Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 01-déc.-06, à 10:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > >> >> Bruno Marchal writes: >> >>> <snip> >>> >>>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to >>>> consciousness but >>>> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal. >>> >>> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is >>> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF >>> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a >>> (1-person) spectrum reversal. >>> >>> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the >>> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, >>> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!). >>> >>> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This >>> means >>> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal, >>> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either .... >>> >>> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an >>> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum >>> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying >>> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay >>> her >>> doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?) >> I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd >> person >> behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean >> copying >> a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified >> for ordinary >> day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level >> which preserves >> 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, >> suppose >> you carried around with you a device which monitored all your >> behaviour in great >> detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your >> actual >> behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device >> might be >> able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take >> over control of >> your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the >> substitution >> had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether >> this copy >> experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to >> be blue as >> you do before the substitution. > > > > Thanks for the precision. > It *is* as reasonable to ask such a question as it is reasonable to ask > if tomorrow my first person experience will not indeed permute my blue > and orange qualia *including my memories of it* in such a way that my > 3-behavior will remain unchanged. In that case we are back to the > original spectrum reversal problem. > This is a reasonable question in the sense that the answer can be shown > relatively (!) undecidable: it is not verifiable by any external means, > nor by the first person itself. We could as well conclude that such a > change occurs each time the magnetic poles permute, or that it changes > at each season, etc. > *But* (curiously enough perhaps) such a change can be shown to be > guess-able by some richer machine. > The spectrum reversal question points on the gap between the 1 and 3 > descriptions. With acomp your question should be addressable in the > terms of the modal logic Z and X, or more precisely Z1* minus Z1 and > X1* minus X1, that is their true but unprovable (and undecidable) > propositions. Note that the question makes no sense at all for the > "pure 1-person" because S4Grz1* minus S4Grz1 is empty. > So your question makes sense because at the level of the fourth and > fifth hypo your question can be translated into purely arithmetical > propositions, which although highly undecidable by the machine itself > can be decided by some richer machine. > And I would say, without doing the calculus which is rather complex, > that the answer could very well be positive indeed, but this remains to > be proved. At least the unexpected nuances between computability, > provability, knowability, observability, perceivability (all redefined > by modal variant of G) gives plenty room for this, indeed. > > Bruno
So what does your calculus say about the experience of people who wear glasses which invert their field of vision? Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
