Re: UDA revisited and then some
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Brent Meeker writes: > >>> You're implying that the default assumption should be that >>> consciousness correlates more closely with external behaviour >>> than with internal activity generating the behaviour: the tape >>> recorder should reason that as the CD player produces the same >>> audio output as I do, most likely it has the same experiences as >>> I do. But why shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even though the >>> CD player produces the same output as I do, it does so using >>> completely different technology, so it most likely has completely >>> different experiences to my own. >> Here's my reasoning: We think other people (and animals) are >> conscious, have experiences, mainly because of the way they behave >> and to a lesser degree because they are like us in appearance and >> structure. On the other hand we're pretty sure that consciousness >> requires a high degree of complexity, something supported by our >> theories and technology of information. So we don't think that >> individual molecules or neurons are conscious - it must be >> something about how a large number of subsystems interact. This >> implies that any one subsystem could be replaced by a functionally >> similar one, e.g. silicon "neuron", and not change consciousness. >> So our theory is that it is not technology in the sense of digital >> vs analog, but in some functional information processing sense. >> >> So given two things that have the same behavior, the default >> assumption is they have the same consciousness (i.e. little or none >> in the case of CD and tape players). If I look into them deeper >> and find they use different technologies, that doesn't do much to >> change my opinion - it's like a silicon neuron vs a biochemical >> one. If I find the flow and storage of information is different, >> e.g. one throws away more information than the other, or one adds >> randomness, then I'd say that was evidence for different >> consciousness. > > I basically agree, but with qualifications. If the attempt to copy > human intelligence is "bottom up", for example by emulating neurons > with electronics, then I think it is a good bet that if it behaves > like a human and is based on the same principles as the human brain, > it probably has the same types of conscious experiences as a human. > But long before we are able to build such artificial brains, we will > probably have the equivalent of characters in advanced computer games > designed to pass the Turing Test using technology nothing like a > biological brain. If such a computer program is conscious at all I > would certainly not bet that it was conscious in the same way as a > human is conscious, just because it is able to fool us into thinking > it is human. Such computer personas will probably be very different in terms of information storage and processing - although we may not know it when they are developed simply because we still won't know how humans do it. But a good example would be a neural net vice a production system. At some level I'm sure you can get the same behavior out of them, but at the information processing level they're very different. Incidentally, I wonder if anybody remembers that the test Turing proposed was for an AI and a man to each try to fool an interrogator by pretending to be a woman. Brent Metaphysics is a restaurant where they give you a 30,000 page menu and no food. --- Robert Pirsig --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: UDA revisited and then some
Brent Meeker writes: > > You're implying that the default assumption should be that > > consciousness correlates more closely with external behaviour than > > with internal activity generating the behaviour: the tape recorder > > should reason that as the CD player produces the same audio output as > > I do, most likely it has the same experiences as I do. But why > > shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even though the CD player > > produces the same output as I do, it does so using completely > > different technology, so it most likely has completely different > > experiences to my own. > > Here's my reasoning: We think other people (and animals) are conscious, have > experiences, mainly because of the way they behave and to a lesser degree > because they are like us in appearance and structure. On the other hand > we're pretty sure that consciousness requires a high degree of complexity, > something supported by our theories and technology of information. So we > don't think that individual molecules or neurons are conscious - it must be > something about how a large number of subsystems interact. This implies that > any one subsystem could be replaced by a functionally similar one, e.g. > silicon "neuron", and not change consciousness. So our theory is that it is > not technology in the sense of digital vs analog, but in some functional > information processing sense. > > So given two things that have the same behavior, the default assumption is > they have the same consciousness (i.e. little or none in the case of CD and > tape players). If I look into them deeper and find they use different > technologies, that doesn't do much to change my opinion - it's like a silicon > neuron vs a biochemical one. If I find the flow and storage of information > is different, e.g. one throws away more information than the other, or one > adds randomness, then I'd say that was evidence for different consciousness. I basically agree, but with qualifications. If the attempt to copy human intelligence is "bottom up", for example by emulating neurons with electronics, then I think it is a good bet that if it behaves like a human and is based on the same principles as the human brain, it probably has the same types of conscious experiences as a human. But long before we are able to build such artificial brains, we will probably have the equivalent of characters in advanced computer games designed to pass the Turing Test using technology nothing like a biological brain. If such a computer program is conscious at all I would certainly not bet that it was conscious in the same way as a human is conscious, just because it is able to fool us into thinking it is human. