Re: Fw: Numbers
On Thu, Mar 30, 2006 at 08:26:52AM -0800, 1Z wrote: > > > Russell Standish wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 28, 2006 at 04:37:06PM -0800, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > I mean that you do not fulfil the promise of the first sentence: > > > "that a description logically capable of observing itself is > > > enough to bootstrap ITSELF into existence." > > > > > ... > > > > > > > > > Therefore a Plenitude > > > > of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is > > > > bootstrapped on all of them. > > > > > > If a Plenitude exists, nothing needs to be bootstrapped. But that > > > is in any case assuming what needs to be proved. > > > > I do so assume. It is one of the main working hypotheses of my > > book. The reason for considering bootstrapping is to see why observers > > must be their own interpreter - as otherwise there must be another > > interpreter running in the background which breaks ontological > > closure. > > If a plenitude already exists, what does bootstrapping add ? > If you feel that an observer needs to be a running process, not just a > static programme (on the hard disk, as it were) then they need to It is needed to demonstrate how meaning gets attached to descriptions. The actual running of things is a bit of a furphy, as you point out. The appearance of time is assumed to necessarily emerge from the meaning. > be interpreted..by another running process. There are no obvious > examples > of processes doing bootstrapping themselves, without having something > that is already dynamic or running, so I suppose that would be another > posit. > > > > Its a subtle point - in ontology, there can only be 3 possible types > > of causality: > > > > 1) Terminal cause. The chain of causality is broken at a first cause > >(eg God), although a final cause will also do. The only difference > >between first and final cause relates to temporal priority, rather > >than logical priority > > > > 2) Infinite regress: There is no first cause - the chain a because b > >because c has no end > > > > 3) Causal loop: A because B because A > > > > Obviously option 1) is very popular. The notion of "stuffy matter" as > > Bruno calls it, fits into this category. However I find it > > unsatisfactory from an Occam's razor point of view. > > Occam's razor is about the simplest explanation that fits the facts, > not the simplest > explanation simpliciter. If materialism is the simplest explanation for > why HP universes are not observed, then it is demanded by O's R, not > excluded by it. > Then you must explain why the argument put forward in my paper "Why Occams Razor" (available from my website mentioned below) for why we don't observe White Rabbit universes (aka HP universes) fails. Nobody to date has done this, although many people are naturally sceptical. Also, you will need to explain why Juergen Schmidhuber's argument put forward in "Algorithmic Theories of Everything", available from his website for why the White Rabbit universes aren't seen fails. It is a different argument, not one that I particularly agree with, but nevertheless one that I cannot rule out on purely logical grounds. These are two arguments put forward that demonstrate the White Rabbit problem is not fatal for Plenitude like theories (it does constrain them in various ways though). There may well be others. > > > I'm promoting option 3), which is ontologically closed with nothing > > further to explain. The gcc story is, obviously, in the form of a > > metaphor to explain the full situation. > > Is ontological closure desirable per se, or just the outcome of a > certain > way of looking at causality? > It is desirable - otherwise the "zero information" advantage of the Plenitude is lost. > > I'm not sure option 2) has much going for it, but I will certainly > > listen to someone try to defend it. It is usually derided as "turtles > > all the way down". > > I'd like to put up a case for 1. while we don't have evidence of > self-bootstrapping processes > or infinite regresses, we apparently do have evidence of uncaused > causes (QM). The contingent nature of quantum uncertainty is not uncaused. The causal explanation basically involves broken symmetry. > So (1) is the > only option that has internal evidence, ie that doesn't require ad-hoc > hypotheses. > Other than it is an ad-hoc hypothesis. > > That being the case,the mere fact that I *might* be being fooled > by a simulation right now, doesn't mean I am being fooled. O's R of > course indicates I should presume I am not in a simulation since it is > more > complex explanation for the same set of facts. > Plenitude-like explanations are always simpler than unexplained contingent reality. That they lead to a case of us being unable to determine if we are in a simulation does not negate that fact. You are being misled by too many "brain in the vat" scenarios. A good paper to read is Bostrom's "Are you living in a simulation", and scale that up to a Plenitu
Re: Fw: Numbers
