On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:

> My impression is that you're more interested in exploring the
> consequences of that conclusion after you accept it.

Not at all. I am just a logician showing that any consistent being  
(human, machine, extraterrestrial, angels, gods, etc.) cannot believe  
both in digital mechanism and materialism. It *is* the only  
consequence I have ever been interested in. My primary goal is to show  
that mechanism does not solve the mind body problem per se, as  
Descartes understood quite well already. Indeed with mechanism, you  
have to justify the appearance of matter without postulating a  
universe. The math part just makes the same reasoning a bit more  
constructive, to please some local mathematicians who found my work  
too much easy as to give a PhD thesis (sic). It is a bit ironical  
because I found the math part before the non math part. But both  
amounts to the same thing. If I am a machine, physical laws are  
emerging from the logic of numbers.

> Obviously,
> there's nothing wrong with focusing on the issues that interest you
> most. But for the world-at-large, the primary issue is *why* we should
> accept in the first place that persons represented by unimplemented
> computations are conscious.

I interpret your "unimplemented computation" by "not implemented in  
the *physical* world" because a computation is always implemented in  
some universal machine language, be it Conway game of life, Fortran,  
Combinators or or Elementary Arithmetic.
All my work (theses, papers, and my talk on this and other lists)  is  
just that: the notion of matter does not even make sense for a  
mechanist. Many got the point with the first seven steps of the UDA,  
and the MGA is intended for people, like Peter Jones, who insists that  
consciousness can appear only when the computation is implemented in a  
"real primary material word". For many this is just an ad hoc moves to  
save physics as the fundamental science. The MGA is intended to show  
that even that magical move does not work. Indeed, from a purely  
logical point of view, you can still believe that the seven first  
steps of the UDA proves only that our physical universe is too much  
"little" to run any significant part of a real UD. After the MGA, as I  
suspect you already understand, we just don't need to run the UD. Its  
"natural" atemporal running is already contained in the set of  
elementary arithmetical truth.

In a next post Kory wrote:

> On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented
>> by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all
>> computations have to be implemented".
> Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or
> computers or whatever) perform in our world.

Why in our world? In (or relatively to) any universal machine,  
material or immaterial. Sorry for not having been clear of that. I use  
the term "implementation" in the sense of theoretical computer  
science. By using Godel's trick I could define implementation purely  
with numbers and addition + multiplication.

> So it's still not quite
> right to refer to "persons represented by unperformed computations".
> But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying
> to say.

Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to  
implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what  
Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious  
like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic,  
or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in  
arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the same  
than mine: we don't need a material bottom.
The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe   
(your mathematical physicalism) is an open one. If it exists, we have  
to explain how it wins the "measure of uncertainty" battle on all  
other programs which reach also your mind computational state in the  
universal deplyment. All right? (this follows from step seven).

> "Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed
> to play for materialists."

I would say "some mathematical facts". But I agree with that. And  
those mathematical facts, after Godel Turing and Co., can even explain  
consciousness, where pure physicalism fails (and the UDA-MGA) explains  
in detail why physicalism has to fail there.

Kory wrote also to Brent:

> On Nov 14, 2008, at 11:22 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented
>> idea or program is an incoherent concept.  So for the non-materialist
>> there can be no such distinction as "implemented" or "not
>> implemented".
> I can't answer for Bruno, but in my formulation, I would say that we
> can talk about "un-implemented" programs as long as we understand that
> we just mean "un-implemented in our particular world".

Yes sure. Although in some context (like the prove by absurdo that  
MECH + PHYS is inconsistent) I mean "our particular world as conceived  
as material".  I think we agree on the meaning, and we have to be sure  
on the vocabulary so as not to confuse the other. For that reason I am  
not sure you will appreciate the MGA, because you clearly seem to be  
aware we don't need material stuff. (Unlike Greg Egan, by as Stathis  
said, he needs the stuff for making his story novel).


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