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Le Mercredi 6 Décembre 2006 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit : >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> ... >> >>> Another thing that puzzles me is that consciousness should be generated >>> by physical (and chemicals which is also "physical") activities of the >>> brain, yet I feel my consciousness (in fact me) is located in the upper >>> front of my skull... Why then neurons located in the back of my brain do >>> not generate conscious feeling ? And if they do participate, why am I >>> located in the front of my brain ? Why this location ? Why only a tiny >>> part of the brain feels conscious activities ? >> Because you're not an ancient Greek. They felt their consciousness was >> located in their stomach. >> >> Brent Meeker > > While I'm not, the questionning was serious... While I've never ask where > other people feels they were... I'm there (in upper front of the brain)... Is > my "feelings" not in accordance with yours ? > > Quenton It might be because we're so visual and hence locate ourself at the viewpoint of our vision (but that wouldn't explain the Greeks). Or it might be because we've been taught that consciousness is done by the brain. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA revisited and then some
On Wed, Dec 06, 2006 at 11:38:32PM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Le Mercredi 6 Décembre 2006 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > ... > > > > > Another thing that puzzles me is that consciousness should be generated > > > by physical (and chemicals which is also "physical") activities of the > > > brain, yet I feel my consciousness (in fact me) is located in the upper > > > front of my skull... Why then neurons located in the back of my brain do > > > not generate conscious feeling ? And if they do participate, why am I > > > located in the front of my brain ? Why this location ? Why only a tiny > > > part of the brain feels conscious activities ? > > > > Because you're not an ancient Greek. They felt their consciousness was > > located in their stomach. > > > > Brent Meeker > > While I'm not, the questionning was serious... While I've never ask where > other people feels they were... I'm there (in upper front of the brain)... Is > my "feelings" not in accordance with yours ? > > Quenton > I don't feel very pointlike. Rather my consciousness feels distributed over a volume that is usually a substantial fraction of my brain. When meditating my consciousness feels like it expands to fill the room or maybe even larger. What of it? Probably not significant -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Le Mercredi 6 Décembre 2006 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit : > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > ... > > > Another thing that puzzles me is that consciousness should be generated > > by physical (and chemicals which is also "physical") activities of the > > brain, yet I feel my consciousness (in fact me) is located in the upper > > front of my skull... Why then neurons located in the back of my brain do > > not generate conscious feeling ? And if they do participate, why am I > > located in the front of my brain ? Why this location ? Why only a tiny > > part of the brain feels conscious activities ? > > Because you're not an ancient Greek. They felt their consciousness was > located in their stomach. > > Brent Meeker While I'm not, the questionning was serious... While I've never ask where other people feels they were... I'm there (in upper front of the brain)... Is my "feelings" not in accordance with yours ? Quenton --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: UDA revisited and then some
Hi Quentin, > > Hi Stathis, > > Le Mercredi 6 Décembre 2006 10:23, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Brent meeker writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > "Fair" is a vague term. That they are the same would be my default > > > assumption, absent any other information. Of course knowing that one is > > > analog and the other digital reduces my confidence in that assumption, > > > but no theory of "audio source experience" I have no way to form a > > > specific alternative hypothesis. > > > > You're implying that the default assumption should be that consciousness > > correlates more closely with external behaviour than with internal activity > > generating the behaviour: the tape recorder should reason that as the CD > > player produces the same audio output as I do, most likely it has the same > > experiences as I do. But why shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even > > though the CD player produces the same output as I do, it does so using > > completely different technology, so it most likely has completely different > > experiences to my own. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > A tape recorder or a CD has no external behavior that would mimic a human. > But > I really think that if you have same external behavior than a human then > the "copy" (whathever it is made of) will be conscious. Exact replica means > you can talk with the replica, learn, etc... It's not just sound (and or > move). Even If I knew that the "brain" copy was made of smashed apples it > would not change my "mind" ;) about it. The only "evidence" of others > consciousness is behavior, social interactions, ... You could scan a brain, > yet you won't see consciousness. The tape recorder/ CD player example was to show that two entities may have similar behaviour generated by completely different mechanisms. As you say, we can see the brain, we can see the behaviour, but we *deduce* the consciousness, unless it is our own. If someone has similar behaviour generated by a similar brain, then you would have to invoke magical processes to explain why he would not also have similar consciousness. But if someone has similar behaviour with a very different brain, I don't think there is anything in the laws of nature which says that he has to have the same consciousness, even if you say that he must have *some* sort of consciousness. > Another thing that puzzles me is that consciousness should be generated by > physical (and chemicals which is also "physical") activities of the brain, > yet I feel my consciousness (in fact me) is located in the upper front of my > skull... Why then neurons located in the back of my brain do not generate > conscious feeling ? And if they do participate, why am I located in the front > of my brain ? Why this location ? Why only a tiny part of the brain feels > conscious activities ? That's just what our brains make us think. If our brains were slightly different our consciousness could seem to be located in our big toe, or on the moons of Jupiter. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Brent meeker writes: > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> Brent Meeker writes: >>> > I assume that there is some copy of me possible which > preserves my 1st person experience. After all, physical > copying literally occurs in the course of normal life and I > still feel myself to be the same person. But suppose I am > offered some artificial means of being copied. The evidence I > am presented with is that Fred2 here is a robot who behaves > exactly the same as the standard human Fred: has all his > memories, a similar personality, similar intellectual > abilities, and passes whatever other tests one cares to set > him. The question is, how can I be sure that Fred2 really has > the same 1st person experiences as Fred? A software engineer > might copy a program's "look and feel" without knowing > anything about the original program's internal code, his goal > being to mimic the external appearance as seen by the end > user by whatever means available. Similarly with Fred2, > although the hope was to produce a copy with the same 1st > person experiences, the only possible research method would > have been to produce a copy that mimics Fred's behaviour. If > Fred2 has 1st person experiences at all, they may be utterly > unlike those of Fred. Fred2 may even be aware that he is > different but be extremely good at hiding it, because if he > were not he would have been rejected in the testing process. > > If it could be shown that Fred2 behaves like Fred *and* is > structurally similar Or *functionally* similar at lower levels, e.g. having long and short-term memory, having reflexes, having mostly separate areas for language and vision. > to Fred then I would be more confident in accepting copying. > If behaviour is similar but the underlying mechanism > completely different then I would consider that only by > accident could 1st person experience be similar. I'd say that would still be the way to bet - just with less confidence. Brent Meeker >>> It's the level of confidence which is the issue. Would it be fair >>> to assume that a digital and an analogue audio source have the >>> same 1st person experience (such as it may be) because their >>> output signal is indistinguishable to human hearing and >>> scientific instruments? >>> >>> Stathis Papaioannou >> "Fair" is a vague term. That they are the same would be my default >> assumption, absent any other information. Of course knowing that >> one is analog and the other digital reduces my confidence in that >> assumption, but no theory of "audio source experience" I have no >> way to form a specific alternative hypothesis. > > You're implying that the default assumption should be that > consciousness correlates more closely with external behaviour than > with internal activity generating the behaviour: the tape recorder > should reason that as the CD player produces the same audio output as > I do, most likely it has the same experiences as I do. But why > shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even though the CD player > produces the same output as I do, it does so using completely > different technology, so it most likely has completely different > experiences to my own. Here's my reasoning: We think other people (and animals) are conscious, have experiences, mainly because of the way they behave and to a lesser degree because they are like us in appearance and structure. On the other hand we're pretty sure that consciousness requires a high degree of complexity, something supported by our theories and technology of information. So we don't think that individual molecules or neurons are conscious - it must be something about how a large number of subsystems interact. This implies that any one subsystem could be replaced by a functionally similar one, e.g. silicon "neuron", and not change consciousness. So our theory is that it is not technology in the sense of digital vs analog, but in some functional information processing sense. So given two things that have the same behavior, the default assumption is they have the same consciousness (i.e. little or none in the case of CD and tape players). If I look into them deeper and find they use different technologies, that doesn't do much to change my opinion - it's like a silicon neuron vs a biochemical one. If I find the flow and storage of information is different, e.g. one throws away more information than the other, or one adds randomness, then I'd say that was evidence for different consciousness. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTE
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Quentin Anciaux wrote: ... > Another thing that puzzles me is that consciousness should be generated by > physical (and chemicals which is also "physical") activities of the brain, > yet I feel my consciousness (in fact me) is located in the upper front of my > skull... Why then neurons located in the back of my brain do not generate > conscious feeling ? And if they do participate, why am I located in the front > of my brain ? Why this location ? Why only a tiny part of the brain feels > conscious activities ? Because you're not an ancient Greek. They felt their consciousness was located in their stomach. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
The word" theology" again (was Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Hi Brent, Our present discussion with Tom and others is particularly important for me. I am concentrating myself on the last decisions before writing "the english version of my thesis", probably in the form of one paper + one book (the difference is that the book should be an, as self-contained as possible, version of the paper. It is difficult because the intended audience is fuzzy: physicists have the right motivations (figure out what is reality), logicians and computer scientists have the right tools (diagonalizations), neoplatonist theologians have the right attitude, basic theory and questions, etc. I still don't know if you have understand the full UDA reasoning, or at least the seven first steps, nor do I know if this would help concerning the "vocabulary" problem. I do think you have not yet understand the AUDA, as your recurrent remark on Gettier illustrateswe should perhaps harness this point in a deeper way at some point. A contingent problem is that physicists, who are the best placed to understand my work, has been cooled down by the fact that someone as brilliant in math as Penrose has been able to be so wrong on Godel's theorem, and for many people the term "Godel" means "risky"! Now, since I have defended my thesis, I have done two "major" discoveries (as people following the list can guess): 1) The interview of the lobian machine directly offers a purely arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus's theory (of mind&matter). 2) The comp standard model of particles can be derived from some permutations group related to universal diophantine polynomial. This has forced me to dig far deeper in number theory, and leads, here too alas, toward very complex mathematical questions. In my mind, the "1)" really helps, as far as we are open to neoplatonism. If not, it obviously favorizes rejection. The "2)" does not help at all and I don't know really what to do with that. Le 05-déc.-06, à 20:05, Brent Meeker a écrit : > I understand that you use "God" to refer to whatever is fundamental. That is the idea, but actually I never use the term "God", except for going quick in some answer to post which use the term. The "God" I refer to is closer to Plotinus' ONE or to the Chinese TAO, the main axiom is that it is the biggest unconceivable reality with the property that you cannot give a name to it, or if you do, you get a multiplication of approximations which can hide the very idea (but which can be rich and creative though when distinguished from It). The arithmetical interpretation of the ONE for the "theology" of a lobian machine PA is arithmetical truth. By Tarski theorem it is unameable by PA, for example. > And that may well be consistent with the way Plato used it. Hard question of course, but a case can be made that it would have been accepted by the most pythagoreans among the neoplatonist. > But even among Plato's contemporary's it was probably heard as > referring to the Olympians. And now, a couple of millenia later, > "theos", "theism", and "theology" have come to refer to a single > personal God. The neoplatonist have introduced it, but Plotinus ascribes it to the Parmenides of Plato. The Timaeus and other text by Plato and even Aristotle are going in that direction. Note that the neoplatonist are rationalist, and their use of words is very near the modern axiomatic like the one used in math. In some late neoplatonist works "Gods" can be translated by the concept of concept, property, or even set. But Plotinus endows monotheism/monism, as I think comp, by its unameable platonism, does too. > Since the time of Plato other terms have been introduced to > distinguish other "fundamentals", deism, pantheism, naturalism. Deism, pantheism, naturalism are all "theological" position. This is perhaps why I need the term "theology", in an admittedly larger sense than the current sense. The UD reasoning shows that the belief in naturalism is a theological position. It need faith in something called "Nature", etc. I really consider scientific theology as the scientific approach to what science cannot prove, but still infer correctly. Of course I would less dare to say this without knowing about the [] and []* distinction in the arithmetical hypostases (G*/G, Z1*/Z1, X1*/X1, etc.) > >> It is an entirely contingent and sad fact that theology has been more >> or >> less stolen by the temporal authoritative power of the Roman, and that >> still today many people forget that theology has been and can still >> be a >> science, ie something than can be driven by the modesty attitude. > > Would a study of the character of leprechauns be science if were > driven by a modesty attitude? Yes. Even to conclude perhaps that there is no evidence known for affirming that there are leprechauns today. A good example is the work of Suzanne Balckmore on parapsychology (In search of the light) where she demolishes one century of par
