Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
[EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev: > > As far as I tell tell, all of physics is ultimately > geometry. But as we've pointed out on this list many times, a theory > of physics is *not* a theory of everything, since it makes the > (probably false) assumption that everything is reducible to physical > substances and properties. I think that everything is reducible to physical substances and properties. And I think that all of physics is reducible to pure mathematics... I have now read Garrett Lisis paper. It was interesting, but it is still to early to say if it is important. There is a lot of symmetries in the elementary particles, and there is a lot of symmetries in the E8 Lie group. So it is not any suprise that they both can be mapped on each other. Lisi has mapped 222 elementary particles on the 242 elements of E8, and he has predicted that the rest of the 20 elements correspond to 20 yet to be discovered elementary particles. If it is true, then Lisi will have the Nobel price. If it is not, then we will have to look for another TOE. But it is possible that we will never find any TOE. Because there is 10^500 different possiblities for our universe, and all of these 10^500 universes exist in the same way. By experiments we will have to decide which of those that is our universe, but we will never reach the correct answer, the number of experiments needed will be too many. -- Torgny --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
On Nov 23, 1:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Now such work raises the remark, which I don't really want to develop > now, which is that qualifiying "TOE" a theory explaining "only" forces > and particles or field, is implicit physicalism, and we know (by UDA) > that this is incompatible with comp. Yes indeed Bruno. As far as I tell tell, all of physics is ultimately geometry. But as we've pointed out on this list many times, a theory of physics is *not* a theory of everything, since it makes the (probably false) assumption that everything is reducible to physical substances and properties. Thus we both are in agreement on this, but for different reasons (you because, you think math is the ultimate basis of everything aka COMP, me, because of my property dualism, aka the need for a triple-aspect explanation of physical/teleological/ mathematical properties as the basis for everything). We keep telling mainstream scients, but mainstream scients are not listening to us. *sigh*. > Yet I bet Lisi is quite close to the sort of physics derivable by > machine's or number's introspection. Actually, getting physics from so > "few" symmetries is a bit weird (I have to study the paper in detail). > With comp, we have to explain the symmetries *and* the geometry, and > the quantum logic, from the numbers and their possible stable > discourses ... If not, it is not a theory of everything, but just a > classification, a bit like the Mendeleev table classifies atoms without > really explaining. But Lisi's theory seems beautiful indeed ... > > Bruno > There's too many people mucking around with physics - I do wish more people were working on computer science. Physics is the most advanced of our sciences, but computer science lags behind. It just seems to be an unfortunate historical accident that physical theories developed first and then lots of social status got attached to theoretical physics (stemming from the glorification of Newton in Europe). As a result, physics has advanced well ahead of comp-sci, and there's lots of money and status attached to physics breakthroughs. But comp- sci is actually far more important to us in practical sense - artificial general intelligence would be way way more valuable than any fundamental physics breakthrough. We would have had real AGI long ago if there was the same money and glory for comp-sci as there is for physics *sigh*. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
One more question: can or should p be the observer? George George Levy wrote: > Hi Bruno, > > I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found > very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. > > Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to > > make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can > really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some > way. > Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, > and > in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for > knowing. That is: > > 1) If p is knowable then p is true; > 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; > 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then > q is > knowable > > (+ some logical rules). > > Bruno, what or who do you mean by "it" in statements 2) and 3). In > addition, what do you mean by "is knowable", "is true" and "entails"? > Are "is knowable", "is true" and "entails" absolute or do they have > meaning only with respect to a particular observer? Can these terms be > relative to an observer? If they can, how would you rephrase these > statements? > > George > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, what or who do you mean by "it" in statements 2) and 3). In addition, what do you mean by "is knowable", "is true" and "entails"? Are "is knowable", "is true" and "entails" absolute or do they have meaning only with respect to a particular observer? Can these terms be relative to an observer? If they can, how would you rephrase these statements? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Cantor's Diagonal
Le 21-nov.-07, à 17:33, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
> What do you think of this "proof"?:
>
> Let us have the bijection:
>
> 0 {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,...}
> 1 {1,0,0,0,0,0,0,...}
> 2 {0,1,0,0,0,0,0,...}
> 3 {1,1,0,0,0,0,0,...}
> 4 {0,0,1,0,0,0,0,...}
> 5 {1,0,1,0,0,0,0,...}
> 6 {0,1,1,0,0,0,0,...}
> 7 {1,1,1,0,0,0,0,...}
> 8 {0,0,0,1,0,0,0,...}
> ...
> omega --- {1,1,1,1,1,1,1,...}
>
> What do we get if we apply Cantor's Diagonal to this?
Note also that in general, we start from what we want to prove, and
then do the math. Your idea of transfinite (ordinal) diagonalisation is
cute though, but I have currently no idea where this could lead. BTW,
it is also funny that such a transfinite idea is proposed by an
ultrafinistist!
I guess you have seen that {(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,...), (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,...),
... does clearly not enumerate the infinite sequences (you don't have
to use the diagonal for showing that. It is also better to use
parentheses instead of accolades, given that the binary sequences are
ordered (notation detail).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: elaboration Re: Cantor's Diagonal
Le 22-nov.-07, à 07:19, Barry Brent a écrit :
>
> The reason it isn't a bijection (of a denumerable set with the set of
> binary sequences): the pre-image (the left side of your map) isn't
> a set--you've imposed an ordering. Sets, qua sets, don't have
> orderings. Orderings are extra. (I'm not a specialist on this stuff
> but I think Bruno, for example, will back me up.) It must be the
> case that you won't let us identify the left side, for example, with
> {omega, 0, 1, 2, ... }, will you? For if you did, it would fall under
> Cantor's argument.
I agree.
Presently, I prefer not talking too much on the ordinals, because it
could be confusing for many. More later ...
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
Le 21-nov.-07, à 19:54, George Levy a écrit : > A theory of everyting is sweeping the Physics community. > > > The theory by Garrett Lisi is explained in this Wiki entry. > > > A simulation of E8 can be found a the New Scientist. > > > The Wiki entry on E8 is also interesting. Thanks, very interesting indeed. Note that the original paper is accessible from the New Scientist entry. Not so easy to read (need of differential geometry, simple groups, etc. Quite close to the idea of the importance of 24 which I mention periodically ... :) Now such work raises the remark, which I don't really want to develop now, which is that qualifiying "TOE" a theory explaining "only" forces and particles or field, is implicit physicalism, and we know (by UDA) that this is incompatible with comp. Yet I bet Lisi is quite close to the sort of physics derivable by machine's or number's introspection. Actually, getting physics from so "few" symmetries is a bit weird (I have to study the paper in detail). With comp, we have to explain the symmetries *and* the geometry, and the quantum logic, from the numbers and their possible stable discourses ... If not, it is not a theory of everything, but just a classification, a bit like the Mendeleev table classifies atoms without really explaining. But Lisi's theory seems beautiful indeed ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