Russell Standish wrote: > On Tue, Mar 28, 2006 at 04:37:06PM -0800, 1Z wrote: > > > > I mean that you do not fulfil the promise of the first sentence: > > "that a description logically capable of observing itself is > > enough to bootstrap ITSELF into existence." > > > ... > > > > > > Therefore a Plenitude > > > of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is > > > bootstrapped on all of them. > > > > If a Plenitude exists, nothing needs to be bootstrapped. But that > > is in any case assuming what needs to be proved. > > I do so assume. It is one of the main working hypotheses of my > book. The reason for considering bootstrapping is to see why observers > must be their own interpreter - as otherwise there must be another > interpreter running in the background which breaks ontological > closure. If a plenitude already exists, what does bootstrapping add ? If you feel that an observer needs to be a running process, not just a static programme (on the hard disk, as it were) then they need to be interpreted..by another running process. There are no obvious examples of processes doing bootstrapping themselves, without having something that is already dynamic or running, so I suppose that would be another posit. > Its a subtle point - in ontology, there can only be 3 possible types > of causality: > > 1) Terminal cause. The chain of causality is broken at a first cause >(eg God), although a final cause will also do. The only difference >between first and final cause relates to temporal priority, rather >than logical priority > > 2) Infinite regress: There is no first cause - the chain a because b >because c has no end > > 3) Causal loop: A because B because A > > Obviously option 1) is very popular. The notion of "stuffy matter" as > Bruno calls it, fits into this category. However I find it > unsatisfactory from an Occam's razor point of view. Occam's razor is about the simplest explanation that fits the facts, not the simplest explanation simpliciter. If materialism is the simplest explanation for why HP universes are not observed, then it is demanded by O's R, not excluded by it. > I'm promoting option 3), which is ontologically closed with nothing > further to explain. The gcc story is, obviously, in the form of a > metaphor to explain the full situation. Is ontological closure desirable per se, or just the outcome of a certain way of looking at causality? > I'm not sure option 2) has much going for it, but I will certainly > listen to someone try to defend it. It is usually derided as "turtles > all the way down". I'd like to put up a case for 1. while we don't have evidence of self-bootstrapping processes or infinite regresses, we apparently do have evidence of uncaused causes (QM). So (1) is the only option that has internal evidence, ie that doesn't require ad-hoc hypotheses. > > > The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It > > > just can't be done. > > > > Assuming that I am real, I can easily tell what is a simulation > > relative to me. > > Really? Even simulations as good as that featured in "the Matrix"? If it can be done in some cases, it can be done. I might be fooled by some simulation in some instances. I might also mistake a cow for a horse in some instances. No-one, however, is saying that cows are the same thing as horses, ontologically. Although that kind of argument can be made, it needs to be made on the basis that there is no conceivable set of circumstances in which X can be distinguished from Y, and it is always conceivable that a simulation could fail in some way. > Perhaps you say that such virtual realities are impossible - that > position is at least compatible with evidence, but nor is there a > good reason why such simulations aren't possible either. > > > Even if I am a simulation, my Sim City is clearly a > > simulation-within-a-simulation.The relative difference is obvious. > > Perhaps you mean that I cannot tell absolutely that I am real. > > Well, I could always employ the idealists favourite weapon: > > Occam's razor. > > Elaborate please... > It seems your "The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It just can't be done." doesn't mean "it can't be done (at all ever)" but rather "it can't always be done". That being the case,the mere fact that I *might* be being fooled by a simulation right now, doesn't mean I am being fooled. O's R of course indicates I should presume I am not in a simulation since it is more complex explanation for the same set of facts. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--
Re: Fw: Numbers
On Tue, Mar 28, 2006 at 04:37:06PM -0800, 1Z wrote:
>
> I mean that you do not fulfil the promise of the first sentence:
> "that a description logically capable of observing itself is
> enough to bootstrap ITSELF into existence."
>
...
>
> > Therefore a Plenitude
> > of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is
> > bootstrapped on all of them.
>
> If a Plenitude exists, nothing needs to be bootstrapped. But that
> is in any case assuming what needs to be proved.
I do so assume. It is one of the main working hypotheses of my
book. The reason for considering bootstrapping is to see why observers
must be their own interpreter - as otherwise there must be another
interpreter running in the background which breaks ontological
closure.
