On 18 Sep 2017, at 01:30, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 5:40 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
I hope you are fine.
Thank you Bruno, I'm OK.
Good.
> Mr. His was sure that his first person experience will be of
being in one city, then he pushed on the button, and both the copies
claim, "yes that prediction was correct: when opening the door I
made the experience of seeing only once city.
And if two copies claims were "I saw one and only one city so the
prediction that I, would see one and only one city was correct"
then a logical contradiction would result because there are two of
them.
In the third person description. In the duplication we must make
precise, both with pronouns and proper names if we talk about the 1p
or the 3p. As we have agreed that the 3p copies are both genuine
Helsinki-guy survivor, it becomes rather easy, and there are no
logical contradiction.
So the claims can not be correct even if they sincerely believe they
are.
They are obviously (with the mechanist assumption) correct. Both
copies saw only one city, and both were unable to predict in advance
which one they would feel to see.
All this assumes the personal pronoun "I" means anybody who
remembers being asked the question yesterday in Helsinki, and if "I"
doesn't mean that then what "I" mean?.
No problem. We have agreed on this. The point is that the two copies
were not able to predict their specific experience. But they can
predict a non specific experience like I will feel to be either in W
or in M. And that is confirmed by the two copies, which is the
criteria for verifying a prediction of a first person experience?
>> If Mr. His had been correct then after the duplication all
the people who remember being Mr. His
> Sorry, but that is the third person description of Mister His.
That's what I don't get, If today Mr. His isn't anybody who
remembers being asked the question yesterday then who is Mr. Hid
today?
You just need to make precise if you talk of body (3p) or of first
person experience (soul, knower, ...)..
Mr His is both the W-guy and the M-guy for any third person looking at
the experience from outside.
But from Mr. His' personal view point after the duplication, he (which
denotes both guys) can only feel to be at once place, and it has to
be, for both of them, one among the two W and M cities.
> The question was about what he expected to live.
Then the question is of no scientific of philosophic significance
You could have said this before as it has always been that same
question. The whole point is that physics use an identity criteria
refuted by Mechanism. Wait perhaps for the study of the next steps to
judge the significance.
and I don't understand why we keep talking about something so trivial.
Yes, it is very simple. So perhaps now you can move on step 4. It
remains as simple up to step 6.
Most people expect Jesus Christ will return in a few years but that
doesn't mean he will. A far far more profound question than "Where
do you expect he will live?" is "Where will he live?" or even better
"Today where are the people who remember being in Helsinki
yesterday?".
That is the 3p question. The answer is just given in the mechanist
assumption and the protocol. The interesting things is the 1p. It is
still very trivial indeed at that stage, yet can be considered as
deep, as it shows that mechanism, which is utter 3p-determinism
entails an irreducible randomness in the subjective experience of
machine or people. later, we will see how crucial is that form of
randomness.
> comp predicts "the guy will feel to be in one city, that he
could not have predicted before"
So there is something called "comp" that can predict it but
nothing can predict it.
Yes. If we are digital machine then we are duplicable. And the theory
predicts or explains entirely that from its first person pov the
person undergoing the split cannot feel the split, nor predict his
self-localization measurement.
Nobody knows the answer because nobody knows the question.
You just did know it above.
What exactly is "it"? Yes yes I know," it" is about the first person
view, but that is all predictable, tomorrow the the first person
view of the Moscow man will be Moscow
The point is that you cannot predict in Helsinki if you will be the
Moscow man *from your first person subjectyive experience". (and there
are no problem with pronouns here).
and tomorrow the the first person view of the Washington man will
be Washington
The point is that you cannot predict in Helsinki if you will be the
Washington man *from your first person subjectyive experience".
and
tomorrow there will be no first person view of Helsinki at all.
The only reason more can't be predicted is because you can't say
exactly what it is you want predicted.
That is not correct. "it" refers to the very precise outcome "I open
the door and see W" and "I open the door and see M".
Both will occur in the 3p view. But whoever I am, I will live only one
outcome.
It is isomorphic to the coin throwing. So the question is very easy,
and the answer too.
> You play dumb or what.
I don't think I'm significantly dumber than average so it must be
or what.
> The prediction is made before, but the verification is the
one made by each first person obtained.
Nothing can be verified if its not know who the prediction was
supposed to be about,
It is not a question of "who". With the identity criterion on which we
agree, we know BOTH will live the answer. But we know that they are
incompatible as 1p experience, and as such, it is simply one of them.
and that is as clear as mud. You say it's not about the people
who remember being asked the question
I never have said that. I say that only in a more precise way: it is
about the experience of the people who remember having been asked the
question in Helsinki.
so I have no idea who the prediction is about and thus have no way
of knowing if any prediction was right or wrong.
In the 3p. Obviously, only the W-guy and the M-guy knows the answers,
and no one else. That can be sued to explain that the first person pov
belongs to the non-communicable truth of the machine. The W-guy would
say that he is really the one in W, and not in Moscow, but that
communicate nothing, and is wrong for the M-guy.
>> And AFTER the button is pushed there are 2 people who go
by the name "he" which causes endless confusion,
> Here, you give credits to those who think you lie and try to
deliberately be confusing.
Bruno just think about that for a minute, why on earth would I do
that? Why would I pretend not understand something when I really
do, and why would I keep up such a silly charade for years?
That is indeed the question!
