Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> ​> ​
> Both copies saw only one city,
>

​Yes.​



> ​>​
> and both were unable to predict in advance which one they would feel to
> see.
>

​Unable
 to predict in advance
​ who would see what? ​Today I can predict what one and only one city the
Moscow man will see tomorrow and today
I can predict what one and only one city the
​Washington​
 man will see tomorrow
​ and, depending on what you mean by "the Helsinki ​man",  I can predict
that too. I honestly don't know what more there is to predict.


> ​> ​
> The point is that the two copies were not able to predict their specific
> experience.
>

​That's because before their ​specific experiences there were not two
copies, neither the Washington man nor the Moscow man existed, only the
Helsinki man existed. You can't make a prediction, or do anything else, *IF
YOU DON'T EXIST*!

​> ​
> which is the criteria for verifying a prediction of a first person
> experience?
>

​By far the most important ​criteria needed to verify a prediction is to
make it clear and unambiguous which first person experience the prediction
is all about, and that you have not even come close to doing. Is it the
first person experience of the person that will experience Moscow tomorrow,
or the first person experience of the person that will experience
Washington tomorrow, or the first person experiences of the people tomorrow
who remember being in Helsinki today?


> ​> ​
> Mr His is both the W-guy and the M-guy for any third person looking at the
> experience from outside.
>

​And Mr His is the W-guy from the W-guy's
 first person experience
​and ​
 Mr His is the M-guy from the M-guy's ​
 first person experience
​. So I ask again for the 999th time, who is the prediction supposed to be
about?​

​> ​
> You just need to make precise


​I don't need to do that, you do. And I know your mantra, you chant it all
the time as if it will solve all problems "you confuse the 1p and the 3p";
but is it really surprising I'm confused when you demand people predict
things BEFORE they exist??​


​> ​
> But from Mr. His' personal view point after the duplication, he
> ​ [...]
>

​And that is a great example of what needs to be made precise. Are you
talking about ​
 Mr. His personal view point
​in Moscow or ​
Mr. His' personal view point
​in Washington?​ Yesterday when there was only one who was the prediction
supposed to be about?

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Then the question is of no scientific of philosophic significance
>
>
> ​> ​
> You could have said this before
>

​I have said it before!


> ​> ​
> as it has always been that same question.
>

​
No there are two
​ things involved. Y
ou ask what some bozo expects to happen
​,​
and that is of no scientific
​ ​
or
​
philosophic significance
​ whatsoever but at least it's a real question with a real answer. ​But you
also say "What one and only one city will you see after you have been
duplicated and become two?" and that is not a question, that is just a
sequence of words that ends with a question mark at the end, so obviously
there is no answer to it.
 ​


> ​>> ​
>> A far far more profound question than "Where do you expect he will live?"
>> is "Where will he live?" or even better "Today where are the people who
>> remember being in Helsinki yesterday?".  ​
>
>
> ​> ​
> That is the 3p question.
>

​OK then please explain ​exactly what the 1p question is and how it differs
from the 3p question.



> ​> ​
> the person undergoing the split cannot feel the split, nor predict his
> self-localization measurement.
>

The Moscow man can't predict anything before his localization measurement
​
because before he sees Moscow the Moscow man did not exist, and its very
hard to make good predictions if you don't exist.

>
> ​> ​
> The point is that you cannot predict in Helsinki if you will be the Moscow
> man *from your first person subjectyive experience". (and there are no
> problem with pronouns here).
>

​If there are no problem with pronouns then please explain what one and
only one thing "you" tomorrow means if I am to be duplicated today.  ​



> ​>> ​
>> The only reason more can't be predicted is because you can't say exactly
>> what it is you want predicted.
>
>
> ​> ​
> That is not correct. "it" refers to the very precise outcome "I open the
> door and see W" and "I open the door and see M".
>

​Well OK then, you just correctly predicted the very thing that you said
could not be predicted.​


​> ​
> It is isomorphic to the coin throwing.
>

​Nope, not even close. Tomorrow everybody can say with 100% certainty how
the coin flip turned out, but tomorrow everybody will be as clueless as
they are today about what one and only one city I ended up seeing. "Will
the coin fall heads or tails?" is a real question and although I might not
know it the answer the answer exists. The problem with "What city will I
see?" isn't that I don't know the answer it's that the answer doesn't exist
today and 

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2017, at 01:30, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 5:40 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


I hope you are fine.

​Thank you Bruno, I'm OK.​


Good.