Its a subtle point - in ontology, there can only be 3 possible types
of causality:
1) Terminal cause. The chain of causality is broken at a first cause
(eg God), although a final cause will also do. The only difference
between first and final cause relates to temporal priority, rather
than logical priority
2) Infinite regress: There is no first cause - the chain a because b
because c has no end
3) Causal loop: A because B because A
Obviously option 1) is very popular. The notion of "stuffy matter" as
Bruno calls it, fits into this category. However I find it
unsatisfactory from an Occam's razor point of view.
I'm promoting option 3), which is ontologically closed with nothing
further to explain. The gcc story is, obviously, in the form of a
metaphor to explain the full situation.
I'm not sure option 2) has much going for it, but I will certainly
listen to someone try to defend it. It is usually derided as "turtles
all the way down".
>
> > The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It
> > just can't be done.
>
> Assuming that I am real, I can easily tell what is a simulation
> relative to me.
Really? Even simulations as good as that featured in "the Matrix"?
Perhaps you say that such virtual realities are impossible - that
position is at least compatible with evidence, but nor is there a
good reason why such simulations aren't possible either.
> Even if I am a simulation, my Sim City is clearly a
> simulation-within-a-simulation.The relative difference is obvious.
> Perhaps you mean that I cannot tell absolutely that I am real.
> Well, I could always employ the idealists favourite weapon:
> Occam's razor.
>
Elaborate please...
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Re: Fw: Numbers
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 24, 2006 at 07:20:20AM -0800, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> > Russell Standish wrote:
> > > This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming book. You can also
> > > read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno Marchal's SANE04
> > > paper.
> > >
> > > \item That a description logically capable of observing itself is
> > > enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me speak to this by
> > > means of an example: The C programming language is a popular
> > > language for computer applications. To convert a program written in
> > > C into machine instructions that can execute on the computer, one
> > > uses another program called a compiler. Many C compilers are
> > > available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C compiler, or gcc. Gcc
> > > is itself a C language program, you can download the program source
> > > code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it yourself, if you
> > > already have a working C compiler. Once you have compiled gcc, you
> > > can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has bootstrapped itself
> > > onto your computer, and all references to any preexisting compiler
> > > forgotten.
> >
> > No, gcc chasn't bootstrapped **itself** -- it has been bootstrapped by
> > another
> > compiler ("if you already have a working C compiler"). You can use gcc
> > to compile itself only if it has already been compiled. Gcc cannot
> > bootstrap
> > itself on a computer without a compiler. what you have said serves a
> > loose
> > illustration of self-bootsrapping, but it is not an actual expample of
> > it.
> > In fact there are no strict examples of self-bootstrapping -- of
> > something starting
> > up ex nihilo.
> >
> > if it is possible for systems to bootstap themselves (or for
> > simulations
> > to be equivalent to realities) we should be able to observe it, and we
> > don't.
> > That is equally true even if we assume the observed world is already
> > a simulation -- "simulations" (ie second-order
> > simulations-within-the-Great-Simulation) don't
> > become "real" (ie first-order simulations)
> >
>
> The trouble is, I don't really know what you mean.
I mean that you do not fulfil the promise of the first sentence:
"that a description logically capable of observing itself is
enough to bootstrap ITSELF into existence."
The examples you give are not examples of programmes bootstrapping
themselves,
in any strict sense; they are of programmes being boostrapped by other
programmes, or by other
copies of themselves.
> It doesn't matter
> what the original compiler is to bootstrap gcc.
If it's not gcc, gcc is not bootstrapping itself.
> Therefore a Plenitude
> of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is
> bootstrapped on all of them.
If a Plenitude exists, nothing needs to be bootstrapped. But that
is in any case assuming what needs to be proved.
> The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It
> just can't be done.
Assuming that I am real, I can easily tell what is a simulation
relative to me. Even if I am a simulation, my Sim City is clearly a
simulation-within-a-simulation.The relative difference is obvious.
Perhaps you mean that I cannot tell absolutely that I am real.
Well, I could always employ the idealists favourite weapon:
Occam's razor.
-
>
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics 0425 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
>
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Re: Fw: Numbers
On Fri, Mar 24, 2006 at 07:20:20AM -0800, 1Z wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> > This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming book. You can also
> > read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno Marchal's SANE04
> > paper.
