Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 20 Jun 2015, at 01:26, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Bruno Marchal got the feeling that John Clark develops an allergy to pronouns. From Bruno Marchal's long time experience, the roots of the allergy is guessed to come from the inability to keep the 1-3 person view distinction all along the thought experience If Bruno Marchal abandoned personal pronouns then Bruno Marchal would be FORCED to keep those 1-3 person view distinction straight all along the thought experience, That does not follow. And then I do keep the distinction all along, that is why I talk of the *first person* indeterminacy. and that is precisely why Bruno Marchal refuses to do it, Where? never make a comment like that, always quote. I will pass those unproven statements. Bruno Marchal's entire theory would evaporate away in a puff of ridiculousness. Personal pronouns in philosophical proofs are like dividing by zero in mathematical proofs, both are great places to hide sloppy thinking. I need John Clark still answering this: does JC agree that in step 3 protocol, John Clark doesn't remember what the step 3 protocol is Oh, it is just what you pretend to not understand, and that we talk about since many years. but is quite certain it, like everything else in the proof, is not important. + the promise of giving coffee to both reconstitutions, the probability of the experience drinking coffee is one? Both? That's sounds rather dull, why not give give it to one but not the other? For the purpose of the reasoning. I ask John Clark in Helsinki, who already agreed that John Clark will survive (with comp and the default hypotheses), and I ask John Clark's expectation of drinking soon a cup of coffee. John Clark is 100% certain that John Clark will drink that coffee and John Clark is 100% certain that John Clark will not drink that coffee. And after the experiment is carried out the outcome will prove that John Clark was not only certain but correct too. Did you change the question? Are you making fun? Both receive coffee, but one will not drink it? prejudice on American or Russian coffee? Bruno Marchal just said all of them are you therefore it doesn't take a professional logician to figure out that you will see Moscow AND Washington. Brilliantly correct, for the 3p description of the experience attributed to 3p bodies. But as Kim pointed out, it does not take long to a child to understand that this was not what the question was about. If that is not the question you wanted answered then rephrase the question so it makes logical sense and ask it; Just read the posts, or the paper, as this has already been done many times. you're a logician so you should know how to do that, Yes, and the idea that somebody have problem with that are inventions, rumors, with one exceptions which happens to be the only having non legal value. So no worry about my ability to explain this. Step 7 and 8 are way subtler. AUDA is simple modulo the study of mathematical logic/computer science. and if not then get that child you were talking about to help you. I can't give an answer, not even a incorrect answer, to a incoherent question. You did agree that a person duplicated does not die in the duplication process, so it is natural to ask her what she expect. Everyone, but you, undresrand that assuming comp and the defaut hypothesis, she must expect to be in W or in M, but not in both, and indeed, when we do the experiment and asks them the confirmation, both confirmed that was correct. This is explained in the preceding post, and you don't quote the explanation. Your comments seems opportunist and motivated only by looking like winning the argument, and not trying to understand what someone explains. The question is about the first person experience The? There is no such thing are THE first person experience! Of course there is. You push on a button, and you open a door, and you see a city. That is true for both, but the cities are different, so from the 1p view, we have a well defined unique experience. We can't predict which one, but this does not change that it is well defined, in a domain of two. expected What on earth do expectations about the future have to do with the nature of personal identity? It is the eleventh time you talk like if we add a problem or interest, here, in the notion of personal identity, which by the way will soon be shown illusory. We mention expectation, because that is part on what we have to clarify in this context. The expectation as such will appear not important, but the fact that the expectation is invariant for a sequence of changes will be crucial to get the why and how of the reversal. If things don't turn out as you expected does that make you feel
Re: A mathematical description of the level IV Multiverse
