On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 7:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> But if the
> emulation attempts to be local then it must include inherent randomness -
> which I think is not Turing computable.
The Turing machine could draw the required randomness from a tape of
random bits, couldn't it?
The question migh
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> What does "locally" mean in this context? I doubt that consciousness is
> strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
> with.
I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim
On 1/27/2011 2:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Jan 2011, at 22:12, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/27/2011 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Mathematical structures do not “do” anything, they merely
exist, if at all! We can use verbs to des
Hi Travis,
I have really enjoyed the challenge of your paper. One difficulty that I
have with it is that the "selection of a gauge" is a highly non-trivial
problem (related to the fine tuning problem!) and thus needs a lot more
attention. More comments soon.
Onward!
Stephen
-Origin
Hi Brent and Bruno,
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 5:23 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”
On 27 Jan 2011, at 22:12, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/27/2011 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
O
Hi Brent,
You ask the perfect question! By locally it is mean that all that can be
defined and/or measured from a single frame of reference (as it is used in
special relativity). This includes a notion of simultaneity that involves those
aspects of the world that can be measured from that f
Hi Travis,
Thank you for joining us. Please prepare to defend your paper.
Onward!
Stephen
-Original Message-
From: Travis Garrett
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 4:10 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: JOINING: Travis Garrett
Hi everybody,
My name is Travis - I'm currently
Dear Bruno,
Interleaving.
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 1:23 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”
On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:
SPK: The supervenience thesis is
Hi Russell,
You'll see that I immediately followed my joining post with an ever-
so-slightly irate response to your comment ;-) I need to go have
dinner with my family, so let me quickly say that taking existing as
an observer for granted is a very easy thing to do, but it well may
need an exp
I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response. He says that he is
"completely unimpressed" - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely
ignores entire sections of the paper where I precisely address the
issues he raises. Going back to the abstract I say:
"We then argue that the observers
collecti
On 27 Jan 2011, at 22:12, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/27/2011 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Mathematical structures do not “do” anything, they merely
exist, if at all! We can use verbs to describe relations between
nouns but that d
Hi Travis,
Welcome to the list. Its great to see some new blood. I did get around
to reading your paper a few days ago, and had a couple of comments
which I posted.
1) Your usage of the term Physic Church-Turing Thesis. What I thought
you were assuming seemed more accurately captured by Bruno's C
On 1/27/2011 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:
The supervenience thesis is separate from the Turing thesis and
Mauldin does a good job in distinguishing them.
Just to be clear, what Maudlin call "supervenience thesis" is what I
called "ph
Hi everybody,
My name is Travis - I'm currently working as a postdoc at the
Perimeter Institute. I got an email from Richard Gordon and Evgenii
Rudnyi pointing out that my recent paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/1101.2198
is being discussed here, so yeah, I'm happy to join the conversation.
I'll re
On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote:
The supervenience thesis is separate from the Turing thesis and
Mauldin does a good job in distinguishing them.
Just to be clear, what Maudlin call "supervenience thesis" is what I
called "physical supervenience thesis", to distinguis
On 25 Jan 2011, at 18:24, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the
points again. And get back to you.
You are welcome. Ask any question.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received t
On 26 Jan 2011, at 11:31, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 09:31:23PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My point is only that IF we accept digital mechanism THEN the
*appearance* of movement is an inside, first person, construction,
due to the gap between what a machine (number) can
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