date:20181026

Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/26/2018 1:14 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 10:03:07 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 2:33:13 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal
wrote:


OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to
make unnecessary assumption.


My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical
consistency. This assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic
multiverse, and I don't mean just ZF or ZFC but all consistent
versions of pure set theory. You add assumptions that restrict
this set-theoretic multiverse to arithmetic.




"Logical consistency" is likely not needed for existence.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/



I disagree. I already mentioned dialetheism and I think it's 
nonsensical because it accepts the existence of objects that are not 
what they are.


You're confusing objects and sentences.

Brent

Such "objects" are nothing. And unless you arbitrarily block logical 
explosion, one inconsistency will make all ontology meaningless, even 
the property of existence will not be different from non-existence.


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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/26/2018 1:03 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 2:33:13 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:


OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make
unnecessary assumption.


My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical
consistency. This assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic
multiverse, and I don't mean just ZF or ZFC but all consistent
versions of pure set theory. You add assumptions that restrict
this set-theoretic multiverse to arithmetic.




"Logical consistency" is likely not needed for existence.

     https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/


Logical consistency is a relation between sentences.  It's not about 
existence.  The sentences might be about the existence of something, but 
that's different.  Or the sentences may have variables quantified by 
existential quantifiers, but that's different too.  To say logical 
consistency is needed for existence would be a category error.


Brent

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Tomas Pales



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 11:59:28 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> As a practical matter though, AI and agent programmers have to deal with 
> inconsistent information in the world:
>
> https://www.hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2013/632319/
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.02851
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0004370216300108
> https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-25664-6_46
> ...
>

Yes, a sentence (or a belief formulated in sentences) can contain words 
that contradict each other but that doesn't mean that the sentence is true. 
Maybe parts of the sentence can contain useful information but the sentence 
is not true. 

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 3:14:05 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 10:03:07 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 2:33:13 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary 
 assumption.

>>>
>>> My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. 
>>> This assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic multiverse, and I don't 
>>> mean just ZF or ZFC but all consistent versions of pure set theory. You add 
>>> assumptions that restrict this set-theoretic multiverse to arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> "Logical consistency" is likely not needed for existence.
>>
>>  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
>>
>
> I disagree. I already mentioned dialetheism and I think it's nonsensical 
> because it accepts the existence of objects that are not what they are. 
> Such "objects" are nothing. And unless you arbitrarily block logical 
> explosion, one inconsistency will make all ontology meaningless, even the 
> property of existence will not be different from non-existence.
>




As a practical matter though, AI and agent programmers have to deal with 
inconsistent information in the world:

https://www.hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2013/632319/
https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.02851
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0004370216300108
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-25664-6_46
...

- pt 

>   
>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread agrayson2000



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 7:36:15 PM UTC, Tomas Pales wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:25:30 PM UTC+2, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 9:32:04 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:

 Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
 Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
 f
 - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
 - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
 diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
 - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in 
 diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or 
 mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.

 What are your thoughts. 

>>>
>>> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
>>> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
>>> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
>>> If this is correct, other models also fall by  wayside. AG 
>>>
>>
>> the
>> *What I don't get is why this is a topic which generates so much 
>> interest, when it is easily falsified. AG* 
>>
>
> I don't know what a plane wave is but according to Tegmark's mathematical 
> universe hypothesis if a plane wave is a consistently defined object, it 
> exists. If not in our universe then in a different one. 
>

*You ought to familiarize yourself with the concept of a plane wave, one of 
the solutions of Maxwell's equations. It certainly doesn't exist in THIS 
universe, or any other unless you accept instantaneous action at a 
distance, and with a vengeance. Why a vengeance? You'll know when you know 
the behavior of a plane wave. AG *

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Tomas Pales



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 10:03:07 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 2:33:13 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary 
>>> assumption.
>>>
>>
>> My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. 
>> This assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic multiverse, and I don't 
>> mean just ZF or ZFC but all consistent versions of pure set theory. You add 
>> assumptions that restrict this set-theoretic multiverse to arithmetic.
>>
>
>
>
> "Logical consistency" is likely not needed for existence.
>
>  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
>

I disagree. I already mentioned dialetheism and I think it's nonsensical 
because it accepts the existence of objects that are not what they are. 
Such "objects" are nothing. And unless you arbitrarily block logical 
explosion, one inconsistency will make all ontology meaningless, even the 
property of existence will not be different from non-existence.
  