On 19 Jun 2015, at 23:20, meekerdb wrote: On 6/19/2015 8:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Jun 2015, at 01:41, meekerdb wrote: On 6/15/2015 8:15 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote: Therefore, perhaps proof of truth is an unattainable goal in math. Perhaps proof of truth is an unattainable goal anywhere. Math isn't concerned with true, it's only concerned with what theorems follow from given axioms. I disagree a lot with this. I'm afarid you confuse the tools, like a theory, formal or informal, with the subject matter. I'm afraid you do the same. You assume that the tools constitute a subject matter. But that is what it becomes when you say yes to the doctor, or when you apply the Schroedinger equation to the physicists looking at a particle. We must not confuse, but we must not dismiss that some hypothesis allows and necessitates some confusion, or identity/invariant thesis. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia
On 6/21/2015 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Z is what the machine can say about the []p t points of view (like the bet that you will have coffee in the modified step 3 protocol).[]coffee means you get coffee in all consistent extensions (which in this protocol are W and M), and t is the explicit conditioning that there is at least one consistent extension, which does not follow from []p due to incompleteness. You can see that []p t is a weakening of the []p p move. Incompleteness forces the machine to provides different logics for those nuances. I don't understand this use of consistent. At first I thought it meant logical consistency, i.e. not proving false. But in the above you use it as though it meant something like nomologically consistent. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Jun 21, 2015 12:35 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: I had a slightly different answer, but didn't post yesterday, because I wanted to see what answers other people had. My answer is to follow this protocol: if the door is closed, duplicate yourself. If the door is open, walk through it. Eventually, you will be the duplicate that walks through the door. Cheers Sounds like there will be a line to use the duplicator ;-) Terren On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 12:05:07PM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: You find yourself in a sealed room. There is only one exit, a door. The next person to open the door will be killed, at which point the door will be disarmed. Fortunately for you, there is a duplication machine in the room that makes an exact replica of whatever is placed inside. How do you get out of the room? I just open the door of course; and your description was quite incorrect. No person will be killed when that door is opened because the person of John Clark is an adjective not a noun, John Clark is the way matter behaves when it is organized in a Johnclarkian way, and there is still a chunk of matter organized in a Johnclarkian way in that duplicate room. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia
On 19 Jun 2015, at 18:36, Terren Suydam wrote: On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 3:23 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Jun 2015, at 15:32, Terren Suydam wrote: On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: We can, as nobody could pretend to have the right intepretation of Plotinus. In fact that very question has been addressed to Plotinus's interpretation of Plato. Now, it would be necessary to quote large passage of Plotinus to explain why indeed, even without comp, the two matters (the intelligible et the sensible one) are arguably sort of hypostases, even in the mind of Plotionus, but as a platonist, he is forced to consider them degenerate and belonging to the realm where God loses control, making matter a quasi synonym of evil (!). The primary hypostase are the three one on the top right of this diagram (T, for truth, G* and S4Grz) T G G* S4Grz Z Z* X X* Making Z, Z*, X, X* into hypostases homogenizes nicely Plotinus presentation, and put a lot of pieces of the platonist puzzle into place. It makes other passage of Plotinus completely natural. Note that for getting the material aspect of the (degenerate, secondary) hypostases, we still need to make comp explicit, by restricting the arithmetical intepretation of the modal logics on the sigma- (UD-accessible) propositions (leading to the logic (below G1 and G1*) S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, where the quantum quantization appears. The plain language rational is that both in Plotinus, (according to some passagethis is accepted by many scholars too) and in the universal machine mind, UDA show that psychology, theology, even biology, are obtained by intensional (modal) variant of the intellect and the ONE. By incompleteness, provability is of the type belief. We lost knowledge here, we don't have []p - p in G. This makes knowledge emulable, and meta-definable, in the language of the machine, by the Theaetetus method: [1]p = []p p. UDA justifies for matter: []p t (cf the coffee modification of the step 3: a physical certainty remains true in all consistent continuations ([]p), and such continuation exist (t). It is the Timaeus bastard calculus, referred to by Plotinus in his two- matters chapter (ennead II-6). Sensible matter is just a reapplication of the theaetetus, on intelligible matter. I hope this helps, ask anything. Bruno I'm not conversant in modal logic, so a lot of that went over my head. Maybe the problem is here. Modal logic, or even just modal notation are supposed to make things more easy. For example, I am used to explain the difference between