> >
> > \item That a description logically capable of observing itself is
> > enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me speak to this by
> > means of an example: The C programming language is a popular
> > language for computer applications. To convert a program written in
> > C into machine instructions that can execute on the computer, one
> > uses another program called a compiler. Many C compilers are
> > available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C compiler, or gcc. Gcc
> > is itself a C language program, you can download the program source
> > code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it yourself, if you
> > already have a working C compiler. Once you have compiled gcc, you
> > can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has bootstrapped itself
> > onto your computer, and all references to any preexisting compiler
> > forgotten.
>
> No, gcc chasn't bootstrapped **itself** -- it has been bootstrapped by
> another
> compiler ("if you already have a working C compiler"). You can use gcc
> to compile itself only if it has already been compiled. Gcc cannot
> bootstrap
> itself on a computer without a compiler. what you have said serves a
> loose
> illustration of self-bootsrapping, but it is not an actual expample of
> it.
> In fact there are no strict examples of self-bootstrapping -- of
> something starting
> up ex nihilo.
>
> if it is possible for systems to bootstap themselves (or for
> simulations
> to be equivalent to realities) we should be able to observe it, and we
> don't.
> That is equally true even if we assume the observed world is already
> a simulation -- "simulations" (ie second-order
> simulations-within-the-Great-Simulation) don't
> become "real" (ie first-order simulations)
>
The trouble is, I don't really know what you mean. It doesn't matter
what the original compiler is to bootstrap gcc. Therefore a Plenitude
of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is
bootstrapped on all of them.
The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It
just can't be done.
--
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Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
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Re: Fw: Numbers
Russell Standish wrote:
> This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming book. You can also
> read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno Marchal's SANE04
> paper.
>
> \item That a description logically capable of observing itself is
> enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me speak to this by
> means of an example: The C programming language is a popular
> language for computer applications. To convert a program written in
> C into machine instructions that can execute on the computer, one
> uses another program called a compiler. Many C compilers are
> available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C compiler, or gcc. Gcc
> is itself a C language program, you can download the program source
> code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it yourself, if you
> already have a working C compiler. Once you have compiled gcc, you
> can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has bootstrapped itself
> onto your computer, and all references to any preexisting compiler
> forgotten.
No, gcc chasn't bootstrapped **itself** -- it has been bootstrapped by
another
compiler ("if you already have a working C compiler"). You can use gcc
to compile itself only if it has already been compiled. Gcc cannot
bootstrap
itself on a computer without a compiler. what you have said serves a
loose
illustration of self-bootsrapping, but it is not an actual expample of
it.
In fact there are no strict examples of self-bootstrapping -- of
something starting
up ex nihilo.
if it is possible for systems to bootstap themselves (or for
simulations
to be equivalent to realities) we should be able to observe it, and we
don't.
That is equally true even if we assume the observed world is already
a simulation -- "simulations" (ie second-order
simulations-within-the-Great-Simulation) don't
become "real" (ie first-order simulations)
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Re: Fw: Numbers
On Sun, Mar 19, 2006 at 11:45:43AM -0500, danny mayes wrote:
> Russell,
>
> Thats a good summary. However, my issue with your conclusion is this:
> even if I accept that a "machine" or a "prime mover" is not necessary,
> such explanations are still part of the plenitude and therefore part of
> reality. So if everything is reducible to math or information, even if
> you are correct that our reality can exist independent of these
> third-party explanations, such explanations still exist as part of the
> totality of everything that can exist. What this would mean to me is
> that the reality I experience may occur naturally as a consequence of
> the logical bootstrapping you describe, but it would also be occuring
> through any number of artificial creations at the same time. These
> realities overlap and it would be meaningless for me to try and say
> whether the reality I am experiencing now is one or the other- it is both.
That is precisely my point. It is meaningless to attribute the
creation of the these universes to any particular creator, or to none
at all. Hence the closure. It is a subtle point. Not everyone gets it,
and I'm not even sure of it myself.
>
> If you accept MWI or the plenitude, there are really only a few ways to
> avoid the above argument. First, you could argue that our reality is
... deleting the rest, as I'm not trying to avoid the above argument ...
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Re: Fw: Numbers
On Sun, Mar 19, 2006 at 01:12:36PM -0800, John M wrote:
>
> A description does nothing. Just as a blueprint (see
> the faulty argument in Intelligent DESIGN which needs
> an unnamed(!) factor to implement it).
> A 'compiler' compiles only when you add the juice to
> drive it. Design, software, hardware DO nothing by
> themselves.
