Re: Aaronson/Penrose
On 5/06/2016 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: Sure, Bell's theorem only rules out local hidden variables. If you simulate non-local hidden variables (i.e., get the separated experimenters to communicate non-locally), then of course you can reproduce the quantum correlations. But I was under the impression that the computationalist goal was to eliminate non-locality. Separated experimenters, with as much computing power as necessary, cannot simulate the quantum correlations by performing only local computations. You can simulate the whole (multiversial) structure, and the observers will find that from their perspective, Bell's inequality are violated. From outside, we can see (like Everett saw) that it is just a case of self-duplication FPI. (Which brings us back to the preceding thread of course). I think you are trying to move the goal posts here The original argument about non-locality in MWI was the contention by people like Price, Tipler, Brown, and Christian that Bell made certain assumptions that were not true in the Everetttian approach. Their conclusion was that his theorem was not applicable to the MWI, rendering the argument that local hidden variables were ruled out inapplicable in that case. (Though Joy Christian tries to go further and argues that Bell made a trivial mistake that rendered his 'theorem' invalid in all interpretations.) I have rebutted the various claims of these papers in other posts: Bell does not depend on such ill-defined things as counterfactual definiteness, and certainly does not assume that experiments have only single outcomes. My conclusion is that Bell's theorem is valid universally -- merely changing the interpretation does not alter that, and thus non-locality has been shown to be intrinsic to quantum mechanics. You are now attempting to change the argument: you appear now to accept that individual experimenters will see the quantum world as non-local, but that this is merely an observer-dependent effect, arising from self-location in the multiverse: another instance of FPI. I think that you have to do a bit more work on this changed approach to non-locality: I think you will find that the argument does not work like the FPI account of apparent indeterminism in a deterministic universe. Bell's theorem applies to every set of correlations obtained by experimenters in every branch of the universal wave function -- there is no 'external' perspective from which Bell' s theorem does not apply. If there were, there would have to be a local account available from the 'bird' perspective, and there is no such account. If you claim that there is, then the onus is on you to produce that account. The singlet state |psi> = (|+>|-> - |->|+>)/sqrt(2) is the wave function from the 'bird' perspective, and particles 1 and 2 are separated in the 'bird' perspective as much as in any 'frog' perspective. Going outside the perspective of the individual experimenters does not actually gain you anything in this instance. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On Fri, Jun 3, 2016 at 2:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Peano Arithmetic (RA + the induction axioms) proves that all computations > exist. Proving an answer exists is not the same as proving you have the answer, or even proving that in theory an answer can be found. If it were otherwise Giuseppe Peano would have been Silicon Valley's first billionaire. > > You have to endow the universal Turing machine or number with magical > abilities for them to avoid arithmetical zombiness. > Yes, if that were not so , and assuming Darwin was right (he was) , then no conscious being would exist in the universe , and yet I know for a fact that at least one does. You're probably conscious too and for the same reason. I have a explanation of how and why Evolution produced intelligent behavior but I have no explanation why intelligent behavior produces consciousness except to say consciousness is the way data feels like when it is being processed , and if it's a brute fact that's all that can be said and all that needs to be said about it. > > When you say "All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever > existed were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of > physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also involved > matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no exceptions. None. ", > that is exactly what we mean by "Aristotelian Matter". > Who is "we"? I want nothing to do with Aristotle, he was a nitwit. >> >> Do you really >> >> doubt that >> >> electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics >> >> ?! > > > > My opinion is private and of no interest. Jez, I'm not asking about your sex life I'm asking a legitimate question about the physics of electrons. Are you ashamed at what your answer would be? >> >> >> you >> can't >> observe >> , >> even in theory, >> computations >> that exist in >> arithmetic >> but not in physics; and that is just another way of saying that such >> computations don't exist. >> > > > > Then prime numbers do not exist, > The very first program my brain, which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, ever wrote instructed a computer, which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, to print a list of prime numbers on a paper, which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. > > You might not understand well what is a theory, or what are theoretical > assumptions. > Then show me a computation that doesn't use matter that obeys the laws of physics and I'll understand it better. And I'll contact INTEL about it too. > > Computationalism explains the appearance of blackboards, and of textbooks, > without assuming the existence of blackboard and textbooks > How would things be different if blackboard s and textbooks DID exist? What does "exist" even mean in your context? > > The physical has a mathematical reason. > If so I have great trouble understanding why changing the physical brain of a mathematician changes not only his mathematical reasoning but also his consciousness. I think there is more evidence the mathematical has a physical reason. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is evolution the only complexity generating process