agnosticism and beliefs, by using the modality []p, that you can in this context read as I believe p. If ~ represents the negation, the old definition of atheism was []~g (the belief that God does not exist), and agnosticism is ~[]g (and perhaps ~[]~g too). The language of modal logic, is the usual language of logic (p q, p v q, p - q, ~p, etc.) + the symbol [], usually read as it is necessary (in the alethic context), or it is obligatory (in the deontic context), or forever (in some temporal context), or It is known that (in some epistemic context), or it is asserted by a machine (in the computer science context), etc... p abbreviates ~[] ~(possible p = Non necessary that non p). All good here. Thus my request for plain language justifications. In spite of that language barrier I'd like to understand what I can about this model because it is the basis for your formal argument AUDA and much of what you've created seems to depend on it. In AUDA, the theory is elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic). I define in that theory the statement PA asserts F, with F an arithmetical formula. Then RA is used only as the universal system emulating the conversation that I have with PA. Everything is derived from the axioms of elementary arithmetic (but I could have used the combinators, the game of life, etc.). So I don't create anything. I interview a machine which proves proposition about itself, and by construction, I limit myself to consistent, arithmetically sound (lost of the time) machine. This determined all the hypostases. It is many years years of work and the hard work has been done by Gödel, Löb, Grzegorczyck, Boolos, Goldblatt, Solovay. I think it's debatable that you didn't create anything. I think reasonable people could disagree on whether the 8 hypostases you've put forward as the basis for your AUDA argument are created vs discovered. Not only they are discovered, but I show that *all* self-referentially correct machine discover them when looking inward. I'm coming from an open-minded position here - but trying to
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: How on earth could exchanging the position of two identical things make a difference either objectively or subjectively, how could you even know that such a exchange had even been made? In fact I can't think of a better definition of two identical things: Two things are identical if and only if exchanging their position makes no difference to anybody or anything. Because they're not identical. If they are not identical then the logical course of action for them to do would be the same as what you'd expect people to do in everyday life and absolutely no insight is gained by the thought experiment, it's just a pointless waste of time. What is irrelevant for the purposes of this experiment is that the two copies are identical. Then things are d-u-l-l. I know you've seen The Prestige. Spoiler alert for everyone else... Anyway, it's like the scene where Hugh Jackman's character duplicates himself for the first time, and he shoots his duplicate as soon as he realizes what's happened. In that scene the two diverge very very quickly because one is pointing a gun at the other and one expects to die in a few seconds and one does not. That's about as big a difference in environmental conditions as you can get. Exactly, and that's where things are headed inside the room, as soon as one of the JohnClarkian bodies opens the door. No, not if when that door is opened one of the collection of atoms arranged in a johnclarkian way is disrupted instantaneously, or at least too fast to form a last thought. In that scene from The Prestige one of them DID have a last thought and the other did not, and that last thought was I am about to die. I don't like any last thought but especially that one. If they don't remain identical identical then they are no longer copies, they're just two people in a room, and the thought experiment no longer has a point. Not at all. They both share the same memories (up until shortly after the duplication) and would both feel like they are John Clark and continue to identify as John Clark. If they were no longer identical then they would both have an equal right to call themselves John Clark BUT they would no longer be each other, and so in matters of life and death they would both act in their individual self interest just as any 2 people you picked off the street at random would do. Thanks for the precision. Two collections of atoms arranged in a Johnclarkian way. Of course, as you said yourself, we can admit minor differences in those arrangements and still consider them Johnclarkian e.g. If an electron in a calcium atom in the fingernail of one is in a higher energy band than the other I'm not going to worry about it. Obviously once there are differences like that we have diverged on the quantum level. But in questions of personal identity I'm not interested in the quantum level I'm only interested in the macroscopic level, the level capable of forming thoughts. Yes quantum events in a biological brain may (or may not, nobody is sure) grow and eventually become macroscopic, but that cumulative change will take time, and until that happens quantum stuff is irrelevant. The important thing with this experiment - which informs the way it was constructed - is not that the copies don't diverge on the quantum level, but that the copies both identify as the same person. After they diverge they will still both identify with the same person, John Clark, HOWEVER they no longer will identify with each other, and both would consider their life to be more important than that other fellow who happened to have the same name. Before they diverged things would be very different, there would be no other fellow, there would only be one. