On Thursday, December 27, 2018 at 6:55:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) >>>> >>>> >>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the >>>> (non-digital) brain? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The >>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates >>>> with symbols. >>>> >>>> >>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could >>>> work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to >>>> now, I see only a magical use of word. >>>> >>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any >>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional >>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if >>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, >>> that's one thing scientists are studying: >>> >>> >>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/ >>> >>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another >>> thing (the next chapter): >>> >>> >>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html >>> >>> >>> >>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as >>> I've given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of >>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have >>> actual (material!) realization as experience. >>> >>> >>> >>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, >>> we cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary >>> matter being quite magical. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*. >> Matter is *Experientialistic*. >> >> That's the whole thing! >> >> >> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first >> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, >> and so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic >> phenomenological matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would >> need to run the entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails >> a “non-cloning” theorem for matter, confirmed by QM. >> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non >> computable things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. >> Most arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy >> inherit it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > > Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter. > > > > But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or > fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no > problem there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who > forbid to doubt physicalism. > > Bruno > > >
What if conventional mathematics itself is in error by assuming its primary elements are numbers? (There is arguably something to category/type theory that maybe gets away from this.) What if primary elements include/are non-numbers - (qualitative) experiences? HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol 9 No 31 (2016) <http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/issue/view/23>: The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology: In Search of New Categories Introduction <https://philarchive.org/archive/PACITT>: – the enactive approach opposes the Cartesian bifurcation of reality into psychological and physical – complements quantitative categories, offering a mathematical treatment of qualitative aspects of reality https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/ - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