>
This is the old "confusing the map and the territory" argument. There
is no problem seeing how these things are connected in the timeless
Plenitude. The only remaining question is how the subjective
appearance of "flowing" time occurs in the first person point of
view. This issue is boxed up and labelled TIME in my "narrative" - I
do not claim a solution to TIME, but nor do I see a solution anywhere
else. At least I'm not sweeping it under the carpet.
> Second part:
>
> Plenitude as described for MWI is one version. I wrote
> another version in my (what I call) "narrative" and
> that is the source of any MWI or universes for that
> matter.
I'm not familiar with your plenitude, but many different, possibly
infinite possibilities exist. The justification for the one I use is
based on algorithmic information theory.
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Re: Fw: Numbers
--- Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing
> machine to
> perform the interpretation. This is the essence of
> the "compiler
> theorem". One can simply iterate this process such
> that there is no
> "concrete" machine interpreting the tape. I think
> this is another way
> of putting the UDA.
>
> Cheers
Russell,
I think you left ou one itzy-bitzy word from your
sentence:
"But the tape can also hold an encoding of the
[WORKING]
Turing machine to perform the interpretation."
A Turing machine does nothing (by itself). Don't take
the power for granted. Something has to OPERATE it to
do anything. And not 'any kind' of power. Don't expect
from a cadaver of a wise man to solve Fermat's puzzle.
John
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman
> Samish wrote:
> >
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > > "Hal Finney" wrote:
> > > The first is that numbers are really far more
> complex than they seem.
> > > When we think of numbers, we tend to think of
> simple ones, like 2, or 7.
> > > But they are not really typical of numbers.
> Even restricting ourselves to
> > > the integers, the information content of the
> "average" number is enormous;
> > > by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a
> lot bigger than 2 or 7!
> > > They are big enough to hold all of the
> information in our whole universe;
> > > indeed, all of the information in virtually
> every possible variant of our
> > > universe. A single number can (in some sense)
> hold this much information.
> >
> > How ? Surely this claim needs justification!
> > ~
> > The single number can be of infinite length, with
> infinite digits, and can therefore contain unlimited
> information. One could compare the single number to
> a tape to a Universal Turing Machine. Granted, the
> UTM needs a head and a program to read the tape, so
> the tape by itself is not sufficient to hold
> information.
> >
> > Norman
> > `
> >
> >
>
> --
> *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment
> to my email, which
> is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry,
> it is not a
> virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be
> used to verify this
> email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed.
> Otherwise, you
> may safely ignore this attachment.
>
>
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308
> 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics 0425
> 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australia
> http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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> prefix 02
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: Fw: Numbers
lso
> >read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno
> Marchal's SANE04
> >paper.
> >
> >\item That a description logically capable of
> observing itself is
> > enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me
> speak to this by
> > means of an example: The C programming language
> is a popular
> > language for computer applications. To convert a
> program written in
> > C into machine instructions that can execute on
> the computer, one
> > uses another program called a compiler. Many C
> compilers are
> > available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C
> compiler, or gcc. Gcc
> > is itself a C language program, you can download
> the program source
> > code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it
> yourself, if you
> > already have a working C compiler. Once you have
> compiled gcc, you
> > can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has
> bootstrapped itself
> > onto your computer, and all references to any
> preexisting compiler
> > forgotten.
> >
> > What I'm tryng to say here is that the
> description is a complete
> > specification of a conscious being, when
> interpreted (observed) by
> > the conscious being. There may have been an
> initial interpreter
> > (conscious or not) to bootstrap the original
> conscious being. It
> > matters not which interpreter it is --- any
> suitable one will do. If
> > {\em computationalism} \S\ref{computationalism}
> is correct, any
> > universal Turing machine will suffice. In fact
> since the 3rd person
> > world has to be a timeless {\em ideal} structure,
> it is not
> > necessary to actually run the initial
> interpreter. The logical
> > possibility of a conscious observer being able to
> instantiate itself
> > is sufficient in a timeless Plenitude of all
> possibilities. Thus we
> > close the ontology of the bitstring Plenitude,
> and find an answer
> > to Stephen Hawking's question ``What breathes
> fire into the
> > equations''\cite[p. 174]{Hawking88}. Paraphrasing
> the words of
> > Pierre-Simon Laplace to Napoleon Bonaparte, we
> have no need of a
> > hypothesis of a concrete reality\cite{Marchal98}.