Re: UDA revisited and then some
Hi Stathis, Le Mercredi 6 Décembre 2006 10:23, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > Brent meeker writes: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > "Fair" is a vague term. That they are the same would be my default > > assumption, absent any other information. Of course knowing that one is > > analog and the other digital reduces my confidence in that assumption, > > but no theory of "audio source experience" I have no way to form a > > specific alternative hypothesis. > > You're implying that the default assumption should be that consciousness > correlates more closely with external behaviour than with internal activity > generating the behaviour: the tape recorder should reason that as the CD > player produces the same audio output as I do, most likely it has the same > experiences as I do. But why shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even > though the CD player produces the same output as I do, it does so using > completely different technology, so it most likely has completely different > experiences to my own. > > Stathis Papaioannou A tape recorder or a CD has no external behavior that would mimic a human. But I really think that if you have same external behavior than a human then the "copy" (whathever it is made of) will be conscious. Exact replica means you can talk with the replica, learn, etc... It's not just sound (and or move). Even If I knew that the "brain" copy was made of smashed apples it would not change my "mind" ;) about it. The only "evidence" of others consciousness is behavior, social interactions, ... You could scan a brain, yet you won't see consciousness. Another thing that puzzles me is that consciousness should be generated by physical (and chemicals which is also "physical") activities of the brain, yet I feel my consciousness (in fact me) is located in the upper front of my skull... Why then neurons located in the back of my brain do not generate conscious feeling ? And if they do participate, why am I located in the front of my brain ? Why this location ? Why only a tiny part of the brain feels conscious activities ? Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: UDA revisited and then some
Brent meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > Brent Meeker writes: > > > >>> I assume that there is some copy of me possible which preserves > >>> my 1st person experience. After all, physical copying literally > >>> occurs in the course of normal life and I still feel myself to be > >>> the same person. But suppose I am offered some artificial means > >>> of being copied. The evidence I am presented with is that Fred2 > >>> here is a robot who behaves exactly the same as the standard > >>> human Fred: has all his memories, a similar personality, similar > >>> intellectual abilities, and passes whatever other tests one cares > >>> to set him. The question is, how can I be sure that Fred2 really > >>> has the same 1st person experiences as Fred? A software engineer > >>> might copy a program's "look and feel" without knowing anything > >>> about the original program's internal code, his goal being to > >>> mimic the external appearance as seen by the end user by whatever > >>> means available. Similarly with Fred2, although the hope was to > >>> produce a copy with the same 1st person experiences, the only > >>> possible research method would have been to produce a copy that > >>> mimics Fred's behaviour. If Fred2 has 1st person experiences at > >>> all, they may be utterly unlike those of Fred. Fred2 may even be > >>> aware that he is different but be extremely good at hiding it, > >>> because if he were not he would have been rejected in the testing > >>> process. > >>> > >>> If it could be shown that Fred2 behaves like Fred *and* is > >>> structurally similar > >> Or *functionally* similar at lower levels, e.g. having long and > >> short-term memory, having reflexes, having mostly separate areas > >> for language and vision. > >> > >>> to Fred then I would be more confident in accepting copying. If > >>> behaviour is similar but the underlying mechanism completely > >>> different then I would consider that only by accident could 1st > >>> person experience be similar. > >> I'd say that would still be the way to bet - just with less > >> confidence. > >> > >> Brent Meeker > > > > It's the level of confidence which is the issue. Would it be fair to > > assume that a digital and an analogue audio source have the same 1st > > person experience (such as it may be) because their output signal is > > indistinguishable to human hearing and scientific instruments? > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > "Fair" is a vague term. That they are the same would be my default > assumption, absent any other information. Of course knowing that one is > analog and the other digital reduces my confidence in that assumption, but no > theory of "audio source experience" I have no way to form a specific > alternative hypothesis. You're implying that the default assumption should be that consciousness correlates more closely with external behaviour than with internal activity generating the behaviour: the tape recorder should reason that as the CD player produces the same audio output as I do, most likely it has the same experiences as I do. But why shouldn't the tape recorder reason: even though the CD player produces the same output as I do, it does so using completely different technology, so it most likely has completely different experiences to my own. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