Maybe just maybe you should entertain the possibility that some
people sincerely think you're dead wrong.
On the first person indeterminacy, I know only one person having a
problem here: you.
And speaking of sincerity, do you really believe personal pronouns
can be used just as they always have been even after people
duplicating machines have become common without creating any
confusion?
I totally agree with this. But you are the one calling by name the
simple precision added, which is just to be clear if we talk about the
3p view accessible, or about the 1p views accessible.
> We have agreed since long that both are equal in being
continuators of the H-guy.
I thought we agreed about that too, and I thought we we also
agreed that 1+1=2 but apparently not because if both those things
are true then the H-guy will see 2 cities but you insist the H-
guy will see only one. And yeah yeah I know, I confuse...
Indeed.
But adding the precision bring up full clarity (and you got it above):
1 copy + 1 copy = 2 copies in the 3p view.
1 copy + 1 copy = 1 experience (for the two copies). The experiencer
does not feel the split, nor the existence of its copies (or you
abandon computationalism).
But I think you're the one who is confused, you're confused by the
fact that there are two the first person views, one in Washington
and one in Moscow and both of them are the H-guy.
That is not confusing when you keep in mind that the question is about
the 1p-expectation. The interest of this came later in the reasoning.
>> If it's one did it turn out to be Moscow or Washington?
> You asked this before.
I know I've asked that before and I received no answer before, and
I don't expect to receive an answer this time either.
> Please read what follow very carefully,
If it's a real question then there is a one word answer, and
I don't need to read one word carefully.
Listen to the copies. They all give the one word answer you need to
hear. Oh, you don't like that you get many different incompatible
answer? Well, that is just what happens with duplication.
> Now you tell me that this means only the tautological "the M-
man finds M", and the "W-man finds W",
Yep. Very dull and of no scientific philosophic or mathematical
interest whatsoever but nevertheless 100% true.
> both are still the same H-guy,
Yep.
> and that the H-guy was unable to predict which precise city
he will feel to survive through in that experience.
That's because there isn't one precise city that is correct and
one one precise city that is incorrect.
Then you put the 1p experience under the rug.
It't not that nobody knows the answer, the answer does not exist;
therefore it wasn't a question.
If the answer does not exist, it means that the W and the M men are
zombies, and computationalism is false.
>> What exactly did the Helsinki Man fail to predict?
> The name of the city that he will write in his personal diary
soon.
I will tell you the one and only one name of that city just as
soon as you tell me who "he" is.
He is the guy remembering Helsinki. From outside, they are two of
them, but they feel unique and the question was about that feeling.
I can't give an answer if I don't know the question.
What one and only one city will I Mr.
Beforethebuttonispushed see after the button is pushed?" is
that a question or is that gibberish?
That is a question on the third person description of the
localization of the experience. It is not gibberish, but is not
relevant.
Not relevant? If that's not the question you want an answer to
then I don't know what is. Not gibberish? Mr.
Beforethebuttonispushed is about to become two, therefore there
can't be one and only one city.
> See Quentin post
No I don't think so. I no longer spend more than 10 seconds
reading any of Quentin's posts and certainty never reread them.
>> There are 2 first-person experiences and the
Helsinki man correctly predicted who would see what.
> But fail to predict who among those who he was about to feel.
Bruno, did it ever occur to you that if the answer can't be known
before the event and the answer can't be known after the event
either then the problem isn't a lack of prediction ability?
But both copies knows the question, and after pushing the button knows
the answer. You just decide to not listen to them.
> You talk in such a way that the first person has just nothing
to say,
No, I talk in such a way that THE first person has two things to
say not one
No. After the duplication there are TWO first person, and they each
say one precise answer.
and both of them are true because there are two THE first person.
And that is not bad grammar, that is just one of the ways the
English language will need to adapt once people duplicating machines
are invented.
> And by numerical identity, and first person incompatibility
of alternate experience (unless telepathy),
You've been talking about telepathy for years now, I didn't
understand why the first time you did so and I still don't.
See just above. You talk again like if the person could feel being in
two places at once. Either you ignore the 1p view, or you introduce a
non computable element in the mind.
> >>There is no ambiguity,
>> Then name the one and only one city it turned out to
be!
> If I could, there would be a weird third person indeterminacy.
If you could then there really would be no ambiguity and it would
be a real question, but you can't answer it, not before the event
and not after it either because there is no "it".
Indeed. No third person can feel the experience of another person. But
there is a "it", for both copies, as we can directly see in their
diaries.
You just avoid the mind-body problem, or the 1p-3p relations problem,
which up to now is simple: just replace ambiguity by indeterminacy.
its study necessitate the study of all diaries.
A study of those diaries would be of equal usefulness as a study
of telepathy would be. Zero.
The diaries contains the 1p. You are just saying that "1p" is not
interesting. You evacuate the whole cognitive science or philosophy of
mind.
> The very fact that it is impossible to answer your question
illustrates that the differentiation is not predictable.
Hey don't push this off on me, it's your "question" not mine!
> Just listen to the copies.
I did, and they named 2 cities not one.
That is plainly wrong, or a word play. They both cited 1 city. You
said it yourself, even above. You cannot treat the multiple copies
like if they were still one person. They have differentiated. They
both are still the H-guy, but none of the W (resp M) guy is the M
(resp W) guy.
Bruno
John K Clark
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