> >
> >
> >I appreciate that some can never do this
> ontological closure, that for
> >them there must always be a machine somewhere doing
> the running. This
> >is reminiscient of those people for whom there must
> be a prime mover
> >to start the universe off.
> >
> >I know that Bruno says he's eliminated the
> "extravagent hypothesis",
> >but really I think he's shown that it is
> unnecessary, and can be pared
> >away by Occam's razor, not that it is
> contradictory.
> >
> >Cheers
> >
> >On Sat, Mar 18, 2006 at 10:37:51PM -0800, Norman
> Samish wrote:
> >
> >
> >>Are you saying that a tape of infinite length,
> with infinite digits, is not
> >>Turing emulable?
> >>
> >>I don't understand how the 'compiler theorem'
> makes a 'concrete' machine
> >>unnecessary. I agree that the tape can contain an
> encoding of the Turing
> >>machine - as well as anything else that's
> describable.
> >>
> >>Nevertheless, it seems to me there has to be a
> 'concrete' machine executing
> >>the tape, irrespective of the contents of the
> tape.
> >>
> >>Norman
> >>~
> >>
> >>- Original Message -
> >>From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >>To:
> >>Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:37 PM
> >>Subject: Re: Fw: Numbers
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>But the tape can also hold an encoding of the
> Turing machine to perform the
> >>interpretation. This is the essence of the
> "compiler theorem". One can
> >>simply iterate this process such that there is no
> "concrete" machine
> >>interpreting the tape. I think this is another way
> of putting the UDA.
> >>
> >>Cheers
> >>
> >>
> >>On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman
> Samish wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >>>
>
=== message truncated ===
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Re: Fw: Numbers
cessary. I agree that the tape can contain an encoding of the Turing machine - as well as anything else that's describable. Nevertheless, it seems to me there has to be a 'concrete' machine executing the tape, irrespective of the contents of the tape. Norman ~ - Original Message - From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:37 PM Subject: Re: Fw: Numbers But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to perform the interpretation. This is the essence of the "compiler theorem". One can simply iterate this process such that there is no "concrete" machine interpreting the tape. I think this is another way of putting the UDA. Cheers On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman Samish wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: "Hal Finney" wrote: The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem. When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7. But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to the integers, the information content of the "average" number is enormous; by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7! They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole universe; indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of our universe. A single number can (in some sense) hold this much information. How ? Surely this claim needs justification! ~ The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can therefore contain unlimited information. One could compare the single number to a tape to a Universal Turing Machine. Granted, the UTM needs a head and a program to read the tape, so the tape by itself is not sufficient to hold information. Norman ` --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Fw: Numbers
This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming book. You can also
read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno Marchal's SANE04
paper.
\item That a description logically capable of observing itself is
enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me speak to this by
means of an example: The C programming language is a popular
language for computer applications. To convert a program written in
C into machine instructions that can execute on the computer, one
uses another program called a compiler. Many C compilers are
available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C compiler, or gcc. Gcc
is itself a C language program, you can download the program source
code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it yourself, if you
already have a working C compiler. Once you have compiled gcc, you
can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has bootstrapped itself
onto your computer, and all references to any preexisting compiler
forgotten.
What I'm tryng to say here is that the description is a complete
specification of a conscious being, when interpreted (observed) by
the conscious being. There may have been an initial interpreter
(conscious or not) to bootstrap the original conscious being. It
matters not which interpreter it is --- any suitable one will do. If
{\em computationalism} \S\ref{computationalism} is correct, any
universal Turing machine will suffice. In fact since the 3rd person
world has to be a timeless {\em ideal} structure, it is not
necessary to actually run the initial interpreter. The logical
possibility of a conscious observer being able to instantiate itself
is sufficient in a timeless Plenitude of all possibilities. Thus we
close the ontology of the bitstring Plenitude, and find an answer
to Stephen Hawking's question ``What breathes fire into the
equations''\cite[p. 174]{Hawking88}. Paraphrasing the words of
Pierre-Simon Laplace to Napoleon Bonaparte, we have no need of a
hypothesis of a concrete reality\cite{Marchal98}.
I appreciate that some can never do this ontological closure, that for
them there must always be a machine somewhere doing the running. This
is reminiscient of those people for whom there must be a prime mover
to start the universe off.
