It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be
different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something
like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.
My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can
you move Gettysburg to Moscow?
Do you see what I am getting at? Human identity is not made of only matter. It
is made partly of unique interactions of unique events. Even without first
person fragmentation (which brain conjoined twins suggest is not a problem -
"I" can be spread out beyond an individual body), there is nothing to suggest
that the event specific entanglement-momentum of any system can be reproduced
independently of context. If you duplicate Bruno's body, you get a newborn baby
in an adult body. If you duplicate Gettysburg you get a bunch of confused
amnesiac babies in uniforms. Each neuron has to discover its own connections
for the first time, recapitulating the experience of the individuals or
historic events as a whole as they struggle to cohere like a mass of
fibrillating cardiac cells unable to synch.
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