On Sat, Jun 04, 2016 at 07:53:47PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 04 Jun 2016, at 03:17, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > >>Only a measure on the existing computations. > >>Of course, all this list is based on the idea that the overall > >>theory should be simple (like RA), but even without notion of > >>observers, such simple theory admit a rich third person theory of > >>complexity. > > > >I still don't see it. > > You can prove the existence of the observer in the theory RA. It is > the proof of the existence of the universal machine and of their > computations. RA is already sigma_1 complete. If ZF proves the > Riemann hypothesis, then RA will prove that ZF proves Riemann > hypothesis (despite RA itself cannot even prove that 0 + x = x). > > We don't need to assume more than RA or the SK axioms. 3p Observers > are defined in such theories. They are richer and more complex than > RA. > This is close to the crux of out disagreement. Yes of course by assumption observers can be defined in RA by finding the right machine. However, what the observers observe is not defined in RA, but rather emerges out of RA. I see that RA itself is a fairly simple thing, and the UD even simpler for that matter, but emerging out of it are 1p experiences that are complex, and complexify over time via an evolutionary process. The complexity is not innate to the platonic realm as you state. It emerges out of it by considering 1p experience. My fairly strong claim is that this is the only way complexity can arise. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Aaronson/Penrose
On 5/06/2016 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/06/2016 4:16 am, Brent Meeker wrote: If the world is a simulation, i.e. is being computed by a Turing machine, then the computation can implement non-local hidden variables and violate Bell's inequality in the simulated world (in fact all its variables would be non-local since locality and spacetime would just be computed phenomena). Sure, Bell's theorem only rules out local hidden variables. If you simulate non-local hidden variables (i.e., get the separated experimenters to communicate non-locally), then of course you can reproduce the quantum correlations. But I was under the impression that the computationalist goal was to eliminate non-locality. Separated experimenters, with as much computing power as necessary, cannot simulate the quantum correlations by performing only local computations. You can simulate the whole (multiversial) structure, and the observers will find that from their perspective, Bell's inequality are violated. From outside, we can see (like Everett saw) that it is just a case of self-duplication FPI. (Which brings us back to the preceding thread of course). Locally, Alice and Bob can simulate anything they like, and they can simulate universes with non-local hidden variables, and predict that within those worlds the Bell inequalities are violated. But when they get back to their own world and compare their results, they will find that the correlations between their separate simulations of the results of spin measurements at arbitrary angles invariably satisfy the inequalities. In other words, they cannot, jointly, simulate the quantum results in any world that they both inhabit. The MWI view from outside is no different -- non-locality is inescapable. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is evolution the only complexity generating process
On 04 Jun 2016, at 03:17, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 05:04:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 May 2016, at 02:33, Russell Standish wrote:
Hmm - the "output" of the UD (ie UD*) is a very low complexity
object. The complexity you refer to is actually UD* seen from the
inside by a computationlist observer. That complexity has indeed
arisen through an evolutionary process: mutation via the FPI,
?
FPI is a random process due to only being able to observe a single
branch within a branching process. Mutation is exactly the same,
particularly as seen from the inside of a multiverse. This argument is
made in my paper "Evolution in the Multiverse".
The FPI is more a personal event (or sequence of personal events) than
a process. The process to which we can attached the random experiences
is itself non random (just a 3p duplication).
But a mutation is a process. Now, if you assume it is a purely quantum
process, then you can use the classical FPI to explain the perception
of evolution (in the multiverse). OK.
The counting algorithm produces a simple object. Complexity is
generated by selecting some subset of that simple object, and it is
the selection which creates the complexity.
Like in quantum mechanics. But the complexity must be present before
we can observe it, and it is mathematically present, like all
branches of Everett Universal Wave.
Why? The opposite clearly appears to be the case. Mathematically, the
UD*, or the Multiverse, are simple objects. Hence their appeal under
Occam's razor.
Simple as a whole (like the everything idea), but it generates all the
complexities from inside. That generation is out-of-time, and the
complexity is there out of time too.
To restate above, you are confusing the complexity observed by a
putative internal observer (which by computationalism assumption
must
exist), and the complexity of the UD*. The former is generated by an
evolutionary process, and high, the latter is low (being equal to
the
KCS complexity of the UD).
I just use Blum complexity. It exists without the introduction of
I had a look at Blum complexity from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blum_axioms
--
A Blum complexity measure is a tuple ( φ , Φ ) {\displaystyle
(\varphi ,\Phi )} with φ {\displaystyle \varphi } a Gödel numbering
of the partial computable functions P ( 1 ) {\displaystyle \mathbf
{P} ^{(1)}} and a computable function
Φ : N → P ( 1 ) {\displaystyle \Phi :\mathbb {N} \to \mathbf
{P} ^{(1)}}
which satisfies the following Blum axioms. We write φ i
{\displaystyle \varphi _{i}} for the i-th partial computable
function under the Gödel numbering φ {\displaystyle \varphi } , and
Φ i {\displaystyle \Phi _{i}} for the partial computable function Φ
( i ) {\displaystyle \Phi (i)} .
the domains of φ i {\displaystyle \varphi _{i}} and Φ i
{\displaystyle \Phi _{i}} are identical.
the set { ( i , x , t ) ∈ N 3 | Φ i ( x ) = t } {\displaystyle \
{(i,x,t)\in \mathbb {N} ^{3}|\Phi _{i}(x)=t\}} is recursive.