​> ​Mr. His was sure that his first person experience will be of  
being in one city, then he pushed on the button, and both the copies  
claim, "yes that prediction was correct: when opening the door I  
made the experience of seeing only once city.


​And if two copies claims were "I saw one and only one city so the  
prediction that I,  would see one and only one city was correct"   
then a logical contradiction would result because there are two of  
them.


In the third person description. In the duplication we must make  
precise, both with pronouns and proper names if we talk about the 1p  
or the 3p. As we have agreed that the 3p copies are both genuine  
Helsinki-guy survivor, it becomes rather easy, and there are no  
logical contradiction.





So the claims can not be correct even if they sincerely believe they  
are.



They are obviously (with the mechanist assumption) correct. Both  
copies saw only one city, and both were unable to predict in advance  
which one they would feel to see.




All this assumes the personal pronoun "I" means anybody who  
remembers being asked the question yesterday in Helsinki, and if "I"  
doesn't mean that then what "I" mean?.



No problem. We have agreed on this. The point is that the two copies  
were not able to predict their specific experience. But they can  
predict a non specific experience like I will feel to be either in W  
or in M. And that is confirmed by the two copies, which is the  
criteria for verifying a prediction of a first person experience?





​>> ​If Mr. His had been correct then after the duplication all  
the people who remember being Mr. His


​> ​Sorry, but that is the third person description of Mister His.

​That's what I don't get, If today Mr. His isn't anybody who  
remembers being asked the question yesterday then who is Mr. Hid  
today? ​


You just need to make precise if you talk of body (3p) or of first  
person experience (soul, knower, ...)..


Mr His is both the W-guy and the M-guy for any third person looking at  
the experience from outside.


But from Mr. His' personal view point after the duplication, he (which  
denotes both guys)  can only feel to be at once place, and it has to  
be, for both of them, one among the two W and M cities.







​> ​The question was about what he expected to live.

​Then the question is of no scientific of philosophic significance



You could have said this before as it has always been that same  
question. The whole point is that physics use an identity criteria  
refuted by Mechanism. Wait perhaps for the study of the next steps to  
judge the significance.






and I don't understand why we keep talking about something so trivial.



Yes, it is very simple. So perhaps now you can move on step 4. It  
remains as simple up to step 6.





Most people expect Jesus Christ will return in a few years but that  
doesn't mean he will.  A far far more profound question than "Where  
do you expect he will live?" is "Where will he live?" or even better  
"Today where are the people who remember being in Helsinki  
yesterday?".  ​


That is the 3p question. The answer is just given in the mechanist  
assumption and the protocol. The interesting things is the 1p. It is  
still very trivial indeed at that stage, yet can be considered as  
deep, as it shows that mechanism, which is utter 3p-determinism  
entails an irreducible randomness in the subjective experience of  
machine or people. later, we will see how crucial is that form of  
randomness.







​> comp predicts "the guy will feel to be in one city, that he  
could not have predicted before"


​So there is something called "comp" that can predict it but  
nothing can predict it.


Yes. If we are digital machine then we are duplicable. And the theory  
predicts or explains entirely that from its first person pov the  
person undergoing the split cannot feel the split, nor predict his  
self-localization measurement.






Nobody knows the answer because nobody knows the question.


You just did know it above.



What exactly is "it"? Yes yes I know," it" is about the first person  
view, but that is all predictable, tomorrow the the first person  
view​ of the Moscow man will be Moscow


The point is that you cannot predict in Helsinki if you will be the  
Moscow man *from your first person subjectyive experience". (and there  
are no problem with pronouns here).





and tomorrow the the first person view​ of the Washington man will  
be Washington


The point is that you cannot predict in Helsinki if you will be the  
Washington man *from your first person subjectyive experience".





and
tomorrow there will be no first person view​ of Helsinki at all.  
The only reason more can't be predicted is because you can't say  
exactly what it is you 

Re: math and the treal world

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Sep 2017, at 01:47, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Sep 15, 2017 at 04:42:56PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


The universal machine put some mess in the arithmetical Heaven, and
its soul is teared apart by its eight (4 + 4*infinity actually)
points of view possible.


What the infinity doing here?


The povs implied by incompleteness are the four

p
Bp (splits in two)
Bp & p

and the 4*infinity:

Bp & Dt
Bp & Dt & p   (which both splits in two again, along G/G*)

but also the weakening (with B^n p = Bp with n Bs).

B^n p & D^m t
B^n p & D^m t & p

(when n is less or equal than m, those variants still obeys a quantum  
logic, and that gives a graded modal logics for the quantum).


Best,

Bruno





--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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