Re: QTI & euthanasia

2008-11-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 14 Nov 2008, at 19:46, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event >> that >> happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. >> But >> these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other c

Re: QTI & euthanasia

2008-11-16 Thread Michael Rosefield
Surely the split is from a single history to multiple histories consistent with the original? Sure, you could say we move from identity to identity at random, but that is unlikely under QM and should be similarly improbable from any other metatheory. 2008/11/17 m.a. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > *I wond

Re: QTI & euthanasia

2008-11-16 Thread m.a.
*I wonder whether my "selves", after a split, retain their memories from the world before the split or now have all the memories appropriate to the "self" in the new universe. Theoretically of course, they wouldn't know the difference, but it seems strange to think that we might perceive entire

Re: QTI & euthanasia

2008-11-16 Thread Michael Rosefield
If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt it. Perhaps there are two main causes of splitting: where an event would cause different 'observables', or where an event by necessity breaks the mechanism of consciousness into different streams. In the latter case, there

Re: QTI & euthanasia

2008-11-16 Thread Günther Greindl
Hello Brent, > That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that > happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But > these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical > objects. Those "objects" are not in some pure state anyway

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-16 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Kory, nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position quite accurately :-) Cheers, Günther > Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to > the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may > be descriptions of beings wh

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-16 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 15 Nov 2008, at 12:12, Michael Rosefield wrote: > Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, > racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a > certain direction on the character's part. > > For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible

Re: QTI & euthanasia

2008-11-16 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 14 Nov 2008, at 19:46, Brent Meeker wrote: > > That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event > that > happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. > But > these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical > objects. This woul

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-16 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: > My impression is that you're more interested in exploring the > consequences of that conclusion after you accept it. Not at all. I am just a logician showing that any consistent being (human, machine, extraterrestrial, angels, gods, etc.) cannot b

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-16 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote: > Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, > whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that > substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical > existence? That's certainly the prevailing

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2008/11/16 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then >> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not >> the null state? >> > I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be > one-to-one (whi

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2008/11/16 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then >> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not >> the null state? > > I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any > computation can be