2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>> and is thus not any particular physical
>> object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that
>> computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose
>> physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to
>> instantiate the rele
On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> > i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
> > the question
>
> Well, a computation is a type,
A type of computation is a type.
A token of a type of computation is a token.
> and is thus not any parti
2009/9/2 Flammarion :
> i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
> the question
Well, a computation is a type, and is thus not any particular physical
object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that
computational type, and is indeed a physical object, al
Yablo and Gallois's paper "Is ontology based on a mistake" is quite
relevant to
the question of Platonism, specificall whether true matehmatical
assertions
of existence have to be taken literally.
http://tinyurl.com/ldekg7
-
On 2 Sep, 18:03, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> >> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >>> I think his exploration of
> >>> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
> >>> the money.
>
> >> So I
2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
>> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
>> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
>> indeed nothing problematic in saying that "two physical
On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
> >> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
> >> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
> >> indee
On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>
> > But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
> > relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
> > at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
> >
On 02 Sep 2009, at 17:16, Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Ouh la la ... Mirek,
>>
>> You may be right, but I am not sure. You may verify if this was not
>> in
>> a intuitionist context. Without the excluded middle principle, you
>> may
>> have to use countable choice in som
Flammarion wrote:
>
> On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>> I think his exploration of
>>> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
>>> the money.
>>>
>> So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves
On 2 Sep, 16:58, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
> >> character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
> >> fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as
> >> possessing intern
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
> But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
> relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
> at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
> higher level. I see nothing incoherent is saying
2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>> Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
>> character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
>> fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as
>> possessing internal temporal duration and differentiation.
>
> Easi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Ouh la la ... Mirek,
>
> You may be right, but I am not sure. You may verify if this was not in
> a intuitionist context. Without the excluded middle principle, you may
> have to use countable choice in some situation where classical logic
> does not, but I am not sur
2009/9/2 Rex Allen :
>
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> I think his exploration of
>> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
>> the money.
>
> So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
> have read some of his articl
On 02 Sep 2009, at 03:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
> But only by isolating a bit of computation from the rest of universe.
> And it doesn't show that a computation supervenes on zero physical
> activity. And even if it did show that, it would not follow that
> mental
> computation *does* superven
On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> > I think his exploration of
> > the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
> > the money.
>
> So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
> have read so
On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
> > anythign more for the specious present than a "snapshop" some of
> > which is out of date?
>
> Well, as well as the question of what constitutes
Hello John,
On 01 Sep 2009, at 23:49, John Mikes wrote:
>
> I am waiting for your explanatory post(s) and anxiously read some
> several thousand pages with related topics.
I am very pleased to hear this.
> Unfortunately the technical examples and discussing their solutions
> are not muc
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