RE: computer pain
peterdjones wrote: Moral and natural laws. An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some extent, of science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, but there is no convincing some people). snip As ethical objectivism is a work-in-progress there are many variants, and a considerable literature discussing which is the correct one. I agree with the thrust of this post and I think there are a few key concepts which can further clarify thinking on this subject: (1) Although moral assessment is inherently subjective--being relative to internal values--all rational agents share some values in common due to sharing a common evolutionary heritage or even more fundamentally, being subject to the same physical laws of the universe. (2) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is good is what is assessed to promote the agent's values into the future. (3) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is better is what is assessed as good over increasing scope. (4) From the point of view of any subjective agent, what is increasingly right or moral, is decision-making assessed as promoting increasingly shared values over increasing scope of agents and interactions. From the foregoing it can be seen that while there can be no objective morality, nor any absolute morality, it is reasonable to expect increasing agreement on the relative morality of actions within an expanding context. Further, similar to the entropic arrow of time, we can conceive of an arrow of morality corresponding to the ratcheting forward of an increasingly broad context of shared values (survivors of coevolutionary competition) promoted via awareness of increasingly effective principles of interaction (scientific knowledge of what works, extracted from regularities in the environment.) Further, from this theory of metaethics we can derive a practical system of social decision-making based on (1) increasing fine-grained knowledge of shared values, and (2) application of increasingly effective principles, selected with regard to models of probable outcomes in a Rawlsian mode of broad rather than narrow self-interest. I apologize for the extremely terse and sparse nature of this outline, but I wanted to contribute these keystones despite lacking the time to provide expanded background, examples, justifications, or clarifications. I hope that these seeds of thought may contribute to a flourishing garden both on and offlist. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Well said! I agree almost completely - I'm a little uncertain about (3) and (4) above and the meaning of scope. Together with the qualifications of Peter Jones regarding the lack of universal agreement on even the best supported theories of science, you have provided a good outline of the development of ethics in a way parallel with the scientific development of knowledge. There's a good paper on the relation facts and values by Oliver Curry which bears on many of the above points: http://human-nature.com/ep/downloads/ep04234247.pdf That is a well-written paper, particularly good on an explanation of the naturalistic fallacy, covering what we have been discussing in this thread (and the parallel thread on evil etc. with which it seems to have crossed over). Basically, the paper argues that Humes edict that you can't get is from ought is no impediment to a naturalistic explanation of ethics, and that incidentally Hume himself had a naturalistic explanation. Another statement of the naturalistic fallacy is that explanation is not the same as justification: that while Darwinian mechanisms may explain why we have certain ethical systems that does not constitute justification for those sytems. To this Curry counters: In case this is all rather abstract, let me re-state the point by way of an analogy. Suppose that instead of being about morality and why people find certain things morally good and bad, this article had been about sweetness, and why people find certain things sweet and certain things sour. The Humean-Darwinian would have argued that humans have an evolved digestive system that distinguishes between good and bad sources of nutrition and energy; and that the human 'sweet tooth' is an evolved preference for foods with high sugar-content over foods with low sugar-content. If one accepted this premise, it would make no sense to complain that evolution may have explained why humans find certain things sweet, but it cannot tell us whether these things are really sweet or not. It follows from the premises of the argument that there is no criterion of sweetness independent of human psychology, and hence this question cannot arise. That's fine if we stop at explanation at the descriptive level. But sweetness lacks the further dimension of ought: if I say sugar is sweet I am stating a fact about the relationship between sugar and my tastebuds, while if I say murder is bad I am not only stating a fact about how I feel about it, I am also making a profound claim about the world. In a sense, I think this latter claim or feeling is illusory and there is nothing to it beyond genes and upbringing, but I still have it, and moreover I can have such feelings in conflict with genes and upbringing. As G.E. Moore said (also quoted in the article), if I identify good with some natural object X, it is always possible to ask, is X good?, which means that good must essentially be something else, simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought, which only contingently coincides with natural objects or their properties. The same applies even if you include as natural object commands from God. I was preparing a response to related questions from Stathis in a separate post when I noticed that he had already done an excellent job of clarifying the issue here. I would add only the following: The fundamental importance of context cannot be overemphasized in discussions of Self, Free-will, Morality, etc., anywhere that the subjective and the objective are considered together. Like particle/wave duality, we can only get answers consistent with the context of our questions. * Many have attempted to bridge the gap between is and ought, but haven't fully grasped the futility of attempting to find the intersection of a point of view and its inverse. * Many have shaken their heads wisely and stated that is and ought are entirely disjoint, so nothing useful can be said about any supposed relations between the two. * Very few have realized the essential relativity of ALL our models of thought, that there is no privileged frame of reference for making objective distinctions between is and ought because we are inextricably part of the system we are trying to describe, and THAT is what grounds the subjective within the objective. There can be no absolute or objective basis for claims of moral value, because subjective assessment is intrinsic to the issue. But we, as effective agents within the context of an evolving environment, can *absolutely agree* that: * subjective assessments have objective consequences, which then feed back to influence future subjective assessments. * actions are assessed as good to the extent that they are perceived to promote into the future the present values of the (necessarily subjective) assessor. * actions are assessed as better to the extent that they are perceived to promote
