Re: Autonomy?
On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the prediction of being in both place is simply refuted. Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington. 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only Moscow. Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested proving that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is confirmed to be completely correct. But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are incompatible. So you can make one more which is 1) OR 2). Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue. Things become contradictory when you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov, leading to 1) and 2) which is non sense. The assumption is not that there is only one Bruno Marchal, but that all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be only one of them. Oh I am the one in Moscow, and not the one in Washington, and I was unable to predict that fact, unless using a or. You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a prediction on the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment. Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect. 1) or 2). But that leads to the indeterminacy. you sill confuse 1 and 3 views. You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a possibility it is you that is confused. It is up to you to show this, but, here again, you deny that after the duplication, whoever you will be, will recognize that he was not able top have predicted with certainty the particular outcome. This can only be I will be in such city, and this will be refuted by the one in the other city. With comp, we agree that there are both bruno marchal, and so the prediction was wrong. It was a selection in disguise. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: what is mechanism?
On 29 Jun 2012, at 20:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.04.2012 11:11 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 10 Apr 2012, at 21:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form, I would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not too little, and not to much. OK I found the paper by Turing: http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in term of functions instead of real numbers. You can try to read it. I will search other information, but there are many, and of different type, and most still blinded by the aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper which would satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with Turing's paper I think. Bruno, I have finally come to mechanism. Thank you for your suggestion. I have browsed Turing's paper. Do I understand correctly, that mechanism is something that could be implemented by some Turing's machine? You can say that. But you could take fortran program instead of Turing machine. The choice of the initial formal system is not important. Do you some paper about it that does not have equations but that discusses this term philosophically? Hmm... Not really. The start is simple, but without doing a minimum of technical work, you can't get the correct intuition, for the field is quickly counter-intuitive. I am currently explaining the whole computability stuff on the FOAR list, where I have a very good candid correspondent. You might try take the wagon. If not I would suggest you to study a good book, like Cutland's book, or even the first hundred pages of the Rogers' book. Many popular account on computability are just invalid, or not precise enough to do serious philosophy, I'm afraid. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: what is mechanism?
On 30.06.2012 11:14 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 29 Jun 2012, at 20:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.04.2012 11:11 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 10 Apr 2012, at 21:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Hence if you know something in Internet or in the written form, I would appreciate your advice. The best about 20 pages, not too little, and not to much. OK I found the paper by Turing: http://www.thocp.net/biographies/papers/turing_oncomputablenumbers_1936.pdf Of course, the language is old, and we prefer to talk today in term of functions instead of real numbers. You can try to read it. I will search other information, but there are many, and of different type, and most still blinded by the aristotelian preconception. So it is hard to find a paper which would satisfy me. But you can get the intuition with Turing's paper I think. Bruno, I have finally come to mechanism. Thank you for your suggestion. I have browsed Turing's paper. Do I understand correctly, that mechanism is something that could be implemented by some Turing's machine? You can say that. But you could take fortran program instead of Turing machine. The choice of the initial formal system is not important. I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then? Evgenii Do you some paper about it that does not have equations but that discusses this term philosophically? Hmm... Not really. The start is simple, but without doing a minimum of technical work, you can't get the correct intuition, for the field is quickly counter-intuitive. I am currently explaining the whole computability stuff on the FOAR list, where I have a very good candid correspondent. You might try take the wagon. If not I would suggest you to study a good book, like Cutland's book, or even the first hundred pages of the Rogers' book. Many popular account on computability are just invalid, or not precise enough to do serious philosophy, I'm afraid. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/30/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the prediction of being in both place is simply refuted. Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington. 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only Moscow. Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested proving that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is confirmed to be completely correct. But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are incompatible. So you can make one more which is 1) OR 2). I think it's 1) AND 2). Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue. Things become contradictory when you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov, leading to 1) and 2) which is non sense. The assumption is not that there is only one Bruno Marchal, but that all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be only one of them. Oh I am the one in Moscow, and not the one in Washington, and I was unable to predict that fact, unless using a or. Suppose you predict I will be in Washinton. Then the Bruno in Washington will be right and the Bruno is Moscow will say, Oh, I was wrong. Brent You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a prediction on the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment. Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect. 1) or 2). But that leads to the indeterminacy. you sill confuse 1 and 3 views. You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a possibility it is you that is confused. It is up to you to show this, but, here again, you deny that after the duplication, whoever you will be, will recognize that he was not able top have predicted with certainty the particular outcome. This can only be I will be in such city, and this will be refuted by the one in the other city. With comp, we agree that there are both bruno marchal, and so the prediction was wrong. It was a selection in disguise. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: what is mechanism?
On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then? Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are equivalent. Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine. More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine. But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical realization? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow? Do you see what I am getting at? Human identity is not made of only matter. It is made partly of unique interactions of unique events. Even without first person fragmentation (which brain conjoined twins suggest is not a problem - I can be spread out beyond an individual body), there is nothing to suggest that the event specific entanglement-momentum of any system can be reproduced independently of context. If you duplicate Bruno's body, you get a newborn baby in an adult body. If you duplicate Gettysburg you get a bunch of confused amnesiac babies in uniforms. Each neuron has to discover its own connections for the first time, recapitulating the experience of the individuals or historic events as a whole as they struggle to cohere like a mass of fibrillating cardiac cells unable to synch. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/CwBs3ZQOFP0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow? We could send Craig there. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow? We could send Craig there. Brent Hi Brent, The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an entire entity and not a system that is just the interactions of many entities. We can copy wholes, not parts, and preserve invariant their identities. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow? We could send Craig there. Brent Hi Brent, The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an entire entity and not a system that is just the interactions of many entities. We can copy wholes, not parts, and preserve invariant their identities. Craig wasn't even talking about duplication; so we can 'teleport' him there by commercial airliner. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/30/2012 9:56 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow? We could send Craig there. Brent Hi Brent, The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an entire entity and not a system that is just the interactions of many entities. We can copy wholes, not parts, and preserve invariant their identities. Craig wasn't even talking about duplication; so we can 'teleport' him there by commercial airliner. Brent - Brent, You are not even trying to understand what Craig is talking/writing about. Please don't pretend otherwise. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