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 19 Jun 2015, at 23:32, meekerdb wrote: On 6/19/2015 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jun 2015, at 02:36, meekerdb wrote: On 6/18/2015 4:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/18/2015 1:10 PM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 1:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net This is gitting muddled. '2+2=4' is a tautology if the symbols are given their meaning by Peano's axioms or similar axiom set and rules of inference. If the symbols are interpreted as the size of specific physical sets, e.g. my example of fathers and sons, it's not a tautology. In an equation, ant equation, isn't a tautology then it isn't true. An equation is just a sentence. A tautology is a declarative sentence that's true in all possible worlds. 2+11=1 in worlds where addition is defined mod 12. That's why an equation alone can't be judged to be a tautology without the context of its interpretation. But your counterexamples are simply changing the meaning of the terms in the equation. I agree that a tautology is true in all possible worlds, because its truth depends only on the meaning of the terms involved. If the meaning is invariant, the truth value does not change. But this is not invariant under changes in meaning. 2+2=4 is a theorem in simple arithmetic, and a tautology because of the way we define the terms. In a successor definition of the integers: 1=s(0), 2=s(s(0)), 3=s(s(s(0))), 4=s(s(s(s(0, 2+2=4 can be proved as a theorem. But that relies on the above definitions of 2, 4 etc. In modular arithmetic, and with non- additive sets, these definitions do not apply. Note, however, that this interpretation of 'tautology' differs from the logical interpretation that Bruno refers to. Bruce I don't think it's different if you include the context. Then it becomes Given Peano's axioms 2+2=4. Isn't that the kind of logical tautology Bruno talks about? Within that meaning of terms it's a logical truism. I don't think it's necessary to restrict logic to just manipulating and, or, and not. Bruno introduces modalities and manipulates them as though they are true in all possible worlds. But is it logic that a world is not accessible from itself? As you say, it depends of the context. Yet, the arithmetical reality kicks backs and imposed a well defined modal logic when the modality is machine's believability(or assertability), for simple reasoning machine capable of reasoning on themselves, as is the case for PA and all its consistent effective extensions. But why should we think of modal logic and the measure of true? I still haven't heard why a world should not be accessible from itself. Logic is intended to formalize and thus avoid errors in inference, but it can't replace all reasoning. Don't confuse Logic, the science, with some of its application. Then in our case, computationalism ovites us to study machines and computations, which are not logical notions, but needs non logical assumption (like x + 0 = 0, or like Kxy = x). Then we study what those machine can really believe ratioanlly and non ratioannaly about themselves, and modal logic appears there by themselves, because provable/believable, knowable, observable simply *are* modalities. Arithmetical truth is a well defined notion in (second order) mathematics. It does not ask more than what is asked in analysis. But all first order or second order *theories*, effective enough that we can check the proofs, can only scratch that arithmetical reality, which is yet intuitively well defined. It is not Given Peano axioms 2+2=4. It is because we believe since Pythagorus, and probably before, that 2+2=4, that later we came up with axiomatic theories capturing a drop in the ocean of truth. I didn't say that's why we believe 2+2=4; I said that's what makes it a tautology, i.e. when you include a context within which is provable. What about Riemann hypothesis, or even the (apparently solved) fermat theorem? Today, we might still believe that both are provable in PA. Would this made them into tautology? Would you say that it is a tautology that even numbers have 24 times (the number of its odd divisors) clothes and odd numbers have 8 times (the set of all its divisors) clothes (with the cloth of a natural number being a representation of the sum of four squared integers)? Well, as they involved non logical axioms, the expert in the field call them theorems. If the theory is reasonable enough, theorem-hood entails truth in all interpretations of the theory, which means that the statement is true independently of its many possible meanings/interpretations/ models. But we use the term valid for that weaker sense of truth. Once a theory get the sigma_1 complete complexity threshold, it becomes *essentially* undecidable. Not only it cannot prove all the truth (notably about itself),