--
Note the key things: Blum complexity is a tuple of functions, one of
which maps programs to integers, and the other maps integers to
programs. This is a far, far cry from the usual notion of complexity
(even structural complexity) which attaches a numerical value to an
object.
That said, I don't really understand how their examples (time and
space complexity, which are very different beasts from structural
complexity) fit the definitions given, so maybe there are some
problems with the Wikipedia article.
Blum complexity is really the second phi in the {phi_i, PHI_i} above.
The first one are just the phi_i. The article is unnecessarily complex
(no pun intended). A Blum measure is any computable predicate on the
phi_i and the inputs. The two more used are the time to do a
computation (the predicate which depends on i (phi_i), x and t. What
need to be able to be answered recursively (by yes or no) is something
like did the program i with input x stop at time t (or before time t,
not after!).
The relation between phi_i and PHI_i is comparable to the realtion
between Gödel's the non decidable beweisbar (Ey(y is a proof of x)),
and simply the decidable 2-ary predicate (y is a proof of x). ("y is a
proof ..." abbreviates "y is a number description of a proof ...}.
But Blum's theory works with any decidable predicate, like the number
of time this or that words is used, or the number of memory-
allocation, etc.
any observer. Also, in the UD, there is no mutation, and no
Darwinian selection.
I already addressed this. Once you admit the presence of a
computationlist observer (a "view from the inside"), you have both
mutation (via FPI)
I can understand, but that is misleading. A mutation is usually
thought as a change in a program. The UD just generates (and run) the
Re: Aaronson/Penrose
On 04 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/06/2016 4:16 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 6/3/2016 1:28 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/06/2016 4:39 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: Scott Aaronson's blog on his debate with Roger Penrose is probably of interest to the list: “Can computers become conscious?”: My reply to Roger Penrose June 2nd, 2016 A few weeks ago, I attended the Seven Pines Symposium on Fundamental Problems in Physics outside Minneapolis, where I had the honor of participating in a panel discussion with Sir Roger Penrose. The way it worked was, Penrose spoke for a half hour about his ideas about consciousness (Gödel, quantum gravity, microtubules, uncomputability, you know the drill), then I delivered a half-hour “response,” and then there was an hour of questions and discussion from the floor. Below, I’m sharing the prepared notes for my talk, as well as some very brief recollections about the discussion afterward. (Sorry, there’s no audio or video.) I unfortunately don’t have the text or transparencies for Penrose’s talk available to me, but—with one exception, which I touch on in my own talk—his talk very much followed the outlines of his famous books, The Emperor’s New Mind and Shadows of the Mind. Read the rest at http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ This is interesting, and I would like to spend more time on it, but one thing struck me as I was leafing through "The third place where I part ways with Roger is that I wish to maintain what’s sometimes called the Physical Church-Turing Thesis: the statement that our laws of physics can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate, by a probabilistic Turing machine). That is, I don’t see any compelling reason, at present, to admit the existence of any physical process that can solve uncomputable problems. And for me, it’s not just a matter of a dearth of evidence that our brains can efficiently solve, say, NP-hard problems, let alone uncomputable ones—or of the exotic physics that would presumably be required for such abilities. It’s that, even if I supposed we could solve uncomputable problems, I’ve never understood how that’s meant to enlighten us regarding consciousness." This relates to my current obsession with the universal applicability of Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH). Consider the statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws of physics can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate, by a probabilistic Turing machine)". This is not true for Bell-type experiments on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations produced from measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be reproduced by any computational process. A recent review (arXiv: 1303.2849, RMP 86 (2014) pp419-478) points out that violations of the Bell inequalities can be taken as clear confirmation the separated experimenters making the measurements had not communicated: if they had communicated during the experiment then the inequalities would be satisfied. The corollary is that there is no possible local computational algorithm (not involving recourse to the effects of quantum entanglement) that can produce correlations that violate the Bell inequalities. In other words, the laws of physics cannot be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine. (I don't think solving NP problems has anything much to do with it.) If the world is a simulation, i.e. is being computed by a Turing machine, then the computation can implement non-local hidden variables and violate Bell's inequality in the simulated world (in fact all its variables would be non-local since locality and spacetime would just be computed phenomena). Sure, Bell's theorem only rules out local hidden variables. If you simulate non-local hidden variables (i.e., get the separated experimenters to communicate non-locally), then of course you can reproduce the quantum correlations. But I was under the impression that the computationalist goal was to eliminate non-locality. Separated experimenters, with as much computing power as necessary, cannot simulate the quantum correlations by performing only local computations. You can simulate the whole (multiversial) structure, and the observers will find that from their perspective, Bell's inequality are violated. From outside, we can see (like Everett saw) that it is just a case of self-duplication FPI. (Which brings us back to the preceding thread of course). Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@google
Re: Has the mind-body problem been solved (was Re: Has the mystery of Black Holes been solved?
