On Sun, Jun 21, 2015 at 12:21 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> How on earth could exchanging the position of two identical things make >>> a difference either objectively or subjectively, how could you even know >>> that such a exchange had even been made? In fact I can't think of a better >>> definition of "two identical things": Two things are identical if and only >>> if exchanging their position makes no difference to anybody or anything. >>> >> >> > Because they're not identical. >> > > If they are not identical then the logical course of action for them to do > would be the same as what you'd expect people to do in everyday life and > absolutely no insight is gained by the thought experiment, it's just a > pointless waste of time. > So say you. > > > What is irrelevant for the purposes of this experiment is that the two >> copies are identical. >> > > Then things are d-u-l-l. > > I find the case where the copies don't diverge to be dull, since it's hard for me to imagine a scenario where that actually happens, and maybe I'm missing something, but it seems to me there's nothing to really talk about there. Why is that case so interesting to you? > >>> I know you've seen The Prestige. Spoiler alert for everyone else... >>>> Anyway, it's like the scene where Hugh Jackman's character duplicates >>>> himself for the first time, and he shoots his duplicate as soon as he >>>> realizes what's happened. >>>> >>> >>> >> In that scene the two diverge very very quickly because one is >>> pointing a gun at the other and one expects to die in a few seconds and one >>> does not. That's about as big a difference in environmental conditions as >>> you can get. >>> >> >> > Exactly, and that's where things are headed inside the room, as soon as >> one of the JohnClarkian bodies opens the door. >> > > No, not if when that door is opened one of the collection of atoms > arranged in a johnclarkian way is disrupted instantaneously, or at least > too fast to form a last thought. In that scene from The Prestige one of > them DID have a last thought and the other did not, and that last thought > was "I am about to die". I don't like any last thought but especially that > one. > What do you mean by "disrupted instantaneously"? Why would that prevent that johnclarkian collection of atoms from dying (in the physical rather than personal sense)? > > >> If they don't remain identical identical then they are no longer >>> copies, they're just two people in a room, and the thought experiment no >>> longer has a point. >>> >> >> > Not at all. They both share the same memories (up until shortly after >> the duplication) and would both feel like they are John Clark and continue >> to identify as John Clark. >> > > If they were no longer identical then they would both have an equal right > to call themselves "John Clark" BUT they would no longer be each other, and > so in matters of life and death they would both act in their individual > self interest just as any 2 people you picked off the street at random > would do. > > Yes. So clearly, the two johnclarkian collections of atoms that are no longer identical, would have their own thoughts and feelings and act in their own self-interest, despite that they would both have equal right to call themselves "John Clark". They would both have their own unique first-person perspective, their own subjective experience. > Thanks for the precision. Two collections of atoms arranged in a >> Johnclarkian way. Of course, as you said yourself, we can admit minor >> differences in those arrangements and still consider them Johnclarkian e.g. >> "If an electron in a calcium atom in the fingernail of one is in a higher >> energy band than the other I'm not going to worry about it." Obviously >> once there are differences like that we have diverged on the quantum level. >> > > But in questions of personal identity I'm not interested in the quantum > level I'm only interested in the macroscopic level, the level capable of > forming thoughts. Yes quantum events in a biological brain may (or may not, > nobody is sure) grow and eventually become macroscopic, but that cumulative > change will take time, and until that happens quantum stuff is irrelevant. > We are in complete agreement here. I only brought up the quantum because I thought you were attributing significance to some small amount of time when the two johnclarkian collections of atoms would diverge on the quantum level. > > >> > The important thing with this experiment - which informs the way it was >> constructed - is not that the copies don't diverge on the quantum level, >> but that the copies both identify as the same person. >> > > After they diverge they will still both identify with the same person, > John Clark, HOWEVER they no longer will identify with each other, and both > would consider their life to be more important than that other fellow who > happened to have the same name. Before they diverged things would be very > different, there would be no other fellow, there would only be one. > > Exactly, and we finally get to the point. Since each johnclarkian collection of atoms, after they diverge, would have their own unique first-person point of view, it's trivial to see how this state of affairs is just like Bruno's duplication scenario - after all, in Bruno's experiment both copies diverge immediately as well. So next time Bruno brings up '1p', instead of ridiculing the terminology, just remember back to this thought experiment and substitute the "1p view of Washington man" and "1p view of Moscow man" for the two first-person views held by the johnclarkian collections of atoms, so you can make sense of what he is saying. Terren > John K Clark > > > >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
