Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Terren Suydam]

On Fri, Sep 8, 2017 at 3:00 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Sep 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
> No, you said:
>>
>> True, it's not gibberish. The question is clear, it's about what I expect
>>> not what will turn out to be true. I might expect to wake up in ​Santa
>>> Claus's workshop
>>
>>
> If I expected to be in Santa Claus's workshop
> ​ ​
> tomorrow and you asked me, not where I will be but where I **expected**
> ​to be ​
> then it would be a real question and "Santa Claus's workshop
> ​" would be the correct answer. I'd write more but ​at the moment
> Hurricane Irma is more on my mind than more of this silliness.
>

Hope you and yours came through the storm ok.

Since the question is about the future, there's no useful distinction
between a question about "where I will be" and "where I expect to be". Both
questions are about what you expect. Whether I ask you where you will be
when you wake up, or if you go through a teleporter, you've acknowledged
that the question is not gibberish, in scenarios where *you're not aware*
of being duplicated. That said, if you are secretly duplicated, questions
about where "you" will be may be gibberish (from your perspective), but
that doesn't change the fact that from the first-person point of view, the
question is not gibberish.

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Re: Is math real?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/11/2017 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the 
universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief 
"scientific belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's 
(sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to 
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a notion of knowledge.


This seems problematic to me.  I understand why you do it; because 
you want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable 
belief).  But this does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge 
(c.f. Getteir for example).


Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of 
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.




It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can assert 
it and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??


Ih he proves it (correctly or not). 


But that is inconsistent with your definition of "know" = "true 
belief".  You are really using "know" = "true and proven".   Which is 
closer to Gettier's "caused true belief".


Brent

Knowledge is Bp & p, which is impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). 
We just cannot know an undecidable (by us)  proposition, by 
definition, although we can bet on it, but then it is different kind 
of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream 
argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into 
disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.


Bruno




Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Is math real?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Sep 2017, at 17:20, David Nyman wrote:

On 11 September 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 11 Sep 2017, at 11:23, David Nyman wrote:


On 11 Sep 2017 9:22 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the  
universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief  
"scientific belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's  
(sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to  
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a notion of knowledge.


This seems problematic to me.  I understand why you do it; because  
you want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable  
belief).  But this does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge  
(c.f. Getteir for example).


Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of  
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.





It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can  
assert it and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??


Ih he proves it (correctly or not). Knowledge is Bp & p, which is  
impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We just cannot know an  
undecidable (by us)  proposition, by definition, although we can  
bet on it, but then it is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp  
& Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream  
argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into  
disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.


Yes, I think the difficulty Brent may be having with this is that  
the notion of belief in play here is to be understood as ramifying  
in some limit (delineated by the FPI) to that of physical structure  
and action.


That follows once we assume the mechanist hypothesis.



Consequently it constitutes, in the first place, an idiosyncratic  
commitment to truths that may or may not correspond, in part or in  
whole, to what is more generally 'believed'. Nonetheless,  
commitments of this sort cannot be disentangled from their own  
proper, and equally undoubtable, truth values, however misleading  
these may ultimately turn out to be in a wider context. They are,  
as you say, more in the nature of bets on a reality,


In this case it is a weaker bet on absence of change in  
consciousness for some self-transformation, but OK, that is the  
"reality" in the sense of "Dt", arguably.


​Yes, that's what I meant.​ We can't know what lies 'beyond' our  
perceptions, but we can take a risk on our conjectures, refined by a  
process of evolution.​​


With multidimensional "Darwinian like story (universal number  
chatting) above the substitution level, and infinitely many  
projections on all computations, below the substitution level. The  
logics (hypostases) operate *at* any correct level.




​which in general of course is consistent with the unavoidable  
rigour of an evolutionary logic. This is the crucial distinction  
between primary or perceptual undoubtability and secondary  
reliability that I've previously remarked on. And as is indeed the  
case with any serious bet, they represent an inescapable commitment  
that puts the bettor permanently at hazard.


OK.
It seems to me also that there are nested levels of such beliefs  
and their associated truths. Hence what is, at a certain level, an  
idiosyncratic commitment to what we would normally think of as  
something non veridical, as in a dream, may be nested within a more  
general or systemic commitment to a consistent and more generally  
shared physical reality (i.e. what will appear in phenomenal terms  
as a brain and its generalised environment).