I know that Bruno says he's eliminated the "extravagent hypothesis",
but really I think he's shown that it is unnecessary, and can be pared
away by Occam's razor, not that it is contradictory.
Cheers
On Sat, Mar 18, 2006 at 10:37:51PM -0800, Norman Samish wrote:
>
> Are you saying that a tape of infinite length, with infinite digits, is not
> Turing emulable?
>
> I don't understand how the 'compiler theorem' makes a 'concrete' machine
> unnecessary. I agree that the tape can contain an encoding of the Turing
> machine - as well as anything else that's describable.
>
> Nevertheless, it seems to me there has to be a 'concrete' machine executing
> the tape, irrespective of the contents of the tape.
>
> Norman
> ~
>
> ----- Original Message -
> From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To:
> Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:37 PM
> Subject: Re: Fw: Numbers
>
>
>
> But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to perform the
> interpretation. This is the essence of the "compiler theorem". One can
> simply iterate this process such that there is no "concrete" machine
> interpreting the tape. I think this is another way of putting the UDA.
>
> Cheers
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman Samish wrote:
> >
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > > "Hal Finney" wrote:
> > > The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem.
> > > When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7.
> > > But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves
> > > to
> > > the integers, the information content of the "average" number is
> > > enormous;
> > > by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7!
> > > They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole
> > > universe;
> > > indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of
> > > our
> > > universe. A single number can (in some sense) hold this much
> > > information.
> >
> > How ? Surely this claim needs justification!
> > ~
> > The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can
> > therefore contain unlimited information. One could compare the single
> > number to a tape to a Universal Turing
Re: Fw: Numbers
Are you saying that a tape of infinite length, with infinite digits, is not Turing emulable? I don't understand how the 'compiler theorem' makes a 'concrete' machine unnecessary. I agree that the tape can contain an encoding of the Turing machine - as well as anything else that's describable. Nevertheless, it seems to me there has to be a 'concrete' machine executing the tape, irrespective of the contents of the tape. Norman ~ - Original Message - From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:37 PM Subject: Re: Fw: Numbers But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to perform the interpretation. This is the essence of the "compiler theorem". One can simply iterate this process such that there is no "concrete" machine interpreting the tape. I think this is another way of putting the UDA. Cheers On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman Samish wrote: > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > "Hal Finney" wrote: > > The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem. > > When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7. > > But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves > > to > > the integers, the information content of the "average" number is > > enormous; > > by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7! > > They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole > > universe; > > indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of > > our > > universe. A single number can (in some sense) hold this much > > information. > > How ? Surely this claim needs justification! > ~ > The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can > therefore contain unlimited information. One could compare the single > number to a tape to a Universal Turing Machine. Granted, the UTM needs a > head and a program to read the tape, so the tape by itself is not > sufficient to hold information. > > Norman > ` --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Fw: Numbers
But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to
perform the interpretation. This is the essence of the "compiler
theorem". One can simply iterate this process such that there is no
"concrete" machine interpreting the tape. I think this is another way
of putting the UDA.
Cheers
On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman Samish wrote:
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > "Hal Finney" wrote:
> > The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem.
> > When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7.
> > But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to
> > the integers, the information content of the "average" number is enormous;
> > by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7!
> > They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole universe;
> > indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of our
> > universe. A single number can (in some sense) hold this much information.
>
> How ? Surely this claim needs justification!
> ~
> The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can
> therefore contain unlimited information. One could compare the single number
> to a tape to a Universal Turing Machine. Granted, the UTM needs a head and a
> program to read the tape, so the tape by itself is not sufficient to hold
> information.
>
> Norman
> `
>
>
--
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is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
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email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
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Fw: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > "Hal Finney" wrote:> The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem.> When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7.> But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to> the integers, the information content of the "average" number is enormous;> by some reasoning, infinite. Most numbers are a lot bigger than 2 or 7!> They are big enough to hold all of the information in our whole universe;> indeed, all of the information in virtually every possible variant of our> universe. A single number can (in some sense) hold this much information.How ? Surely this claim needs justification! ~ The single number can be of infinite length, with infinite digits, and can therefore contain unlimited information. One could compare the single number to a tape to a Universal Turing Machine. Granted, the UTM needs a head and a program to read the tape, so the tape by itself is not sufficient to hold information. Norman ` --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
