It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.
My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow? Do you see what I am getting at? Human identity is not made of only matter. It is made partly of unique interactions of unique events. Even without first person fragmentation (which brain conjoined twins suggest is not a problem - "I" can be spread out beyond an individual body), there is nothing to suggest that the event specific entanglement-momentum of any system can be reproduced independently of context. If you duplicate Bruno's body, you get a newborn baby in an adult body. If you duplicate Gettysburg you get a bunch of confused amnesiac babies in uniforms. Each neuron has to discover its own connections for the first time, recapitulating the experience of the individuals or historic events as a whole as they struggle to cohere like a mass of fibrillating cardiac cells unable to synch. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/CwBs3ZQOFP0J. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