Probably, but the initial nested "levels" we have should be given by  
the hypostases p, Bp, etc. and also the graded B^n p  & D^m t, with  
m bigger than n. With p sigma_1 they all provide a quantization, and  
thus the physical reality is layered in some sense. There are no  
"correct dream" within a dream, because physical correctness appears  
when "you" are distributed all (infinitely many) most probable  
relative history. This might be related to what you say here.


​I think it might be. The idea is that the probabilities converge  
on what we might then call a canonical (shared) reality.


Exactly.



​
It plays some role in the "after life", making it a bit closer to to  
the Tibetan Bardo Todol. A poet said that there are only two  
certainties: taxes and death, but that was still wishful thinking​ 
:​


​I know, and I can't honestly say this ​has ​give​n​ me  
much comfort​.​



Hmm...






there is only one certainty: taxes.

​Or this :(​



I might be wrong on this. The universal machine does not pay taxes  
(well, not yet!). There is (from experience reports) a state of  
consciousness which needs no energy, nor time, etc.


So I guess the Greek were right on this God (the One) 

Re: Is math real?

[David Nyman]

On 11 September 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 11 Sep 2017, at 11:23, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 11 Sep 2017 9:22 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the
>>> universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief "scientific
>>> belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1 arithmetical)
>>> beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to incompleteness which prevent
>>> provability to be a notion of knowledge.
>>>
>>
>> This seems problematic to me.  I understand why you do it; because you
>> want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable belief).  But this
>> does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example).
>>
>
> Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of knowledge.
> Gödel mention this already in 1933.
>
>
>
>
> It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can assert it
>> and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??
>>
>
> Ih he proves it (correctly or not). Knowledge is Bp & p, which is
> impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We just cannot know an undecidable
> (by us)  proposition, by definition, although we can bet on it, but then it
> is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
> That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream
> argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into
> disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.
>
>
> Yes, I think the difficulty Brent may be having with this is that the
> notion of belief in play here is to be understood as ramifying in some
> limit (delineated by the FPI) to that of physical structure and action.
>
>
> That follows once we assume the mechanist hypothesis.
>
>
>
> Consequently it constitutes, in the first place, an idiosyncratic
> commitment to truths that may or may not correspond, in part or in whole,
> to what is more generally 'believed'. Nonetheless, commitments of this sort
> cannot be disentangled from their own proper, and equally undoubtable,
> truth values, however misleading these may ultimately turn out to be in a
> wider context. They are, as you say, more in the nature of bets on a
> reality,
>
> In this case it is a weaker bet on absence of change in consciousness for
> some self-transformation, but OK, that is the "reality" in the sense of
> "Dt", arguably.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant.
​ We can't know what lies 'beyond' our perceptions, but we can take a risk
on our conjectures, refined by a process of evolution.​
​

> ​
> which in general of course is consistent with the unavoidable rigour of an
> evolutionary logic. This is the crucial distinction between primary or
> perceptual undoubtability and secondary reliability that I've previously
> remarked on. And as is indeed the case with any serious bet, they represent
> an inescapable commitment that puts the bettor permanently at hazard.
>
> OK.
>
> It seems to me also that there are nested levels of such beliefs and their
> associated truths. Hence what is, at a certain level, an idiosyncratic
> commitment to what we would normally think of as something non veridical,
> as in a dream, may be nested within a more general or systemic commitment
> to a consistent and more generally shared physical reality (i.e. what will
> appear in phenomenal terms as a brain and its generalised environment).
>
> Probably, but the initial nested "levels" we have should be given by the
> hypostases p, Bp, etc. and also the graded B^n p  & D^m t, with m bigger
> than n. With p sigma_1 they all provide a quantization, and thus the
> physical reality is layered in some sense. There are no "correct dream"
> within a dream, because physical correctness appears when "you" are
> distributed all (infinitely many) most probable relative history. This
> might be related to what you say here.
>

​I think it might be. The idea is that the probabilities converge on what
we might then call a canonical (shared) reality.
​

> It plays some role in the "after life", making it a bit closer to to the
> Tibetan Bardo Todol. A poet said that there are only two certainties: taxes
> and death, but that was still wishful thinking
> ​:​
>

​I know, and
 I can't honestly say this
​has ​
give
​n​
me much comfort
​.​




> there is only one certainty: taxes.
>

​Or this :(​

David


> Bruno
>
> PS B^n p is ...Bp, with n Bs. (B^0 p = p, by convention).
>
>
> David
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> Brent
>>
>> --
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Re: Is math real?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Sep 2017, at 11:23, David Nyman wrote:


On 11 Sep 2017 9:22 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the  
universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief  
"scientific belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's  
(sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to  
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a notion of knowledge.