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 21 Jun 2015, at 05:27, Terren Suydam wrote: The key is that both JC1 and JC2 would feel like they are John Clark. They would both remember walking into the duplicator and then emerging from it, one way or the other, and despite having different thoughts and experiments from one another, both would reject the claim that they are not John Clark. Or Johnclarkian, if you prefer. Yes, that is the key, what the person feels after the experience. In those duplication experience the person only feel like being unique, and getting some doppelganger. If iterated 64 times, you feel unique, + getting 2^64 - 1 doppelgangers. They all remember Helsinki, but they all have a private and unique history/memory. The majority of them looks random, and even more so when the iteration is extended. It is hard to understand what is that John Clark fails to understand, if that is the case. His tone and insults makes me suspect that it is not for a rational reason. Only people without arguments feels the need to insult when arguing, like only fake religion use violence to communicate the message. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Sun, Jun 21, 2015 at 12:21 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: How on earth could exchanging the position of two identical things make a difference either objectively or subjectively, how could you even know that such a exchange had even been made? In fact I can't think of a better definition of two identical things: Two things are identical if and only if exchanging their position makes no difference to anybody or anything. Because they're not identical. If they are not identical then the logical course of action for them to do would be the same as what you'd expect people to do in everyday life and absolutely no insight is gained by the thought experiment, it's just a pointless waste of time. So say you. What is irrelevant for the purposes of this experiment is that the two copies are identical. Then things are d-u-l-l. I find the case where the copies don't diverge to be dull, since it's hard for me to imagine a scenario where that actually happens, and maybe I'm missing something, but it seems to me there's nothing to really talk about there. Why is that case so interesting to you? I know you've seen The Prestige. Spoiler alert for everyone else... Anyway, it's like the scene where Hugh Jackman's character duplicates himself for the first time, and he shoots his duplicate as soon as he realizes what's happened. In that scene the two diverge very very quickly because one is pointing a gun at the other and one expects to die in a few seconds and one does not. That's about as big a difference in environmental conditions as you can get. Exactly, and that's where things are headed inside the room, as soon as one of the JohnClarkian bodies opens the door. No, not if when that door is opened one of the collection of atoms arranged in a johnclarkian way is disrupted instantaneously, or at least too fast to form a last thought. In that scene from The Prestige one of them DID have a last thought and the other did not, and that last thought was I am about to die. I don't like any last thought but especially that one. What do you mean by disrupted instantaneously? Why would that prevent that johnclarkian collection of atoms from dying (in the physical rather than personal sense)? If they don't remain identical identical then they are no longer copies, they're just two people in a room, and the thought experiment no longer has a point. Not at all. They both share the same memories (up until shortly after the duplication) and would both feel like they are John Clark and continue to identify as John Clark. If they were no longer identical then they would both have an equal right to call themselves John Clark BUT they would no longer be each other, and so in matters of life and death they would both act in their individual self interest just as any 2 people you picked off the street at random would do. Yes. So clearly, the two johnclarkian collections of atoms that are no longer identical, would have their own thoughts and feelings and act in their own self-interest, despite that they would both have equal right to call themselves John Clark. They would both have their own unique first-person perspective, their own subjective experience. Thanks for the precision. Two collections of atoms arranged in a Johnclarkian way. Of course, as you said yourself, we can admit minor differences in those arrangements and still consider them Johnclarkian e.g. If an electron in a calcium atom in the fingernail of one is in a higher energy band than the other I'm not going to worry about it. Obviously once there are differences like that we have diverged on the quantum level. But in questions of personal identity I'm not interested in the quantum level I'm only interested in the macroscopic level, the level capable of forming thoughts. Yes quantum events in a biological brain may (or may not, nobody is sure) grow and eventually become macroscopic, but that cumulative change will take time, and until that happens quantum