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 2:33:13 PM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary 
>> assumption.
>>
>
> My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. 
> This assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic multiverse, and I don't 
> mean just ZF or ZFC but all consistent versions of pure set theory. You add 
> assumptions that restrict this set-theoretic multiverse to arithmetic.
>



"Logical consistency" is likely not needed for existence.

 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

- pt

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Tomas Pales



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:25:30 PM UTC+2, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 9:32:04 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>>> f
>>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in 
>>> diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or 
>>> mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>>
>>> What are your thoughts. 
>>>
>>
>> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
>> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
>> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
>> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 
>>
>
> *What I don't get is why this is a topic which generates so much interest, 
> when it is easily falsified. AG* 
>

I don't know what a plane wave is but according to Tegmark's mathematical 
universe hypothesis if a plane wave is a consistently defined object, it 
exists. If not in our universe then in a different one. 

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Tomas Pales

On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary 
> assumption.
>

My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. 
This assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic multiverse, and I don't 
mean just ZF or ZFC but all consistent versions of pure set theory. You add 
assumptions that restrict this set-theoretic multiverse to arithmetic.

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread agrayson2000



On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 9:32:04 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>> f
>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>
>> What are your thoughts. 
>>
>
> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 
>

*What I don't get is why this is a topic which generates so much interest, 
when it is easily falsified. AG* 

>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Tomas,


> as I see it, my ontology, whose relational aspect is defined by the relation 
> of similarity (and its special kinds - instantiation and composition), 
> includes your ontology, because pure set theory includes arithmetic.


OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary 
assumption. Indexical Digital Mechanism (the idea that we would personally 
survive in the usual clinical sense with a digitalis-able body) can be shown to 
make one simple inductive set enough, and actually needing the simplest model 
of arithmetic. Infinite computations do play an important role, but in the 
ontology, we can use only their finite portions. If we allow inductions and/or 
axiom of the infinite, things get awry with the first person indeterminacy, as 
you will need to take into account transfinite histories. I have not yet prove 
this, but I suspect the axiom of infinity making unnecessary mess.




> You may be right that arithmetic is sufficient to define physics

The arithmetical reality is sufficient, and eventually, even just the partial 
computable part (the Sigma_1 reality). But that is only true for the ontology. 
The phenomenology will not be bounded in any way. Even ZF + KAPPA (the 
existence of a inaccessible cardinal) can still only scratch on the 
arithmetical reality.



> but reality may also contain more than arithmetic.

If you are a digitalis able machine, arithmetic seen from inside *is* more than 
arithmetic. 

That is the reason why we would be foolish to commit oneself in any ontological 
commitment bigger than one universal 
machine/number/word/combinator/game-of-life-pattern, etc.




> On the other hand, if I understand Godel's second incompleteness theorem 
> correctly, as far as the relational/mathematical aspect of reality is 
> concerned, we will never be able to prove that there exists more than 
> arithmetic

No, but it is consistent to assume more. And the ontological arithmetical 
reality explains already, by incompleteness indeed, that the numbers will have 
to assume much more than the numbers to be able to understand themselves.

Like complex analysis is useful in Number Theory, incompleteness justify the 
helpfulness of some strong axioms. Löbian machine, like PA or ZF, or ZF+KAPPA 
can prove their own incompleteness and contemplate the geometry of their 
ignorance. The fact that all that is phenomenological does not make it less 
real.

There is a Skolem phenomenon. From outside the ontology is recursively 
enumerable, from inside it is above anything expressible.Somehow, the whole of 
possible math can only scratch it a little bit.



> (because we will never be able to prove that it is consistent). And if we are 
> not able to interact with infinite objects, we will never be able to observe 
> them either.

Yes, indeed. Same with the non-computable. Ae^iH(omega)t, with omega = Caitin 
or Post number is a solution of the schroedinger equation, but is not 
computable, but we would never recognise it as such, and confuse it with (pure) 
noise.


> 
> But I don't see a reason to exclude infinite objects from existence.

They do exist, the machines met them all the time, and are keeping in touch 
with them. Phenomenological existence is not non existence.

But we don’t need them in the theory: they are explained by the entity living 
in that theory, without f-havng them to commit an ontological act. So why would 
we do that? Plus the fact that if we do that, the semantic, which is what make 
the “consciousness flux” differentiate on the computations/histories. 