This seems problematic to me.  I understand why you do it; because  
you want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable  
belief).  But this does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge  
(c.f. Getteir for example).


Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of  
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.





It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can  
assert it and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??


Ih he proves it (correctly or not). Knowledge is Bp & p, which is  
impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We just cannot know an  
undecidable (by us)  proposition, by definition, although we can bet  
on it, but then it is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream  
argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into  
disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.


Yes, I think the difficulty Brent may be having with this is that  
the notion of belief in play here is to be understood as ramifying  
in some limit (delineated by the FPI) to that of physical structure  
and action.


That follows once we assume the mechanist hypothesis.



Consequently it constitutes, in the first place, an idiosyncratic  
commitment to truths that may or may not correspond, in part or in  
whole, to what is more generally 'believed'. Nonetheless,  
commitments of this sort cannot be disentangled from their own  
proper, and equally undoubtable, truth values, however misleading  
these may ultimately turn out to be in a wider context. They are, as  
you say, more in the nature of bets on a reality,


In this case it is a weaker bet on absence of change in consciousness  
for some self-transformation, but OK, that is the "reality" in the  
sense of "Dt", arguably.




which in general of course is consistent with the unavoidable rigour  
of an evolutionary logic. This is the crucial distinction between  
primary or perceptual undoubtability and secondary reliability that  
I've previously remarked on. And as is indeed the case with any  
serious bet, they represent an inescapable commitment that puts the  
bettor permanently at hazard.


OK.



It seems to me also that there are nested levels of such beliefs and  
their associated truths. Hence what is, at a certain level, an  
idiosyncratic commitment to what we would normally think of as  
something non veridical, as in a dream, may be nested within a more  
general or systemic commitment to a consistent and more generally  
shared physical reality (i.e. what will appear in phenomenal terms  
as a brain and its generalised environment).


Probably, but the initial nested "levels" we have should be given by  
the hypostases p, Bp, etc. and also the graded B^n p  & D^m t, with m  
bigger than n. With p sigma_1 they all provide a quantization, and  
thus the physical reality is layered in some sense. There are no  
"correct dream" within a dream, because physical correctness appears  
when "you" are distributed all (infinitely many) most probable  
relative history. This might be related to what you say here. It plays  
some role in the "after life", making it a bit closer to to the  
Tibetan Bardo Todol. A poet said that there are only two certainties:  
taxes and death, but that was still wishful thinking: there is only  
one certainty: taxes.


Bruno

PS B^n p is ...Bp, with n Bs. (B^0 p = p, by convention).



David


Bruno




Brent

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Re: Is math real?

[David Nyman]

On 11 Sep 2017 9:22 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:


>
> On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the universal
>> number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief "scientific belief",
>> (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar
>> Bp. That makes sense, due to incompleteness which prevent provability to be
>> a notion of knowledge.
>>
>
> This seems problematic to me.  I understand why you do it; because you
> want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable belief).  But this
> does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example).
>

Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of knowledge.
Gödel mention this already in 1933.




It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can assert it
> and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??
>

Ih he proves it (correctly or not). Knowledge is Bp & p, which is
impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We just cannot know an undecidable
(by us)  proposition, by definition, although we can bet on it, but then it
is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream
argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into
disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.


Yes, I think the difficulty Brent may be having with this is that the
notion of belief in play here is to be understood as ramifying in some
limit (delineated by the FPI) to that of physical structure and action.
Consequently it constitutes, in the first place, an idiosyncratic
commitment to truths that may or may not correspond, in part or in whole,
to what is more generally 'believed'. Nonetheless, commitments of this sort
cannot be disentangled from their own proper, and equally undoubtable,
truth values, however misleading these may ultimately turn out to be in a
wider context. They are, as you say, more in the nature of bets on a
reality, which in general of course is consistent with the unavoidable
rigour of an evolutionary logic. This is the crucial distinction between
primary or perceptual undoubtability and secondary reliability that I've
previously remarked on. And as is indeed the case with any serious bet,
they represent an inescapable commitment that puts the bettor permanently
at hazard.

It seems to me also that there are nested levels of such beliefs and their
associated truths. Hence what is, at a certain level, an idiosyncratic
commitment to what we would normally think of as something non veridical,
as in a dream, may be nested within a more general or systemic commitment
to a consistent and more generally shared physical reality (i.e. what will
appear in phenomenal terms as a brain and its generalised environment).

