Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, December 27, 2018 at 6:55:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 


 Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
 (non-digital) brain?






 are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
 brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
 with symbols. 


 I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could 
 work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to 
 now, I see only a magical use of word.

 For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
 words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
 symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
 there is a theory, or just idea-associations.

 Bruno 





>>>
>>>
>>> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, 
>>> that's one thing scientists are studying:
>>>
>>> 
>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>
>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>>
>>> 
>>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as 
>>> I've given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, 
>>> we cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>>> matter being quite magical.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*.
>> Matter is *Experientialistic*.
>>
>> That's the whole thing!
>>
>>
>> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
>> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, 
>> and so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic 
>> phenomenological matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would 
>> need to run the entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails 
>> a “non-cloning” theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
>> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non 
>> computable things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. 
>> Most arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy 
>> inherit it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.
>
>
>
> But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or 
> fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no 
> problem there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who 
> forbid to doubt physicalism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


What if conventional mathematics itself is in error by assuming its primary 
elements are numbers?

(There is arguably something to category/type theory that maybe gets away 
from this.)


What if primary elements include/are non-numbers - (qualitative) 
experiences?

HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies
Vol 9 No 31 (2016) : 
The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology: In Search of New Categories

Introduction :
– the enactive approach opposes the Cartesian bifurcation of reality into 
psychological and physical
– complements quantitative categories, offering a mathematical treatment of 
qualitative aspects of reality

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/


- pt

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Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Dec 2018, at 20:58, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/24/2018 5:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 07:44, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 12/23/2018 8:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 9:33 PM Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 12/22/2018 12:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2018-12/lsu-be122018.php 
> 
> 
> Theoretical physicists developed a theory called loop quantum gravity in 
> the 1990s that marries the laws of microscopic physics, or quantum 
> mechanics, with gravity, which explains the dynamics of space and time. 
> Ashtekar, Olmedos and Singh's new equations describe black holes in loop 
> quantum gravity and showed that black hole singularity does not exist.
> 
> 
> "In Einstein's theory, space-time is a fabric that can be divided as 
> small as we want. This is essentially the cause of the singularity where 
> the gravitational field becomes infinite. In loop quantum gravity, the 
> fabric of space-time has a tile-like structure, which cannot be divided 
> beyond the smallest tile. My colleagues and I have shown that this is the 
> case inside black holes and therefore there is no singularity," Singh 
> said.
> 
> 
> "These tile-like units of geometry--called 'quantum excitations'-- which 
> resolve the singularity problem are orders of magnitude smaller than we 
> can detect with today's technology, but we have precise mathematical 
> equations that predict their behavior," said Ashtekar, who is one of the 
> founding fathers of loop quantum gravity.
> 
 
 But is this consistent with https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 
  which showed spacetime to be smooth 
 down to 1/525 of the Planck length?
 
 Brent,
 
 Wouldn't this be a successful prediction of Bruno's theory?  In another 
 thread you said it had only made retrodictions, but wasn't one of Bruno's 
 predictions that space and time would be continuous (not discrete), 
 therefore it would predict LQG is false, and then 
 https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2  
 would be a confirmation of that.
>>> 
>>> First, I don't see that his theory even predicts a topoloical space. 
>> 
>> By the semantics available for S4Grz1, and the X1* logics.
> 
> How does that define open sets?


Because S4Grz interprets (in a technical precise sense) Intuitionist logic, and 
add some structure to the topological interpretation of the truth value, common 
in intuitionistic semantic.

The OR is union of open sets, the AND is the intersection, the negation is the 
larger open set disjoint from a set. It is easy to show that this gives an 
algebraical model for intuitionist logic, and to build a counter-example for 
the excluded middle (using the topology of the real line, or any other 
topological space, but grr endows them with richer structures. Same for the 
quantum logic. In that sense, mechanism does predict new things in physics, and 
should be tested.






> 
>> But intuitively, you can see them arising from the fact that the first 
>> person indeterminacy has a continuum range, as the DU multiplies all 
>> histories on all oracles (real numbers) in the limit of all computations, 
>> which cannot be avoided from the first person views associated to the 
>> machine.
> 
> But you haven't even defined a first persons' "views", appearance from a 
> given place. 

Yes I do! That is what the “<>t” in the variant of G given by “[]p & <>t” is 
all about. The place is the reality I bet. 
Universal machine get that sensation because they can’t avoid their 
incompleteness which brings that nuance. It is an “instinctive” bet on some 
(indexical) large notion of reality. 





> You need metric space and physiscs for that.

Only for the physical reality, not a reality.



> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Second, Newton said space is a continuum so it's not a prediction peculiar 
>>> to Bruno.
>> 
>> Like the very existence of a physical observable universe, this is explained 
>> by Mechanism. Aristotle took this for granted, and Newton assumed the 
>> continuum at the start, which is not an explanation, even if that was a very 
>> clever move to get the correct local prediction. Note that Newton was aware 
>> that his theory was on shaky metaphysical base, though.
>> 
>> Now, Mechanism predicts only that some observable are continuous. To derive 
>> that time or position are such observable would need to get a notion of 
>> space, which in the mechanist approach is the most difficult things to get. 
>> We will get first the mathematics of knots, and derive space from there, 
>> perhaps. 
> 
> Which I take 

Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, December 27, 2018 at 4:43:23 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 26, 2018 at 3:30:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 26, 2018 at 2:37:59 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/25/2018 4:42 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 25, 2018 at 11:26:14 PM UTC, Brent wrote: 



 On 12/25/2018 8:01 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 25, 2018 at 1:16:53 PM UTC, John Clark wrote: 
>
> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 3:21 PM  wrote:
>
> >> You can never prove that any physical quantity is exactly zero, 
>>> but we do know from observations of the cosmic microwave background 
>>> radiation that if the universe is curved at all it is by less than one 
>>> part 
>>> in 100,000.
>>>
>>  
>
> *> Agreed. However, IMO the observed universe cannot be flat with 
>> exactly zero curvature (which I refer to as "mathematically flat) since 
>> that would imply infinite volume *
>>
>
> If information can't travel faster than light then by definition the 
> radius of the spherical volume of the universe you can observe can't be 
> larger than the age of the universe in years times a light year. 
>  
>
>> *> **which contradicts its finite age.*
>>
>
> There is no reason spacetime couldn't extend a finite distance into 
> the past but an infinite distance into the future. 
>

 *The observable universe could continue to expand forever, but it 
 always has a finite radius. We have no information about the unobserved 
 part, so it could be any size, maybe even tiny. AG*


 All of those inferences are based on the universe obeying Friedman's 
 equations, i.e. Einstein's equations for a  homogeneous, isotropic 
 universe.  So they are inconsistent with the unobserved part of the 
 universe obeying some other conditions.  Whether there is a solution with 
 the observable patch being different from the unobservable part is an open 
 question.  If you find one, publish it.  But you can't just assume that 
 because there's an unobserved part that it could be anything.

>>>
>>> *If we don't know anything about the unobservable part of the universe, 
>>> it could obey any conditions; maybe consistent with the Friedman's 
>>> equations, maybe not. I was just saying we can't assume anything. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> And I'm saying you can't say the observable part of the universe 
>>> satisfies the Friedman equations and the rest of can be anything.  That the 
>>> rest of the universe is constrained by what the observable part is like is 
>>> a consequence of Einstein's equations.  Could Einstein's equations be 
>>> wrong?  Sure they could, but they've passed every test, so applying them is 
>>> not an assumption.
>>>
>>
>> *I concur. Using the Cosmological Principle, one would expect the 
>> unobservable region to obey the same or similar laws as the observable 
>> region. What's your view of whether inflation solves the flatness problem? 
>> TIA, AG*
>>
>
> *Bruce doesn't buy it and I am not sure why. Far be it from me to disagree 
> with the Oracle from Australia, but I figure the curvature of the visible 
> region is well know (although I don't have a clue how it's measured), and I 
> believe there's some nominal reasonable rate of expansion based on 
> Friedman's equations (although I haven't a clue WHAT it is). Therefore, 
> based on these values and my state of belief, it must be the case that the 
> observable region is way too flat for an expansion that spanned 13.8 
> billion years at the assumed rate. Therefore again, it seems reasonable 
> that inflation could account for this discrepancy. Why is this view 
> simplistic to the point of being wrong, as Bruce would have it? TIA, AG*
>

*As for the temperature very close to the BB, I would expect it to be 
uniform given the small size (as Clark claims), or possibly random due to 
quantum effects. If the latter, then maybe inflation is required to smooth 
out the fluctuations. But I don't have a feel for which initial condition 
is more plausible. Opinions welcome. AG*

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>>> 
>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>>> (non-digital) brain?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
 brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
 with symbols. 
>>> 
>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
>>> see only a magical use of word.
>>> 
>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>> 
>>> Bruno 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's 
>>> one thing scientists are studying:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
>>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>> 
>> 
>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
>> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>> matter being quite magical.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
>> Matter is Experientialistic.
>> 
>> That's the whole thing!
> 
> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and 
> so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological 
> matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the 
> entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning” 
> theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable 
> things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most 
> arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit 
> it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.


But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or 
fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no problem 
there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who forbid to 
doubt physicalism.

Bruno



> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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