On 11 September 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 11 Sep 2017, at 11:23, David Nyman wrote: > > On 11 Sep 2017 9:22 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >> >> On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the >>> universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief "scientific >>> belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1 arithmetical) >>> beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to incompleteness which prevent >>> provability to be a notion of knowledge. >>> >> >> This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do it; because you >> want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable belief). But this >> does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example). >> > > Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of knowledge. > Gödel mention this already in 1933. > > > > > It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can assert it >> and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ?? >> > > Ih he proves it (correctly or not). Knowledge is Bp & p, which is > impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We just cannot know an undecidable > (by us) proposition, by definition, although we can bet on it, but then it > is different kind of knowledge (closer to Bp & Dt). > That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream > argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into > disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did. > > > Yes, I think the difficulty Brent may be having with this is that the > notion of belief in play here is to be understood as ramifying in some > limit (delineated by the FPI) to that of physical structure and action. > > > That follows once we assume the mechanist hypothesis. > > > > Consequently it constitutes, in the first place, an idiosyncratic > commitment to truths that may or may not correspond, in part or in whole, > to what is more generally 'believed'. Nonetheless, commitments of this sort > cannot be disentangled from their own proper, and equally undoubtable, > truth values, however misleading these may ultimately turn out to be in a > wider context. They are, as you say, more in the nature of bets on a > reality, > > In this case it is a weaker bet on absence of change in consciousness for > some self-transformation, but OK, that is the "reality" in the sense of > "Dt", arguably. > Yes, that's what I meant. We can't know what lies 'beyond' our perceptions, but we can take a risk on our conjectures, refined by a process of evolution. > > which in general of course is consistent with the unavoidable rigour of an > evolutionary logic. This is the crucial distinction between primary or > perceptual undoubtability and secondary reliability that I've previously > remarked on. And as is indeed the case with any serious bet, they represent > an inescapable commitment that puts the bettor permanently at hazard. > > OK. > > It seems to me also that there are nested levels of such beliefs and their > associated truths. Hence what is, at a certain level, an idiosyncratic > commitment to what we would normally think of as something non veridical, > as in a dream, may be nested within a more general or systemic commitment > to a consistent and more generally shared physical reality (i.e. what will > appear in phenomenal terms as a brain and its generalised environment). > > Probably, but the initial nested "levels" we have should be given by the > hypostases p, Bp, etc. and also the graded B^n p & D^m t, with m bigger > than n. With p sigma_1 they all provide a quantization, and thus the > physical reality is layered in some sense. There are no "correct dream" > within a dream, because physical correctness appears when "you" are > distributed all (infinitely many) most probable relative history. This > might be related to what you say here. > I think it might be. The idea is that the probabilities converge on what we might then call a canonical (shared) reality. > It plays some role in the "after life", making it a bit closer to to the > Tibetan Bardo Todol. A poet said that there are only two certainties: taxes > and death, but that was still wishful thinking > : > I know, and I can't honestly say this has give n me much comfort . > there is only one certainty: taxes. > Or this :( David > Bruno > > PS B^n p is BBBB...Bp, with n Bs. (B^0 p = p, by convention). > > > David > > > Bruno > > > > >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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