qualia *including my memories of it* in such a way that my > 3-behavior will remain unchanged. In that case we are back to the > original spectrum reversal problem. > This is a reasonable question in the sense that the answer can be shown > relatively (!) undecidable: it is not verifiable by any external means, > nor by the first person itself. We could as well conclude that such a > change occurs each time the magnetic poles permute, or that it changes > at each season, etc. > *But* (curiously enough perhaps) such a change can be shown to be > guess-able by some richer machine. > The spectrum reversal question points on the gap between the 1 and 3 > descriptions. With acomp your question should be addressable in the > terms of the modal logic Z and X, or more precisely Z1* minus Z1 and > X1* minus X1, that is their true but unprovable (and undecidable) > propositions. Note that the question makes no sense at all for the > "pure 1-person" because S4Grz1* minus S4Grz1 is empty. > So your question makes sense because at the level of the fourth and > fifth hypo your question can
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 01-déc.-06, à 10:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > >> >> Bruno Marchal writes: >> >>> >>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to consciousness but not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal. >>> >>> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is >>> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF >>> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a >>> (1-person) spectrum reversal. >>> >>> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the >>> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, >>> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!). >>> >>> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This >>> means >>> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal, >>> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either >>> >>> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an >>> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum >>> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying >>> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay >>> her >>> doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?) >> I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd >> person >> behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean >> copying >> a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified >> for ordinary >> day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level >> which preserves >> 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, >> suppose >> you carried around with you a device which monitored all your >> behaviour in great >> detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your >> actual >> behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device >> might be >> able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take >> over control of >> your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the >> substitution >> had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether >> this copy >> experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to >> be blue as >> you do before the substitution. > > > > Thanks for the precision. > It *is* as reasonable to ask such a question as it is reasonable to ask > if tomorrow my first person experience will not indeed permute my blue > and orange qualia *including my memories of it* in such a way that my > 3-behavior will remain unchanged. In that case we are back to the > original spectrum reversal problem. > This is a reasonable question in the sense that the answer can be shown > relatively (!) undecidable: it is not verifiable by any external means, > nor by the first person itself. We could as well conclude that such a > change occurs each time the magnetic poles permute, or that it changes > at each season, etc. > *But* (curiously enough perhaps) such a change can be shown to be > guess-able by some richer machine. > The spectrum reversal question points on the gap between the 1 and 3 > descriptions. With acomp your question should be addressable in the > terms of the modal logic Z and X, or more precisely Z1* minus Z1 and > X1* minus X1, that is their true but unprovable (and undecidable) > propositions. Note that the question makes no sense at all for the > "pure 1-person" because S4Grz1* minus S4Grz1 is empty. > So your question makes sense because at the level of the fourth and > fifth hypo your question can be translated into purely arithmetical > propositions, which although highly undecidable by the machine itself > can be decided by some richer machine. > And I would say, without doing the calculus which is rather complex, > that the answer could very well be positive indeed, but this remains to > be proved. At least the unexpected nuances between computability, > provability, knowability, observability, perceivability (all redefined > by modal variant of G) gives plenty room for this, indeed. > > Bruno So what does your calculus say about the experience of people who wear glasses which invert their field of vision? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Bruno Marchal writes: > >> >> >>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to >>> consciousness but >>> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal. >> >> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is >> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF >> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a >> (1-person) spectrum reversal. >> >> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the >> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, >> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!). >> >> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This means >> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal, >> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either >> >> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an >> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum >> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying >> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay her >> doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?) > > I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd person > behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean copying > a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified for > ordinary > day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level which > preserves > 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, suppose > you carried around with you a device which monitored all your behaviour in > great > detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your actual > behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device might > be > able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take over > control of > your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the > substitution > had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether this > copy > experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to be > blue as > you do before the substitution. That's a precis of Greg Egan's short story "The Jewel". I wouldn't call it unreasonable to wonder whether the copy experiences the same qualia, but I'd call it unreasonable to conclude that it did not on the stated evidence. In fact I find it hard to think of what evidence would count against it have some kind of qualia. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Sorry for my long reaction time. I have my thoughts on Bruno's, Stathis' and Brent Meekers' posts, but I will not be able to post until this weekend. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Testing the MWI