RE: computer pain
Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: snip Further, from this theory of metaethics we can derive a practical system of social decision-making based on (1) increasing fine-grained knowledge of shared values, and (2) application of increasingly effective principles, selected with regard to models of probable outcomes in a Rawlsian mode of broad rather than narrow self-interest. This is really quite a good proposal for building better societies, and one that I would go along with, but meta-ethical problems arise if someone simply rejects that shared values are important (eg. believes that the values of the strong outweigh those of the weak), Historically this problem has been dealt with by those who think shared values are important ganging up on those who don't. and ethical problems arise when it is time to decide what exactly these shared values are and how they should best be promoted. Aye, there's the rub. Because any decision-making is done within a limited context, but the consequences arise within a necessarily larger (future) context, we can never be sure of the exact consequences of our decisions. Therefore, we should strive for decision-making that is increasingly *right-in-principle*, given our best knowledge of the situation at the time. Higher-quality principles can be recognized by their greater scope of applicability and subtlety (more powerful but relatively fewer side-effects). With Sthathis' elucidation of the Natural Fallacy in a separate post, and Brent's comments here (more down-to-earth and easily readable, less abstract than my own would have been) I have very little to add. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Oops, it was Jef Allbright, not Mark Peaty responsible for the first quote below. Brent Meeker writes: [Mark Peaty]Correction: [Jef Allbright] From the foregoing it can be seen that while there can be no objective morality, nor any absolute morality, it is reasonable to expect increasing agreement on the relative morality of actions within an expanding context. Further, similar to the entropic arrow of time, we can conceive of an arrow of morality corresponding to the ratcheting forward of an increasingly broad context of shared values (survivors of coevolutionary competition) promoted via awareness of increasingly effective principles of interaction (scientific knowledge of what works, extracted from regularities in the environment.) [Stathis Papaioannou] What if the ratcheting forward of shared values is at odds with evolutionary expediency, i.e. there is some unethical policy that improves the fitness of the species? To avoid such a dilemna you would have define as ethical everything improves the fitness of the species, and I'm not sure you want to do that. If your species doesn't define as unethical that which is contrary to continuation of the species, your species won't be around to long. Our problem is that cultural evolution has been so rapid compared to biological evolution that some of our hardwired values are not so good for continuation of our (and many other) species. I don't think ethics is a matter of definitions; that's like trying to fly by settling on a definition of airplane. But looking at the long run survival of the species might produce some good ethical rules; particularly if we could predict the future consequences clearly. If slavery could be scientifically shown to promote the well-being of the species as a whole does that mean we should have slavery? Does it mean that slavery is good? Teaching that slavery is bad is similar to teaching that lying is bad. In each case it's a narrow over-simplification of a more general principle of what works. Children are taught simplified modes of moral reasoning to match their smaller context of understanding. At one end of a moral scale are the moral instincts (experienced as pride, disgust, etc.) that are an even more condensed form of knowledge of what worked in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Further up the scale are cultural--including religious--laws and even the patterns of our language that further codify and reinforce patterns of interaction that worked well enough and broadly enough to be taken as principles of right action. Relatively few of us take the leap beyond the morality that was inherited or given to us, to grasp the broader and more extensible understanding of morality as patterns of behavior assessed as promoting increasingly shared values over increasing scope. Society discourages individual thinking about what is and what is not moral; indeed, it is a defining characteristic that moral principles subsume both narrow self interest and narrow situational awareness. For this reason, one can not assess the absolute morality of an action in isolation, but we can legitimately speak of the relative morality of a class of behavior within context. Just as lying can clearly be the right action within a specific context (imagine having one's home invaded and being unable, on moral grounds, to lie to the invaders about where the children are hiding!), the moral issue of slavery can be effectively understood only within a larger context. The practice of slavery (within a specific context) can be beneficial to society; numerous examples exist of slavery contributing to the economic good of a locale, and on a grander scale, the development of western philosophy (including democracy!) as a result of freeing some from the drudgery of manual labor and creating an environment conducive to deeper thought. And as we seek to elucidate a general principle regarding slavery, we come face-to-face with other instances of this class of problem, including rights of women to vote, the moral standing of sentient beings of various degrees of awareness (farm animals, the great apes, artificial intelligences), and even the idea that all men, of disparate mental or emotional capability, are created equal? Could there be a principle constituting a coherent positive-sum stance toward issues of moral interaction between agents of inherently different awareness and capabilities? Are we as a society yet ready to adopt a higher level of social decision-making, moral to the extent that it effectively promotes increasingly shared values over increasing scope, one that provides an increasingly clear vision of effective interaction between agents of diverse and varying capabilities, or are going to hold tightly to the previous best model, one that comfortingly but childishly insists on the fiction of some form of strict equality between agents? Are we mature enough to see