The problem of the machine is that it has the foot on the finite ground, living 
in the neighbourhood of 0. Bt its soul, where it truly live belongs to the 
neighbourhood of infinity. 

Infinity is a key notion, it is just that we don’t need to assume it, it is a 
necessary “meme” of all universal machine introspecting itself, and it is a key 
help to them in most situation.




> Some say that an infinite collection can never be "completed", as if 
> mathematical objects are created by some kind of process that must reach 
> completion. They are not created by a process; they exist timelessly; there 
> is nothing to complete. Only inconsistency would prevent their existence.

Yes. OK.



> 
> You said you don't really believe in sets. But a set is just a combination of 
> objects, where the combination is another object, isn't it? Everything you 
> see around you is structurally a set.

Yes, but with mechanism, that is the result of the work of a finite number, in 
front of (infinitely many variants) of a finite number.




> 
> About category theory vs. set theory, this is how I understand it: more 
> general (more abstract) mathematical objects are instantiated in more 
> specific mathematical objects (e.g. "geometric object" is instantiated in 
> "triangle") and ultimately in concrete mathematical objects (e.g. in concrete 
> triangles), which are not instantiated in anything else.

Oh,

Re: Combinator joker (a note in passing on formal combinator theory)

2018-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

Just a typo error correction I hope you have spotted it


> On 24 Oct 2018, at 18:45, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> 
> Thomas Pavel wanted that something is identical to itself. In most formal 
> combinator theory x = x is given as an axiom, yet  I did not take it. 
> Likewise, the rule: if x = y then y = x is also given, usually, but you can 
> prove it too!
> 
> That is very simple, but admittedly subtle, probably more difficult than all 
> the exercises given so far, so don’t worry and feel free to look at the 
> solution. Note that the meta-logic is the usual informal classical logic.
> 
> Here is the formal theory of combinators: Three rules and two reduction 
> axioms:
> 
> 1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z
> 2) If x = y then xz = yz
> 3) If x = y then zx = zy
> 4) Kxy = x
> 5) Sxyz = xz(yz)
> 
> Exercise(*):
> 
> a) prove that x = x, 
> 
> Hint use 1) and 4).
> 
> 2) prove that the rule which follows is correct:
> 
> If x = y then y = x.
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> (*) Solution (coming from a book by Rosser) below:
> 
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> ;
> 
> 1) x = x
> 
> Proof:
> 
> Kxy = y (by 4)


Kxy = x.  (Of course)



> Thus we have Kxy = x and Kxy = x, so by “1)” we have that x = x.
> 
> 2) if x = y then y = x
> 
> Proof
> 
> Let us suppose x = y. But by the exercise just above, x = x, so now we have x 
> = y and x = x, so by “1)” again, we have y = x.
> 
> 
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

2018-10-26 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Oct 25, 2018 at 12:36 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:

*>"2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language that has been
> created in which that sentence is labeled "true".*


If there were not at least 2 physical things in existence it would be
labeled neither true or false but gibberish; or at least it would be if
there was anybody around to do any labeling, which there wouldn't be.

John K Clark

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Re: The hard problem of matter

2018-10-26 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, 
>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time 
>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language 
> that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>
>
> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>
> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>
>
>
>
> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
> reality …. 
>
>
> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
> see this.
>
>
>
>
>
> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)
>
>
> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>
> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
> centuries.
>
> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt 
> this too.
>
>
>
> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], 
> written by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
> ].
>
>
>
> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
> that there is a moon.
>
> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory 
> in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>
> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>
> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, 
> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, 
> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in mathematics 
at some level of language:

*Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
value, Rutgers, March 2013*
http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/

As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as "reduction 
to physics:

*Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/

*non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:

"Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the 
objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are 
genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some 
other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. 
Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking 
the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the 
existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the 
terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor 
influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and 
explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible 
from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has 
grown up around the relation between these views."
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing.


- pt



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Re: The hard problem of matter

2018-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 25 Oct 2018, at 20:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/25/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 24 Oct 2018, at 03:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/23/2018 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
>> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of 
>> their exploration.
> So how do you prove theorems without a language?
 Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was 
 saying (see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a 
 language.
 
 The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs 
 needed the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not 
 need a mathematician to assert it, or to think about.
 