stuff is irrelevant. We are in complete agreement here. I only brought up the quantum because I thought you were attributing significance to some small amount of time when the two johnclarkian collections of atoms would diverge on the quantum level. The important thing with this experiment - which informs the way it was constructed - is not that the copies don't diverge on the quantum level, but that the copies both identify as the same person. After they diverge they will still both identify with the same person, John Clark, HOWEVER they no longer will identify with each other, and both would consider their life to be more important than that other fellow who happened to have the same name. Before they diverged things would be very different, there would be no other fellow, there would only be one. Exactly, and we finally
Dreams of Computers
http://googleresearch.blogspot.com/2015/06/inceptionism-going-deeper-into-neural.html Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On Sun, Jun 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If Bruno Marchal abandoned personal pronouns then Bruno Marchal would be FORCED to keep those 1-3 person view distinction straight all along the thought experience, That does not follow. So even then Bruno Marchal would not be able to keep those 1-3 person view distinctions straight? and that is precisely why Bruno Marchal refuses to do it, Where? never make a comment like that, always quote. Huh? It would be rather difficult to provide a quote of what Bruno Marchal DIDN'T say. If Bruno Marchal has ever made a post on this subject that didn't contain wall to wall personal pronouns John Clark has not see it and would appreciate somebody re-posting it. Bruno Marchal just said all of them are you therefore it doesn't take a professional logician to figure out that you will see Moscow AND Washington. Brilliantly correct, for the 3p description of the experience attributed to 3p bodies. But as Kim pointed out, it does not take long to a child to understand that this was not what the question was about. If that is not the question you wanted answered then rephrase the question so it makes logical sense and ask it; Just read the posts, or the paper, as this has already been done many times. And yet Bruno Marchal is unwilling, or much more likely unable, to ask it just one time time. John Clark thinks it's because Bruno Marchal knows that personal pronouns would have to be used to cover up all the sloppy thinking. Everyone, but you, undresrand that assuming comp I don't assume comp. The question is about the first person experience The? There is no such thing are THE first person experience! Of course there is. Bullshit. There is A first person experience but there is no such thing as THE first person experience if the person has been duplicated. You push on a button, and you open a door, and you see a city. Who opens the door? Who sees a city? Bruno Marchal just can't do without that personal pronoun addiction, it's the best place to stash sloppy thinking. If things don't turn out as you expected does that make you feel like you've lost your identity? You evade the elementary question That's because you refuse to state what that mysterious question is. You did say it was in one of the thousands of posts you've sent to the list over the years but I haven't found it yet. If I check 5 old posts a day I might be able to find it sometime before 2020. children and layman understand more easily the indeterminacy I keep telling you, if you can't clearly and logically formulate that then question get that child to help you. so Bruno Marchal is conceding that according to that definition of the pronoun you will see Moscow AND Washington. You are a bit ambiguous on the views again. I'm ambiguous?!! All I want is a non-ambiguous definition of you such that it would be logical to tell the Helsinki Man you will only see one city. Are you going to tell me you already did this in one of your old posts that I somehow missed? by comp the *experience*remains singular. I don't care about comp or any of your baby talk. the question is about the future 1p experience Then the question is gibberish because there is no such thing as THE future 1p experience. That is refuted by *all* those doing the experiences. If *all* were having a 1p experience then there is no such thing as THE 1p experience. . The question was asked of the man in Helsinki about what he will felt in the future. ^^ That question has the personal pronoun he in it so the answer depends on what he means: 1) If he means Bruno Marchal then he will experience Moscow AND Washington. 2) If he means the man currently experiencing Helsinki then he will experience nothing because nobody will be experiencing Helsinki in the future.. 3) If he means the man who remembers being the Helsinki man and now is experiencing Moscow then then he will see Moscow. 4) If he means the man who remembers being the Helsinki man and now is experiencing Washington then then he will see Washington.. So Bruno, which one of these does he mean? There is no such thing as THE 1-you. It is THE 1-you of each reconstituted person? The Helsinki Man is reconstituted TWICE, so there is no such thing as THE future 1-view of the Helsinki Man. You confess all the time that you don't even know what comp is Nobody knows what comp is, least of all Bruno Marchal. or step 3 is, Oh I know what step 3 is, step 3 is crap. and that you have not read anything after step 3 If step 3 of a proof is crap only a fool would read step 4. I am not a fool. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post
Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal
On 6/21/2015 8:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jun 2015, at 23:32, meekerdb wrote: On 6/19/2015 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jun 2015, at 02:36, meekerdb wrote: On 6/18/2015 4:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/18/2015 1:10 PM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 1:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net This is gitting muddled. '2+2=4' is a tautology if the symbols are given their meaning by Peano's axioms or similar axiom set and rules of inference. If the symbols are interpreted as the size of specific physical sets, e.g. my example of fathers and sons, it's not a tautology. In an equation, ant equation, isn't a tautology then it isn't true. An equation is just a sentence. A tautology is a declarative sentence that's true in all possible worlds. 2+11=1 in worlds where addition is defined mod 12. That's why an equation alone can't be judged to be a tautology without the context of its interpretation. But your counterexamples are simply changing the meaning of the terms in the equation. I agree that a tautology is true in all possible worlds, because its truth depends only on the meaning of the terms involved. If the meaning is invariant, the truth value does not change. But this is not invariant under changes in meaning. 2+2=4 is a theorem in simple arithmetic, and a tautology because of the way we define the terms. In a successor definition of the integers: 1=s(0), 2=s(s(0)), 3=s(s(s(0))), 4=s(s(s(s(0, 2+2=4 can be proved as a theorem. But that relies on the above definitions of 2, 4 etc. In modular arithmetic, and with non-additive sets, these definitions do not apply. Note, however, that this interpretation of 'tautology' differs from the logical interpretation that Bruno refers to. Bruce I don't think it's different if you include the context. Then it becomes Given Peano's axioms 2+2=4. Isn't that the kind of logical tautology Bruno talks about? Within that meaning of terms it's a logical truism. I don't think it's necessary to restrict logic to just manipulating and, or, and not. Bruno introduces modalities and manipulates them as though they are true in all possible worlds. But is it logic that a world is not accessible from itself? As you say, it depends of the context. Yet, the arithmetical reality kicks backs and imposed a well defined modal logic when the modality is machine's believability(or assertability), for simple reasoning machine capable of reasoning on themselves, as is the case for PA and all its consistent effective extensions. But why should we think of modal logic and the measure of true? I still haven't heard why a world should not be accessible from itself. Logic is intended to formalize and thus avoid errors in inference, but it can't replace all reasoning. Don't confuse Logic, the science, with some of its application. Then in our case, computationalism ovites us to study machines and computations, which are not logical notions, but needs non logical assumption (like x + 0 = 0, or like Kxy = x). Then we study what those machine can really believe ratioanlly and non ratioannaly about themselves, and modal logic appears there by themselves, because provable/believable, knowable, observable simply *are* modalities. Sure. And implies is a inference, but that doesn't mean material implication is the right formalization of it. You've assumed that Kripke's formalization IS the modality. You still haven't explained why the formalization denies that a world is accessible from itself. Arithmetical truth is a well defined notion in (second order) mathematics. It does not ask more than what is asked in analysis. But all first order or second order *theories*, effective enough that we can check the proofs, can only scratch that arithmetical reality, which is yet intuitively well defined. It is not Given Peano axioms 2+2=4. It is because we believe since Pythagorus, and probably before, that 2+2=4, that later we came up with axiomatic theories capturing a drop in the ocean of truth. I didn't say that's why we believe 2+2=4; I said that's what makes it a tautology, i.e. when you include a context within which is provable. What about Riemann hypothesis, or even the (apparently solved) fermat theorem? Today, we might still believe that both are provable in PA. Would this made them into tautology? Would you say that it is a tautology that even numbers have 24 times (the number of its odd divisors) clothes and odd numbers have 8 times (the set of all its divisors) clothes (with the cloth of a natural number being a representation of the sum of four squared integers)? Well, as they involved non logical axioms, the expert in the field call them theorems. Every sentence of the form axioms imply theorem using rules of inference is a tautology. If the theory is reasonable enough, theorem-hood entails truth in all