RE: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: [Stathis Papaioannou] If slavery could be scientifically shown to promote the well-being of the species as a whole does that mean we should have slavery? Does it mean that slavery is good? Teaching that slavery is bad is similar to teaching that lying is bad. In each case it's a narrow over-simplification of a more general principle of what works. Children are taught simplified modes of moral reasoning to match their smaller context of understanding. At one end of a moral scale are the moral instincts (experienced as pride, disgust, etc.) that are an even more condensed form of knowledge of what worked in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Further up the scale are cultural--including religious--laws and even the patterns of our language that further codify and reinforce patterns of interaction that worked well enough and broadly enough to be taken as principles of right action. Relatively few of us take the leap beyond the morality that was inherited or given to us, to grasp the broader and more extensible understanding of morality as patterns of behavior assessed as promoting increasingly shared values over increasing scope. Society discourages individual thinking about what is and what is not moral; indeed, it is a defining characteristic that moral principles subsume both narrow self interest and narrow situational awareness. For this reason, one can not assess the absolute morality of an action in isolation, but we can legitimately speak of the relative morality of a class of behavior within context. Just as lying can clearly be the right action within a specific context (imagine having one's home invaded and being unable, on moral grounds, to lie to the invaders about where the children are hiding!), the moral issue of slavery can be effectively understood only within a larger context. The practice of slavery (within a specific context) can be beneficial to society; numerous examples exist of slavery contributing to the economic good of a locale, and on a grander scale, the development of western philosophy (including democracy!) as a result of freeing some from the drudgery of manual labor and creating an environment conducive to deeper thought. And as we seek to elucidate a general principle regarding slavery, we come face-to-face with other instances of this class of problem, including rights of women to vote, the moral standing of sentient beings of various degrees of awareness (farm animals, the great apes, artificial intelligences), and even the idea that all men, of disparate mental and emotional capability, are created equal? Could there be a principle constituting a coherent positive-sum stance toward issues of moral interaction between agents of inherently different awareness and capabilities? Are we as a society yet ready to adopt a higher level of social decision-making, moral to the extent that it effectively promotes increasingly shared values over increasing scope, one that provides an increasingly clear vision of effective interaction between agents of diverse and varying capabilities, or are going to hold tightly to the previous best model, one that comfortingly but childishly insists on the fiction of some form of strict equality between agents? Are we mature enough to see that just at the point in human progress where technological development (biotech, nanotech, AI) threatens to drastically disrupt that which we value, we are gaining the necessary tools to organize at a higher level--effectively a higher level of wisdom? Well, I think slavery is bad, even if it does help society - unless we were actually in danger of extiction without it or something. So yes, the moral rules must bend in the face of changing circumstances, but the point at which they bend will be different for each individual, and there is no objective way to define what this point would or should be. I thought you and I had already clearly agreed that there can be no absolute or objective morality, since moral judgments are based on subjective values. And I thought we had already moved on to discussion of how agents do in fact hold a good portion of their subjective values in common, due to common environment, culture and evolutionary heritage. In my opinion, the discussion begins to get interesting from this point, because the population tends to converge on agreement as to general principles of effective interaction, while tending to diverge on matters of individual interests and preferences. Please notice that I don't say that slavery *is* immoral, because as you well know there's no objective basis for that claim. But I do say that people will increasingly agree in their assessment that it is highly immoral. Their *statements* are objective facts, and measurements of the degree of agreement are objective facts, and on this basis I claim that we can implement an improved form of social decision
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker wrote: That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's true? Of course in general we don't know what's true and we never know it with certainity. But we do know some things, in the scientific, provisional sense. And we also have certain values which, as Jef says, are the basis of our action and our judgement of good and bad. So what happens when we know X and believing X is *not* conducive to realizing our values? Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that it's always best (in the values sense) to believe what's true. But I think this is doubtful. For example, person who is certainly dying of cancer (and we're all dying of something) may realize more of his values by believing that he will live for much longer than justified by the evidence. On the other hand you could argue that one can't just believe this or that as an act of will and so it is impossible to know X, even in the provisional scientific sense, and also believe not-X. Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow apart from its own value-system, somehow able to observe and comment on its own subjective experience? But seriously, the values that matter most are generally below conscious awareness and can only be inferred. This is why I suggested that story-telling might be among the most effective methods for collecting sets of values for further analysis and distillation. It would be more accurate to say that our values drive our self rather than belong to our self. Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self) being subject to a great deal of distortion, fabrication, and revision, and the human capacity for cognitive dissonance and confabulation answers loudly your question in regard to the handling of conflicting values and beliefs. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Brent Meeker wrote: Jef Allbright wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's true? Of course in general we don't know what's true and we never know it with certainity. But we do know some things, in the scientific, provisional sense. And we also have certain values which, as Jef says, are the basis of our action and our judgement of good and bad. So what happens when we know X and believing X is *not* conducive to realizing our values? Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that it's always best (in the values sense) to believe what's true. But I think this is doubtful. For example, person who is certainly dying of cancer (and we're all dying of something) may realize more of his values by believing that he will live for much longer than justified by the evidence. On the other hand you could argue that one can't just believe this or that as an act of will and so it is impossible to know X, even in the provisional scientific sense, and also believe not-X. Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow apart from its own value-system, somehow able to observe and comment on its own subjective experience? I don't think I said anything about self, much less that it is separate from a value system. But seriously, the values that matter most are generally below conscious awareness and can only be inferred. This is why I suggested that story-telling might be among the most effective methods for collecting sets of values for further analysis and distillation. An interesting idea. I'd say that action has to be the real test of values. Has there been any study of the correlation between stories told and actual behavior? Not of which I am aware, although there has been some collecting of stories in anthropology, and some listing of human universal values in rough form. It would be more accurate to say that our values drive our self rather than belong to our self. That's fine with me. I'd say the self is nothing but an abstraction to collect values, memories, thoughts, etc. Then I think you're on the right track. Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self) being subject to a great deal of distortion, fabrication, and revision, and the human capacity for cognitive dissonance and confabulation answers loudly your question in regard to the handling of conflicting values and beliefs. So you observe that people commonly believe things they know are false. Do you also conclude that they are generally doing this to maximize the projection of their values into the future? No, most such action is not a result of rational consideration, or even conscious intention. Or would they do better if their beliefs and knowledge aligned? In other words, is there a should about belief? There is no should, but only that what works tends to persist, thus increasing the likelihood of it being assessed as good. Some beliefs, despite being invalid, can be very effective within a limited context but tend eventually to succumb to competition from those with greater effectiveness, generally through more general scope of applicability and with fewer side-effects. We come to think of these principles of increasingly effective action as laws of nature. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express this belief of his in the form of a tautology. I've observed that he is generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. --- In response to John Mikes: Yes, I consider my thinking about truth to be pragmatic, within an empirical framework of open-ended possibility. Of course, ultimately this too may be considered a matter of faith, but one with growth that seems to operate in a direction opposite from the faith you express. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. I don't see any tautology in Stathis writing so I guess I miss something. Apparently something subtle is happening here. It seems to me that when people say believe, they mean hold true or consider to be true. Therefore, I parse the statement as equivalent to ...criterion for what to hold true should be what is true... I suppose I should have said that the statement is circular, rather than tautological since the verbs are different. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. This would mean you disagree with Stathis's tautology, but then how could not believe in a tautology? If someone states A=A, then there is absolutely no information content, and thus nothing in the statement itself with which to agree or disagree. I can certainly agree with the validity of the form within symbolic logic, but that's a different (larger) context. Similarly, I was not agreeing or disagreeing with the meaning of Stahis' statement, but rather the form which seems to me to contain a piece of circular reasoning, implying perhaps that the structure of the thought was incoherent within a larger context. From your working criteria I guess you favor a pragmatic notion of belief, but personally I conceive science as a search for knowledge and thus truth (independently of the fact that we can never *know* it as truth, Yes, I favor a pragmatic approach to belief, but I distinguish my thinking from that of (capital P) Pragmatists in that I see knowledge (and the knower) as firmly grounded in a reality that can never be fully known but can be approached via an evolutionary process of growth tending toward an increasingly effective model of what works within an expanding scope of interaction within a reality that appears to be effectively open-ended in its potential complexity. Whereas many Pragmatists see progress as fundamentally illusory, I see progress, or growth, as essential to an effective world-view for any intentional agent. except perhaps in few basic things like I am conscious or I am convinced there is a prime number etc.) To talk like Stathis, this is why science is by itself always tentative. A scientist who says Now we know ... is only a dishonest theologian (or a mathematician in hurry ...). I agree with much of your thinking, but I take exception to exceptions (!) such as the ones you mentioned above. All meaning is necessarily within context. The existence of prime numbers is not an exception, but the context is so broad that we tend to think of prime numbers as (almost) fundamentally real, similarly to the existence of gravity, another very deep regularity of our interactions with reality. The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an exception, because it's not even coherent. It has no objective context at all. It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself. Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. If instead you mean that you know you are conscious in the same sense that you know other people are conscious, then that is not an exception, but just a reasonable inference, meaningful within quite a large context. If Descartes had said, rather than Je pense, donc je suis, something like I think, therefore *something* exists, then I would agree with him. Cartesian dualism has left western philosophy with a large quagmire into which thinking on consciousness, personal identity, free-will and morality easily and repeatedly get stuck in paradox. Paradox is always a case of insufficient context. In the bigger picture all the pieces must fit. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it ought to be the case. I agree within the context you intended. My point was that we can never be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of comparisons being discussed here. We can know that some patterns of action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is always within a specific context. Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an example of special circumstances. There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits within the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective models of reality for the group. Here's a recent article on this topic: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html?pagewanted=print If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one criterion I would add to those you mention above is that it should come from someone able to put aside his own biases and wishes where these might influence his assessment of the evidence. I agree, but would point out that by definition, one can not actually set aside one's one biases because to do so would require an objective view of oneself. Rather, one can be aware that such biases exist in general, and implement increasingly effective principles (e.g. scientific method) to minimize them. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which is that I am having the present experience. Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Further, how can you claim certainty of the truth of subjective experience when there is so much experimental and clinical evidence that self-reported experience consists largely of distortions, gaps, time delays and time out of sequence, fabrications and confabulations? I realize that people can acknowledge all that I've just said, but still claim the validity of their internal experience to be privileged on the basis that only they can judge, but then how can they legitimately contradict themselves a moment later about factual matters, e.g. when the drugs wear off, the probe is removed from their brain, the brain tumor is removed, the mob has dispersed, the hypnotist is finished, the fight is over, the adrenaline rush has subsided, the pain has stopped, the oxytocin flush has declined... What kind of truth could this be? Of course the subjective self is the only one able to report on subjective experience, but how can it *justifiably* claim to be infallible? To be certain of the truth of something implies being able to see it objectively, right? Or does it equally imply no questions asked? - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit : All meaning is necessarily within context. OK, but all context could make sense only to some universal meaning. I mean I don't know, it is difficult. But this can be seen in a very consistent way. The significance of an event is proportional to the scope of its effect relative to the values of the observer. With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe. Why? Because making basic choices against the way the universe actually works would be a losing strategy, becoming increasingly obvious with increasing context of awareness. Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of the physical universe, the difference between events and values decreases with increasing context of awareness, thus the significance, or meaningfulness of events also decreases. With an ultimate, god's eye view of the universe, there would be no meaning at all. Things would simply be as they are. From the point of view of an agent undergoing long-term development within the universe, its values would increasingly converge on what works, i.e. principles of effective interaction with the physical world, while the expression of those values would become increasingly diverse in a fractal manner, optimizing for robust ongoing growth. The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an exception, because it's not even coherent. It has no objective context at all. It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself. Machine have many self-referential abilities. I can develop or give references (I intend to make some comments on such book later). Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. But this is almost a consequence of the self-referential ability of machine, they can distort their own view, and even themselves. I talk about universal machine *after Godel* (and Post, Turing,.. I'm in interesting in following up on this line of thought given available time. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. The essence of Buddhist training is to accept this non-existence of Self at a deep level. It is very rare, but not impossible to achieve such an understanding, and while still experiencing the illusion, to see it as an illusion, with no actual boundary to distinguish an imagined self from the rest of nature. I think that a machine intelligence, while requiring a model of self, would have no need of this illusion which is a result of our evolutionary development. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker wrote: Jef Allbright wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very dubious proposition. I don't know what other examples to give at this point, other than the comparison with the Copernican model. Knowing the actual center of our highly multidimensional basis of thought, even if it were possible, is not necessary--just as we don't need to know our exact physical location in the universe to know that we should no longer build theories around the assumption that we're at the center, with the unique properties that would imply. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. Yes, although we can say that a particular point of view is completely objective within a specified context. For example we can have completely objective proofs in mathematics as long as we agree on the underlying number theory. In our everyday affairs we can never achieve complete objectivity, but I agree with you that multiple points of view, in communication with each other, constitute an intersubjective point of view that increasingly approaches objectivity. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!?? I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences the interpretation
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno - It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level epistemology. But I don't know much about your comp so I'll begin reading. - Jef Bruno Marchal wrote: With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe. Apparently you are even more optimistic than me. I just wish you are correct here. It is fuzzy because the term resemble is fuzzy. Yes, I was writing in broad strokes, just to give you the pattern, but not the detail that has been mentioned earlier. Humanity certainly could be within an evolutionary cul de sac. snip Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of the physical universe, Hmmm... It is out of topic, but I don't believe this at all. Better I can show to you that if I (or You) are turing-emulable, then all events, including the apparition and the development of the physical laws are the result of the relation between numbers. For the sake of my argument I might better have said that all interactions seem to follow a consistent set of rules (which we see as the laws of the physical universe. It seems that you have some theory of a more fundamental layer having to do with numbers. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ I'll take a look. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. I don't know about no effect on the external world. If the mental supervenes on certain physical processes, that means that without these physical processes there can be no mental, and without the mental there can be no physical processes. It works both ways. But to claim that it works both ways would seem to invalidate the claim of the absolute primacy of the subjective experience. This is a slippery concept, made more difficult due to the evolutionary imperative to protect the Self (at least long enough to successfully propagate the genes), and consequentially reinforced by our language and culture. I've enjoyed your thoughtful and good-natured comments, and at this point, having nothing further to add, I'll step back and try to read and work through Bruno's comp. Best regards, - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there could not be any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and excited with this discovery, and ran around trying to explain it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember). It seemed to me just another interesting fact about the world, like scientific and historical facts. It inspired me to start reading philosophy, looking up words like nihilism in the local library. It also encouraged me to question rules, laws and moral edicts handed down with no justification other than tradition or authority, where these were in conflict with my own developing value system. Overall, I think the realisation that there was no ultimate meaning was one of the more positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw me into a deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true? It's encouraging when one sees that one is not entirely alone in breaking free of the patterns of popular thought. I came to a similar realization at a similarly young age, and when I tried to share my wonderful and powerful new idea I received not just blank looks, but reactions of concern that I intended to abandon all morality. At that point I learned that I had better not discuss these ideas, but continued to read and think with the belief that while there was no absolute meaning, at least the scientific method could provide explanation. It took me until my early twenties to realize that science was also fundamentlly incomplete. I then had an experience I call passing through the void and coming out the other side seeing that everything is just as before despite lacking any absolute means of support or justification. It was intensly and profoundly liberating. I saw clearly that I could never know any absolutes, but being an inherently subjective being, my subjective awareness was absolutely appropriate. Since then, paradoxes of self, personal identity, free-will and morality became clearly resolved, extending to a theory of collaborative social decision-making that becomes increasingly moral as it promotes converging values over diverging scope. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Thanks Bruno. Much of your terminology at this point escapes me. I do see that a small part of our differences below are simply due to the imprecision of language (and my somewhat sloppy writing.) I also sense that at the core of much of this discussion is the idea that, although we are subjective agents, we do create objective effects within any practical context. If I intend to swat a fly, my sensing of the fly's position is incomplete and contingent and my motor control is subject to error, but I act, and the fly is objectively dead, within any reasonable degree of certainty. I find that the concept of context is essential at all levels and extends in the Godelian sense that we are fundamentally limited to operating within a limited but expanding context. Perhaps your terminology states this more elegantly, I can't tell. Time for me to go do some reading from your site. - Jef Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Jef, Please, don't hesitate to skip the remarks you could find a bit too technical, but which could help others who know perhaps a bit more on G and G*, which are theories which I use to tackle many questions in this list. You can come back on those remarks if ever you got time and motivation to do so. Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:14, Jef Allbright a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. All this makes sense to me. I can interpret your terms in the (post-godelian) mechanist theory of mind/matter. The bias is given by our body itself, or our godel number or any correct 3-person description of ourselves (like the artificial digital body proposed by the digital computationalist doctor). When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, ... before Godel Co. Classical philosophy is different before and after Turing, Post, Church, Godel, Markov, Uspenski, Kolmogorov, etc. but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Here there is a technical problem because there is just no real environment; but it could be easily resolved by replacing real environment by relatively most probable computational histories. This is more coherent with both the comp hyp and quantum mechanics. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. I am not sure which meaningless absolutes you refer too. In the comp theory many simple truth can be considered as absolute and indeed communicably so (like arithmetical truth, piece of set theoretical truth, ...). Also the first person (which admit some precise definition) is related to some absolutes. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. Hmmm here I think you are a bit quick. But I have no problem with many philosophical paradoxes, although the theory solves them with different degree of quality. Free-will is due in part to the availability, for enough rich universal machine, of its ignorance space. Somehow I am free to choose going to the movie or to the theater because ... I don't know what I want Once I know what I want, I remain free in the sense of being self-determinate about my (future) action. For the modalist: The 3-description of that difference space is given by G* (truth about the self-referential ability of the machine) and G (what the machine can prove about its self-referential ability). But G* minus G admit modal variants, so that the ignorance space, like the whole of arithmetical truth differentiates with the change of point of view. This indeed shed light on many paradoxes (and, BTW, can also be used to show invalid many reasonings in cognitive computer science). If you
Re: String theory and Cellular Automata
On 3/14/07, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: See previous posts here re EC - Entropy Calculus. This caught my eye, thought I'd throw in my $0.02 worth. I have been working on this idea for a long while now. Am writing it up as part of my PhD process. Makes *complete* sense to me, with the understanding that it's necessarily *incomplete*. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
On 6/7/07, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny the existence of the consciousness? (I also deny the existence of infinity...) Um, refreshingly rational? Pleasingly parsimonious? :-) - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quentin Anciaux skrev: On Friday 08 June 2007 17:37:06 Torgny Tholerus wrote: What is the problem? If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with that? That type of behaviour increases the probability for the computer to survive, so the natural selection will favour that type of behaviour. I claim that if it behaves as if, then it means it has consciousness... Philosophical zombie (which is what it is all about) are not possible... If it is impossible to discern it with what we define as conscious (and when I say impossible, I mean there exists no test that can show between the presuposed zombie and a conscious being a difference of behavior) then there is no point whatsover you can say to prove that one is conscious and one is not. Either both are conscious or both aren't... While you say you're not conscious... I am, therefore you're conscious. The question, as I see it, is if there is anything more than just atoms reacting with each other in our brains. I claim that there is not anything more. The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and your...) behaviour. Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is nothing supernatural with them. Physics explains everything. While I would point out that physics cannot possibly explain everything, being a necessarily constrained subjective model of reality, I would like to reinforce the point about consciousness. Consciousness certainly exists, as a description relating a set of observations having to do with subjective awareness, but there is nothing requiring that we assign it the status of an ontological entity. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
A Natural Axiomatization of Church's Thesis
Apropos much discussion on this list, a new paper is available at ftp://ftp.research.microsoft.com/pub/tr/TR-2007-85.pdf Abstract: The Abstract State Machine Thesis asserts that every classical algorithm is behaviorally equivalent to an abstract state machine. This thesis has been shown to follow from three natural postulates about algorithmic computation. Here, we prove that augmenting those postulates with an additional requirement regarding basic operations implies Church's Thesis, namely, that the only numeric functions that can be calculated by effective means are the recursive ones (which are the same, extensionally, as the Turing-computable numeric functions). In particular, this gives a natural axiomatization of Church's Thesis, as Gödel and others suggested may be possible. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: belief, faith, truth
To realize that we are just machines in a physical world, and that this validates and enhances--rather than diminishes--the romance, the meaning, and the mystery of human existence, is a very empowering conceptualization. To travel into the void, leaving behind myths and tradition, and then to emerge from the void, to see that all is as it was, but standing on physical law, both known and not yet known, is to gain the freedom to grow. - Jef http://www.jefallbright.net Increasing awareness for increasing morality On 2/6/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: We can't JUST DO things (like AI). Whenever we DO things, we are THINKING ABOUT them. I'd venture to say that HOW WE THINK ABOUT THINGS (e.g. philosophy, epistemology, etc.) is even MORE important that DOING THINGS (engineering, sales, etc.). That is one way of looking at the advantage that we humans have over machines. We have the capability to not just do things, but to know why we are doing them. This runs counter to the whole PHILOSOPHY (mind you) of modern science, that we are simply machines, and that there is no WHY. This modern philosophy, if taken to its extreme, is the death of the humanness.
Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On 2/7/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So Bruno says that: a) I am a machine. b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man A and b above both make sense to me. Jef and Brent say that we are machines who (that?) philosophize. I'll agree that was implied by my statement. I suggest we start out by concentrating on the fact that Brent and Jef don't agree with Bruno's b) above. Note that I would in fact agree with both a and b above. (And also perhaps Bruno doesn't agree with himself (Bruno's a) vs. b) above)). If we truly are machines, then by definition we should be able to (in theory) figure out the list of instructions that we follow. But wouldn't this be grasping all aspects of ourselves? If not, then what part of ourselves is outside of the realm of being able to grasp, and if so, how can we say we are machines in a totally closed rationalistic/naturalistic world? Brent and Jef's paragraphs sound mystical to me, as mystical as any other first truth assumption. I intentionally adopted a mystical tone in response to Tom's assertion about modern philosophy being the death of humanness since I was trying to relate to someone who appeared to be saying that there's something essentially special about the human experience. So I agreed, trying to show that from the subjective point of view, the human experience certainly is extraordinary, but that it's all a part of an objectively knowable, but never fully known, world. My viewpoint is mystical to the extent that Albert Einstein and Buckminster Fuller were mystical, acknowledging the mystery of our experience while remaining fully grounded in an empirical but never fully knowable reality. To go to the heart of Tom's assertion about complete self knowledge, in order for a system to fully know something, it must contain a complete model of that something within itself, therefore the system that knows must always be more complex than that which it knows. It seems to me that much endless discussion and debate about the nature of the Self, Free Will and Morality hinges on a lack of understanding of the relationship between the subjective and objective viewpoint, and that each tends to expand in ever-increasing spheres of context. Expanding the sphere of subjective understanding across an increasing scope of subjective agents and their interactions provides ever-increasing but never complete understanding of shared values that work. Expanding the sphere of objective understanding provides increasing scope of instrumental knowledge of practices that work. Combining the two by applying increasingly objective instrumental knowledge toward the promotion of increasingly shared subjective values is the very essence of moral decision-making. Paradox is always a case of insufficient context. - Jef http://www.jefallbright.net Increasing awareness for increasing morality
Re: platinum-eaters and alien abductees
On 5/24/06, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Finally, the very notion of continuity of personal identity, which is necessary if survival is to have any meaning, is just as much a product of evolutionary expedience. That is, it is no more logically necessary that an organism is the same individual from one moment to the next than it is logically necessary that an organism will strive to survive from one moment to the next. Those organisms which run away when a predator approaches because they believe they will be the same individual in the next moment will thrive, while those which believe that the organism with their approximate shape, memories, position etc. in the next moment is a completely different individual, and don't care if that other individual gets eaten, will die out. Such considerations do not apply to most of the devices that humans produce, which replicate on the basis of usefulness rather than a desire to survive and have progeny. A car does not care if it is wrecked for spare parts for use in another car, or a modern sculpture, or whatever, while even a non-sentient organism such as a bacterium is essentially a machine with no purpose other than maintaining its structural integrity from moment to moment and producing exact copies of itself. I want to add that while I agree with Stathis' remarks, we can abstract this further and thereby resolve some of the popularly conceived paradoxes of personal identity and of morality if we consider that what we really want is to promote our *values* into the future. This explains how one can rationally sacrifice one's life for one's family or the good of the greater group on the principle that this is consistent with promoting the kind of world one (and by extension, most others) would like to live in. It also resolves the paradox of taking actions today for the benefit of a self in the future, without the unrealistic requirement of static personal identity. Of course, we tend to think of these actions as good because we are enmeshed in and a product of the very process of evolution that tends to promote what works into the future. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