David


Bruno




> Brent
>
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Re: Is math real?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Sep 2017, at 00:55, David Nyman wrote:

On 10 September 2017 at 18:24, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 09 Sep 2017, at 18:58, David Nyman wrote:

On 7 September 2017 at 10:03, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 06 Sep 2017, at 19:45, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/6/2017 7:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some physicists can be immaterialist, but still believe that the  
fundamental reality is physical, a bit like Tegmark who remains  
(despite he is willing to think differently) open to the idea  
that the physical reality is a special mathematical structure  
among all mathematical structures, for example. That is  
problematical for pure mathematical reason: the notion of all  
mathematical structures do not make much mathematical sense, but  
it is of course problematic also with Mechanism, where the  
physical reality becomes the border of the whole "computable  
mathematics" (which is very tiny, as it is the tiny sigma_1 part  
of arithmetic).


I think Tegmark has changed his opinion and now only champions all  
computable universes.


Yes. The problem now, is that there are no computable physical  
universes. Here he miss the first person indeterminacy in  
arithmetic. He miss that any universal machine looking below its  
substitution level is confronted to its infinity of implementations  
in arithmetic. In fact, he remains somehow physicalist, and does  
not seem aware of the computationalist mind-body problem.


​Yes, it's quite surprising how elusive this absence of universes  
seems to be in the context of mechanism. Old presuppositions  
seemingly die very hard. Another elusive point is what Chalmers is  
getting at with what he calls the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement​ 
. This is the problem of how what one might call an 'extensional  
infrastructure' and any corresponding phenomenal reality are  
seemingly able to 'refer' to each other. It's a big fly in the  
ointment of physicalist theories of mind like panpsychism, although  
it seems to be exceedingly difficult to point this out to  
panpsychists in my experience. For example, if we consider a movie  
being rendered on an LCD screen, nobody imagines that either the  
pixels comprising the screen, or the action of the movie tracked or  
carried by those pixels, either do, or in any way need to, refer to  
each other. They are, in a sense, mutual epiphenomena. However, my  
own utterances or judgements - standing in a general way for the  
'extensional infrastructure' of my perceptions - and those  
perceptions themselves, do indeed seem to need to cross-refer. It's  
this cross-reference that is alluded to in Bp and p.


Hmm... Perhaps OK. There might be a problem with the "extensional  
infrastructure" where I see an intensional one, and only the "body"  
is the (relatively and indexically) extensional.


​Yes, in this case I meant beliefs or judgments as they would  
appear in bodily expression, e.g. utterances, and hence extensional.

  ​




I've been thinking about how this might play out very generally in  
terms of the coincidence or intersection of action and perception  
as generalisations of B and p. As you say, we assume at the outset  
a knower in the guise of the universal or generic machine (i.e. a  
number playing the role of 'processor' with respect to another  
number).


You force me to be very precise. I assume only p, the true sigma_1  
propositions. You can equate them with the computational states  
attained by the, or a, universal dovetailing. I define the "believer- 
knower-observer-feeler" by a universal number, mastering classical  
first order logic, and (unlike what we need to assume for the  
ontology) the induction axioms (on the sigma_1 sentences). The  
believer can prove its own incompleteness and its "modesty", in the  
conditional way.


So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the  
universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief  
"scientific belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's  
(sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to  
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a notion of knowledge.


Then incompleteness enforce the correct machine to distinguish the  
nuances between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p. Which  
corresponds with Truth ("God", the One, Reality, ...), Belief  
(theories, ideas), Knowledge (where ideas fits with Reality), and  
the "material" version which encapsulate the idea of possibility and  
non transitive alternative, which incompleteness offers on a plate:  
consistency, Dt.


So the universal machine endowed with, say, a classical logical  
instinct, is born with those quite different views on the universal  
reality. Those views can be in conflict, or live at peace.


G* prove p <-> Bp <-> Bp & p <-> etc.

But G does not prove any of those equivalences. Sigma_1 truth, seen  
as the set of all true arithmetical sigma_1 sentences is the same  
set as the set of provable 

Re: Is math real?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the  
universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief  
"scientific belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's  
(sigma_1 arithmetical) beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to  
incompleteness which prevent provability to be a notion of knowledge.


This seems problematic to me.  I understand why you do it; because  
you want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable  
belief).  But this does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge  
(c.f. Getteir for example).


Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of  
knowledge. Gödel mention this already in 1933.




It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can  
assert it and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ??


Ih he proves it (correctly or not). Knowledge is Bp & p, which is  
impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We just cannot know an  
undecidable (by us)  proposition, by definition, although we can bet  
on it, but then it is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt).
That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream  
argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into  
disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did.


Bruno




Brent

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