On 03 Jun 2016, at 21:48, Brent Meeker wrote: On 6/3/2016 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I'd say a rational person is one who can give coherent reasons for their beliefs. Which makes PA into a rational person, even more so than most of us. Humans still act like they believe that the only coherent reason to believe in something is that the boss say so (and everyone know that the boss is always right, especially when wrong!). That is a coherent reason and a person giving it is rational. Being rational doesn't mean being right or having all knowledge. "Because the boss said so." may be a weak reason if the the boss is expounding on international politics, but an excellent reason if theboss said, "You'll be fired if you're late to work again." OK, but to derive physics, we can limit ourselves to arithmetical statement. It is irrational to believe such a statement just because the boss or the teacher say so (in practice, it can be rational if the goal is to have a good note, or to impress a mate, but again that is not relevant). But even PA, if asked about why she believes in x + 0 = x, might say something like "obvious", or "Instinct", Those are not coherent reasons. I find it telling that you use the religious formulation "believes in" rather than just "believes". Hmm, I am afraid it is just me mishandling english. or "I have been told", or "I have many examples", or Those are weak reasons. All beliefs in physics are of that kind. We believe that F = GmM/r^2 only because we have many, but a finite number, examples. I cannot prove to you that x + 0 = x. Well, I could prove it from the K and S combinators axioms, but I will use implicitly my intuitive number knowledge to choose a definition of numbers such that we recover x + 0 = x from the combinators axioms. In fact all beliefs in *any* theory is never 100% rational. But when we work in a theory, or when we interview a machine, we start from things that we have few doubts upon. To be clear, I say that a belief by a machine M is rational when M can makes its hypothesis clear (so I can define in the machine's language "believed of p by M", say []p, and which is such that the machine believability is closed form modus ponens, that is we have [](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q), and, in our case, that the machine can prove (also) [](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q). In fact, to make the proof simple I use: M believes p entails M believes []p (normality) M believes []p entails M believes p (stability) M believes [](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q). Löbian machines believes also []p -> [][]p (and eventually, it is a theorem: []([]p -> p) -> []p. The reason is that by being a machine, we get the diagonal closure and the fixed point properties from which Gödel and Löb theorem follows (in the ideal case of sound machines). To believe does not, indeed, mean to be sure that it is true. You can use "assume" instead of beliefs. All laws are assumed, in the applied science. In science, we *never* say that some statement are true. We say that a statement is an axiom, or a theorem, or that is confirmed experimentally. We just cannot prove anything from a finite number of observations. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: R: Re: Aaronson/Penrose
On 03 Jun 2016, at 12:22, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: Bruce: This relates to my current obsession with the universal applicability of Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH). Consider the statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws of physics can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate, by a probabilistic Turing machine)". To be sure, this has nothing to do with Church thesis. Church thesis is just the thesis that Intuitively Computable = Turing Computable. It does not refer to physical-computable. Intuitively computable means that there is a an algorithm, human sharable, that we can use to compute a function in some finite (but arbitrarlly long) time on each input. This is not true for Bell-type experiments on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations produced from measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be reproduced by any computational process. [] For this I refer to my post of yesterday. Quantm computer do not violate Church thesis, but do violate the thesis that all universal machine can emulate each other in polynomial time. (time is used here in the computer science theoretical sense, it is not necessarily the physical time). Bruno ### Unless something strange is going on here. In example, I'm trying to understand something J.Christian wrote recently.. See Appendix D, page 8 and 9 in this paper https://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.03393v6.pdf BTW L. Accardi, (Accardi and Regoli, 2000, 2001; Accardi, Imafuku and Regoli, 2002) has claimed to have produced a suite of computer programmes, to be run on a network of computers, which will simulate a violation of Bell's inequalites. See also http://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.00106v3.pdf -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Wigner (1970) on hidden variables and Bell's theorem
Just an interesting paper by Wigner on hidden variables and Bell's theorem (of course the paper is well known but it is not so easy to find it). 'On Hidden Variables and Quantum Mechanical Probabilities' Wigner, Eugene P. American Journal of Physics, Volume 38, Issue 8, pp. 1005-1009 (1970) http://dropcanvas.com/#qBYMyi9b4hcDra -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