Le 30-nov.-06, à 08:10, Maurice (for-list) wrote : > It was hoped by some that the study of quantum gravity might deliver > something along these lines. > This may be the wrong place to ask, but does anyone know if string > theory and so on offer any hope in this direction? Interesting question. I have related questions. Take "loop gravity" (the main competitor of string theory for the marriage between GR and QM). In loop gravity, the GR idea that gravity force = curvature of space is kept all along, so that quantization of gravity leads to quantization of space and time. So there exists, in loop gravity, atoms of space time, and so the physical reality is eventually completely discrete, except for the complex quantum wave amplitudes. Now we can also replace the use of complex numbers by gaussian integers (a+bi with a and b in the set of integers or rationals or algebraical). Due to the linearity of the SWE, this is "mathematically" enough. But then such a loop gravity theory would entail that the number of worlds (of the MWI) are always finite (unless we posit at the start some infinite "Garden of Eden). In that sense String Theory is more coherent with both the comp hyp in the cognitive science and David Deutsch view that the splitting/differentiation is a multiplication by 2^aleph_0 (the continuum). Now about the many world in String theory I remember having read by Witten that the wave aspect of the string theory is not yet well worked out, but a priori, given that string theory is entirely based on the quantum theory (without collapse, it seems to me), the MW should fit in without much problem. Sometimes I think that string theory will even lead to a MW with a vengeance, that nature tries not just all consistent histories, but tries all number systems as well (like the p-adic fields, finite fields, etc.) and all possible topologies, in which those consistent histories can be implemented. Don't know... I have another question: could a quantum chaotical system (as far as we know what that is) be turing universal? Any comments are welcome. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Le 01-déc.-06, à 10:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > Bruno Marchal writes: > >> >> >>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to >>> consciousness but >>> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal. >> >> >> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is >> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF >> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a >> (1-person) spectrum reversal. >> >> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the >> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, >> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!). >> >> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This >> means >> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal, >> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either >> >> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an >> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum >> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying >> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay >> her >> doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?) > > I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd > person > behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean > copying > a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified > for ordinary > day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level > which preserves > 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, > suppose > you carried around with you a device which monitored all your > behaviour in great > detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your > actual > behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device > might be > able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take > over control of > your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the > substitution > had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether > this copy > experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to > be blue as > you do before the substitution. Thanks for the precision. It *is* as reasonable to ask such a question as it is reasonable to ask if tomorrow my first person experience will not indeed permute my blue and orange qualia *including my memories of it* in such a way that my 3-behavior will remain unchanged. In that case we are back to the original spectrum reversal problem. This is a reasonable question in the sense that the answer can be shown relatively (!) undecidable: it is not verifiable by any external means, nor by the first person itself. We could as well conclude that such a change occurs each time the magnetic poles permute, or that it changes at each season, etc. *But* (curiously enough perhaps) such a change can be shown to be guess-able by some richer machine. The spectrum reversal question points on the gap between the 1 and 3 descriptions. With acomp your question should be addressable in the terms of the modal logic Z and X, or more precisely Z1* minus Z1 and X1* minus X1, that is their true but unprovable (and undecidable) propositions. Note that the question makes no sense at all for the "pure 1-person" because S4Grz1* minus S4Grz1 is empty. So your question makes sense because at the level of the fourth and fifth hypo your question can be translated into purely arithmetical propositions, which although highly undecidable by the machine itself can be decided by some richer machine. And I would say, without doing the calculus which is rather complex, that the answer could very well be positive indeed, but this remains to be proved. At least the unexpected nuances between computability, provability, knowability, observability, perceivability (all redefined by modal variant of G) gives plenty room for this, indeed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: UDA revisited and then some
Bruno Marchal writes: > > > > We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to > > consciousness but > > not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal. > > > Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is > substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF > she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a > (1-person) spectrum reversal. > > Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the > color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, > she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!). > > So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This means > that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal, > but obviously there is no 3-description of it either > > So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an > incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum > reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying > something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay her > doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?) I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd person behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean copying a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified for ordinary day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level which preserves 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, suppose you carried around with you a device which monitored all your behaviour in great detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your actual behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device might be able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take over control of your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the substitution had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether this copy experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to be blue as you do before the substitution. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