 To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can 
 only ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is 
 prime, assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is 
 neither necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent 
 of the big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang 
 requires some part of the arithmetical reality.
>>> But you are basing our shared reality in what is provable,
>> Absolutely not. I mean no more than any scientist, and I make clear my 
>> hypotheses.theory, without have ever claim any truth, like any sane 
>> scientist do. I am more exorcist: I base our shared reality on a mix of 
>> theory and experiences.
>> 
>> A theory is better identify with a being or a set of belief. I say that a 
>> machine believes A if the machine asserts A. I limit myself to what 
>> self-referentially correct machine can say, and not say, ...
> 
> But don't you identify "machine believes A" with "machine can prove A”?

Only because I am limiting myself to the theology of rational machine, which 
believe in some universal system. 




> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> which is therefore dependent on having language.  Right?
>> The reality itself does not depends on the language, even if the language 
>> will be itself a part of the reality.
> 
> Not the reality, but the proof depends on language.

The proof depends on language, yes. No problem with that. Actually the proof 
depends accidentally on the language but depends in a more important way on the 
theory. If the axiom is the Riemann conjecture, the proof will be very easy.

I identify machine, theories, hypotheses, (personal) beings, numbers, finite 
things, etc. That is enough to get very interesting conclusions, and we can 
introduce the nuances when needed later. Likewise I identify semantic, meaning, 
model, reality, divine, god... The interesting things happen in the relation of 
machine and meaning/reality.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> We need lanaguage to communicate about reality, including languages. We are 
>> ourselves words, written in the biochemical languages, and particles are 
>> words of some wort too. Now, the more a theory is lade independent of the 
>> language, or the even the theories,, the more is has a chance to be deep, 
>> and to help avoiding geographical prejudice on what is real or not.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

2018-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 25 Oct 2018, at 19:46, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/25/2018 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Now, when you say that there was no mathematics before writing, I am not 
>> sure. I think the incas have developed ways to compute (notably the position 
>> of the star in the sky) before writing. I think that arithmetic precede 
>> thought which precedes languages, and I can identify machines, words, 
>> numbers, finitely-describale-thing,  as opposed to the meaning which are 
>> usually infinite, but will belong to the machines/numbers mind.
> 
> People counted on their body parts, joints, fingers, etc long before there 
> was writing.  They're called “digits"
> for a reason.


Absolutely. 

Bruno



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Re: The hard problem of matter

2018-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical reality 
> and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, although 
> this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time and space. 
> It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in the 
> first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language that 
> has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.

Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as true, 
and send me the 1000.000 dollars.

Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical fictionalism, 
but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, which just means 
false (assuming Mechanism).

> 
> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
> reality …. 

There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to see 
this.

> 
> (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …)

That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.

I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or physicalism. It 
is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that those who harbour 
doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for centuries.

Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was contradicted by 
nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps some notion of 
“primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt this too.

> 
> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], written 
> by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].

I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime that 
there is a moon.

To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory in 
physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 

It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an arithmetical 
dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of consciousness to a piece of 
rock. To be short.

Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible 
together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, done by 
contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The multiplication 
and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, is a normal 
happening in arithmetic.

Bruno

> 
> - p 
> 
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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-10-26 Thread agrayson2000



On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 10:39:27 AM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 10:12:42 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 23, 2018 at 10:39:11 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> If a system is in a superposition of states, whatever value measured, 
>>> will be repeated if the same system is repeatedly measured.  But what 
>>> happens if the system is in a mixed state? TIA, AG
>>>
>>
>> If you think about it, whatever value you get on a single trial for a 
>> mixed state, repeated on the same system, will result in the same value 
>> measured repeatedly. If this is true, how does measurement distinguish 
>> superposition of states, with mixed states? AG
>>
>
> For a pure quantum state the statistical variance of a large number of 
> experiments reflect a wave nature.
>
> LC 
>

For ensembles, I think you'll get overlapping interference patterns, one 
for each component of the mixed state, with intensity proportional to the 
probability of occurrence of each state of the mixture. AG 

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-10-26 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 10:12:42 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 23, 2018 at 10:39:11 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> If a system is in a superposition of states, whatever value measured, 
>> will be repeated if the same system is repeatedly measured.  But what 
>> happens if the system is in a mixed state? TIA, AG
>>
>
> If you think about it, whatever value you get on a single trial for a 
> mixed state, repeated on the same system, will result in the same value 
> measured repeatedly. If this is true, how does measurement distinguish 
> superposition of states, with mixed states? AG
>

For a pure quantum state the statistical variance of a large number of 
experiments reflect a wave nature.

LC 

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